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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the representation of coma within contemporary fiction and 
non-fiction, including Irvine Welsh’s Marabou Stork Nightmares, Alex Garland’s 
The Coma, Stephen King’s The Dead Zone, Iain Banks’s The Bridge, Tom 
McCarthy’s Remainder and Jeff Malmberg’s documentary-film Marwencol. Initially 
examining these representations of coma through the lens of ‘trauma theory’, I 
examine how it is frequently depicted as a purely psychological trauma, often 
ignoring the physical consequences of brain injury and the impact this can have upon 
the patient’s identity.  
During the course of my investigation, I draw links between diverse theoretical 
fields rooted in literary criticism, philosophy, classics and medicine, creating my 
own critical framework against which representations of coma can be critiqued and 
which allows me to explore both authors’ and audiences’ fascination with the 
condition. Ultimately, I examine how misrepresentations have led to the proliferation 
of confusion and misinformation surrounding coma within the public arena and I 
look at the potential damage that this has for the real ‘survivors’.  
My approach is focused on close-reading, drawing out comparisons between 
archetypal tropes, common in depictions of coma, that have led to the condition 
being conflated with others states or disorders of consciousness (from the sleep and 
dream-states, to the chronic disorder of consciousness, the persistent vegetative 
state), which further contributes to the overall distortion of public perceptions of the 
condition.  
As part of my research, I have run a writing group, the members of which are all 
survivors of coma and brain injury. I have published collections of their work and I 
draw on this resource of first-person testimony to critique fictional 
misrepresentations. In doing so, I have produced an addition to the field of trauma-
narrative analysis, examining a medical condition that, whilst depicted frequently in 
literature and the media, has remained largely unexplored within the sphere of 
literary analysis. 
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A Relatively Normal Life. An Introduction 
 
 
In 1968, the Harvard Brain Death Committee made a ground-breaking decision that has 
shaped how we think of death today and which has consequently helped to influence 
medico-legal policy: they developed a list of criteria that focused upon the diagnosis of 
death based upon the permanent failure of the brain to function. 
Prior to this, diagnosis of death was purely cardio-centric, with the declaration of 
death based upon the irreversibility of cardio-respiratory functions. However, due to the 
increasingly inadequate and outmoded technologies (the basic empirical data gained, for 
example, from listening to the patient’s heart through a stethoscope), and the rise in 
more advanced, life-supportive technologies (with life support machines that electro-
mechanically provide and sustain cardio-respiratory functions), there was suddenly the 
very real need to move away from the older cardio-centric diagnoses of death and 
towards a more satisfactory and ethically responsible one. There was also the 
development of MRI and CT scans, resulting in physicians being able to monitor the 
state of the brain, again allowing for more complex life-support mechanisms to be put in 
place. 
The decision of the Harvard Brain Death Committee was soon recognized 
worldwide, with many countries developing further modifications to the diagnostic 
criteria. For example, it was acknowledged that ‘brain death’ does not necessarily refer 
to the total failure of brain functions, as during scans, there may still be residual 
activity. Thus, as Stephen Holland points out in his discussion of this landmark 
development in medicine and its impact upon bioethics, ‘A patient is diagnosed as dead 
when their brain stem is dead’,1 a diagnostic measure known as the Minnesota criterion. 
As a consequence, there began to be a sudden rise of patients who were kept alive in 
near-death states, not least the chronic disorder of consciousness, coma. 
Then in 1972, a further complication arose. The two neurologists Fred Plum and 
Byron Jennett identified what they called the ‘persistent vegetative state’, a disorder of 
consciousness in which patients who were previously in coma have ‘progressed to a 
state of wakefulness without detectable awareness’.2 However, it was eleven years later 
in 1983 when the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
                                                     
1
 Stephen Holland, Bioethics: A Philosophical Introduction, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 71 
2
 The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, ‘Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State’, The 
New England Journal of Medicine, 330 (21) (1994), 1499-1508 (p. 1499). 
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Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research accepted the definition of PVS, 
defining unconsciousness as the inability to ‘experience the environment’.3  
This broadening out of the divisions of chronic disorders of consciousness not only 
called into question the boundaries of consciousness itself, but also of the thresholds 
between life and death. Where exactly on the spectrum between consciousness and 
unconsciousness, life and death, does the coma patient lie? Where is the patient in the 
PVS? The brain is minimally active, brain stem functions have not failed, and yet the 
body and the subjective self are in stasis, inert. This was to be complicated to an even 
greater degree when, in 2002, the ‘minimally conscious state’ was diagnosed, defined as 
a ‘condition of severely altered unconsciousness in which minimal but definite 
behavioural evidence or environmental awareness is demonstrated’.4 Unlike the PVS 
state this meant that the patient who reaches a minimally conscious state has a good 
prognosis for significant recovery, although permanent disability is highly likely. 
The recognition of these alternative disorders of consciousness has been significant 
both in aiding the developments of medical care for the coma, PV and MC patient and 
in simultaneously creating confusion and bafflement within the public arena, these 
conditions being often conflated or mythologized through popular representations. This 
is a repercussion that has also become common in media reportage that will often 
contain ‘scientific inaccuracies, inconsistent diagnostic and descriptive terminology’ 
alongside ‘mismatches between the descriptions of [the patient’s] state and the medical 
terms used to characterize it’ and ‘inaccurate prognoses’.5  
One current case study, much in the public eye, concerning such confusions 
surrounding diagnostic reporting of coma and the disorders of consciousness and one 
that has unfolded during the latter stages of writing this thesis is that of the Formula 
One driver Michael Schumacher. Since being brought out of his medically-induced 
coma in January 2014 after suffering a severe head injury during a skiing accident, 
media speculation over Schumacher’s condition and the inconsistencies in language 
employed to voice these theories has been rife. An article from a January edition of The 
Times entitled ‘Schumacher “is being brought out of coma”’,6 included a photograph of 
the driver with the caption, ‘Michael Schumacher: “can open his eyes and squeeze a 
                                                     
3
 The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, ‘Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State’, p. 1499. 
4
 Joseph J. Fins, Nicholas D. Schiff and Kathleen M. Foley, ‘Late Recovery from the Minimally 
Conscious State’, Neurology, 68 (2007), 304-307 (p. 305). 
5
 James L. Bernat, ‘Theresa Schiavo’s Tragedy and Ours, Too’ in Neurology, 71 (2008), 964-965 (p. 
964). 
6
 Simon de Bruxelles, ‘Schumacher “is being brought out of coma”’, The Times (30 Jan 2014). 
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hand”’. However, on reading the article, it transpires that this revelation was merely a 
speculation formulated by the French newspaper L’Equipe that was refuted by 
Schumacher’s manager. The way this conjecture had been used by The Times as a ‘pull-
quote’, however, imbued it with a sense of positivity and veracity which was further 
questioned by a report from The Express almost six months later. This article queried 
the ‘level of progress’ that Schumacher has actually made since coming out of coma, 
even writing of the ‘fears that he could remain in a permanent vegetative state’.7 The 
Times, around the same time as the report in The Express, ran the article, ‘Michael 
Schumacher “an invalid for life” says coma specialist’8 and yet most recently, The 
Metro ran a report in which the former Ferrari boss Jean Todt is quoted as saying that 
Schumacher can expect to lead a ‘relatively normal life’9 in the near future. The term 
‘relatively normal’ seems to heighten the confusion and ambiguity concerning 
Schumacher’s condition whilst simultaneously injecting an element of ‘hope’ into the 
media coverage, akin to that created by the L’Equipe article. 
The professor of intensive care at Edinburgh University, Peter Andrews, reveals his 
deliberate decision to select carefully medico-linguistic terminology when talking about 
coma that is significant in this discussion. Quoted in an article concerning the 
Schumacher case in The Guardian, Andrews says how he avoids ‘the term “awaken” 
because it could trigger too high expectations among relatives’.10 He therefore clearly 
recognises the dangers of misrepresenting and conflating coma with other states of 
consciousness, most notably that of sleep.  
This advocacy for the careful representation of disorders of consciousness is likewise 
voiced by several doctors in an article that is openly concerned with the reportage of 
Schumacher’s accident published in The Telegraph in June 2014. In this report, the 
former Formula One physician Dr. Gary Hartstein describes the overly optimistic 
recovery claims and the opacity and confusion of media reportage as ‘a highly cynical 
                                                     
7
 Allan Hall, ‘Michael Schumacher moved out of intensive care, report claims’, The Express (13 June 
2014)  <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/482136/Michael-Schumacher-moved-out-of-intensive-
care-but-still-in-coma-claim-reports> [accessed: 14/10/14]. 
8
 David Charter, ‘Michael Schumacher “an invalid for life” says coma specialist’, The Times (20 June 
2014)  <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article4125140.ece> [accessed: 14/10/14]. 
9
 Don Mackay and Allan Hall, ‘F1 Hero Michael Schumacher Can Lead “Relatively Normal Life” 
Soon, Says Former Ferrari Boss’, The Metro (7 October 2014) 
<http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/formula-1/f1-hero-michael-schumacher-can-4395046> [accessed: 
14/10/14]. 
10
 Philip Oltermann, ‘Michael Schumacher Being Brought Out of Induced Coma, Says Manager’, 
The Guardian (30 January 2014)  <http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2014/jan/30/michael-
schumacher-brought-out-induced-coma> [accessed: 14/10/14]. 
9 
 
 
 
use of language, using the truth to convey an impression that is almost certainly false’.11 
Throughout the course of this investigation, I will seek to explore such examples of 
cynical language, alongside the many representations, misrepresentations and 
conflations of coma and other chronic disorders of consciousness and explicate what 
impact these have upon the struggle for identity of the coma survivor. The Schumacher 
case, I propose, illustrates many of the central issues that this investigation will seek to 
explicate. Examining a range of fiction and non-fiction, I will explore how coma is 
represented (and misrepresented) whilst exploring how the medical condition is often 
conflated with other chronic disorders of consciousness, thereby contributing to an 
overall opacity and confusion surrounding the nature of these conditions, a confusion 
that is evident in the recent media coverage of Michael Schumacher’s accident and 
recovery. Lastly, drawing upon such real-life cases, alongside the stories of those 
survivors of coma and brain injury I have worked with during the course of my 
research, I will explore the potential impact that misrepresentations of these medical 
conditions can have upon the identity of the coma survivor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11
 Tony Paterson, ‘Michael Schumacher: Doctors Voice Concerns Over Coma “Recovery” Claims’, 
The Telegraph (17 June 2014)  <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/motorsport/formulaone/michael-
schumacher/10905287/Michael-Schumacher-Doctors-voice-concerns-over-coma-recovery-
claims.html> [accessed: 14/10/14]. 
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1: You Wake, You Die. Trauma, Aesthetics and the Writing of Coma 
 
There are four stages to my current existence and they repeat ad infinitum: sleep, dream, confusion and 
fear. At present I am at stage three. 
                                                    -Steve Hollyman, Keeping Britain Tidy. 
 
 
1.1: Introduction 
 
In his discussion of literary and critical attempts to come to terms with trauma, 
Dominick LaCapra warns against ‘fetishized and totalizing narratives’, stories of trauma 
that are overly focused upon ‘harmonizing events, and then recuperating the past in 
terms of uplifting messages or optimistic, self-serving scenarios’.1 LaCapra’s statement, 
here, immediately describes many of the problems with the representations of coma that 
I will explore during the course of this investigation. The image of the coma, a 
traumatic state of unconsciousness in which there is ‘the total absence of awareness of 
self and environment even when the subject is externally stimulated’,2 has been 
prevalent in literary and filmic texts over the last fifty years. Within a genre that I will 
refer to throughout this thesis as ‘coma literature’, there are many texts that perpetually 
teeter upon the edge of fetishization, and several that plunge headlong over it. 
Within this inquiry, I seek to consider the ways in which coma is represented, 
although, whilst I am concerned primarily with the (mis)representation of coma, I am 
also inevitably drawn to the representation, or, rather (in most cases) the non-
representation of brain injury. This is primarily due to the fact that in most cases, deep 
coma will cause profound, irreparable brain injury, a consequence with which many 
texts often do not concern themselves. I will place my literary analysis within the 
context of the constantly-evolving field of ‘trauma theory’ which, in itself, draws upon 
wide-ranging theoretical approaches across the fields of psychoanalysis, medicine, 
history, philosophy and, of course, literary studies. I argue that whilst literary 
representations seek to approximate the traumatic experience of coma by drawing on 
historical and contemporary theories of trauma, such representations fail ultimately in 
their agenda by diluting the traumatic experience through a lack of engagement with the 
realities of the impact coma has upon identity and personhood.  
                                                     
1
 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2001), p. 78. 
2
 Fred Plum and Jerome B. Posner, The Diagnosis of Stupor and Coma (Philadelphia: F.A.Davis 
Company, 1980), p. 1. 
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I will investigate the importance and relevance of trauma theory in my analysis and 
critique of representations of coma, examining how various concepts of trauma and the 
traumatic event have influenced fictional depictions. On the surface the plight of the 
coma survivor seems to be paradigmatic of that of the trauma survivor: someone who is 
subjected to a deeply unsettling and often violent event that, at the time it occurs, may 
not be fully comprehended or assimilated into conscious understanding. In the case of 
the coma survivor, the initiating traumatic event that leads to coma is physical: road 
traffic accident, a violent assault, brain tumour or stroke, to name but a few causes. 
Moreover, brain injury sustained by the coma survivor due to an external influence 
enacting upon the body (accident, assault) is referred to as a Traumatic Brain Injury 
(TBI). For the coma survivor, this trauma cannot be understood as it occurs precisely 
because of the coma itself, a state of depressed consciousness characterized by ‘a 
suspension of wakefulness, emotion, attention, purposeful behaviour’.3 However, as 
will be discussed in more detail within this chapter, the trauma of coma is more 
complex than the standard models of psychological traumatic neurosis proposed, for 
example, by Freud. For the survivor of coma, there is not only the trauma of the cause 
of the coma and of the coma itself (whether or not this disorder of consciousness is 
remembered), but also the tertiary level of trauma constituted by the emergence from 
coma and the almost inevitable consequence of this: traumatic or acquired brain injury. 
In using the designation ‘coma-trauma’, therefore, I refer to this multi-faceted and 
multi-dimensional manifestation of trauma of the coma survivor who is both physically 
wounded, but also psychologically traumatized by both the coma itself and the 
consequences of living with brain injury. 
As I will illustrate, authors of coma fiction frequently overlook the third level of 
trauma and instead attempt to fit the medical condition into more traditional Freudian 
models of psychological traumatic neurosis, thus failing to create fully nuanced 
depictions of coma. Such depictions, I suggest, have led to what I call the ‘soap-opera’ 
model of coma representation, with patients emerging from coma with full cognition 
intact, often with little or no need for physical rehabilitation.
4
 
 
Or there are the cases in 
                                                     
3
 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens (London: Vintage, 2000), p. 237. 
4
 At the time of writing this, two literal, differing examples of my “soap-opera” model have come to 
light, one reflecting and one conflicting with my definition. An episode of EastEnders, during the 
2013 Autumn season, saw the character Phil Mitchell fall into coma after a spectacular (ratings-
attracting) car crash, only to emerge days later with full cognition, and with little need for physical 
rehabilitation, other than superficial physical damage caused by the crash itself. In August 2013, one 
Coronation Street storyline similarly saw character Nick Tilsley emerge from a car crash-induced 
coma (a crash that was aired on the same day as the EastEnders crash – 5 August 2013). Interestingly, 
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which, as most readers of this thesis will have encountered, a character receives a blow 
to the head, loses his memory, and then recovers his memory after receiving a second 
head injury. Often, these violent, catalysing incidents cause coma, or unconscious 
states, within which memory is arbitrarily switched on or off. In all of these cases, the 
medical gravity of coma is overlooked and furthermore, the almost-inevitable result of 
brain injury is either trivialized or ignored altogether, once more undermining the 
tertiary level of coma-trauma. 
Using this critique of ‘trauma-theory’ as a starting point for my analysis, I will draw 
links between other diverse theoretical fields rooted within literary criticism, 
philosophy, psychoanalysis, classics and medicine in order to create my own critical 
framework against which representations of coma and the coma survivor can be 
exemplified and explored. It is therefore my intention to produce an addition to the field 
of trauma-narrative analysis, examining a medical condition that, whilst rife in its 
literary depictions, has remained largely unexplored within the sphere of literary study. 
As part of my research, I have run writing workshops with coma and brain injury 
survivors, generating first-person testimony and accounts of the writers’ experiences of 
coma and brain injury. I published their first collection of work, Head-Lines, in 2011 
and their second collection in 2014. What has been most noticeable is the distinct lack 
of first-person testimonies of the coma experience in mainstream literature, and so 
throughout my work, here, I refer to writings produced by this group to provide 
comparative counter-points for analysis, when looking at fictional representations in the 
light of real-life experiences. 
Whilst this inquiry is primarily concerned with literary representations of coma, I 
will use my analysis to work towards an understanding of why authors have become 
                                                                                                                                                      
the writing for this plot-strand has focused upon representing the irreparable brain damage he has 
sustained, the actor playing the role, Ben Price, openly discussing the first-hand research both he and 
the writers have conducted, working with the head injury charity, Headway, an organization I have 
also worked with throughout my research. Subsequent episodes of Coronation Street have depicted 
this character’s (and other characters’) struggle with his shattered identity, his violent mood-swings 
and cognitive confusion, physical rehabilitation and strained familial/marital relationships, all typical 
and common consequences of both coma and traumatic or acquired brain injury. For further discussion 
of the impact of coma and/or brain injury on selfhood and family relationships, see for instance: 
Catherine Malabou, The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage, trans. Steven Miller (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2012); Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat 
(London: Picador, 1986); www.headway.org.uk; Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens 
(London: Vintage, 2000), Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Orlando: 
Harcourt, 2003), and Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Penguin, 
2005); ‘Coronation Street Storyline Sadly Rings True for Brain Injured People’, Brain Injury Group 
(2013) <http://www.braininjurygroup.co.uk/coronation-street-sadly-rings-true.html> [accessed: 
27/11/2013]; <http://www.ukabif.org.uk/brain-injury-information>; Narrative Approaches to Brain 
Injury, eds. Stephen Weatherhead and David Todd (London: Karnac Books, 2013). 
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fascinated with the idea of coma as a literary trope, but also how literary and filmic 
misrepresentations have socio-political implications for the real victims of coma and 
brain injury, returning, full-circle, to LaCapra’s warning against fetishized trauma 
narratives. 
 
 
1.2: The Unpleasant Experience: Coma, Trauma, Narrative 
 
Coma literature can be broadly split into two categories: interior and exterior coma 
narratives. The interior coma narrative focuses upon the subjective experience of the 
coma victim, often creating complex, dream-like worlds of the unconscious. In the 
exterior coma narrative, the focus is placed either upon the victim still within coma and 
the strains his condition has upon the personal relationships that he has outside of coma, 
or upon the coma survivor, and his reintegration into the world of consciousness post-
coma. In both categories, LaCapra’s notion of trauma ‘fetish’ is present, no more so 
than in several televisual and filmic representations of the last ten years. BBC One’s 
series Life On Mars,
5 
for example, whilst depicting an interior state of coma, is 
preoccupied with representing (and parodying) the 1970s, to the point of fetishizing 
icons of that era, from the BBC test card with the little girl and the clown, to coma-
protagonist, Sam Tyler, receiving televisual direct-address advice from Open University 
professors with customary leather elbow-patches and helmet-strap beards. Even the 
representation of the police force, metonymically embodied by the politically incorrect 
Gene Hunt, fetishistically totalizes the era in its parodic homage to such ‘realist’ police 
dramas as The Sweeney, alluding, almost affectionately, to inherent racism and sexism 
within the workplace. The viewer is engaged by these fetishized signifiers of Tyler’s 
coma, eventually gaining pleasure from them and, in the end, from the coma itself and 
the possibilities it offers for conjuring up further pleasurable images. 
The coma as narrative device can similarly be seen in David Chase’s hit TV- series 
The Sopranos. In the final season, the central protagonist, Tony, spends several episodes 
within a coma, this particular production exploiting the soft-focus ‘white-tunnel’ trope 
of the near-death experience, alongside, as in Life On Mars, representations of the 
interiorization of external stimuli. At one point, Tony bangs on the wall of his hotel 
within the world of coma in order to silence the incessant chattering of his ‘neighbour’, 
                                                     
5
 Life On Mars, dir. Various, BBC One, 2006-7. 
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a chattering that, in reality, is entering his unconscious from the external world and 
becoming interiorized and assimilated into his subjective experience of coma.
6 
In an 
example of exterior coma narrative, Almodóvar’s Talk To Her,7 the victim of coma, 
Alicia, becomes fetishized by the morally-dubious anti-hero, Benigno, to the point 
whereby he repeatedly rapes her, causing her to become pregnant. It is the birth of the 
stillborn child that becomes the catalyst for her ‘awakening’ from coma and subsequent 
rehabilitation, a closure that echoes LaCapra’s allusion to the ‘optimistic…scenario’. 
As outlined earlier, because coma seems to fit the traditional model of trauma, it is 
useful to examine such representations of coma through the lens of trauma theory. 
Superficially, the coma condition, like the traumatizing event, ‘is not fully perceived as 
it occurs’.8  Developing Freud’s work on traumatic neuroses, Cathy Caruth discusses the 
‘haunting’ nature of trauma, postulating that, ‘To be traumatized is precisely to be 
possessed by an image or event’.9 Within Freud’s language on the subject of trauma 
there are frequent references to this notion of ‘haunting’, with the mind’s ‘compulsion 
to repeat’10 embodying a form of psychic possession. His core example of Tancred from 
Tasso’s romantic epic Gerusalemme liberata, cited in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
echoes this notion of the spectral nature of trauma, and it is significant that Caruth uses 
this as a foundation for her own theory of the ‘possessive influence’.11 After unwittingly 
killing his lover, Clorinda, Tancred enters a charmed and frightful forest, where he 
attacks one particular tree with his sword, at which point ‘blood gushes from the wound, 
and the voice of Clorinda, whose spirit magically entered into that very tree, accuses 
him of yet again doing harm to his beloved’.12 This emphasises the notion of the 
repetitive, inwards-turning nature of trauma and the compulsion to repeat the traumatic 
event of the past, an event that ‘perpetually escapes or eludes our understanding’.13 
Through this repetition, the victim of trauma hopes to reassimilate this rupture of 
temporality and of identity, thereby mastering or coming to terms with the traumatizing 
event. But this example also emphasises the ghostly form of trauma, its haunting 
quality. The voice of Clorinda manifests itself as a ghost, and cries out to Tancred 
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against his will. Just as he unwittingly killed her the first time, he unwittingly kills her 
the second time and this traumatic repetition takes the form of a ghostly voice, a 
spectral re-run of the traumatic event, akin to, as Freud postulates, the dreams of those 
‘possessed’ by traumatic neuroses, the survivors of the First World War, for example, 
who were at the forefront of his mind at the time of writing Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. Thus, as Anne Whitehead concludes in her appraisal of the development of 
trauma theory, for Freud, ‘Trauma is inextricable…from the ghostly or spectral, and it 
testifies to the profoundly unresolved nature of the past’.14 The subsequent repetition 
compulsion of trauma, the tantalizingly intangible haunting of the traumatic event, 
constitutes the psyche’s attempt to seize and master the trauma through repetition and 
practice in order to exorcise it from the mind. 
In coma literature, the traumatizing event, often caused by a violent assault enacted 
upon or within the physical self (road traffic accident/brain tumour) is likewise often not 
perceived as it occurs. In such texts, the plight of the coma victim is centred upon the 
attempt to face up to the event that has caused such a catastrophic ‘break in the mind’s 
experience of time’15 but that has also caused such a rupture within the victim’s sense 
of selfhood. What is most interesting is that in interior coma narratives this attempt to 
‘reunify’ the self through a rediscovering of the haunting, past event occurs within the 
world of the unconscious – that once the victim of coma has confronted the traumatic 
event, then the process of their survival has only just begun. In many of these narratives, 
it is the confrontation with the traumatizing event that catalyses the victim’s emergence 
from coma, the texts concluding at the point of ‘awakening’. However, in the reality of 
coma, the victim may be confronted with a further, re- traumatizing struggle for identity 
post-coma through any brain injury that may have been sustained, an eventuality, as will 
be revealed, that many works of coma fiction fail to address. 
In Alex Garland’s The Coma, for example, whilst within his coma, the central 
protagonist, Carl, only briefly entertains the possibility that he may have sustained a 
brain injury, proclaiming: 
 
I was not suffering from psychological trauma, as I had at first suspected. 
Instead, as Mary pointed out, it was more likely that I had some sort of brain 
damage. Which, to look on the bright side, might be reversible. Even, in 
some ways, easier to address than psychological trauma – or at least more 
straightforward.
16  
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Whilst Philip Tew sees this passage as an example of Garland’s ‘parodying [of] both the 
postmodern condition and society’s rendition of the individual through the narrative’s 
evocation of a traumatized consciousness revisiting a concrete traumatic experience’,17 I 
argue that this exposes a deeper problem with the representation of coma within the 
novel and within coma fiction as a whole. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
two, by his own admission, Garland’s literary objective in writing this novel was to 
create a text in which ‘dreams’ were presented in a less ‘naff’ way,18 a goal implied 
within the closing section of the novel as Carl ‘awakes’ from coma and concludes that, 
‘Everybody dreams, but nobody has ever managed to tell me what their dream was 
like’. Coma, then, is clearly equated with sleep and it is as this point when Carl 
formulates his first principle of, ‘You wake, you die […] when you wake, you lose a 
narrative’,19 Garland representing coma, again, as a sleep-state. However, within a rather 
throw-away, expository conclusion to the novel, Garland does touch upon a central 
debate within trauma and narrative theory: the possibility that the process of trauma can 
be seen to be embodied by the structures of narrative and the reader’s relationship with 
the text. In his essay, ‘Freud’s Master Plot’, Peter Brooks makes the insightful 
connection between Freud’s psychoanalytical perspective on traumatic repetition and 
his own narratological perspective. Crucially, Brooks focuses on Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, in which, as discussed earlier, Freud attempts to hone his theory of 
traumatic repetition compulsion and ‘haunting’. Brooks sees Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle as ‘an essay about the dynamic interrelationship of ends and beginnings’,20 
going on to suggest that all of the literary devices present within a text and those that 
keep drawing the reader back into the middle section, are indicative of the compulsion 
to repeat, the traumatic compulsion that Freud outlines in his works. Through the 
repetition of the ‘unpleasant experience’21 the individual attempts to convert a passive 
subject position within a traumatic experience into an active subject position, an 
endeavour that can, Freud argues, ‘Be attributed to an instinctive urge to assert control 
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that operates quite independently of whether or not the memory as such was 
pleasurable’.22 This attempt to achieve mastery over the trauma through repetition, 
Brooks argues, manifests itself in the process of reading a text, with literary repetition 
acting as a form of ‘binding of textual energies that allows them to be mastered by 
putting them into a serviceable form within the energetic economy of the narrative’.23 In 
this statement, Brooks aligns the literary agenda with that of the victim of trauma, 
repeating the traumatic event in order to ‘bind’ it and achieve a sense of psychic and, 
therefore, emotional control. But Brooks goes further, suggesting that ‘what operates in 
the text through repetition is the death instinct, the drive toward the end’.24 Here, 
Brooks alludes to Freud’s bold conclusion to Beyond the Pleasure Principle: that ‘the 
goal of all life is death’.25 In making this declaration, Freud asserted that the aim of all 
life was to return to the state that existed prior to the evolution of the species: the 
lifeless, inanimate state. The repetitive confrontation with the traumatic event (an event 
that Robert Jay Lifton refers to as the ‘death encounter’,26) reveals, Freud suggests, the 
drive towards death, but a death that must be achieved only on the victim’s own terms. 
Thus the compulsion to repeat reveals a paradoxical agenda: both to come to terms with 
and master the death encounter (a threatened death that the victim neither chose nor was 
prepared for) but also the desire to return to a state of inertia, embodied by death itself. 
Similarly, Brooks argues, ‘The desire of the text is ultimately the desire for the end, for 
that recognition which is the moment of the death of the reader in the text’.27 The 
reader, therefore, wants to master both the text but also wants his involvement in the 
unfolding of the narrative to end – for his interaction with and role in the text to, in 
effect, achieve their demise. 
This intersection of trauma and narrative theory becomes particularly pertinent at the 
ending of Garland’s novel, itself a literary, plot-driven text that concerns itself with a 
traumatized subject. By discussing, albeit cursorily, the ‘loss’ of self-narrative as being 
a form of ‘death’ (‘you wake, you die’), Garland aligns the coma experience with this 
notion of the traumatic loss of story during which the element of selfhood which has 
been invested in that story is likewise lost. In short, both story and a piece of selfhood 
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dies during the narrative process, yet the subject survives and retains this knowledge of 
the loss. Throughout the novel, Garland’s protagonist constantly repeats the events that 
led up to his coma, even falsely experiencing an ‘awakening’ from coma. Alongside 
this, the reader is repeatedly confronted with the same repeated scenarios, characters 
and landscapes. The reader and the protagonist alike are trapped within the repetitive, 
traumatic core of the novel and both strive towards the end through a compulsion to 
repeat that echoes Freud’s death drive, alongside Brooks’s drive towards the end of the 
text. For Carl, the moment of clarity that he reaches is, paradoxically, a perplexing one 
as he realises that he both desires and fears the death of his coma narrative and his role 
in it. In the final moments of coma, he observes, ‘Now, moments from waking, the 
death is suddenly frightening. I want to hold it off as long as possible’.28 Once more, 
this desire to ‘hold off’ his emergence from coma reveals the compulsion of traumatic 
repetition, in the hope to master truly the death encounter. But it also reveals the 
conflicting desires of the reader: to hold off the ending of the novel for as long as 
possible, but also to desire truly the end to come in order to gain pleasure in the 
discovery of the fate of the protagonist whose journey they have been following avidly. 
This pleasure, therefore, constitutes jouissance, as proposed by the psychoanalyst 
Jacques Lacan (in his development of Freudian concepts) and linked with the death-
drive. It is the pleasure gained from the fulfilment of a need (the death-drive being one 
of these ‘needs’) and so in this sense, jouissance is gained by the fulfilment of the need 
for the novel to end, and for the reader’s role in the text to ‘die’. 
However, despite alluding to some of these key debates in both narrative and trauma 
theory, by limiting the part of consciousness that is ‘lost’ within coma to simply the 
‘dream’ narratives that are experienced therein, Garland ignores the possibility of post-
coma brain injury. Even as Carl begins to arise from coma, despite the fact that he will 
lose his coma narrative, he appears to be ‘awaking’ with his cognition intact, as if 
stirring from a bad dream. In short, he only seems to be losing a dream-narrative, not his 
entire pre-coma self, as is often the case with victims of coma and brain injury. As 
argued earlier, there is a doubling of coma-trauma prima facie: the initiating event that 
causes the coma, and the experience within the coma itself, even though this most often 
constitutes a blank in consciousness for the coma survivor. However, this may be no 
less traumatic than a full recollection of the state of coma, the void in memory being 
equally as alienating and traumatic as fragmented, uncanny images of the unconscious. 
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What is prevalent in much of the literature of coma (primarily in coma fiction) is the 
failure to address or discuss the tripling of trauma: the coma-survivor’s brain injury and 
subsequent rehabilitation. Similarly to The Coma, in Iain Banks’s The Bridge and Irvine 
Welsh’s Marabou Stork Nightmares, the protagonists emerge from their prolonged 
comas, seemingly with cognition intact. In two of the broadcast works discussed earlier, 
both Tony and Alicia emerge from their respective comas with few lasting effects, and 
with very little need for a comprehensive rehabilitation programme. In short, all of these 
texts equate the coma-state with the sleep state, exploring the traumatic impact of coma, 
but failing to explore fully the multi-layered nature of this trauma, thus, I argue, 
romanticizing the condition through a misleading, literary aesthetic. In his own 
development of aesthetic theory, Theodor Adorno analyses authors’ use of language to 
communicate suffering, referring to, ‘Fantastic art in romanticism’, with their 
‘presentation of the nonempirical as if it were empirical’.29 Whilst he goes on to assert 
that, ‘This effect is facilitated because the fictions originate in the empirical’,30 I argue 
that in these examples of coma fiction, they have no real origin in the empirical as in 
most cases, survivors of coma emerge with little or no memory of what occurs within 
the unconscious state as I will now begin to illustrate with reference to examples of 
non-fiction narratives of coma survival. 
In Paul Pritchard’s account of his traumatic brain injury incurred through a rock-
climbing accident, his repetitions and hallucinatory traumatic experiences only occur 
after emergence from his induced coma. Writing about the occurrences in the world 
around him, he writes, ‘Obviously I wasn’t aware of any of these goings on, I was 
unconscious or hallucinating wildly for the best part of four days’.31 The ‘unconscious’ 
stage, a blankness in experience, Pritchard attributes to the coma itself; his dream-like 
hallucinations to his traumatic, cognitive confusion post-coma, experiences that are, for 
the most part, attributed to the interior coma-state within coma fiction as seen in 
Garland’s novel. 
In describing her son Erik’s coma and subsequent traumatic brain injury, Ruthann 
Knechel Johansen paints a similar picture to the first-hand experience of Pritchard. She 
outlines the various stages of coma, marked by subtle shifts in the Glasgow Coma Scale 
that measures depth and ‘levels of responsiveness in three areas: motor response, eye-
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opening, and vocal response’.32 Writing as witness to her son’s trauma, her account 
avoids using the designation ‘waking’ to describe her son’s emergence from coma, a 
literary decision that is in opposition, for example, to Garland’s novel. She talks about 
the coma ‘lightening’,33 only using the words ‘sleep’ and ‘napping’ to describe the post-
coma condition, a confusing and frightening experience that is akin to that described by 
Pritchard. Importantly, Johansen, herself, uses inverted commas for these designations, 
almost to emphasise the metaphorical, even ironic nature of her terminology. Writing 
figuratively, she describes the coma itself as ‘a lost “realm” we could not enter’,34 but it 
is a lost realm that can neither be recalled by her son, through the irreparable brain 
damage he has sustained. Indeed, Erik’s recovery seems to hinge upon his loved ones’ 
attempts to fill in the void of consciousness and selfhood through the telling of stories: 
‘[…] We tried to present stories that linked his former, healthy self with his present, 
recovering self and that projected a future of restored well-being’. 35 In a rehabilitative 
process that seems to echo Brooks’s reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle (and his 
comparison of trauma with the narrative process), this revisiting of stories of the past to 
rebuild a self of the future seems to be a strategy of recovery that is traumatic in itself. 
In short, Erik confronts the loss of his pre-injury, pre-traumatized identity by listening 
to stories about this identity in order to work through and master his loss and therefore 
attempt to move forward with the re-building of a future, post-traumatic identity. 
Significantly, Johansen repeatedly uses the language of (re)birth in writing of her 
son’s rehabilitation, describing his emergence from coma as his ‘second “birth”’,36 an 
image of trauma that reflects Jacques Lacan’s theoretical position with regard to the 
trauma and loss of childbirth. Drawing a link between this notion of the second 
(traumatic) birth of coma and Lacanian theories of ‘the Thing’ (‘the unsymbolisable and 
unimaginable reality of loss’37), the emergence from coma and the process of birth can 
be seen to be both inherently traumatic. Lionel Bailly, in his appraisal of Lacan’s 
conceptualization of ‘the Thing’, argues that ‘if a primary characteristic of the Thing is 
to be unsymbolised and unsymbolisable, then perhaps the Thing is what is lost at the 
point of birth’.38 However, this Thing can only be ‘conceptualised after the event of its 
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loss, and the lost object was never and could never be symbolised’.39 Through this 
Lacanian perspective, the comparison of the post-coma condition to a form of birth is 
magnified. Due to the fact that often, in cases of serious coma, memories and even 
whole identities may be lost in the void created by traumatic or acquired brain injury, 
there nevertheless remains an awareness, a knowledge, that something has been lost, yet 
it cannot be symbolized because of the ruling condition of the brain injury. Thus a link 
can be drawn between the void in consciousness prior to birth and the void in 
consciousness prior to the (re)birth from coma. In both cases, there is an awareness that 
there was a consciousness prior to birth, constituted by the stories that are told and 
circulated by loved ones, but this consciousness, due to the fact that it now constitutes a 
lost void, is now unsymbolizable, though loved ones may still attempt to symbolise it 
through their narratives of the past. 
Such a manifestation of the post-coma condition generates yet another parallel with a 
traditional strand of trauma theory and Freud’s foundational theory of traumatic 
neurosis: the phenomenon of latency. In another key work, Moses and Monotheism, 
Freud writes of a hypothetical situation in which a man walks away from a train wreck 
‘apparently unharmed’.40 It is only after a delayed period of time that he begins to 
develop ‘a series of grave psychical and motor symptoms, which one can ascribe only to 
his shock or whatever else happened at the time of the accident.’41 In a similar example 
to that of Tancred cited in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the traumatic condition only 
takes hold after a certain delay in time. As Caruth explicates in her development of 
Freudian thought, ‘So trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original event in 
an individual’s past, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature – the way it 
was precisely not known in the first instance – returns to haunt the survivor later on’.42 
In the cases of both the trauma survivor and coma survivor, the traumatic event is not 
confronted or understood as it occurs and only makes its impact belatedly, often in the 
form of traumatic repetitions and psychic ‘hauntings’. Of course, to reiterate what I 
revealed earlier, for the victim of trauma, the initiating event may be recovered, 
confronted and ‘mastered’ through the repetition and working through process; for the 
survivors of coma, this event may never be recovered, as all memory of it may have 
been obliterated completely through physical injury. As Catherine Malabou discusses in 
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her analysis of the ‘new wounded’ (those affected by physical brain trauma, alongside 
neurosis), here, in analytical and theoretical terms, ‘the break between contemporary 
psychopathology and classic psychoanalytic practice occurs’.43 For the coma survivor, 
the traumatic event may forever remain as a void and beyond the borders of 
consciousness, an eventuality that is no less traumatic than if the memory and cognition 
of the trauma had remained intact. This transformation that has occurred, as Malabou 
posits, ‘through destruction’,44 will ‘not allow patients to return to a previous state, to 
seek refuge in a past of any kind’.45 And whilst Malabou concedes that for both the 
victim of ‘sociopolitical trauma’ and of ‘organic trauma’ there exists the ‘same relation 
between the psyche and catastrophe’,46 the victims of organic trauma undergo ‘an 
unprecedented metamorphosis… of identity’[original italics], as if they become 
‘separated from themselves’.47 However, for the coma survivor (one victim of ‘organic’ 
trauma), despite this unprecedented metamorphosis alongside the gap in consciousness 
that the coma, itself, has created, he may still repeatedly return to snap-shots of memory 
from the pre-coma mind of his ‘separated’ self, memories that, whilst not traumatic per 
se, become traumatic through their incoherence, temporal rupture and detachment from 
all frames of reference that may allow him to make sense of them, thus reminding him 
of the fractures in selfhood and the irretrievable pre-coma identity: the ‘shredded’ 
psyche
48
 that Malabou makes reference to. 
Despite these differences, however, both the trauma survivor and the coma survivor 
are linked by these doomed repetitions of fractured memories (Freud’s traumatic 
‘hauntings’) that are, themselves, symptomatic of a process of survival that has taken 
place. As Caruth concludes when discussing Freud’s constantly shifting approaches to 
trauma, ‘What Freud encounters in the traumatic neurosis is not the reaction to any 
horrible event but, rather, the peculiar and perplexing experience of survival’.49 
Whether or not the coma victim ever recovers memory of the traumatic, initiating event, 
or whether this forever remains a void in consciousness, he is still confronted with the 
problematic condition of all survivors of trauma: survival itself, and the confrontation 
with Lifton’s ‘death encounter’. And whilst Malabou calls for ‘new forms of treatment 
that would no longer be based on the investigation of the past, the exploration of 
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memory, or the reactivation of traces’,50 the coma survivor will inevitably be drawn 
back into this traumatic repetition in the desperate hope and need to recover and reunite 
with their old ‘self’, but also to appease the desperation of their loved ones who hope 
for such a recovery to take place. 
As I will now illustrate, there are numerous other texts which similarly present coma 
as a void that again refute the representations of complex coma dreamscapes present in 
Garland’s novel. In James Cracknell’s autobiography Touching Distance (written with 
his wife Beverley Turner, to provide an alternative account of her husband’s recovery 
from coma and brain injury), it becomes immediately clear that he has no awareness of 
the coma. After falling into a deep coma following a serious biking accident, he writes: 
‘My next memory is of lying down in a strange room. But I can see Bev, and there’s 
Mark. That’s all. One weird disassociated image and then it fades. They call these 
‘islands’, sudden breakthroughs of conscious memory, in what is otherwise a total 
blank’.51  
In Sandra Lyman’s self-published memoir, Waking Up: Memoirs Of A Coma 
Recoverer, she writes, in the foreword, ‘I dedicate this book primarily to my God. He 
gave me […] the memories of coma’,52 yet peculiarly, she relates very few memories of 
the deep coma she was in. What soon becomes clear is that those ‘memories’ of coma 
that she attests to are rather ‘locked-in’ thought processes that come into consciousness, 
not within deep-coma, but within the semi-conscious state that she reaches through her 
gradual emergence and recovery from coma. In narrating her story, she fluctuates 
between relating factual detail of the occurrences in the hospital room (‘The nurses just 
changed the tube to a smaller one and left me in bed’53) and internalized, frustrated 
utterances, marked by her use of italics (‘There is nothing to do. Maybe I can pick up 
that box with my foot. I can!’) Because these interiorized thoughts and narration of 
physical actions are detached from the physical action of the hospital room, there 
becomes a blurring between what is real and what is not: is this depiction of her picking 
up the box real, or imagined? This sense of cognitive confusion is heightened through 
Lyman’s description of her locked-in (yet physically active) state as her ‘nightmare’54 
from which she wakes up, yet it soon becomes clear that what she claims to remember 
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about her coma are actually the confused memories of what Johansen refers to as the 
‘lightening’ coma. Baldly, rather than writing about her coma, Lyman could 
inadvertently be writing about her recovery from coma and the transitions she makes 
through other chronic disorders of consciousness during which brain function becomes 
increasingly active and purposeful: the Minimally Conscious State (MCS), for example. 
Lyman therefore focuses not on unconsciousness, but the growing consciousness and 
awareness of the outside world as she begins to emerge from deep coma, even, at one 
point, hurling a ball at one of her physical therapists whilst still trapped in a ‘locked-in’ 
state. Her use of italics to delineate the world outside of her consciousness from her 
locked-in self takes on particular significance when analysed in the light of theories of 
the writing of trauma. Roger Luckhurst, in his critical overview of the traumatic memoir 
‘boom’, notes that often, in such texts, ‘Disjunct strands of self, typographically 
separated on the page, eventually converge in a classic account of the ‘breakthrough’ of 
traumatic memories’.55 In Waking Up, the use of ‘disjunct’, italicized utterances are 
increased as Lyman comes closer to full consciousness, again highlighting the lack of 
consciousness in deep coma, and converging in swathes of traumatic breakthroughs that 
allow her to strive towards full post-coma consciousness. 
In a similar vein, the tagline of the book Journeys In Dream and Imagination, by the 
Swedish poet Artur Lundkvist, reads: ‘The hallucinatory memoir of a poet in a coma’.56 
However, in the blurb of the frontispiece of the text, the reader is immediately presented 
with a contradictory disclaimer: ‘After two months in a coma in the intensive care unit 
of the hospital, Lundkvist, at the age of 75, awakened… There followed weeks of semi- 
consciousness during which the moments of wakefulness and clarity increased’. What 
follows is not so much a memoir detailing the condition of deep-coma, but, again, 
poetic depictions of the post-coma condition and of the flood of dreams, ‘islands’ (to 
refer again to Cracknell’s memoir) and the general cognitive confusion that this brings. 
These examples of post-coma recovery that illustrate, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, the void of the coma unconscious, are not just limited to non-fiction. 
The opening of Steve Hollyman’s Keeping Britain Tidy details one character’s 
emergence from coma: 
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There was the blackness, and it blanketed me, and then there was 
nothing. Nothing for days, and then the wall clock tick-tocking. 
 
And here it comes, The Surfacing. 
 
This is how it feels to be born. Unwombed and taking the first breath.
57
 
 
In this depiction, Hollyman employs the imagery of the void and (re)birth also present 
in Johansen’s autobiographical account of her son’s coma. Hollyman’s distinction 
between the ‘blackness’ and the ‘nothing’ is an interesting one, the first suggesting the 
slippage into coma, the second the coma itself. Both are linked by their 
incommunicability (but only rendered in language retrospectively after Shaun emerges 
from coma) and both exacerbate the void in consciousness that Shaun is left with. 
Significantly, Hollyman was chiefly interested in accurately presenting the post-coma 
condition, and the traumatic process of rehabilitation, conducting interviews with coma 
survivors and victims of traumatic brain injury. Speaking in an interview with me in 
2013, Hollyman discussed these literary aims, saying, ‘I wanted the novel to be realistic, 
and no one I spoke to had any memory of being ‘inside’ the coma’.58 Hollyman’s 
findings in researching his novel clearly reflect the autobiographical experiences of 
coma survivors cited herein, alongside Antonio Damasio’s own observations of coma 
survivors who ‘can recall the descent into the nothingness of coma’ but ‘nothing at all’ 
of the coma itself.
59
 And yet despite the reality of coma survival, depictions of lucid 
interiorities of coma still seem to be common within fiction. 
In the cases of all of the writers I have worked with to-date through the coma and 
brain injury survivor writing group, such complex and detailed memories of the coma 
are absent, and only one of the writers, Caroline Waugh, possesses snap-shots of dream-
like memory, openly admitting that she is unable to attribute this to deep-coma or to her 
semi-conscious state experienced on her emergence from coma. Indeed, in her story of 
post-coma recovery, ‘Lager and Black’, she describes her physiotherapists feeding her 
‘frozen cubes of blackcurrant ice [to] stimulate the muscles’ of her mouth. She then 
describes the frequent visits she received from her local vicar because ‘staff believed 
she was going to die’. These two events of the ice cubes and receiving the Last Rites 
intersect to form her coma ‘island’, ‘receiving Holy Communion, in the form of frozen 
cubes of wine!’. However, again Waugh’s description of this ‘memory’ is filled with 
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doubt, using question marks to emphasise her cognitive confusion. In trying to pin-point 
exactly when this ‘island’ occurred, she writes, ‘?Probably about the same time as 
this?’, using question marks as parentheses to illustrate her uncertainty. When writing 
of the ‘island’ itself, she describes it as ‘a very vivid dream(?)’, again emphasizing her 
vacillating opinion on whether this was a genuine memory from coma, or a dream 
arising from the ‘lightening’ stages of her return to consciousness. 60 However, for the 
rest of the writers, they are left with a void in consciousness, the ‘nothing’ that 
Hollyman makes reference to. In the case of another of the writers, Steph Grant, this 
‘nothing’ continues to ‘haunt’ consciousness throughout his post-coma recovery. In 
‘Blue Polystyrene Shoes’, Grant paints a picture of post-coma ‘islands’ between which 
he must confusedly navigate, a void in consciousness sitting between each island and 
signalled by Grant’s repetition of a two-word phrase appearing throughout the story: 
‘Then nothing’.61 What Grant experiences constitutes the ‘break in the mind’s 
experience of time’62 that Caruth sees as symptomatic of the trauma survivor who, 
failing to experience the trauma at the precise time it occurs, continues to relive it 
through traumatic repetitions. The present, then, is constantly disrupted by the 
incomprehensible past which, in turn, disrupts the possibility of the traumatized victim 
to move forward with their life in the future. This traumatic rupture in the perception of 
time is clearly evidenced in one particular section of Grant’s narrative: 
 
Who knows when later? A few hours? A few days? A week? Five weeks? It 
matters not. The man who has a crying-smiling woman that loves him, and 
he her, is sat in an armchair, apparently reading an edition of J.S.Mill’s 
Utilitarianism. Nothing goes into his head out of the book for the man is 
unable to understand written language. But he looks the part. 63 
 
Again, this conveys the intrusion of one of the disjunct, italicized voices that Luckhurst 
points out as being a common trope of the trauma memoir, this meta-narration reflecting 
the temporal rupture (typical of trauma, to return to Caruth) that the coma has created. 
What is also noticeable is the use of third person narration, signifying the detachment 
between the narrator, Steph, and the Steph that emerged from coma, inextricably altered 
from his selfhood and identity pre-coma. The comment, ‘But he looks the part’ chimes 
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with this notion of the ruptured, post-traumatic identity, as though he is playing a role in 
his attempt to return to his pre-traumatized self, a goal that is rendered impossible due 
to the reality of his brain injury. Indeed, the role he attempts to play is that of his old 
‘self’ as he tries to belong to this new world he has been ‘reborn’ into, to borrow 
Johansen’s designation. Despite the futility of this post-coma role-play, Grant persists 
with it in a pattern of behaviour that reflects Freud’s repetition compulsion of traumatic 
neurosis: attempting to re-read Mill, for example, despite not understanding a single 
word. In his preface to the story, Grant refers to his attempts to reunify the ‘ripped apart 
remnants’ of his identity and this is conveyed through his struggle to attempt to play the 
‘role’ of his pre-coma self. I suggest that these ripped apart remnants exemplify 
Catherine Malabou’s notion of the ‘shredded psyche’, both in the linguistic violence of 
the two phrases, but also in their conceptual construction, both referring to the idea of a 
shattered, fragmented post-brain injury identity. 
Similarly to Grant, the former professor of surgery at Yale School of Medicine, 
Richard Selzer, adopts the third person voice to narrate his own experience of coma 
after succumbing to Legionnaire’s Disease. Writing of his decision to use the third-
person pronoun, Selzer explains that the use of ‘he gives a blessed bit of distance 
between myself and a too fresh ordeal in which the use of I  would be rather like 
picking off a scab only to find that the wound had not completely healed’.64 
Interestingly, in discussing his narrative technique, Selzer uses a most apposite 
metaphor to describe his attempt to distance himself from the trauma of his coma 
experience. The image of the unhealing wound has enormous resonance with the word 
trauma itself, which translates as ‘wound’ from the original Greek and the etymology of 
which both Freud and Caruth draw attention to. Indeed, the premature picking of a scab 
is indicative of a traumatic repetition during which one is both repulsed by the action of 
picking and compelled to continue with the action until the scab is removed and the 
wound reopened.  However, despite Selzer proposing that his use of the third person has 
allowed him to avoid such a traumatic process, I would argue that he still relives his 
coma-trauma  by the very process of narrating his ‘chronicle of an illness told 
afterwards’.65 Furthermore, Selzer’s candid reasoning for using this pronoun, and then 
his persistence in writing of his trauma reveals the paradigmatic dichotomy of trauma: 
the repulsion finely balanced against compulsion. Steph, in discussing publically the 
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process of writing about his coma-trauma and decision to use third person narration still 
speaks of the emotional difficulty of facing the coma-trauma of his past, an experience 
that, by his own admission, he had never been able to voice fully prior to the writing of 
‘Blue Polystyrene Shoes’ due to its upsetting nature, yet an experience that he 
constantly voiced and relived in his mind. We can again return to Brooks’s re-reading 
of Beyond the Pleasure Principle and his interpretation of the process of narrative being 
indicative of traumatic repetition. As Luckhurst posits, drawing an overt link between 
the processes of trauma and of narrative, ‘Trauma does not halt narrative but might be 
regarded as the motor that drives its manifold forms’.66 However, despite both adopting 
the third person pronoun to write of traumatic autobiographical experiences, Selzer, 
unlike Steph, purports to reveal the secrets of the coma itself: 
 
Even to death and beyond, he will be the teller of tales, collecting 
impressions, defying forgetfulness, and meeting gods all along the road, the 
way you do when reading Homer or Virgil. He can do all that? In coma? Oh, 
yes he can. Dream, imagination – these are the chariots that the comatose 
body rides.
67
  
 
This declaratory preface to his coma ‘memoir’ contradicts many of the autobiographical 
coma-texts discussed herein and in terms of linguistic styling has more in common with 
some of the coma fiction I have cited to-date, not least Garland’s The Coma through 
Selzer’s comparison of coma to ‘dream’. Unlike Garland’s protagonist, though, Selzer’s 
comatose self is not daunted by the loss of story and of selfhood as he confronts and 
apparently overcomes the ‘forgetfulness’ of post-coma. Furthermore, Selzer’s final line 
in this passage seems to suggest, through the use of the indefinite article, that every 
‘comatose body’ is able to narrate their own experience of coma in a rather 
presumptuous, sweeping and, as I have illustrated, untrue generalization. The veracity 
of this assumption, however, is further called into question when, embarking upon the 
narration of his coma-trauma, Selzer hardly evokes the dreamscapes and imaginative 
flights of fancy that he promises in his preface. Instead, exploiting the use of third 
person narration, he focuses on the external perspective of his degenerating body, 
narrating from an objective external position and looking down upon himself through 
the imagined eyes of the medical staff. It seems as though the reader will finally get a 
glimpse of the ‘chariots’ of coma Selzer refers to when he writes, ‘He has been in coma 
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for almost three weeks. What is it like?’.68 However, what follows, once the flurries of 
figurative language have been stripped away, are simply descriptions of straightforward 
medical processes and details that struggle to inhabit the two realms of ‘dream, 
imagination’. He writes that, ‘It is like being encased in a layer of wax that separates 
him from the rest of mankind’,69 a simile that merely reinforces the inert physical 
condition of all coma victims. He goes on to describe the ‘immense weight’ that ‘holds 
down his thin bluish eyes’,70 again a figurative utterance that brings textual colour to an 
otherwise mundane fact of coma that is retrospectively narrativized – the fact that he 
cannot force his eyes open. Developing this image, he writes, ‘He has no need for eyes. 
Here, there is nothing for him to do but wait and listen to the silences rubbing against 
each other’.71 The use of the active verbs in this statement  implies an awareness of the 
coma-state, yet the reference to ‘nothingness’ and ‘silence’ (an inter-connected, back-to-
back friction of silence, with no sounds of the world outside of coma filtering in) seems 
to speak only of the void of coma and lack of brain function addressed by the authors 
examined earlier. Despite the slippery language, it appears that Selzer, too, struggles to 
narrate comprehensively the interiority of his coma-trauma. In this narration of ‘an 
illness told afterwards’, then, the adverb ‘afterwards’ is most pertinent. Between the 
traumatic event of coma and the ‘afterwardsness’ of narrating this event, Selzer is still 
unable to write, in detail, of the experience within the coma itself, and has simply been 
developing the language with which he can figuratively and retrospectively describe the 
bald details of the inertia and void of coma. 
This dilemma of coma-narration is again indicative of the dilemma of narrating 
trauma: the inability to render fully, in language, an experience that was not fully 
comprehended as it occurred, and we can look to the philosopher Maurice Blanchot to 
explicate this dilemma further. In one of his key works, The Writing of Disaster, 
Blanchot repeatedly refutes the idea that the disaster or traumatic catastrophe can be 
fully and comprehensively narrated or represented. Writing of the inherently incomplete 
and flawed nature of historical testimony, he discusses how such testimony is not false 
as such, nor is it of no importance to us. However, it simply cannot fully embody the 
traumatic reality of the disaster. The ‘afterwardsness’ of Selzer’s testimony, I argue, is 
indicative of Blanchot’s theoretical position: the coma-trauma, the void in 
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consciousness, perhaps perfectly embodying Blanchot’s notion of ‘the disaster, 
unexperienced’. This is, Blanchot goes onto explain, ‘what escapes the very possibility 
of experience – it is the limit of writing’.72 At this limit and at this point of 
afterwardsness, despite all assurances to the contrary, Selzer still cannot lucidly narrate 
the disaster of the coma itself, unconsciously aligning himself with all of the 
autobiographical narrators of coma explored earlier. 
 
 
1.3: How Do You Solve a Problem Like Aesthetics? 
 
This overview of coma memoir (and empirically-researched coma fiction) exposes the 
gap between the first-hand, traumatic experience of coma and the representations of 
coma within much of the fiction that I will be discussing throughout this thesis. 
Returning to Adorno’s notion of romanticism presenting the ‘nonempirical as if it were 
empirical’, I argue that through this aesthetic transformation, coma fiction (and 
occasionally non-fiction) is instrumental in misinforming a collective audience of what 
the coma condition truly entails, thus failing to represent fully its traumatic weight. 
Through the conflation of coma and sleep/dream-states, audiences, in turn, equate these 
two differing states of consciousness with each other, a connection promoted through 
examples of inaccurate, overly-aestheticized fiction. On a rudimentary level, much 
coma fiction fails to address the grades or levels of coma, adopting a one-size-fits-all 
approach and therefore failing to recognise the subtle shifts in consciousness that take 
place. Plum and Posner’s pioneering work The Diagnosis of Stupor and Coma, from the 
outset, makes it abundantly clear that, ‘Between the extreme states of consciousness and 
coma stand a variety of altered states of consciousness’,73 openly admitting that ‘the 
limits of consciousness are hard to define satisfactorily and quantitatively’ and going on 
to assert that ‘we can only infer the self-awareness of others by their appearance and by 
their acts’.74 The slippages between states of consciousness discussed in The Diagnosis 
are also referred to by Johansen, commenting that, ‘Coma was not simply a clearly 
demarcated state of unconsciousness. In many patients coma does not end suddenly, as 
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if turning on a light switch’.75 This is further supported by Plum and Posner when they 
assert how ‘sleep-like coma almost never lasts more than 2 to 4 weeks’, after which the 
patient enters a ‘chronically unresponsive state’.76 This is a position reinforced by Dr. 
David Bates who notes, in outlining an aetiology of coma, that, ‘The longer a patient 
remains in a coma the poorer his or her chance of recovery’.77 He points out that, ‘By 
the third day [of coma] the chance of making a moderate or good recovery is reduced to 
only 7%, and by the 14
th 
day is as low as 2%’, and even more interestingly, ‘By the end 
of the first week almost half of those patients who have not recovered consciousness are 
in a vegetative state’.78 Crucially, in their use of the description ‘sleep-like’, Plum and 
Posner  refer to the physical similarity of the coma-patient and the sleeping subject, and 
are at pains to distinguish the state of consciousness of sleep from that of coma going on 
to explain how the coma-patient, unlike the sleeping subject, remains ‘behaviourally 
unresponsive to all external stimuli’.79 In short, as Antonio Damasio is quick to point 
out, coma ‘may look like sleep, it may sound like sleep, but it is not sleep’.80 However, 
these two states of consciousness, as discussed, are conflated frequently in both works 
of fiction and non-fiction. 
The coma-as-sleep metaphor, then, alongside the dramatic, fantastical escapades that 
the coma-protagonist embarks upon whilst trapped within this chronic disorder of 
consciousness links back to LaCapra’s discussion of ‘fetishized and totalizing 
narratives’. LaCapra’s further explication of trauma and the development of his warning 
against such a trauma fetish is particularly pertinent to this discussion of the writing of 
coma. He proposes, in a similar vein to Freud, Caruth and also Blanchot (in his 
discussion of the unexperienced disaster), that the traumatized subject may not be able 
to master fully the traumatic event, just as the coma-survivor cannot fully master the 
trauma (and post-trauma) of coma. LaCapra writes that, ‘Trauma is a disruptive 
experience that disarticulates the self and creates holes in existence’,81 further 
illustrating Caruth’s idea of the temporal disruption in the mind of the trauma survivor. 
This is a disruption that, as discussed, is likewise indicative of the coma-survivor who, 
post-coma, experiences the disarticulation of selfhood that LaCapra alludes to and seen, 
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for example, in Grant’s ‘Blue Polystyrene Shoes’. Because of these interconnected 
theoretical positions, it is also useful to examine LaCapra’s insistence upon a certain 
delicacy and care that the writer of trauma must adopt if they are to produce ethical 
representations of trauma, proposing a form of writing that he refers to as ‘empathic 
unsettlement’. This, LaCapra explains, would be a form of writing that would avoid an 
appropriation of ‘the traumatic experience of […] victims’ but instead use a series of 
‘stylistic effects’ that should render the feeling and unsettling nature of trauma without 
revelling in the act of writing, or fetishizing the writing itself. Such an approach should 
also, LaCapra asserts, avoid ‘formulas or rules of methods’82 which have the effect of 
normalising or homogenizing trauma and traumatic writing. In this way, LaCapra offers 
an ethical approach to the writing of trauma which would avoid the attempt to paint 
realistic and ‘total’ landscapes of trauma, but would instead empathically unsettle the 
reader through stylistic devices, such as temporal and narrative ruptures, or 
experimentations with form and mise-en-page. 
I will argue that whilst much of the writing of coma fails to address the medical truth 
of coma, often descending into flights of dream-like fancy and glossing over the impact 
of brain injury, LaCapra’s notion of empathic unsettlement is present throughout the 
majority of texts that constitute the canon of coma literature. In their pursuit of empathic 
unsettlement through stylistic choices, writers of coma fiction, in particular, attempt to 
communicate at least some of the traumatic experience. In her analysis of such stylistic 
devices, Anne Whitehead suggests that ‘the impact of trauma can only adequately be 
represented by mimicking its forms and symptoms, so that temporality and chronology 
collapse, and narratives are characterized by repetition and indirection’.83 The 
representation of temporal collapse relates to one of the fundamental principles of the 
traumatic event not being experienced as it occurs, itself rupturing time and selfhood 
and creating the ‘holes of existence’ LaCapra discusses and the temporal disruption that 
Caruth refers to. It is a dilemma of temporal cognition that, as discussed, also relates to 
the trauma of coma, as evidenced by the autobiographical accounts of post-coma 
selfhood and the haunting islands of memory that pervade the mind of the coma-
survivor. It is therefore no surprise that we see this trope of temporal disruption 
throughout many examples of coma fiction. As I will detail, in Marabou Stork 
Nightmares, the protagonist, Roy, is constantly caught within collapsing narratives, both 
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from his disturbed and distorted past marked by violence and childhood sexual abuse, 
and from his present experience within his coma. The typography and mise-en-page 
visually represent his temporal disjunction as he refuses to emerge from his coma and 
face the outside world, the typographically miniaturized repetition of ‘up’ placed above 
each other on the page both physically representing the transition from an unconscious 
to a conscious state, but also his reluctance to make this transition (a reluctance, 
perhaps, echoing Carl’s own reticence in The Coma). Similarly, the capitalized 
commands ‘DEEPER’ are positioned vertically beneath each other on the page, again 
representing both dynamic and emotive content that conveys Roy’s desperation to 
sustain his coma. Frequently, the past intrudes upon his present, the traumatic memories 
of childhood assimilated into a nightmarish quest through the South African landscape, 
the atrocities caused within this apartheid-era ‘coma-scape’ imbued with metaphorical 
implications of sexual abuse and the violent acts that Roy, himself, has performed in the 
world outside of coma. These are acts that he cannot face up to and so he repeats them 
constantly, in the form of his coma dreams, in a process that embodies the traumatic 
compulsion to repeat, and the temporal collapse inherent within this schema. 
Similarly, in Iain Banks’s The Bridge, time and space collapse. The central, unnamed 
coma-protagonist repeatedly creates multiple alter-egos who all attempt to emerge from 
the disorder of consciousness. The chief alter-ego, John Orr, is constantly trapped 
within the repetitive cycles of the oppressive world of the Bridge, itself conceived as a 
circular structure, from which there is no escape. It is a place where there is no 
beginning and no end, in the middle of a seemingly endless expanse of water and where 
the only train-line seems to loop in on itself, back into the centre of the Bridge. In this 
world, the vague, disjunct memories and conceptions of the narrator’s pre-coma self and 
loved ones seem to be manifested in distorted apparitions and hauntings that represent 
the traumatic car-crash that caused the coma, but which lack the necessary connections 
to the world outside of coma that are required to trigger a ‘rising’. 
In Garland’s novel, Carl constantly repeats his actions, trapped, again, in a circular 
experience, confronting memories of the past that lack all referential meaning and 
memorial detail. Form, crucial in LaCapra’s appraisal of ethical trauma writing, plays a 
key role, as in Welsh’s novel. Silhouetted woodcut prints pervade the text, representing 
the outline of Carl’s memories, but lacking the detailed frames of reference and 
temporal connections essential in the rebuilding of selfhood, as I will explore in the next 
chapter. Carl, within his coma, continually returns to the same places, the same vague 
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people that inhabit the ‘overworld’ outside of coma, in order to make the necessary 
connections that will allow an ‘awakening’. These vague journeys and the encounters 
that he has lack all referentiality, emphasized by Garland’s lack of pagination, once 
more representing the rupture in temporality and Carl’s disjunction of selfhood that 
generates a sense of dizzying confusion that extends into the consciousness of the 
reader. 
These levels of empathic unsettlement, in the form of temporal disruption, 
interruption and disturbance ‘might serve as an outline of a general trauma aesthetic’,84 
as suggested by Luckhurst in his discussion of Robert Eaglestone’s formulation of the 
features of the genre of Holocaust testimony. One of Eaglestone’s key components of 
such an aesthetic, Luckhurst goes on to highlight, is ‘a resistance to closure that is 
demonstrated in compulsive telling and retelling’.85 This is noticeable within the three 
novels discussed here with the representation of multiple voices, alongside the 
compulsion to repeat past, fractured memories, embodying the disjunction of traumatic 
experience. However, I suggest that because the protagonists emerge from coma in all 
three novels, seemingly with cognition intact, the writers undermine their own 
employment of empathic unsettlement in a rush for closure that seems to be at odds with 
the agenda of an ethical trauma aesthetic. In short, the authors have created narratives 
that are more concerned with ‘harmonizing events’, to return to LaCapra’s warning 
against ‘totalizing narratives’ and so in the end, empathic unsettlement is neutralized. 
Indeed, in Welsh’s novel, it seems that Roy’s cognitively-lucid ‘light switch’ moment 
of emergence from coma is deployed by Welsh in order for his heroine to enact her 
emasculating revenge upon her violent sexual abuser of the past. This is the sort of 
‘self-serving scenario’ that LaCapra also cautions against with the coma-motif being 
employed simply as a means to explore other, hierarchically-privileged themes and 
narrative threads of the novel, most notably rape, sexual abuse and the well-trodden 
road of revenge. 
Whilst there are certainly problematic issues with the representations of coma in 
much of the fiction I have discussed, these are by no means the most extreme cases. In a 
2006 study of the portrayal of coma in thirty contemporary motion pictures, the two 
neuroscientists Eelco and Cohen Wijdicks concluded that ‘the depiction of comatose 
states in motion pictures is misrepresented’ [sic] and that ‘miraculous awakening from 
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prolonged coma with no long-lasting effects was a typical feature’.86 One of their chief 
concerns was related to the ‘“sleeping beauty” phenomenon’,87 in which the coma 
patients depicted in prolonged coma ‘remained well groomed with normal, muscular, 
tanned appearance… as if they were sleeping’.88 This habit of ‘trivialising the depiction 
of prolonged coma to a sleep-like state [with] sudden awakening from coma’89  (the 
‘light-switch’ moment that Johansen refers to) is highly problematic, they suggest, with 
such misrepresentations having a palpable impact upon how audiences understand 
coma, their survey discovering that ‘viewers were unable to identify important 
inaccuracies in one-third of the selected scenes’.90 Significantly, the audience cohort 
that they used for their study was made up of medical professionals, and still the 
medical inaccuracies were often misunderstood as medical fact. This study exemplifies 
the problem of the fetishization of both coma and trauma, not least embodied by the 
‘Sleeping Beauty’ phenomenon. The very image of Sleeping Beauty romanticises coma, 
an intent that is overtly present in the 1995 romantic comedy While You Were 
Sleeping
91 
in which, in a gender-reversal of the Sleeping Beauty tale, a young woman 
falls in love with a comatose stranger whom she has rescued from an oncoming train. 
This also reflects Almodóvar’s Talk To Her in the fetishization of coma, and the 
elevation of the coma patient to a romanticized, even sexualized, heroine, the lack of the 
portrayal of ‘muscle atrophy, decubital ulcers, bladder and bowel incontinence’92 
preserving Alicia’s status as a glamorized, eroticized subject. 
This Sleeping Beauty phenomenon is rife within coma literature, even explicitly 
referred to in Banks’s The Bridge, the coma victim described as a ‘Sleeping Byooty’ by 
one of his own alter-egos. In Liz Jensen’s The Ninth Life of Louis Drax, the young, 
eponymous coma-hero, Louis, is frequently fetishized and romanticized: ‘I looked at his 
soft cheeks, the waxy skin, the parted mouth, the long dark lashes. I stroked his hair. It 
was sleek and thick, and already seemed longer than when he first arrived’.93 Here 
Louis is described in almost sublime terms, his corporeal self, whilst in coma, elevated 
to a form of artistic and even erotic perfection. Elsewhere Jensen describes his 
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‘luminous skin’, comparing him to church carvings ‘with their tiny, perfect hands and 
feet, their dreamily closed eyes’.94 This glorification and aesthetic amelioration of the 
coma body, I suggest, further undermines the gravity of the condition, thus attenuating 
the traumatic content and fetishizing the coma condition. This is problematized further 
as the novel also explores Louis’s interior state of coma, a narrative thread that, whilst 
depicting traumatic repetitions within Louis’s unconscious as he comes to terms with 
how he came to be in coma, ultimately undercuts the seriousness of the coma condition, 
further, by suggesting that all Louis has to do to emerge from coma is to decide that this 
is actually what he wants. 
This coma fetish and the use of the Sleeping Beauty are similarly apparent in Marc 
Levy’s If Only It Were True. This novel tells the story of Lauren, a young doctor who 
‘dies’ in a car crash, only to be brought back to life moments later. Trapped in coma, an 
astral projection of her ‘self’ inhabits her apartment, now being sub-let by a new tenant, 
Arthur. He is the only one who sees her, and he soon falls in love with her, becoming 
increasingly desperate to save her before her life support machine is switched off. 
Sitting firmly within the mainstream genre of romantic fiction, Levy’s novel recycles 
the stories of Snow White and Sleeping Beauty to create a modern fairy-tale, complete 
with ‘sleeping’ Princess and dashing Prince Charming. Rather than the cursed apple or 
spindle, though, it is a car crash that precipitates the heroine’s descent into the deep 
‘sleep’. 
In the description of the crash itself, Levy uses the figure of the coma patient that 
further exemplifies this glorification of the traumatized body: 
 
Lauren lay still, peaceful, at rest. Her features were calm, her breathing slow 
and even. There might even have been a small smile on her slightly parted 
lips. Her eyes were closed – she seemed to be sleeping. Her long hair framed 
her face, her right hand lay across her midriff.
95
  
 
This passage exudes a sense of calm that is at odds with the violence of the traumatizing 
incident: the car crash that sees Lauren flung through a shop window. The lingering 
upon the physical, beautified aspects of Lauren’s body is almost sexualized, 
romanticizing the coma in much the same way as the other novels discussed. Again, the 
coma is portrayed as a serene state of deep sleep with the sibilant reference to the ‘small 
smile’ even implying that this is a perfect state of being in the aftermath of the violence 
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of the crash, the precision with which her body is described chiming with Jensen’s 
depiction of the angelic, statuesque hero of her own novel. Levy’s romanticization is 
further evidenced in his depiction of the astral projection of Lauren from the coma-state, 
creating a fantasy out of a severe medical condition. 
However, this fetishized coma aesthetic becomes more complex as Levy gradually 
integrates factual medical detail seen, most prominently, at the point at which Arthur 
and the astrally-projected Lauren pay a visit to the corporeal Lauren who still lies in her 
hospital bed: ‘The motionless woman was paler than her double, and thinner. Her hands 
had begun to turn inward in the seizing up that occurs in long-term coma patients, and 
she looked frail, but the resemblance was striking’.96 Here, the romantic notion of the 
Sleeping Beauty intersects with the degradation of the body occurring within actual 
cases of long-term coma victims. Later, images of the ‘IV drip to irrigate her’ and the 
‘catheter to carry away her waste’97 are once more at odds with this modern-day fairy-
tale narrative and serve to deconstruct the earlier, sexualized depiction of Lauren post-
accident. Levy portrays the Sleeping Beauty figure as a physically flawed heroine, who 
nevertheless seizes hold of (and maintains, despite these flaws) the romantic attention 
and commitment of the Prince Charming. Crucially, though, it is the ‘perfect’, unflawed 
Lauren that Arthur falls in love with, and even though he physically rescues the 
‘flawed’, corporeal Lauren by kidnapping her from the hospital ward, what he strives 
towards is a recovery of the pre-accident Lauren that haunts his apartment. This being 
said, despite the overly-romanticized aesthetic of the novel, the narrative of Arthur’s 
determination to save the ‘unflawed’ Lauren by protecting the ‘flawed’ Lauren becomes 
a hypostasized portrayal of the relationship between the coma victim and her loved 
ones. In other words, Levy attempts to portray the faith in the recovery of the coma 
victim and the hopes for a return to her pre-coma self that are held by those people in 
the world outside of her coma.  
In Lauren, also, there is the manifestation of the haunting nature of trauma, the 
protagonist literally becoming the ghost of her trauma constituted by a violent accident 
of which she has no memory. We again see the connection between the ‘haunting’ of 
traumatic memory and the ‘haunting’ of the post-coma, post-traumatic memories of the 
coma survivor (the spectral nature of Steph Grant and James Cracknell’s ‘islands’ of 
cognitive confusion, for example). Within the pages of Levy’s novel, the latency period 
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of Freud’s hypothetical train wreck survivor is re-imagined through the depiction of 
Lauren’s car-wreck trauma that is not comprehended as it occurs (seen in the stasis of 
her post-accident self). Instead it is repeated and confronted as she continues to exist 
(through her astrally-projected self) after leaving the scene of the accident. Lauren is 
both haunted by this traumatic event, but also actively haunts, forcing Arthur to become 
the witness to her trauma in all of its forms: the trauma of the accident, the trauma of 
her coma and the potential future trauma of her death as the decision to switch off her 
life support machine draws ever closer. The figure of Lauren becomes an embodiment 
of the multi-faceted traumatic experience of coma, both in the trauma of her lost past, 
and in her struggle to work through this and to survive. To once more refer to 
Luckhurst’s analysis of trauma, Lauren is ‘the traumatic memory [that] persists in a 
half-life, rather like a ghost, a haunting absent presence of another time in our time’.98 
The coma is this half-life that sustains and preserves Lauren’s existence but which 
prevents her from fully living. She is trapped in spiritual form within her old apartment 
and so is both absent and present, a ghost of the trauma that is etched upon and within 
her physical body. This paradox of trauma is heightened in the novel’s denouement 
when Lauren, emerging from coma, has no memory of who Arthur is or what her 
relationship is to this strange man who holds vigil, each day, at her bedside: ‘She 
opened her eyes and placed her hand on his. She looked at him with wondering eyes as 
she asked, “Who are you? Why are you here every day?”’.99 The ‘playing out’ (or 
‘working through’) of Lauren’s astral projection seems to be an externalization of her 
struggle for survival within coma. However, at the end of the novel, Levy by no means 
paints a wholly romanticized depiction of coma survival. Ultimately, Lauren has only 
survived the first stage of her traumatic ordeal: the emergence from coma. The next 
stage of her traumatic experience and survival awaits, namely her rediscovery and 
rebuilding of selfhood, albeit a trauma that is somewhat romantically buffered by 
Arthur’s faithful, optimistic role of Prince Charming. In the light of this critical 
interrogation, the tagline of the novel, ‘Fall in love again’ does not relate to the storyline 
contained within the pages of the novel but pertains to the future lives of Arthur and 
Lauren that exist in the world beyond the ending of the story. The romantic repetition 
implied in this tagline is indicative of the traumatic ordeal (we can only imagine that 
this process of falling in love ‘again’ for the protagonists will not be straightforward, as 
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testified to by Lauren’s lack of recognition of Arthur) and so the very act of falling in 
love also becomes traumatic set against this backdrop of coma and survival. This novel, 
sitting within a mainstream genre (testified to by its adaptation into the Hollywood 
blockbuster, Reese Witherspoon vehicle Just Like Heaven
100
) is by no means a 
straightforward example of romantic fiction, or one of fetishized coma narratives, 
despite its romantic propensities. Moreover, the unease that this supposed example of 
romantic coma fiction engenders can be seen within the film adaptation that departs 
from Levy’s treatment of the most common medical consequences of coma – the void 
of the post-coma consciousness. Within the closing stages of the film, rather than 
leaving David (Arthur, in the novel) and Elizabeth (Lauren) at the stage of 
reacquaintance (or, more accurately, acquaintance, as Elizabeth has no memory of ever 
meeting David, astrally or otherwise), instead, through the briefest moment of physical 
contact, Elizabeth’s memories of the coma come flooding back, and the couple 
embrace. It is the archetypal Hollywood and fairy-tale ending, metaphorically 
‘awakening’ the sleeping beauty with a kiss. 
 
 
1.4: From the Real to the Unreal and Back Again 
 
In navigating towards a ‘correct’ or ethical approach to the writing of trauma, Michael 
Rothberg has coined the phrase ‘traumatic realism’, arguing that writers who adopt this 
approach ‘challenge the narrative form of realism as well as its conventional indexical 
function’101 in order to, as Whitehead proposes, ‘make us believe the unbelievable’.102 
Traumatic realism ‘does not produce an imaginary resolution’103 but ‘seeks to bring 
forth “traces of trauma,” to preserve and even expose the abyss between everyday 
reality and real extremity’.104 This exposure of ‘the abyss’ and the avoidance of neatly-
packaged resolutions is indicative of LaCapra’s warning against ‘self-serving 
narratives’, discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The works of fiction of which I 
have given a brief overview certainly attempt to expose this ‘abyss’ as, by their very 
nature, they depict the fracturing of the coma-self through the traumatic encounter. They 
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often do this by pushing ‘the realist project to its limits’,105 seeking to ‘present the real 
by representing the fictionality of the realist contract’106 through the exploration of the 
aporia of traumatic experience, and through a range of narrative strategies that are 
highlighted by Laurie Vickroy in her discussion of trauma and survival in fiction. She 
writes of the ‘textual gaps (both in the page layout and content), repetition, breaks in 
linear time, shifting viewpoints, and a focus on visual images and affective states’,107 all 
part of the repertoire of narrative techniques at the disposal of the writer of trauma 
fiction. It is these sorts of techniques that writers of trauma fiction employ to preserve 
the ‘hole’ in traumatic experience, to bring it into light, rather than, in Rothberg’s 
words, to ‘convert a hole in the real into a real whole’.108 In other words, through using 
such techniques, authors attempt to avoid the creation of neatly-packaged, ‘totalizing 
and ‘self-serving’ narratives that LaCapra warns against, and which Blanchot asserts are 
impossible to produce. However, this stylistic approach becomes somewhat problematic 
when looking at the writing of coma in which an ultimate abyss of traumatic experience, 
the coma itself, is represented through imaginative approximations of what might 
actually occur within that abyss. Moreover, the fact that much of coma writing does not 
confront the ‘abyss’ in consciousness post-coma (the tertiary trauma of brain injury and 
permanent loss of memory and, on a more acute level, of identity itself) means that 
nuanced representations of the trauma of coma are often absent. 
Luckhurst also highlights a problem that is inherent within the use of literary tools 
through which the writer can attempt to communicate trauma: ‘Paradoxically, the 
aesthetic means to convey the singularity of a traumatic aporia has now become highly 
conventionalized, the narratives and tropes of traumatic fiction easily identified’.109 The 
same literary techniques and tics have become adopted across a whole range of trauma 
texts, no matter what the nature of the trauma is and so in the drive to avoid 
conventionalizing, fetishizing and, ultimately, desensitizing trauma through revealing 
‘the scars that mark the relationship of discourse to the real’,110 often authors may trip 
directly into the pitfalls that they have been trying so carefully to side-step. In calling 
for a mode of empathic unsettlement that would always evade a formulaic approach of 
narrative style and promote an ethical traumatic aesthetic, LaCapra failed to predict the 
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inevitable repercussion: the production and repetition of an infinitely recognisable 
‘repertoire of elements’, to cite Roy Stafford’s theory of the development of common 
generic tropes within broadcast media.
111
 This consequence is frequently seen within 
coma literature, and a paradox that I will be exploring throughout this thesis. A solution 
to this paradox, Luckhurst proposes, is simple and twofold: to consider not just 
‘narrative rupture as the only proper mark of a trauma aesthetic’112 and to regard trauma 
fiction not as ‘a narrow canon of works’,113 but to recognise its ‘explosion’ across low, 
middle and highbrow fiction. This rather catholic approach to the analysis of trauma 
writing allows us to conduct an unprejudiced appraisal of all literature of trauma, 
recognizing and evaluating both progressive and regressive techniques of the trauma 
aesthetic across a wide range of texts. 
Over the course of the next five chapters, I will take a similar stance, examining 
common representations and tropes across a wide selection of coma texts, both 
exploring how trauma and coma are represented, but also evaluating this against the 
‘wiggle-your-big-toe’114 view of post-coma recovery present within contemporary, 
popular culture. Overall, I will explore how these coma narratives, whilst raising 
pertinent and complex issues around the representation of coma and trauma as a whole, 
most often use the coma itself as a narrative springboard for the exploration of wider 
socio-political or moral and philosophical issues. In short, I will look at how the lack of 
in-depth empirical knowledge of what occurs within deep coma gives authors carte 
blanche to use this void of consciousness to write about whatever they wish in the light 
of their wider creative agenda. 
In chapter two, further exploring Freud’s theory of traumatic departures (alongside 
Caruth’s development of this theory), I will examine how Garland and Welsh, in their 
novels The Coma and Marabou Stork Nightmares, depict the interior landscape of coma 
as a form of exile. Developing my discussion, I will draw on Lacanian theory, positing a 
theoretical approach that sees the fictional representation of coma as an ultimate form of 
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a traumatic, exilic state: an exile from the self and from society with the coma 
protagonist in each novel trapped within the alien landscape of their coma. 
In chapters three and four, I will examine how writers of both coma fiction and non-
fiction assimilate traditional and classical stories of katabasis (or hellish descent), 
resurrection and rebirth in order to depict the plight of the coma victim. Drawing 
parallels between such coma texts as Stephen King’s The Dead Zone, Liz Jensen’s The 
Ninth Life of Louis Drax and Iain Banks’s The Bridge, I will trace how these novels 
equate the coma-state to a descent into Hell/Hades, the underworld of the unconscious, 
whilst mapping these representations against tales of katabasis within Judeo-Christian 
and Greco-Roman tradition. I draw links between the development of archetypal 
psychology by Carl Jung and, later, James Hillman, and narratological theories of the 
role of mythology in both literature and the development of personhood and the storied 
self, as posited by Northrop Frye and Paul Ricoeur. In doing this, I argue that whilst 
these intricate, modern-day versions of messianic transfiguration and classical quests 
through hellish landscapes detract from the genuine traumatic experience of the coma 
abyss, these narratives, in themselves, reveal a need to confront, explain and ‘contain’ 
the ultimate fear: the void in consciousness. This void may act as an indicator, for many 
people, of what occurs after death. I suggest that by containing and ‘mastering’ the 
coma abyss, authors are attempting to contain and master the fear of death. 
In chapter five, I turn to Tom McCarthy’s post-coma novel Remainder, exploring his 
representation of the theories of the simulacrum posited by Jean Baudrillard. However, I 
superimpose this theoretical framework over real-life experiences of post-coma 
recovery, looking at the coma survivor’s identification with the new ‘self’ post-brain 
injury, and the alienation from the old self. I also examine this through Jacques 
Derrida’s concept of ‘the trace’, an absent-presence of the survivor’s former self that 
can never be reassimilated because of the permanence of brain trauma. As part of this 
analysis of the simulacrum within coma literature, I will look at the real-life case of 
Mark Hogancamp, as seen in the documentary-film Marwencol who, post-coma and 
brain injury, relived and attempted to work through his traumatic experience by creating 
simulations of his life-story using action figures and scale-models. I will also explore 
how McCarthy’s commitment to researching the post-traumatic recovery of coma 
contributes to his accurate portrayal of coma and brain injury rehabilitation, but also 
how he raises important questions about the post-coma identity through the assimilation 
of post-modernist and post-structuralist theory. 
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In the final chapter, I will look at the use of coma as ‘metaphor’, evaluating how the 
image of the coma has been appropriated to explore wider socio-political issues, often 
undermining the traumatic nature of coma itself. Exploring Susan Sontag’s seminal 
works Illness As Metaphor and AIDS And Its Metaphors, I argue that both coma and 
brain injury are the latest medical conditions to be appropriated by authors for 
metaphorical purposes, allowing them free rein to explore wider agendas. I look at how 
political and media commentators also use these medical terms metaphorically to 
describe socio-political and cultural issues of the day. Looking at such novels as Robin 
Cook’s Coma and Douglas Coupland’s Girlfriend in a Coma, I will look at how, 
throughout the last sixty years, the image of coma has been used to tap into 
contemporary fears or issues – in the case of the former, black-market organ donations 
and the rise of medical technology and in the case of the latter, the vacuity of an 
increasingly capitalist and postmodern society. I conclude by suggesting that 
misrepresentations of coma, chiefly the negation or dilution of the possibility of brain 
injury post-coma, serve to create a collective mythology that influences an audience’s 
understanding of what the medical conditions of both coma and brain injury entail. I 
argue that such misinformed representations serve to stigmatize the brain injury 
survivor, in particular, through the failure to represent brain injury successfully and 
accurately as a legitimate and widespread consequence of coma survival. 
But before I move deeper into the realm of coma literature, I would like to refer to 
one last example of coma representation, and one that illustrates both how widely the 
image of the coma has inveigled its way into contemporary and popular culture but 
which also highlights the ethical problems of overly romanticized and aestheticized 
representations of coma and trauma. 
In 2011, the video game developer, Ubisoft, released its sixth instalment of the high- 
octane driving simulation series, Driver. Driver: San Francisco kept the first-person, 
sandbox format of its predecessors, but what marked its key departure was the narrative 
twist. Within the first segment of the game, its central protagonist, Tanner, a cop for the 
SFPD, is involved in a violent car-crash whilst in pursuit of his criminal nemesis. From 
this point on, the rest of the gameplay unfolds within the coma unconscious of Tanner, 
the narrative plotting allowing a new gameplay dynamic: the ‘shift’. This ‘shifting’ 
allows the player to astral project across the city and ‘possess’ the driver of any car he 
chooses. In terms of narrative, much like Sam Tyler in the BBC series Life On Mars 
discussed earlier, Tanner must solve crimes within his coma, in order to come closer to 
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comprehending his true state of consciousness and emerge from coma. 
The trope of the astral projection, as previously discussed, is similarly utilized in 
Levy’s If Only It Were True, but is also present within the interior coma narratives of 
Garland’s The Coma and Welsh’s Marabou Stork Nightmares, in which the respective 
protagonists seem to develop a remarkable ability to ‘shift’ between different levels of 
their coma unconscious as will be examined further in chapter two. In Driver: San 
Francisco, at one point Tanner utters, ‘Maybe if I could hop a whole building… or a 
whole block…’,115 developing his ability to shift between locations. He no longer has to 
use the physical ‘shift-stick’ of his car but can ‘shift’ psychically, possessing the minds 
of other drivers scattered across the cityscape of his coma. The linguistic tone here is 
markedly similar to that used by Garland, at the point at which Carl realises his own 
growing ability to ‘shift’: ‘The place I was seeing was a sense of place. While I could 
sense it, I could see it. And if, as I shifted from one location to another, I could sense 
two places…’.116 This moment of realization, the tentative yet confident understanding 
that the ability to ‘shift’ can be illimitable, is present in both of these texts with the 
coma seen as an alternative reality that allows the protagonist boundless possibilities 
and over which he can develop control. This kind of introspective reflection continues 
throughout Driver: San Francisco; Tanner’s observation that, ‘I’m not dead… but I’m 
not me’, could, in fact, serve as an epigraph for both Garland and Welsh’s novels. 
Embedded within the world of the game are, likewise, generic motifs inherent within 
works of coma fiction. Throughout, Tanner is confronted with road-signs that contain 
subliminal messages concerning his condition, sign-posts that try to guide him out of 
coma: ‘Wake Up’, one sign orders him. This notion of psychological and subliminal 
messages at work within the interior consciousness of coma appears throughout coma 
fiction: the OU lecturer in Life On Mars; the manifestations of vehicle wrecks and 
mishaps in Banks’s The Bridge; the marabou stork in Welsh’s novel. These become part 
of the unconscious process of repeating and working through trauma (the Freudian 
‘dream-work’) that must be undergone if an ‘awakening’ from coma is to be achieved, 
once more aligning the consciousness of coma with the consciousness of sleep. 
Throughout Driver: San Francisco, both narrative and gaming progress is hindered 
by intrusions from the world outside of coma. The jolting shock from defibrillator 
paddles or the jarring pitch of the life-support machine frequently impacts upon 
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Tanner’s interior world, reminding him of the precarious life-or-death situation which 
he currently inhabits. Again, such motifs are constantly present within Life On Mars, 
The Sopranos but also within The Bridge: the protagonist at one point picks up his 
telephone only to hear the pips of a dead line that sound eerily like the staccato tone of a 
life-support machine. 
Frequently, Tanner is confronted with flocks of black crows which, in some 
mythologies and cultures, are symbols of death. In this instance, the coma-state 
becomes equated with a death-state. This again utilises associations also present within 
such works of fiction as Stephen King’s The Dead Zone, in which the central 
protagonist, Johnny Smith, is ‘resurrected’ from the death-state of coma, only to be 
‘transfigured’ and granted the messianic power to save the world from nuclear 
destruction. Such a tendency towards equating the coma with a death-state is similarly 
noticeable in Banks’s The Bridge, and also within the autobiographical poetry of Peter 
Redgrove, himself a survivor of multiple, induced comas. 
This instalment of a popular game franchise, I suggest, highlights some of the ethical 
dilemmas that stem from overly fetishized representations of the trauma of coma. The 
game encourages the player to continue to speed and crash into scores of cars in 
increasingly spectacular ways, in order to attain objectives, constituting repetitions of 
the protagonist’s traumatizing event. This leads to a sustained glorification both of the 
trauma that led to the coma (the crash) and of the coma itself as the player is always 
encouraged to look for new and inventive ways to drive a rival off the road, actions that 
are played-out in lingering slow-motion, fetishized cut-aways. I argue that such 
representations of the disaster of coma and its many levels of trauma are deeply 
problematic, not least because in the case of Driver: San Francisco Tanner ‘wakes’ 
from his coma with cognition fully intact and immediately becomes involved in a ‘real-
world’ car pursuit that results in yet another crash, once more glossing over the tertiary 
level of coma-trauma: brain injury. In this case, the negation of the possibility of brain 
injury and creation of a coma-fetish is even more troubling when we consider the fact 
that motor vehicle accidents are the second leading cause of traumatic brain injury
117 
and yet in this game that portrays multiple car crashes and which uses this as its core 
conceit, one consequence of this trauma (coma) is overly romanticized as a high-octane 
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dreamscape and the consequence of coma (brain injury) is ignored altogether. 
Over the course of the following chapters, I will continue to explore this notion of 
the ethical responsibility of authors when representing the trauma of coma whilst 
examining the common metaphorical tropes that they use. Crucially, I will explicate 
how these tropes have the potential to misinform and mislead a collective audience as to 
the true nature of the medical conditions of coma and brain injury, whilst revealing 
simultaneously the deepest human concerns with the mysteries of chronic disorders of 
consciousness. 
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2: A Compartmentalised Life. Coma, Memory and the Exilic Self in Alex 
Garland’s The Coma and Irvine Welsh’s Marabou Stork Nightmares. 
 
The strange appears as a defense put up by a distraught self: it protects itself by substituting for the image 
of a benevolent double that used to be enough to shelter it the image of a malevolent double into which it 
expels the share of destruction it cannot contain. 
                                                                                                                                                  - Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves. 
 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 
Coma, as both a medical condition and literary conceit, constitutes, I suggest, a 
manifestation of exile, with the subject wrenched out of society and locked within the 
confines of ‘the deepest form of unconsciousness’.1 Whilst in coma, the subject is 
exiled from the outside world within which they used to play a part. This is an exile 
which is imposed upon the individual, often through violence enacted both upon and 
within the body as previously discussed. 
Akin to exile from a country, the coma has a paradoxical, dual function. In one 
respect, both exile and coma constitute a traumatic transition, a painful upheaval in 
which everything that was once secure and solid is left behind, leaving little other 
option but an enforced journey into the unknown. Counteracting this, however, is the 
reality that the process of exile is also, despite its traumatic resonance, a process of self-
preservation and ultimately of survival: if the exile were to remain in their country, in 
their homeland, there would often be the distinct possibility that they would be facing 
death. In medical language, the coma is frequently described as a safety mechanism, a 
‘re-setting’ of parts of the brain in order to preserve the functioning of the brain as a 
whole. Indeed, the medical practice of induced coma is often used to aid and even save 
the lives of patients: to prevent brain-swelling, for example, in head-trauma incidents, 
or to stem the growth of cancer cells. The exile of coma, therefore, both traumatizes and 
helps to sustain the life of the victim. But in medical practice, this exilic state can 
extend beyond the coma itself. For those who emerge from coma, the state of exile may 
continue through the inevitability of post-trauma brain injury that may be incurred, a 
consequence that can vary in extremity. 
Baldly, I argue that the exilic condition is perpetuated often by the memory of the 
place from which one was exiled: the ‘homeland’. The persistence of this memory and 
the yearning to return to the homeland is, I propose, much like the traumatic memory. 
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Memory will not allow the exile to become fully contented and at peace in his present 
surroundings and will not allow him to move forward and beyond the feeling of exile. 
Just as the traumatic memory entraps the survivor of trauma within a ruptured 
temporality of existence in which the traumatic episode of the past is repeated and 
relived, so that the memory of the homeland for the exile entraps him in a constant 
yearning for the past and the traumatic associations of displacement and upheaval that it 
evokes. Edward Said, in his influential essay on exile, refers to this predicament as ‘the 
loss of something left behind forever’,2 a loss which is embodied by the ‘unhealable rift 
forced between […] the self and its true home’.3 I suggest that Said’s language, here, 
illustrates the traumatic condition and presents the possibility of translating the image of 
the ‘unhealable rift’ into the language of trauma: the ‘rift’ of exile relating to the 
‘wound’ of the traumatized subject that is constantly reopened through reoccurring 
encounters with the traumatizing incident. This incident, as Anne Whitehead posits in 
her discussion of Caruth’s development of the Freudian structure of trauma, is ‘not 
available in the usual way to memory and interpretation’.4 Interestingly, whilst 
Whitehead goes onto discuss how the traumatic event ‘cannot be possessed in the forms 
of memory or narrative’, nevertheless the ‘haunting quality’ of trauma continues to 
‘possess the subject with its insistent repetition and returns’.5 The memory of trauma, 
then, cannot be possessed and yet the spectre of it possesses the memory of the victim.  
Drawing a parallel between the language of such trauma theory and of the theory of 
exile, we can once more look to the notion of the ‘loss of something left behind 
forever’. This reference to a permanent loss evokes a sense of death, or of a ghost, with 
the lost object (in this case the homeland) repeatedly haunting and possessing the 
memory of the traumatized exile. Indeed, as Catherine Reuben succinctly posits when 
writing about exile and identity, ‘There is a strong link between exile and memory. 
Without memory, one would not know that one was in exile’,6 a sentiment supported by 
Said in his suggestion that, ‘Almost by definition exile and memory go together’.7 I 
suggest that here, the word ‘exile’ could be exchanged for ‘trauma’. No matter how 
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fractured and dysfunctional memory is for the traumatized subject, it is still memory (or 
the rupture in memory) that reminds that subject that it is traumatized. Significantly, 
later on during his explication of the condition of exile, Said proposes that in order to 
attempt to move beyond this traumatizing memory, the victim must refuse to ‘sit on the 
sidelines nursing a wound’.8 Once more, the language of trauma is evoked. According 
to Said, it seems as though the only way one can cope with the trauma of exile is to put 
a stop to the reopening of the wound of the traumatizing incident – the initiating 
moment of exile. 
As I will explore, this complex nexus between trauma, memory and exile can also be 
extended to the medical state of coma and the plight of the coma victim. For the 
individual who survives coma but has sustained brain damage, they not only return 
from the exile of coma but return to a ‘homeland’ in which they now still feel exiled 
due to the indelible changes in personhood that they carry with them. Even if the 
survivor has no memory of who they used to be, these memories will still be held by 
proxy by their loved ones and shared with them, perpetuating not only a sense of exile 
within the homeland (the world outside of coma) but also a sense of metaphorical exile 
from their former self. As an exile himself, displaced from his Palestinian homeland, 
Edward Said’s personal and literary analysis of the exilic state is once more germane to 
this discussion of the coma survivor. In writing about the group-mentality of 
nationalism and its ‘essential association with exile’,9 Said proposes that, ‘In a very 
acute sense exile is a solitude experienced outside the group: the deprivations felt at not 
being with others in the communal habitation’.10 This is an interesting statement in that 
frequently, the exile may not be alone in his banishment. It may be the case that he has 
been exiled as part of a group and so will physically be in the presence of others, living 
side-by-side with them in the new place to which they have all been exiled. Said’s 
concept of solitude, then, cannot be understood literally. Even if the exile is alone in his 
banishment, the new place to which he travels will be built around a ‘communal 
habitation’ in the form of society itself and although assimilation into this society will 
not happen immediately, the exile will still be amongst other people. Said’s concept of 
exilic solitude can only work if it is seen as a metaphorical solitude, a mental isolation 
that is triggered by being forced to leave the familiar, as represented by the people and 
social groups that have helped to create memory and conceptions of homeland. In this 
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way, the persistence of the unpossessable memory of what has been lost is instrumental 
in refusing to allow exiles to reform and recreate their old home and habitat – that 
despite being within groups, each individual is alone. Everything that helped to shape 
memory within the homeland has been stripped away from the exile, thus creating a 
palpable sense of alienation, isolation and loss.  
This, once more, can be extended to the coma-state, and perhaps in a far more literal 
way: whilst within the coma the victim is directly outside of the ‘group’, but on 
emerging from coma, the fragmentary, shattered memory of the victim and the radical 
shifts in their personhood only serves to extend the exilic existence. For the exile, the 
memory of the past homeland is ‘reconstructed’ by the present psychological trauma of 
their isolation and banishment, thus generating disillusionment and embitterment; for 
the coma survivor, memory of their homeland is reconstructed through either the 
physical and medical trauma of ensuing rehabilitation or through any brain damage 
incurred by the coma (or the initiating physical trauma) itself. 
It follows that memory, whether disrupted or obliterated completely through the 
conditions of coma and brain injury, has the ability to sustain the exilic state: the exile 
may always be an exile, even if a return to the homeland takes place. In those cases 
whereby the coma survivor has ‘islands’ of memory retained from the ‘lightening’ stage 
of post-coma consciousness (the often surreal and ungraspable hauntings, that evoke 
Whitehead’s elucidation of the spectre of trauma), the survivor’s sense and memory of 
exile is perpetuated by these ‘memories’ constantly reminding the survivor that he has 
been exiled, despite residing once again in his homeland. This homeland, therefore, can 
never be the same again; the feeling of exile will always persist and be perpetuated by 
the memory of the loss of something left behind forever. Said also addresses this 
concept of the exile’s ‘unreachable’ homeland to which the exile can never return, 
suggesting that, ‘The pathos of exile is in the loss of contact with the solidity and the 
satisfaction of earth: homecoming is out of the question’.11 I suggest that this statement 
can be considered as a powerful metaphor for the plight of the ‘coma-exile’ who loses 
contact with the solidity and familiarity of the homeland whilst within the ‘outland’ of 
coma and who then returns from exile only to find that the homeland can never be the 
same again. In short, even if the exile does eventually return to the homeland, a true 
‘homecoming’ is impossible because the homeland is now loaded indelibly with the 
traumatic memory of exile and loss.  
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Having established where the concept of coma is positioned within this complex 
critical framework of the theories of trauma, exile and memory, I would now like to 
move away slightly from the discussion of the coma survivor’s return from the outland 
of ‘coma-exile’ to the ‘homeland’ and instead focus on the representation of the exilic 
state of coma itself within two particular works of fiction: Alex Garland’s The Coma 
and Irvine Welsh’s Marabou Stork Nightmares. I will explore how the interiority of 
coma is depicted as an exilic condition and how both authors draw upon both trauma 
theory and wider principles of psychoanalysis in order to represent the plight of the 
victim of coma and how traumatic memory perpetuates their state of exile. 
 
 
2.2: A New World to Rule: Coma, Memory, Control 
 
Whilst much of Said’s discussion of exile focuses upon the physical and geographical 
dislocation of an individual from his homeland, David Bevan, in his introduction to a 
collection of essays analysing the relationship between literature and exile, proposes a 
model of exile that occurs within the homeland. He posits that, ‘Exile within a place is 
often still more poignant than exile from a place or exile to a place. Exile, viscerally, is 
difference, otherness’.12 I argue that the coma victim exemplifies this concept of exile 
within a place, still physically inhabiting the homeland and yet, through the distinct 
otherness of coma, exiled from it. The Coma by Alex Garland and Marabou Stork 
Nightmares by Irvine Welsh explore this ‘internal’ exile of coma and how memory 
impacts upon and often perpetuates the exilic self. However, rather than representing 
the realities of memory and the post-coma condition, they are more concerned with the 
representation of how memories of the outside world (of the homeland) may operate 
within the exilic state of coma itself. Both novelists focus upon representing the inner 
state of (un)consciousness of the coma-exile as he gradually moves out of coma and 
returns to the homeland. Furthermore, for both Carl (The Coma) and Roy (Marabou 
Stork Nightmares) the exile of coma is triggered by a violent act. For this reason, it is 
important to first consider the initiating incident of exile for these characters – their 
points of departure for the outland of coma.  
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In his analysis of the work of another prominent literary exile, W.G. Sebald, Philip 
Schlesinger highlights a common connection between violence and exile: ‘Typically, 
violence - actual or threatened - propels people into exile, although we cannot exclude 
the inner compulsion to depart’.13 In the case of Carl in The Coma, it is certainly a 
violent initiating event that heralds his metaphorical departure from the homeland: a 
vicious attack on a tube train at the hands of a delinquent gang. For Welsh’s 
protagonist, Roy, his departure is an altogether more complex manifestation of 
departure, triggered by an act of self-violence: a botched suicide attempt, the cause for 
which is gradually revealed through narrative exposition. The two novelists, however, 
present the characters’ respective comas in two sharply contrasting ways. For Carl, it is 
an exile from which he is desperate to escape; for Roy, the self-imposed and self-
sustained exile becomes a safe haven in which he can attempt to hide from the realities 
of his homeland, realities that led him to the suicide in the first place. Despite this 
difference, both novelists explore how memory (and the distortion of memories) plays a 
key role in sustaining coma. Again, it is useful to consider Said’s discussion of exile in 
analysing the representation of coma in these two novels. He writes, ‘For an exile, 
habits of life, expression or identity in the new environment inevitably occur against the 
memory of these things in another environment’.14 This description of the ‘doubling’ of 
exile (physical and psychological) supports the idea that it is the memory of the 
homeland that makes it impossible for the exile to live comfortably; that he can only 
compensate for the real sense of loss by ‘creating a new world to rule’.15 This creation 
of a new place and a new order occurs through an attempt to, in turn, create a new 
conception of selfhood in order to learn to accept and overcome the feeling of exile and 
assent to a future self that can live comfortably within a new land. However, as Said 
suggests, the memories of exile cannot be completely put out of mind and so this 
attempt to develop control over how one perceives and accepts a new life and a new 
land will be inevitably superimposed over those distant memories of the homeland. We 
can once more think back to Steph Grant’s attempt to move forward and away from the 
exile of coma by adopting the fragmented memories and behaviours of a lost self, trying 
to re-read Mill, for example. As discussed in chapter one, for the real victims of coma, 
these ‘memories’ of the homeland (a place inhabited by the old self) are often 
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completely obliterated. In this regard, however, Said’s exegesis may still be applied, 
only more problematically. Indeed, I argue that in such real-life cases it is the memory 
of a memory of the homeland and the ‘pre-exilic’ self that continues to haunt the coma-
survivor, eruptions that perpetuate the exilic state despite the fact that, to all intents and 
purposes, they have made the physical, medical return from coma to the homeland. 
However, both Garland and Welsh gloss over the real potential of shredded or even 
obliterated memories of the post-coma exile. Instead, as I will demonstrate, in both 
novels memory is depicted in a far more conventional way in that lost memories or 
distorted, fragmentary memories of the homeland (and pre-coma self) can ultimately be 
largely retrieved and confronted. In other words, permanent loss of memory through 
brain trauma is not entertained by the authors, thereby over-simplifying the multifaceted 
exilic nature of coma. This has clear implications for the application of Said’s theories 
of exile in that both Garland and Welsh align the psychological exile of coma with 
geographical exile. Both Carl and Roy are trapped within psychical projections of 
geographical landscapes in which they are exiled and where they do indeed attempt to 
accept exile through the creation of ‘a new place’, although in markedly different ways.  
At the start of The Coma, Carl narrates the details of his attack and his emergence 
from coma, describing the nightmarish homeland that he has returned to, inhabited by 
shadowy taxi drivers, unnamed nurses and vague friends and neighbours. However, it 
soon transpires that this entire ‘memory’ of survival and rehabilitation is a falsification, 
a ‘new world to rule’ that was formed whilst still within his coma. The more Carl tries 
to inhabit this world comfortably, the more uncomfortable he becomes, with the world 
itself threatening to collapse and reveal the truth of his sustained exile within coma. 
Applying Said’s concepts of exile, Carl’s existence within this fake re-imagining of his 
homeland occurs against the backdrop of memories of his real homeland. These 
memories, however, lack solid definition and are maddeningly intangible and so this 
new world, to once more refer to Said, becomes ‘unnatural and its unreality resembles 
fiction’.16 Here, Said acknowledges the inevitable consequence of the attempt of the 
exile to ‘build’ a new world upon memories of the homeland. Such an existential 
palimpsest can only have one result: the alienation from the new world as the eruption 
of memories of the homeland ensues, leading to an overall and persistent traumatic 
memory of exile. These haunting feelings of displacement, alongside the memories of 
exile and the homeland that leak through the cracks of consciousness, are represented in 
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Garland’s novel, creating an unnerving sense of disorientation and dislocation within 
Carl’s comatose mind. His attempts to reside within a ‘fictionalized’ version of his 
homeland continually remind him of the place from which he was exiled and so it is 
only a matter of time before the façade breaks down to reveal the truth: that despite 
experiencing a return to the homeland and liberation from the exile of coma, he is still 
actually trapped within the outland. 
Throughout the novel, Garland represents a highly complex relationship between 
memory and ‘coma-exile’. Even before Carl realises his initial memories of awakening 
are false, the reliability of his memory as a whole is brought into question as he 
describes the attack which initiated his departure into coma: 
 
Now, through the side windows of the train, as if I were hovering between 
the external glass and the subway walls, I saw myself walking backwards 
through the carriage, holding up my arms around my face and upper body. 
The young men were attacking me […] From my position outside the 
carriage, I watched as the young men kicked me into unconsciousness 
(Original emphasis).
17
 
 
In this early extract, the reliability of memory comes under scrutiny. Carl positively 
affirms that as the incident took place, he stood as an external witness to his own 
trauma. However, this suggests that he has a somewhat distorted memory or that 
perhaps his consciousness is creating Freudian ‘screen memories’, a psychic 
mechanism, Freud postulates, that assists the subject in concealing ‘the memory of a 
more significant or painful event than that which is superficially remembered’.18 In 
other words, the screen memory is designed to protect the traumatized subject from the 
true gravity and emotional weight of the trauma itself. In the above extract, Carl 
witnessing his attack from an objective subject position creates a sense of separation 
between him and the trauma of the violence which constituted his point of departure 
into the exilic state of coma. It is, therefore, as though the attack were happening to 
someone else and the flat, apathetic tone of the narrative voice represents the self-
preservative function of the screen memory, distancing the subject from the trauma. 
This technique, I suggest, also resonates with Grant and Selzer’s use of the third person 
pronoun in order to distance themselves from their own trauma. However, the fact that 
Carl’s memory of his attack takes this objective form calls into question the very 
                                                     
17
 Alex Garland, The Coma (London: Faber and Faber, 2004), [p. 4]. 
18
 Nicola King, Memory, Narrative, Identity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 109. 
55 
 
 
reliability of his memory itself, as Freud explicates in his discussion of the phenomenon 
of seeing oneself from an objective subject-position within certain memories: 
‘Wherever one appears in a memory in this way, as an object among other objects, this 
confrontation of the acting self with the recollecting self can be taken as proof that the 
original impression has been edited’.19 Significantly, Freud also refers to this 
phenomenon in his discussions of how one perceives one’s own death, proposing that 
‘our own death is indeed unimaginable, and however often we try to imagine it, we 
realize that we are actually still present as onlookers’.20 In Carl’s out-of-body 
testimony, this Freudian ‘edit’, he describes only what he imagines the attack (the 
encounter with death) would have looked like from the point of view of an external 
witness, just as Selzer only imagines what his comatose self (his ‘dead’ self) looked like 
after his own ‘death encounter’. Garland’s use of italics adds weight to this sense of 
unreality whilst also, as discussed earlier, exhibiting one technique utilized by the writer 
of trauma fiction as observed by Luckhurst: italics to mark the eruptions and 
‘breakthrough’ moments of traumatic memory. But the question remains: what exactly 
does this action of memory signify and why is it being distorted in this way? In order to 
elucidate this complex relationship between memory and exile, we can once more turn 
to the field of trauma theory and revisit Freud and Caruth’s hypotheses of ‘traumatic 
departures’, discussed briefly in chapter one.  
Returning to Freud’s hypothetical case study in Moses and Monotheism of someone 
walking away from a train wreck with no obvious signs of injury, the concept of 
‘latency’ becomes most apposite when analysing the representations of exile. As Freud 
discusses, over the subsequent days and weeks, the train wreck survivor may develop a 
‘traumatic neurosis’21 as the realization of the seriousness of the accident, and the 
delayed recognition of just how close the person came to death, begin to be absorbed 
and rationalized by the survivor. As discussed, exile, by its very nature, is concerned 
with traumatic departures that are both physical and psychological. During the process 
of departure from the homeland, the individual is absorbed in the action of departing 
and it is not until the departure is complete and the individual has left the homeland that 
the process of exile is also complete. It is at this point that the true weight of disruption 
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and dislocation begins to manifest itself through the memories of what the exile has lost 
or left behind; it is at this point when the psychological trauma begins to take root in the 
form of fragmented memories of the lost homeland, thus sustaining the exilic condition. 
In Freud’s case study, it is only when the traveller has moved beyond the action of 
surviving the wreck that he is then ‘free’ to confront the nature of the survival itself, 
just as the exile is only free to confront his condition when the transition between 
homeland and outland is complete. As Caruth summarises, building upon Freudian 
theories of trauma: ‘For history to be a history of trauma means that it is referential 
precisely to the extent that it is not fully perceived as it occurs’.22 In Carl’s case, the 
historical incident of his attack is not fully perceived ‘as it occurs’, resulting in the 
Freudian memory edit in which he detaches part of his identity from the violent event in 
an attempt, perhaps, to disassociate himself from the attack and to initiate a fake 
narrative of survival and awakening from coma (a Freudian screen memory), thus 
repressing both the physical and psychological traumatic reality of his situation. In 
essence, this function of memory represents a splitting of the self - a ‘cloning or 
twinning’,23 as Michael Seidel discusses in his work on narrative representations of 
exile - in which part of the self is left within the external world (his corporeal self) 
while the other part of him (his unconscious) is trapped within the interior world of his 
coma. This fragmentation of self is often symptomatic of the condition of trauma in 
which part of the self and the traumatic experience may be repressed, only to come 
resurfacing in the form of traumatic echoes or episodes. But it is also symptomatic of 
the exilic condition whereby the subject stands astride two worlds, trying to reside here 
but inevitably residing there and so generating, as Schlesinger postulates, a ‘hybrid… 
sense of identity’.24 Carl cannot remember how long he has been in his coma, a gap in 
memory that embodies the ‘incubation period’ that Freud discusses:25 the limbo in 
which the memories of the traumatic incident begin to coalesce to form an overall 
traumatic neurosis. Between the end of the accident (the moment of departure) and the 
first memories Carl experiences within the coma, the exilic (and therefore traumatic) 
condition takes hold, leading to a ‘hybrid identity’ and moreover, a hybrid, fictionalized 
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world within which he temporarily resides, thus causing a fragmentation of selfhood 
which Carl must attempt to reunite if he ever wishes to escape from his coma. 
The first stage of this reunification is to confront the fact that his ‘memory’ of 
leaving the coma and embarking upon rehabilitation is false, constituting a distorted 
reality: a coma ‘dream’. In his discussion of the exile’s use of coping strategies, Seidel 
suggests that, ‘Another imaginative solution to the exile’s anguish is to export just 
enough of the homeland to the outland to metonymically purify it’.26 This approach to 
dealing with the traumatic nature of exile is adopted by Carl who transposes certain 
memories and relationships extant within the homeland to his false narrative in order to 
‘purify’ the exilic landscape to which he has been banished: the otherwise alien outland 
of coma. However, in doing this, his consciousness creates a doubling of exile, a 
traumatic echo that he has to live through twice: facing up to the trauma of his coma 
within his fake narrative of ‘awakening’ before confronting the fact that he is still in the 
exilic state of coma which heralds the end of this false experience of return from exile 
and recovery. 
The function of Carl’s memory within his exilic state, therefore, becomes even more 
complex and paradoxical. His false memories of awakening from coma both protect 
him from confronting the psychological trauma of his exile, but at the same time 
prevent him from commencing his return to the homeland. Garland’s depiction of 
dream-like narratives and memories to convey a form of coma consciousness 
consistently highlights Carl’s fractured sense of self, both preventing his unconscious 
from revealing the reality of his situation whilst conversely encouraging him to accept 
the new rules and conditions of his exilic territory (a shadowy resemblance of his 
homeland). His early encounter with his ‘friends’ Anthony and Mary exposes this 
tension between memory and exile. Throughout this episode, Carl is confronted with, in 
the Freudian sense, ‘uncanny’ occurrences which reflect ‘the helplessness we 
experience in certain dream-states’.27 In the first instance, he has no memory of how he 
arrives at their house, a confusion he expresses when he says to Anthony: ‘One moment 
I was lying in the bath, the next I was ringing your doorbell’.28 He also mentions how 
there was ‘nothing in between’, like the dizzying jump-cuts that occur in dream 
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narratives or the ‘detached shreds of the scenes we have really experienced’29 that the 
sociologist Maurice Halbwachs refers to in his extensive analysis of the appearance of 
deceptive memory-scenes within dream-states. It is also soon revealed that Anthony did 
not come to collect Carl from the hospital, with Anthony himself confessing that ‘a real 
friend should have been there’.30 When Anthony hands over a cup of coffee to Carl, 
Carl says: ‘I felt mildly irritated that Anthony had given me the mug in the first place, 
because, considering our friendship, I thought my dislike of coffee was the sort of thing 
he ought to know’.31 These indications of a dysfunctional friendship come to a head 
when Anthony seems more interested in catching the milkman than he does listening to 
his friend’s fears over the potential psychological and traumatic impact of his coma. 
Over time, Garland reveals how Carl’s screen memories, whilst appearing to 
perpetuate his coma-exile, are creating a complex matrix of triggers to force Carl into 
confronting the truth of his condition. Significantly, whilst with Anthony and Mary, 
Carl feels ‘a sudden and terrific feeling of despair’,32 which is akin to those feelings he 
experienced as a child when he had ‘very powerful fever dreams’. In his current 
situation, he is living through the ultimate ‘fever dream’ of his coma which is creating 
an entire, alternative reality that evokes the alienating ‘otherness’ of exile that Bevan 
refers to. Thus, Anthony’s comment that ‘a real friend should have been there’ becomes 
an unconscious signpost that points towards the fact that he isn’t a ‘real’ friend. Instead, 
as is revealed, Anthony is a cypher, a character created within Carl’s coma 
consciousness and based upon the patriarchal frontman of a ‘bland family’33 at the 
centre of an advertising campaign in Carl’s homeland. In fact, one of Carl’s last 
memories before he is attacked on the train is seeing ‘Anthony’ on a poster within the 
tube station. His constant meetings with this cypher within his fake coma ‘dream’ 
becomes a traumatic echo of his last, fractured memory before slipping into 
unconsciousness. 
Said’s exegesis of exile can again help to illuminate the processes of Carl’s coma-
state when he proposes that, in extreme cases, ‘the exile can make a fetish of exile, a 
practice that distances himself from all connections and commitments’.34 This resonates 
with Carl’s false reality created by his coma-dream. It seems that the comfort provided 
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by this unreal friend, no matter how traumatic, initially outweighs the need to face up to 
the reality of his medical dilemma: that he is still in his coma and needs to awake if he 
wishes to return to the homeland. In this regard, Carl’s traumatic neurosis is highly 
complex. In his coma-dream, he faces the physical trauma of his attack when in reality 
what he should be facing (and, indeed, what he does face when he subsequently 
awakens from this dream) are both the trauma of the attack and the psychological, 
traumatic exile of his coma. It is only this confrontation with the ‘reality’ of his 
situation (marked by his last pre-coma memory of seeing the poster of Anthony in the 
tube station prior to the attack) that will allow him to attempt to return to the homeland. 
Said’s notion of exilic ‘fetish’ can be seen in the form of Carl’s invented friends, 
Anthony and Mary, themselves creations spun from a paradigm of cultural fetishization: 
advertising. However, it becomes inevitable that, following the encounters with his 
false friends and sensation of dream-despair, a gradual realization of a ‘powerlessness 
in [his] adopted land’35 (to refer to Lucy Wilson’s analysis of the exile’s relationship to 
the outland) guides Carl to his own hospital room where he comes face-to-face with the 
corporeal self within which he is exiled. This proves to be the first step toward 
accepting the severity of his circumstances (at the point of confronting his body, he says 
‘not for the first time in this dream, I woke up’)36 and the catalyst for his quest to 
reunite his fragmented identity. In other words, applying Said’s theories, Carl finally 
makes the ‘connections and commitments’ that are required to accept the truth of his 
exilic state. 
The complex and paradoxical nature of Carl’s initially fetishized exile and his screen 
memory of awakening can perhaps be more cogently elucidated through the adaptation 
of Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory that is particularly centred on concepts of 
trauma, identity and alienation. Throughout the novel, Garland attempts to render a 
model of consciousness manifested within the coma-state, a model that I suggest echoes 
much of Lacan’s work on the formation and processes of the unconscious. Carl’s 
confrontation with a psychological projection of his physical self, still submerged in 
coma, reflects Lacan’s theories of the mirror stage, the point at which, in a child’s 
development, it recognises its ‘self’ in a mirror, thus forming the child’s Subject37 and 
allowing the child to move towards having a unified image of itself, rather than the 
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hitherto fragmented understanding of its own identity. Whilst Lacan’s theories were 
formulated through the analysis of child development, I argue that in many cases of 
coma literature, the coma is viewed as a form of birth or rebirth. Indeed, referring back 
to some of the works discussed in the first chapter, this seems to be a recurring motif. 
Johansen refers to her son’s ‘second “birth”’;38 Hollyman writes, at the point of Shaun’s 
emergence from coma, ‘This is how it feels to be born’.39 The victims of coma, 
therefore, may emerge as a completely different person – the new birth of a new self 
that, often, may have to learn (or re-learn) everything it once knew – starting with the 
Lacanian recognition of self, as embodied by the ‘mirror-stage’. I have also already 
drawn a parallel between Lacan’s notion of birth as being a traumatic episode and the 
traumatic emergence from coma, not least due to the fact that after each, the ‘survivor’ 
experiences a certain ‘lack’. Whilst Garland’s novel doesn’t concern itself with a deeply 
nuanced or empirically-researched representation of this post-traumatic condition, at the 
point at which Carl sees himself lying in the hospital bed, a Lacanian recognition of the 
self occurs. This is a recognition that allows Carl’s identity to be both unified and 
alienated. Just as the baby recognises itself for the first time ‘as a unitary being’,40 Carl 
is finally able to resolve the elements of the disturbing, uncanny ‘otherness’ of his exile 
he has encountered up until this moment: ‘One moment I was opening the door to the 
ward room and seeing myself lying on the bed […] The next moment, I was lying on 
the bed. I was lying on the bed’.41 Metaphorically, Carl, through this secondary mirror 
stage that has been triggered by the trauma of his attack and subsequent coma, is able to 
unify all of his fragmentary actions and conceptions of himself into this one revelation 
of selfhood (that he is still within coma), just as the baby is able to reconcile all of its 
fragmented actions and functions into one unified body and self-image. However, as 
Lacan suggests, despite this moment of unification, this mirror stage is still a hugely 
alienating experience constituting a ‘splitting’ of the self. This is a necessary rift as it 
separates the Subject from itself, creating the Object-self which is acknowledged by the 
child to be its mirror image. It is this Object that constitutes the ego and which forms 
the building blocks upon which the child builds a sense of itself. It is also an important 
moment in the socialization of the child, seeing itself as an ‘other’ that will then 
socialise with other ‘others’, and often recognizing its own sense of self that is reflected 
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within the behaviours and reactions of these others with whom it chooses to interact. 
The mirror stage, Lacan summarises, is therefore ‘the symbolic matrix into which the I 
is precipitated in a primordial form, prior to it being objectified in the dialectic of 
identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its 
function as subject’.42 From the very instant of identification, the baby knows that this 
image of itself is contradictory – its identity in the mirror (its Object) is both what it 
thinks it is and what others see of it. This is an important splitting of identity for Lacan, 
primarily as it allows the Subject to enter the Symbolic realm; it heralds the acquisition 
of complex language signification which is vital for the creation of the Subject, of the 
‘I’, and the elaboration of the Object: the ego or ‘Ideal-I’. The mirror stage, therefore, is 
an intellectual action in which the child begins to recognise the function of metaphor. 
The building of the ego ‘comes with the gradual acquisition of language’,43 as language 
attaches ideas to the objectified idea of self, first acknowledged in the mirror. 
Essentially, this pivotal moment in a child’s development marks the moment where it 
begins to understand metaphor: that what I see in the mirror is not really me, yet I will 
still regard it as though it is me, an act of signification grounded within the Symbolic 
realm that is built upon language and metaphor and where, Lacan proposes, the 
unconscious resides. 
I argue that his theory of the acquisition of language and comprehension of metaphor 
plays a significant role within Garland’s representation of Carl’s metaphorical mirror 
stage within his coma. In this case, Carl re-enters language, or rather, the language 
schema that he had developed up until his attack – the language that constitutes part of 
the Other that is embodied by his knowledge and experience of his homeland. It is the 
Other that pre-dated even Carl’s birth, formed from the systems of language, society 
and the law, ‘the whole set of hypotheses within which the Subject is constituted’.44 
Through facing, again, his Object-self and acknowledging his unconscious Subject 
which is still trapped within the coma, Carl once more acquires the necessary language 
and comprehension of metaphor to be able to interpret his false screen memory of 
awakening, confronting the truth of his exilic state, thereby allowing him to attempt a 
return to the homeland. 
Looking once more at the interchange between Anthony and Mary, it seems that 
every action and utterance they perform constitute signifiers of his true exilic state 
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within coma, ‘blurted’ by his unconscious Subject, the true meaning of which Carl has 
repressed into his unconscious, in much the same way as a child will repress negative or 
hurtful signifiers into its unconscious in order to preserve the embellishment and 
perceived ‘perfection’ of its Object-ego – its Ideal-I – in a process of ‘wishful thinking’ 
that denies reality. The child, then, will create ‘master signifiers’, linguistic ‘tics’ that 
will sometimes emerge from the unconscious Subject in the form of blurts, denegations, 
language slips and dream images. These work to preserve the Ideal-I in re-orientating 
signifying chains to support the ego. The master signifiers ‘usually mask their 
opposites’,45 changing the meaning of one signifying chain into an opposite meaning 
that supports the ego. Signifiers in a signifying chain that are perhaps painful or hurtful 
to hear or accept for the Subject are turned into more comfortable, supportive and self-
validating signifiers. In the process of psychoanalytic treatment, for example, a master 
signifier that might be repeatedly uttered by the analysand within different 
conversational contexts is ‘things could be worse’. Despite the fact that the analysand is 
frequently plagued by trauma and negative situations, the positive affirmation of the 
master signifier conceals the fact that in reality, and on a personal, psychic level, things 
could not actually be much worse. It follows that Carl’s guidance out of exile relies 
upon him interpreting the master signifiers in order to confront the signifying chains 
that Lacan proposed were suppressed into the Subject to preserve the Ideal-I. Anthony’s 
failure to pick up Carl from hospital; his unawareness of Carl’s dislike of coffee; 
Mary’s insistence upon him going to hospital; Anthony’s ‘language-slip’ that a ‘real 
friend should have been there’ all constitute a preservation of the ego – in this case an 
‘ideal’ scenario in which Carl has emerged from coma and is engaged in a process of 
successful rehabilitation with the (questionable) support of his friends. The notion and 
repetition of ‘friendship’ is the master signifier which masks and re-orientates the 
reality that within his coma, Carl has no friends and that he is isolated by an ultimate 
embodiment of exile. Carl, therefore, has to follow his discourse of the unconscious (the 
repressed signifiers of his Subject) in order to recognise and confront the opposite and 
true meaning of the signifying chain: that he is still trapped within the exile of coma and 
has no contact with his friends. 
However, even after this revelation (triggered by the secondary ‘mirror stage’), this 
process of following the signifying chains is further complicated for Carl due to the fact 
that the chains themselves contain gaps or are shattered completely. Throughout the 
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novel, in an attempt to trigger an awakening, Carl must follow various signifying chains 
in an attempt to piece his life together and move out of exile. However, these chains 
frequently come to an abrupt end, or fail to go anywhere at all due to the disruptions in 
memory, thus exacerbating and sustaining the exilic state. This suggests that exile is 
also a state that is grounded in language: that it is the understanding of language, 
metaphor and signifying schemes that allows the state of exile to be perpetuated. The 
exile experiences this sense of permanent, personal loss because the homeland comes to 
represent a fundamental part of the individual’s identity, with the place of habitation 
often becoming personified and the relationship with it being deeply personal: a 
relationship that one understands through the grasp of metaphor and language 
signification. Furthermore, the signifier ‘exile’ may well also be masking the real 
signifying chains that have been suppressed into the unconscious. It is these signifying 
chains of the unconscious Subject that might reveal the real traumatic weight of exile 
that the individual tries to avoid, signifiers such as ‘outcast’, ‘endangerment’, ‘threat’, 
and ultimately ‘death’: a death that might have befallen the exile had he stayed within 
the homeland. 
The difference in how Freud and Lacan view the unconscious can also be seen 
within Garland’s novel. Unlike Freud’s notion of the unconscious being a personified 
presence hidden within a topographical conception of the psyche, Garland’s model of 
the unconscious within coma seems to adhere to Lacan’s notion of it being an abstract 
matrix consisting of repressed signifiers, the shifting meanings of which are dictated by 
the discourse of the Other: the rules and habits of language itself. 
 
 
2.3: His Dark Confusions: Coma, Exile, Trauma 
 
This operation of language and memory functioning within the exile of coma is also of 
paramount concern to Irvine Welsh in Marabou Stork Nightmares. The point of ‘exilic 
departure’ for its protagonist, Roy Strang, is withheld from the reader for much of the 
novel. Roy consistently comes close to revealing the cause of his coma exile, but then 
always shies away from revealing the truth. These constant narrative side-steps function 
both as an engaging plot device, enhancing the conventions of the mystery genre that 
Welsh employs, and as representations of Roy’s reluctance to confront the cause of his 
coma: his guilt over his involvement in the violent rape of a young woman. It is this that 
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has led to his unsuccessful suicide attempt and subsequent condition, exemplifying 
Schlesinger’s ‘inner compulsion to depart’. In Roy’s outland of coma, instead of 
obliterating all memories of the atrocity he has committed, he repeatedly and 
traumatically re-enacts them in the form of his ‘Marabou Stork nightmares’. However, 
another idea of Schlesinger’s is also important to consider: that ‘suicide is one response 
to exile’.46 As discussed above, the self-exile of suicide unintentionally leads to the 
coma exile, but Schlesinger is talking about the possibility of suicide as a response to 
exile, not as a point of departure into it. Indeed, as the reader follows Roy’s quest to 
discover his true self through the tripartite narrative of his coma (his ‘surface’ narration 
that is triggered by the constant threats of ‘awakening’; his autobiographical narration; 
and his twisted coma nightmares on the hunt for the Marabou Stork), he begins to 
reveal an unending cycle of exile that has led him to the point of suicide. Roy implies 
that, from birth, he was exiled from his family and homeland, referring to the former as 
a ‘genetic disaster’47 and the ‘scheme’ in which he was brought up as ‘a concentration 
camp for the poor’.48 In this metaphor, Welsh uses another example of an exilic people, 
the Jews, to create a connection with Roy’s early feelings of exile. Genetics continues 
to play a key role in his childhood alienation as he is bullied because of his physical 
features inherited from his cruel and violent father, not least his large ears giving fuel to 
the nickname ‘Dumbo Strang’, again serving to exile him from the ‘collective’ group. 
Roy only seems to find peace when his family decides to emigrate to South Africa. 
Welsh, here, uses the oppressive ideology of apartheid to create an unyielding 
landscape of exile whilst at the same time developing the idea of self-exile through 
Roy’s father’s hatred of Scotland and his desire to leave the homeland behind. Despite 
Roy’s relative ‘contentment’ in this environment, the reader, because of Welsh’s 
creation of an unreliable narrator, has to dig much deeper to find the final reason for 
Roy’s exile of coma. In his ‘autobiographical’ narrative, despite projecting a sense of 
belonging in South Africa, he has to suffer sexual abuse at the hands of his Uncle 
Gordon. Within the coma, however, Roy persists in creating screen memories to 
conceal the horrors of what was actually done to him so that, to return to Freud’s 
exegesis, ‘instead of the memory image that was justified by the original experience, we 
are presented with another, which is to some extent associatively displaced from it’.49 
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This process of ‘displacement’ (in which the unconscious substitutes dangerous or 
traumatic thoughts or memories for vastly more acceptable or ‘controllable’ goals) 
occurs within Roy’s coma ‘dreams’ in which he is back in South Africa with his 
fictitious friend, Sandy, on the hunt for the vicious Marabou Stork. The stork, itself, is a 
displacement that is so loaded with traumatic associations that it gradually develops into 
an example of ‘condensation’, whereby a single image becomes symbolic of many 
other, traumatic associations or ideas. The stork, therefore, is a symbol that represents 
all of the horrors Roy has experienced and, ultimately, the ‘monster’ that Roy had 
become prior to his suicide attempt. During the quest for this stork, Roy’s pre-coma 
memories are assimilated into screen memories, prolonging the cycle of repression. The 
character of Dawson, for example, with his corrupt sexual proclivities and white 
supremacist beliefs becomes a projection of Uncle Gordon, despite the fact that the 
latter was ‘a thin, spindly man’50 whereas Dawson is an obese ‘desperate old queen’51 
who appears ‘to be covered in a strange, translucent oil’.52 This symbolises the disgust 
Roy felt for Gordon at the time of his abuse, a disgust he could never fully voice as a 
child victim. Despite the physical differences, they are both described as having breath 
that is ‘sweet and rancid’.53 This transference of negative memories brings to mind Paul 
Tabori’s definition of the exile: ‘someone who inhabits one place and remembers or 
projects the reality of another’.54 In the case of the ‘geographical’ exile who is 
physically forced to leave his homeland, these ‘projections’ can have a double-bind. On 
the one hand the positive memories of the homeland become a reference point for the 
outland, creating a model of place that can never be matched or reconciled; on the other 
hand, the negative, traumatic memories of the action of exile itself may serve to sour 
the individual’s existence within the new place of habitation. It follows that the 
banishment to this ‘new place’ can only be understood and interpreted through the lens 
of the traumatic memory of exile. This double-bind of exilic memory is similarly 
represented in Welsh’s depiction of Roy’s coma. Roy attempts to evoke and inhabit the 
positive memories of his past place of habitation, South Africa, yet also projects the 
negative memories of the sexual abuse that occurred there and which served to exile his 
child-self further in this outland that his father brought him to. Thus, this new place in 
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which he tries to reside, in which he tries to sustain his self-imposed coma-exile, is 
constantly alienating and turning against him. 
His processes of screen memory, displacement, condensation and projection are not 
just employed in his coma quest-fantasies: they are also utilised in his seemingly 
‘factual’ autobiographical narration. Whenever Roy is in danger of nearing a painful 
truth in his life, he shifts into his fantasy narrative, creating a rupture in memory and 
narrative cohesion in order to repress both the severity of his sexual abuse and the 
degree of his involvement in the rape: 
 
The funny thing was that it didn’t really feel like abuse at the time, it felt 
mildly funny and amusing watching Gordon making a drooling tit of 
himself over me. I felt a sense of power, a sense of attractiveness, and a 
sense of affirmation that I hadn’t previously experienced, during those 
sessions in the garage.
55
 
 
In these early autobiographical narrations, Roy describes the abuse as being grounded 
in masturbatory titillation allowing him ‘a sense of power’ and control by granting 
Gordon access to his body in exchange for gifts and favours. In the dream-like outland 
of coma, this perversion is transposed to Dawson who is frequently portrayed as 
masturbating and defecating in public, depicting him as a rather pathetic, derisory 
figure. Towards the end of the novel, however, as the divisions between fantasy and 
reality increasingly threaten to corrode completely, Roy enters into what Roger 
Luckhurst refers to as the ‘emergency phase’, a common feature of trauma fiction 
characterized by ‘the intrusion of occluded memories into an identity built on an 
excised version of the past’.56 In Welsh’s novel, Roy’s narrative voice explodes into a 
confessional, capitalized stream of consciousness, the most significant declaration 
being: ‘GORDON WITHDRAWING HIS BLOOD-STAINED COCK FROM A 
FRIGHTENED YOUNG BOY BENT OVER A WORKBENCH’.57 In a similar way to 
Carl, Roy sees the traumatic event from an external position, disassociating his current 
self from the impersonal ‘boy’ of the confession, but the most significant implication of 
this is that he was never in control, that the abuse he suffered was total, violent and 
unrelenting. Again, both the fantasy and the autobiography are screen memories and 
distortions, attempts not to face up to the full extent of the abuse. This is often a 
                                                     
55
 Welsh, Marabou, p. 72.  
56
 Roger Luckhurst, The Trauma Question (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 105. 
57
 Welsh, Marabou, p. 255. 
67 
 
 
consequence of  traumatic experience as Kalí Tal proposes in her extensive work on the 
trauma of sexual abuse when she writes that, ‘The dislocation of trauma, which 
removed meaning from the world, is gradually replaced by new stories about the past 
that can support a rewritten personal myth’.58 For Tal, this ‘myth-making’ is an 
essential element of the process of trauma survival and allows the traumatized subject 
to speak of and testify to their past in order to retell their trauma and attempt to make it 
seem more ‘real’ so that future communities can bear witness to and learn from this 
past. However, for Roy, this ‘myth-making’ becomes a way of creating a screen 
between himself and the trauma so that he does not have to face the real gravity of his 
past, a form of deceptive self-protection and preservation. Even at the end of the novel 
when his repressed memories come flooding back in the stream-of-consciousness 
episode cited above, Roy still insists that his involvement in the gang-rape was as a 
bystander, dragged into the horrific act by his brutal friend Lexo. It is only when, in his 
collapsing Stork fantasy, Sandy turns a gun on him that Roy begins to see through the 
screen memories and face up to the fact that far from being a bystander, he was the 
actual instigator of the rape: the actions he fervently attributes to Lexo throughout the 
novel are finally revealed to be his own. His ‘personal myths’ and screen memories, 
therefore, break down and it is at this point when the reader finally begins to understand 
why Roy developed a penchant for sexual violence in the first place: he was trying to 
take control of every sexual encounter through abusive, brutal means, just as his uncle 
did with him. It thereby becomes clear that he was trying to gain the power about which 
he can now only fantasise in his coma narratives by undermining and parodying Gordon 
in the guise of the dream-figure of Dawson. However, in doing this, he also exiles 
himself from both society and morality. Welsh portrays this through Roy’s inability to 
sustain a wholesome relationship after he has managed to escape a criminal conviction. 
His relationship with Dorie promises to flourish, until Roy is repeatedly confronted by 
an anti-rape campaign, the posters for which act as signifiers of Roy’s moral failure. 
These, in turn, trigger a state of crippling depression and self-loathing as he is reminded 
of his psychological and moral exile from ‘decent’ society. This causes his relationship 
with Dorie, his family, and society as a whole to unravel. He is reminded of his exilic 
status and he descends further into this condition, cutting himself off from everybody, 
until this ultimately leads to his suicide attempt: his ‘inner compulsion to depart’. 
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This also demonstrates how Welsh represents the Freudian concept of ‘remembering, 
repeating and working-through’. Through his sexual violence, Roy ‘does not remember 
anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out… he repeats it not as a 
memory but as an action’.59 It therefore follows that the repetitious nature of his coma 
dreams and his transference of traumatic memories, not least his creation of the 
symbolic Marabou Stork, become Roy’s way of ‘repeating and working through’. It 
must be remembered that Freud, as an ego-psychologist, was working clinically with 
patients, using, analysing and interpreting their stories of day-to-day behaviour and 
dream images as a means of locating and eradicating the source of the symptoms of 
neurosis. Applying this approach to Welsh’s novel, I suggest that Roy follows his own 
‘dream’ narrative towards the origin of his neurosis and as author, Welsh exploits the 
interiority of coma to reflect upon how consciousness might cope with both physical 
and psychological trauma. In discussing how Welsh depicts Roy’s unconscious 
confrontation with his traumatic memory, it is also useful to draw a link between 
Freud’s psycho-analytical approach to the functions of narrative, and the systems of 
narrative style as posited by the narrative theorist Dorrit Cohn. Whilst not concerned 
with the practices of psychoanalysis per se, Cohn is particularly interested in psycho-
narration and other narrative modes for representing consciousness. For this reason, his 
discussion of the function of the self-narrated monologue (a technique at play in 
Marabou Stork Nightmares) is particularly germane to my analysis of the novel. Cohn 
lucidly suggests that, ‘Unable to cast a retrospective light on past experience, [the 
narrator] can only relive his dark confusions, perhaps in the hope of ridding himself of 
them’.60 Cohn’s concept of the ‘dark confusions’ is embodied by Roy’s quest for the 
Marabou Stork, a quest which is hampered by narrative non-sequiturs and interruptions 
due to the fact that the stork, itself, represents the evil of Roy’s crime, an evil he is not 
yet ready to face up to and which, moreover, he goes out of his way to avoid. The 
revelation, at the end of the novel, that Roy’s physical affliction was not large ears but a 
large nose (‘Beaky Strang’, not ‘Dumbo’) exacerbates this idea that the Stork represents 
Roy himself: the vile corruption that needs to be, as Roy repeatedly insists, ‘eradicated’. 
The ways both protagonists use memory in their exilic states are starkly contrasting. 
Carl is desperate to eliminate false memories and retrieve lost memories and to follow 
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the signifying chains of his unconscious so that he can reconfigure his identity in order 
to escape exile and return to the ‘waking world’ of his homeland. Roy is desperate to 
preserve his false memories and fantasies to perpetuate his coma and evade the 
homeland. Despite this divergence, the structural models of memory that both Garland 
and Welsh use are surprisingly similar, representing a model of memory in which levels 
of consciousness lie in vertical relation to each other: the deeper the level, the more 
repressed the memory. I have discussed earlier how Welsh splits Marabou Stork 
Nightmares into three narrative voices, voices which are positioned in vertical relation 
to each other, with the voice of the narrative present being at the surface, the 
autobiographical memory being at the intermediary level, and the fantasy-quest lying at 
the deepest point of consciousness. It is this deepest point (the unconscious) that 
provides refuge for Roy, the place to which he goes when the truth of his exile comes 
knocking at his door: 
 
61
 
 
At this point of the novel, though, Roy struggles to move between layers and to hide 
within his Stork nightmares as he comes ever closer to the truth. The repetition of ‘up’ 
emphasises the magnetic pull towards an ‘awakening’, brought about by the intrusion of 
his mother’s coma tape that plays a Matt Monroe song, and the involuntary insistence 
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of his memory to bring to an end his self-imposed exile. Welsh utilises the mise-en-
page to represent how close the vertical layers of memory are coming together, with the 
diagonal ‘up’ string physically encroaching upon Roy’s coma narrative, carrying the 
music and dialogue of the external homeland with them so that they are constantly 
threatening a return to the homeland. The closer Roy comes to this external reality, the 
less control he has over the layers of his mind to which he can travel. Previously, when 
an uncomfortable memory threatens his exile, he uses the command ‘DEEPER’ to find 
shelter from it within his fantasies – now, the command is losing its potency as the 
layers are moving closer together and becoming, in essence, a coherent narrative that 
unifies the fractured elements of Roy’s psyche, therefore revealing the truth of his self-
imposed exile. Welsh emphasises this reunification of selfhood through his use of 
language and dialect. Initially, as Roy embarks upon his quest for the Marabou Stork, 
his story is narrated in the style of a Boy’s Own adventure story, with frequent 
exclamations in the vein of ‘Gosh Sandy, you’re a Hungry Horace today’62 and ‘Let’s 
do the blighter!’.63 The closer the layers of memory and consciousness move together, 
the closer Roy gets to his Scottish identity: 
 
Simply Devine, Patricia. 
Sidney Devine. 
I’ll be back, Sandy. 
-Your Girlfriend looked nice. I hadn’t seen her before. Still, I suppose 
I’m quite new on this ward. 
What girlfriend? Surely that fat hoor wisnae back. Some mistake surely. 
She’ll be getting fucked by somebody else long ago and good riddance. And 
I gave that fuckin boot a ring. Fuckin joke. Go back tae Fathell, Dorie my 
love. 
No don’t talk about her that way don’t talk like that about Dorie who 
isnae real nowt’s fuckin real 
Stay cool.
64
 
 
The conflicting voices, represented by the fluid movement between Standard English 
and Scottish dialect, reveals Roy’s fragmented identity and his desperation to repress 
the memories of his violent misogynistic behaviour that his Scottish self represents. 
However, these memories will not be easily forgotten (after all, they constitute his old 
identity, the unconscious Subject that was repressed, further, within the coma) and so 
they constantly attempt to catapult Roy toward a much-feared enlightenment: an 
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awakening and return from exile. Through this gradual reunification of the psyche, I 
argue that Lacanian theory can once more be adapted in order to further understand the 
nature of Roy’s coma exile and how memory and language function within it. 
The layers of consciousness that Welsh develops seem to represent Lacan’s three 
‘realms’: the Symbolic (the realm which contains language and the Other that holds ‘all 
the rules and hypotheses that organise human society and thought’);65 the Imaginary 
(the realm that is created at the point at which the child recognises itself in the mirror 
and therefore begins to conceptualise itself as an other, using its body’s image as a basis 
for the creation of the Ideal-I); and the Real (the most elusive realm to define where the 
unsymbolizable resides, constituted, perhaps, by the traumatic experience). Roy’s quest 
narrative certainly embodies the Symbolic, the realm which also, Lacan proposes, 
harbours the unconscious due to the fact that it consists of repressed signifiers which 
form the ‘true’ self, the Subject. However, for much of the novel, he refuses to make the 
connections between these repressed signifying chains and interpret the metaphorical 
symbolization, thus sustaining his exile. It is at these points, when signification is about 
to occur (for example, when he comes close to confronting the elusive Marabou Stork), 
that he drifts back into the Imaginary realm. Here, he finds relative comfort in the 
autobiographical narration of the Object self which has created an ‘Ideal’ version of his 
life-story, therefore embellishing his Ego-identity, diluting the seriousness of his 
childhood abuse and involvement in the rape and projecting himself as a virile, 
violently macho and essentially ‘imaginary’ anti-hero. This implies that the surface 
level of narration, the level that Roy is so terrified of, represents the Real. Lacan said of 
this realm that it is ‘something you find always at the same place. However you mess 
about, it is always in the same place, you bring it with you, stuck to the sole of your 
shoe without any means of exiling it’.66 This is a significant use of the word ‘exile’ in 
light of the analysis of Roy’s coma exile. The Real holds the source of ‘absolute 
terror’67 for Roy: the memory of the confrontation with death and, more specifically, 
death through suicide. The very act of ‘self-murder’ is an ‘absolute terror’ in that it 
perhaps signifies a much deeper, unsymbolizable truth: what drove the individual to 
suicide in the first place. It is worth noting that throughout all three narrative threads, 
Roy continually falls short of facing up to his suicide – it remains unsymbolizable so 
instead he avoids it altogether. Despite this, it continually lurks in the background, an 
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absolute terror that overshadows all of his attempts to hide within his coma from the 
outside world. Roy’s coma, therefore, can be seen as an unravelling of Lacan’s 
Borromean knot: 
 
 
 
This is a structure representing the three realms and their mutual reliance upon each 
other for the knot to hold and for the three realms to maintain their perfect balance: if 
one knot comes undone, then so do the other two. However, with psychosis comes the 
unravelling of the knot with only the tiniest of threads holding together the three realms, 
yet the individual still clings to these threads, the tiny glimpses of meaning that can still 
be comprehended. In Roy’s case, this unravelling is reflected in the frequent intrusions 
of multiple voices (as seen, above, with the Scottish voice impinging upon Roy’s 
‘adopted’ heroic identity within his stork fantasy) and the literality that Roy 
superimposes over his stork quest, refusing to interpret the metaphorical signifiers so 
that he can perpetuate his coma exile in an attempt to avoid the pressing shadow of the 
Real. 
In Garland’s novel, the vertical structure of memory is emphasized when Carl says: 
‘Waking is rising, and dreaming is sinking. You wake up, you fall asleep’.68 This 
comment also emphasises Garland’s approximation of the state of coma to the states of 
sleep and dream. Unlike his counterpart in Welsh’s novel, Carl is desperate for a 
‘rising’, as one would ‘rise’ from sleep – or even ‘rise’ from the dead (a metaphor in 
coma literature that I will discuss in greater detail in chapters three and four of this 
investigation). However, before this ‘rising’ can occur, Carl begins to develop, firstly, a 
certain amount of control over his coma – like Roy, he is able to move between the 
levels of consciousness by simply ‘willing’ it: 
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And now that I knew I was dreaming, had become self-aware […] The 
place I was seeing was a sense of place. While I could sense it, I could see it. 
And if, as I shifted from one location to another, I could sense two places… 
If I could sense a bedroom and open curtains, but also sense a record 
shop, with strip lighting and shelves stacked with L.Ps, alphabetised… 
Then for a moment, curtains would blow open over the window of the 
record shop, and the vase of flowers would stand on the record shop 
counter.
69
 
 
Carl creates this transition between memory scenes in a moment of empowerment, 
thereby negating the fear and panic he felt, earlier, when discussing his disjointed 
memory with Anthony. He begins to use this method of moving between the layers of 
his consciousness to try and locate memory triggers (the signifiers within particular 
chains, as discussed earlier) that will put an end to his exile. In the record shop he tries 
to find a piece of music that may draw him back to the homeland. This is both an 
interesting counterpoint to how Roy tries to resist surface music (a component of the 
Real, the traumatic world outside of coma) and a subversion of the image of the coma 
tape that Roy’s mother plays and that, generally, is often used in coma treatment to try 
and present the victim with a sense of the familiar: a trigger for ‘waking’. Here, Carl 
creates his own virtual ‘coma tape’ within the coma. However, this ability to control his 
memories is illusory, as the reader soon discovers when Carl begins to listen to a Little 
Richard record that should be familiar. Troublingly, far from being familiar, it becomes 
ever more alienating, the opening line of Good Golly Miss Molly constantly repeating 
throughout the song as this is the only line he has a memory of. It soon becomes 
apparent that Carl, instead of controlling memory, is, himself, being controlled by it. 
The scraps and islands of memory and the blank spaces in between only serve to bring 
him so far to the surface of his coma before, at their worst, sending him spiralling back 
into a black void of his unconscious (the deepest level in the vertical model) where the 
only trace of his identity is a disembodied voice that gibbers ‘random words, strung 
together. Strings of words. Simple and unhinged. Without pattern, no looping, no 
meaningful repetitions’.70  
This nadir of his exilic existence is initiated by following the trail of a certain 
signifying chain which he feels is sure to trigger a unification of his fragmented self: it 
is a trail that leads to a house he lived in as a child. Just as he appears close to breaking 
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through ‘the boundary of full consciousness’,71 he realises that the two figures he 
thought were his parents are again empty cyphers: blank, featureless silhouettes. This 
schism in such an important signifying chain (a chain that constitutes his status and 
identity within the family unit of the homeland) causes him to plummet into the darkest 
depths of the Subject, smashing any connections with the Ideal-I. Any Object-
identification is made impossible by the fact that all he becomes is a ‘consciousness’ in 
a black void. In fact, he loses ‘track of any understanding of physicality at all’.72 At this 
deepest level of coma, not only does Carl lose sense of all physicality but this also leads 
to him losing language altogether, until eventually the ‘strings of words’ come back to 
him: ‘BENT UNION TRACK OVER FINE CUBA ORE UNDER RED SORT ETHER 
INK TOKE INTRO SATURN NILE OR TRAP’.73 Garland creates an idea of the 
Subject trying to reform signifying chains (almost like a ‘re-booting’ of the brain) 
emphasizing the importance of language in order for Carl to unify his fragmented, exilic 
self. Even in these ‘simple and unhinged’ babblings, the signifying chains can be 
detected, reconfiguring themselves into an overall discourse of Carl’s unconscious. For 
example, the words ‘UNDER’, ‘ETHER’ and ‘TRAP’ can signify the state of being 
exiled and alienated within a chronic disorder of consciousness. As Lacan proposes, 
language, even at phoneme level, is essential for the individual to listen to and 
comprehend the utterances that frequently emerge from his unconscious Subject. At this 
point of The Coma, this language chain, no matter how fragmented, helps Carl to 
reunify his identity and re-embark upon his journey out of exile. Once more, the reader 
sees how Garland represents memory and language as having the potential to free the 
coma exile but also the capability to perpetuate the exilic state forever. 
 
 
2.4: The Unassimilated Scraps: Coma and the Unsymbolizable 
 
The models of memory that both authors use adhere to the model of repression in 
Freudian psychology: ‘What is repressed is pushed downwards, into the unconscious. 
The subject no longer has access to it’.74 This lack of access to the unconscious is akin 
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to Lacan’s notion that direct access to the Subject is impossible. However, Lacan is not 
interested in a process of repression occurring within a vertical model of consciousness. 
Instead, he is much more concerned with horizontal models of repressed language 
signifiers that need to be traced in order to reach their signified meaning, a concept that 
is similarly explored in these novels. In psychoanalysis, of course, one way to access 
these repressed memories can be through dream-work, hypnosis or, more specifically, 
through hypnoanalysis in which hypnosis is employed in order to seek out the root 
cause of the problem, often stored deep within the unconscious. The coma, as described 
in these novels, is a model of the unconscious state within which the protagonists of 
both novels are forced to reside and where they can tap into the unconscious, accessing, 
rejecting and ultimately accepting the memories and fragments of experience that are at 
the root of their respective traumas: their exile within coma. In this sense, the coma is 
equated to a hypnotic trance in which the victims can attempt to recapture or reinterpret 
repressed memories through an abreactive process during which the repressed emotions 
are released by ‘acting out’ (through language, behaviour and the imagination) the 
memory-trace that is causing the conflict, in order to bring about an end to exile. 
Indeed, one could see the splitting of the self in both novels as the characters becoming 
their own psychoanalysts, their own guides to lead the way out of their exilic 
landscapes, regardless of whether this exodus is desired or not. In Roy’s case, it is his 
journey through the hellish landscape of his quest narrative and the constant repetitions 
that he performs that once more serve to reunify the Borromean knot. He acts, however 
reluctantly, as his own psychoanalyst to help himself find signifiers for the 
unsymbolizable: his sexual violence and subsequent act of attempted suicide. At the 
point whereby Sandy turns the gun on him, he finally accepts his full involvement in the 
rape and his suicide attempt – he finally faces up to the unsymbolizable that conflicts so 
greatly with his heroic Ideal-I and re-written personal history that he has created in the 
Imaginary realm. It is at this point, therefore, where the rings of the Borromean knot are 
reunited, where Roy finally accepts the fact that he represents the stork, the vicious 
scourge of his coma fantasy, and that the action of Sandy shooting him represents his 
act of self-murder. In the same way as our own deaths are unsymbolizable (it is 
common in dreamscapes for the dreamer to awake immediately before the moment of 
death), Roy confronts his own death at the point when emergence from coma is 
reached. When he has finally located the source of his symptoms of psychosis he is able 
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to interpret the signifying chains of his unconscious and once more reunify the 
Borromean knot. 
Similarly, there are several instances of abreactive interchanges in The Coma. Prior 
to the recognition and acknowledgement of the fact that he is in a coma, Carl interacts 
with characters within his coma dreams that play the role of ‘spirit guides’ to help lead 
him out of exile. Chief amongst these is the taxi driver who transports Carl between 
potential memory triggers and, moreover, who morphs into the Nurse who is 
instrumental in forcing Carl to confront his comatose self. All of the conversations that 
Carl has with the Cabbie are mediated through the taxi’s rear-view mirror, or delivered 
to his profile as he drives the cab. In both situations, his face ‘looks familiar’, although 
Carl can never quite ‘place it’. It follows that all of these characters are conjurations 
from Carl’s unconscious. But they are also, inherently, manifestations of Carl himself 
and of various aspects of his fractured identity. Even the coma-version of Catherine, his 
girlfriend, is not really Catherine but rather a vessel that Carl can inhabit and speak 
through, appropriating a familiar face in order to create a trustworthy, inner 
psychoanalyst with whom he can cathartically discuss ideas and plans for a potential 
escape from exile. She also becomes a figure of the Lacanian Other, someone who 
represents the outside world with all of its mores and functions and habits. This 
Other/Catherine figure helps to generate a discourse of the unconscious which has the 
potential to guide Carl out of exile; significantly, it is Catherine who often suggests 
areas of memory which could possibly trigger an awakening for Carl. This is an Other, 
therefore, that Carl must re-assimilate if he ever wishes to return to the homeland and 
once more accept the rules of that homeland that govern his consciousness. The Cabbie, 
too, is a manifestation of part of Carl’s unconscious self and so the two-way 
conversation in the rear-view mirror becomes ever more significant. Indeed, the notion 
of the mirror stage can be extended to this interchange with the Cabbie embodying the 
first mirror-gaze that occurs between a mother and child, an interchange in which the 
latter first becomes aware of itself. This connection between Carl and the Cabbie after 
all helps the former to confront his sense of self and gradually leads him to his 
secondary mirror stage as it is the Cabbie who guides Carl to the hospital. At this point, 
the Cabbie metamorphosizes into the Nurse who then leads him to the vision of himself 
in the hospital bed, in much the same way that the mother might lead the child to the 
mirror. In using the Cabbie as a guide towards various signifying chains, Garland aligns 
the pathways of the mind with the roadways of a city – Carl, with the guidance of the 
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Cabbie, follows the roads that connect his lost memories and signifying chains in order 
to escape the exile of coma. 
In Marabou Stork Nightmares, Roy, too, has multiple guides out of coma. Unlike 
Carl, however, he doesn’t always want to follow where they lead. Constantly, the 
voices of his guides are appropriated by the apparitions of his past in a desperate 
attempt to make him confront the truth at the heart of his coma. When meeting Dawson 
for the first time, for example, Roy’s heroic sidekick and alter-ego, Sandy, begins 
‘rocking in his chair and letting out a low sound. –Mmmmm’.75 Elsewhere, in the 
autobiographical narration, it is revealed that Elgin, Roy’s autistic brother, exhibited 
similar behaviour when confronted with stressful situations. It seems that even the 
resilient Sandy is cowed by the oppressive dominance of Dawson to such an extent that 
he adopts the persona of Elgin in an unconscious attempt at condensation (as would 
occur in a dream) to force Roy into accepting the true nature of the abuse that his Uncle 
(in the guise of Dawson in these stork fantasies) subjected him to. But the Dawson 
figure is far more complex than being simply a screen memory for a traumatic 
childhood. He is also the character who charges Roy with the task to eradicate the 
Marabou Stork. In essence, Dawson is an unconscious creation designed to uncover 
both the seriousness of the child abuse and to guide Roy towards the quest that will, 
essentially, force him into hunting himself down. Roy, as discussed, ultimately 
metamorphosizes into the stork, the very quarry that he has been ordered, by Dawson, 
to eradicate, thus forcing him to confront the horrors that he has committed in the 
homeland and finally accept his identity as an abuser. It could be argued, in fact, that 
Garland and Welsh create paradigms of the Lacanian analyst as within his clinical 
practice, Lacan proposed that the analyst should speak as little as possible to the 
analysand, should not impose his own ego (through language) upon the patient. In this 
way, the patient will, in Lacan’s words, ‘reveal him to himself’,76 will confront and 
answer his own questions from the knowledge and memories that have always existed 
within the signifying chains of the unconscious. 
The theories of the two psychotraumatologists, Van Der Kolk and Van Der Hart, are 
perhaps important in bridging the gap between these abstract conceptions of coma and 
trauma, as present in these novels, and practical, clinical work. They posit that, ‘In 
traumatized people, visual and motoric reliving of experiences, nightmares, flashbacks, 
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and re-enactments seem to be preceded by physiological arousal’.77 In Garland’s novel, 
any reference to the influence of the outside world is omitted, yet in Marabou Stork 
Nightmares, Roy’s ‘reliving of experiences’ and, most appropriately, of ‘nightmares’ is 
frequently triggered by external influences. At one point, the perfume of his rape victim 
is enough to ‘pull’ him out of his quest narrative to the surface of his coma where he 
becomes aware of the victim, herself, looming over him, teasing him and kissing his 
cheek. Despite desperately trying to go ‘DEEPER’, he is unable to escape the repressed 
memories of his crime (the physical scent of the perfume within the Real becomes 
unsymbolizable), and so instead, he is forced once more to move closer towards a 
revelation of the truth. However, both Garland and Welsh depict pivotal moments 
whereby ‘physiological arousal’ actually succeeds (rather than ‘precedes’) a ‘reliving of 
experience’ as both characters physiologically leave the exile of coma following the 
moment whereby they reassimilate the flashbacks, memories and language signifiers 
that previously remained elusive. It is these stages when selfhood is ‘reunified’ that 
finally prove to be the catalysts for an escape from exile. In Roy’s case, as discussed, it 
is the acceptance of his guilt and subsequent suicide that begins the return to the 
homeland; in Carl’s case, it is the opening of his work briefcase and the reading of the 
enclosed documents that brings him out of coma – he confronts what he does as a career 
which identifies one of his ‘roles’ that he plays in the homeland. In both cases, the 
abreactive process reaches a conclusion with both Roy and Carl successfully ‘psycho-
analysing’ themselves, through the adoption of alter-egos, memory-apparitions and 
confrontations with the Other which allow them to reintegrate the ‘unassimilated scraps 
of overwhelming experiences’78 that Van Der Kolk and Van Der Hart refer to in their 
theories of traumatic memory. 
But the exilic state of coma and the manipulative power of memory are not just 
communicated by the authors through narrative technique. As mentioned, Welsh plays 
with the concrete structure of the novel, the mise-en-page, to represent visually the exile 
of the coma and the fine line between reality and fantasy. It is important to note that 
Garland, too, uses unconventional presentation techniques to achieve the same 
outcome. The lack of pagination, for example, denotes a lack of specificity so that just 
as Carl is alienated by the collapsing, kaleidoscopic patterns of his exilic coma dreams, 
the reader is alienated to some extent by the fluidity of the unnumbered pages of the 
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novel itself. Most interesting, though, is the use of monochrome, abstract illustrations, 
woodcuts created by the author’s father, Nicholas Garland. These clearly make visual 
the nature of Carl’s exile, whilst highlighting the rupture in memory that has occurred 
within the exilic state. The images depict silhouettes of specific episodes of the coma 
dreams, yet the images are conspicuous in their absolute lack of specificity: facial 
features blacked out in cameo-style woodcuts; landscapes and cityscapes depicted from 
skewed angles that are evocative of German-expressionist films, or points of view that 
obscure scenic and personal detail; and, in one extraordinary sequence, solid black 
pages that represent the nadir (previously discussed) of Carl’s exile, as he sinks into the 
blankness of his unconscious, reduced to a voice without a body and without sensation. 
The reverse of each image is given a blank page, due to the saturation of ink devoted to 
each illustration, so that the image ‘bleeds’ through the page. However, this in itself 
leads to a strange and significant effect. The bleed itself might be seen to represent the 
vague memories that surface from Carl’s unconscious – visible, yes, but just out of 
range of full recognition: signifying chains that persistently evade full comprehension. 
In this way, the illustrations reflect Said’s theories of how memory exacerbates the 
exilic state: that once exiled, the distant memory of what once was will always be with 
the exile, no matter how distant, no matter how vague, and this will inexorably shape 
the attempts to forge a new existence within a new environment. In other words, the 
ghosts of memory (represented by the image bleeds) always haunt the subject, acting as 
constant reminders of exile. However, in The Coma, the images themselves, when 
viewed in their full glory, are equally vague and do not provide explanations of their 
ghost-images which again implies that the exilic state can never be overcome as posited 
by Said: that no matter how hard the individual works to conquer exile, and no matter 
how accustomed to it he feels, exile’s ‘unsettling force erupts anew’,79 thereby 
perpetuating the feeling of exile. 
The experimentation with form, in both novels, can be explicated by Anne 
Whitehead when she writes that ‘novelists have frequently found that the impact of 
trauma can only adequately be represented by mimicking its forms and symptoms, so 
that temporality and chronology collapse’.80 In the case of Garland and Welsh’s novels, 
the authors have clearly adopted unconventional techniques to try to describe the 
traumatic and exilic state of coma. They are, in fact, trying to create a form through 
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which they can attempt to express the inexpressible: the unconsciousness of the coma-
state. However, this is inevitably impossible to achieve as the meaning of the form can 
only be wholly deciphered through language itself. For example, Welsh’s techniques of 
mise-en-page to represent physically his model of vertical layers of the coma state are 
not, in themselves, imbued with meaning through the form alone – they rely upon the 
reader’s understanding of the words ‘DEEPER’ and ‘UP’ for the form to take on 
meaning. 
This impossibility of representing the unrepresentable, the largely unknown world of 
the interior coma experience, is perhaps why both Garland and Welsh adopt concepts of 
fantastical dreamscapes through which they attempt to communicate the coma 
experience. Indeed, in an interview with The Guardian from 2004, Garland commented 
that, ‘I spent a lot of time wondering why dreams are so tricky in a narrative. There is 
something rather naff about talking about dreams. This in itself is something that 
pushed a button in me because it felt like a taboo or something’.81 This statement, as 
alluded to in chapter one, omits all reference to the condition of coma, and yet this is 
the condition around which the novel purports to be centred. Furthermore, neither 
novelist concerns themselves with the real-life issues of coma and the exilic nature of 
post-coma survival in the homeland to which the patient has returned. Garland, 
superficially, pays lip service to the possibility that his protagonist may have a brain 
injury, but this is soon brushed over (as addressed in chapter one). Welsh (also 
reflecting Garland’s obsession with the dreamscape of the unconscious through his 
constant references to nightmares) never once entertains the possibility that brain injury 
could have been sustained for his protagonist, despite the fact that he has been within 
his coma for three years. When Roy awakes, he appears to awake with full cognition 
intact, in the ‘light switch’ moment that Johansen criticises. 
Both Garland and Welsh clearly explore how memory affects the traumatic and 
exilic condition of the victim in fictive approximations of coma that draw upon what the 
authors understand about the unconscious, which seems to be based upon what 
psychoanalysis has taught us. This is perhaps why various manifestations of 
psychoanalytical theory can be so broadly applied to the texts – because these 
discourses that explore the nature of the unconscious are the closest referents that each 
novelist has to coma. In the following chapter, I will continue to explore how authors 
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build upon existing models of the unconscious and of wider mythologies and 
symbolism (most notably resurrection and katabatic tales, themselves embodying exilic 
narratives) in an attempt to mediate the abstract and unknowable state of the 
unconsciousness of coma. 
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3:Why, This Is Hell. Coma and the Katabatic Archetype. 
 
 
Then he remembered that death had taken him to pieces, that he was conscious of being the mud and soil, 
that no mythological personages had greeted or punished him. 
                                                                                  - Peter Redgrove, In the Country of the Skin 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
Toward the end of Nikos Kazantzakis’s contemporary and controversial re-imagining of 
the story of Christ, The Last Temptation, one famous episode is rendered in a 
particularly visceral style. The episode in question is the raising of Lazarus from the 
dead, a biblical story that is significant in this discussion of the literature of coma. 
Indeed, both the story and image of Lazarus are frequently alluded to in a range of 
coma texts, as are references to resurrection in general, alongside imagery of ‘hellish’ 
descent or katabasis. This use of the Lazarus story to describe the coma-state is 
apparent throughout literature, not least in Robert Mawson’s bestselling novel, The 
Lazarus Child, which follows the Heywood family’s struggle to cope with their 7-year-
old son’s coma following a road traffic accident.1 Internet searches will reveal other, 
varied examples of this comparison between the resurrection of Lazarus and coma, 
from discussions of whether the biblical figure was truly dead or in a coma on faith 
forums,
2
 or even news articles using the Lazarus designation to describe victims who 
suddenly ‘arise’ from the ‘death-state’ of coma.3 
Over the course of the next two chapters, I will be exploring the links between 
classical and traditional tales of katabasis and coma literature, drawing upon the 
theories of archetypal psychology and narratology to create a framework against which 
this symbiosis of coma and descent/resurrection can be elucidated. I will also look 
closely at the manifestations of the topography of the underworld in specific works of 
both coma fiction and non-fiction, mapping the journeys of coma-protagonists through 
these psychological places of the underworld against traditional and mythological 
geographies.  
In this chapter, I will first explicate Judeo-Christian tales of katabasis, drawing 
parallels between the stories of Lazarus and Christ and works of coma literature. For the 
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purposes of this discussion, when referring to the various depictions of the underworld 
of Greco-Roman tradition, I will use the designation Hades, and the capitalized Hell 
when referring to the underworld of Christian thought. However, because of the locus 
of both, I will use the term underworld as a general term to describe the subterranean 
place to which all of the katabatic heroes discussed, herein, descend. Similarly, I will 
use ‘hellish’ as an adjectival umbrella term to describe general depictions of the 
underworld.
4
 
 
 
3.2: A Pleasant Time in Hades: Trauma and the Underworld 
 
Kazantzakis’s revisioning of the Lazarus story is significant to this discussion of coma 
and resurrection in that the imagery he uses to render the tale can be seen in works of 
coma literature, both non-fiction and fiction. But before looking more closely at 
Kazantzakis’s interpretation as a model against which representations of the Lazarus 
story in coma literature can be mapped, it is useful to examine first the source material 
as it appears (albeit briefly) in John 11: 43 – 44: 
 
And when he thus had spoken, he cried with a loud voice, Lazarus, come 
forth. 
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 And he that was dead came forth, bound hand and foot with graveclothes: 
and his face was bound about with a napkin. Jesus saith unto them, Loose 
him, and let him go.
5
 
 
The grammatical use of the past simple which implies a completed, unalterable past 
action in the sentence ‘he that was dead’ suggests that Jesus brings Lazarus back from 
the dead, and so has transformed a corpse into a living being once more. Indeed, beyond 
his own resurrection, this instance of raising Lazarus is the only example of resurrection 
throughout the four gospels. There is the account of the raising of the daughter of Jairus 
in Mark 5, but significantly, the language attributed to Jesus is markedly different to the 
previous passage from John: ‘And when he was come in, he saith unto them, Why make 
ye this ado, and weep? The damsel is not dead, but sleepeth’.6 These two Biblical 
sources clearly make the grammatical and physical distinction between the sleep-state 
and the death-state, despite the fact that they are often seen to be synonymous with each 
other throughout metaphorical, literary imagery and within mythological tales: in Greek 
mythology, Hypnos, the god of sleep, is the twin brother of Thanatos, the god of death, 
and both reside alongside Hades in the underworld over which he rules and which takes 
his name. Similarly in coma literature, the victim appears to be at once asleep and dead. 
As previously discussed, this phenomenon can be seen in the novels of both Welsh and 
Garland whereby the protagonists variably refer to their comas as death states and 
dreamscapes from which they try to initiate either their ‘resurrection’ or ‘awakening’. 
Kazantzakis, however, takes the Lazarus story and radically reinterprets it, building 
on the notion that this is a resurrection in its truest sense (not just a stirring from a deep 
sleep) and extrapolating all of the possible consequences of this highly significant event 
in the life of Christ that takes up such little space within the Bible. Thus, rather than 
breathing life into the dead, Kazantzakis’s Christ merely reanimates the dead. Lazarus, 
in this sense, becomes an early embodiment of that most staple figure of contemporary 
horror: the zombie. Martin Scorsese’s film adaptation of the novel, The Last Temptation 
of Christ,
7
 plays on this conceit by using generic conventions of horror, visually 
representing the stench of the corpse with even Willem Dafoe’s Christ appearing 
disgusted at his own actions of bringing a corpse back into the land of the living as 
Lazarus’s rotting hand thrusts violently out of the darkened cave in a biblical ‘jumping 
cat’ moment. 
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Kazantzakis’s sensibilities become even more apparent upon further examination of 
the section in his novel that describes the aftermath of the resurrection, an event that is 
only touched upon in the Bible. Lazarus sits ‘in the darkest corner of the house’, his 
body ‘swollen and green’, his face ‘bloated’ and ‘[exuding] a yellowish-white liquid’ 
like a ‘four-day corpse’. Initially, he had ‘stunk terribly’ and any visitors he had ‘held 
their noses’. Attached to him are ‘small earthworms’. 8 Kazantzakis’s imagery is 
immediately striking, grounded in the language of rot and decay, detailing the 
degradation of the body and a physical transfiguration that is in stark opposition to 
Christ’s only days later. Even Lazarus’s ‘stench’ can only be covered up and 
superficially concealed with incense, the predominant scent being ‘of earth’.9 Lazarus’s 
process of returning to the earth (the transition from flesh to dust) has been interrupted 
and, I suggest, the sensation of this interruption will remain with him forever, etched 
into his physical self and his psyche. The stench of rot that is superficially concealed 
may, in time, dissipate; his wounds that have degraded his body may heal; and the 
worms that cling to him may eventually leave, but the memory and the feeling of his 
interrupted death will never leave him. Back from the grave, Lazarus is permanently 
trapped within an earthly limbo in which he is neither dead not quite fully alive. In 
Kazantzakis’s reimagining of the story, he is reduced to little more than a resurrected 
corpse, a macabre curio at which his fellow villagers can gawp and marvel in equal 
measures. Lazarus has performed a katabasis, a word derived from the Greek, 
originally referring to ‘any physical descent, through a cave mouth or other such 
entrance, into the earth’.10 During the katabatic journey, the hero travels to the 
underworld, before returning to the ‘overworld’,11 days or even hours later. Once back 
in this land of the living, the katabatic hero will have changed inexorably, their 
experience of being within the underworld impacting upon them forever. As will be 
discussed here, much of coma literature, and fiction in particular, mimetically employs 
this model of descent/resurrection/transfiguration, often overtly alluding to the Lazarus 
story and the changes that the protagonist undergoes. In the case of Kazantzakis’s 
Lazarus, these changes appear to be purely physical but it soon becomes increasingly 
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apparent that in The Last Temptation (and, indeed, in The Bible), Lazarus does not 
speak about his ordeal. Moreover, in Kazantzakis’s version, it seems as though Lazarus 
refuses to speak, as evidenced when he is visited by the blind village-chief who asks, 
laughing: ‘“Did you have a pleasant time in Hades?”’, before going on to warn Lazarus 
not to reveal ‘all the secrets of the underworld’. 12 However, despite this caution, the old 
man can’t seem to help himself, leaning over to Lazarus and saying: ‘“Worms, eh? 
Nothing but worms…?”’,13 in an attempt to coax some of these ‘secrets’ from Lazarus. 
When Lazarus does not answer, and after waiting ‘a considerable time’, the old man 
becomes ‘enraged’.14 
The dichotomy that the villagers are experiencing is embodied by the blind chief: 
they don’t want to learn of Lazarus’s travails in the underworld, but at the same time 
are desperate for that knowledge. This contradictory state of consciousness is reflected 
in the old man’s language, not least in his apparent harmonization of the concepts of 
‘hellish’ descent and ‘luck’, declaring: ‘“You’re a lucky fellow, Lazarus”’.15 Moreover, 
the implication, in his elliptical, unfinished question about the worms, is that no sooner 
has the old man warned Lazarus against revealing the secrets of his katabasis, than he is 
probing Lazarus about the very same secrets he, seconds earlier, purported to want to 
know nothing about. His probing implies that he sees the external, physical evidence of 
the worms as creatures from the underworld that have returned with Lazarus, forcing 
him to want to know more about Hell. It is Lazarus’s refusal to speak, even after this 
less than subtle and contradictory pressure, that causes the blind man to ‘become 
enraged’ and leave abruptly: because he is being refused the knowledge that he both 
desires and fears. But Lazarus’s silence, in itself, provides another key motif. Unlike in 
the Bible, Lazarus is given the opportunity to speak but seemingly refuses or perhaps, 
more accurately, he does not have the language to express what he has witnessed and 
experienced. Falconer touches upon this when discussing the witness testimony of the 
katabatic hero: ‘The wisdom acquired on the underworld journey cries out to be shared, 
yet at the same time it is unspeakable; it cannot be communicated’.16 The katabatic 
journey, therefore, can be seen in terms of a traumatizing experience with the trauma of 
the descent into the underworld being resistant to language and narrative structures. For 
both the katabatic hero and the trauma survivor, the traumatic event is insufficiently 
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understood as it occurs and so becomes unspeakable, whilst simultaneously possessing 
and haunting consciousness. It follows that Lazarus’s descent to and ascent from the 
underworld can represent a Freudian traumatic departure, a journey which cannot be 
comprehended as it occurs and which cannot be communicated immediately in 
language.  
I suggest that this model of katabatic trauma is pertinent to my analysis of the 
condition of coma. As discussed, most often the survivor of coma has no recollection of 
what has occurred within coma, despite having the awareness that they have been 
trapped within this ‘underworld’ of the unconscious. But also frequently, coma 
survivors, due to brain injury, may have the physical inability to communicate their 
ordeal. This ‘hellish’ medical condition (the descent into and return from coma) is 
thereby unspeakable on several levels. Returning to the description of Lazarus’s post-
resurrection condition, the reference to him sitting in the dark, ‘for light bothered him’, 
becomes particularly fascinating. Rather than this being a purely physical affliction (an 
over-sensitivity to light brought on by being too long in the tomb), it begins to represent 
his traumatized psyche. His journey into Hell has exiled him from the overworld, 
represented by the synecdoche ‘light’. Lazarus has consequently brought some of the 
underworld back with him during his traumatic transfiguration and return from the land 
of the dead. In coma literature, and particularly in those texts that focus upon the 
victim’s emergence from coma, this concept of traumatic transfiguration is similarly 
explored, with the survivor of coma having to come to terms with the changes that have 
impacted upon his fragmented, ‘resurrected’ self. 
 
 
3.3: Practising Death: Coma, Katabasis, Hell, Resurrection 
 
All traditional tales of descent into and return from the underworld are stories of 
katabasis that incorporate a form of resurrection, so that even Christ’s death and 
subsequent resurrection constitutes a katabatic journey, possibly the ultimate archetype 
of descent. For this reason, the theories of Jung and the post-Jungian theorist James 
Hillman are useful, both developing theories of mind that prioritise the role of cultural 
and social archetypes in shaping the psyche. Indeed, when discussing how the story of 
Christ has contributed to the development of the collective psyche, Hillman explains 
that: 
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The underworld would be wiped out not at the end of time; it had already 
been destroyed. Christ’s dying and resurrection was absorbed by the 
classical mythologem of the nekyia, now not a journey, but a 
descensuskampf,
17
 for Christ harrows hell, and in one version, forces 
Thanatos to hide behind his own throne.
18
 
 
In this way, Hillman continues, Christ is seen to be greater than ‘the greatest of man-
gods, Hercules’. Despite being able to force Hades from his throne in a fight that 
embodies a clash between the flesh of the overworld and the shadow of the underworld, 
Heracles (to use the traditional Greek name, rather than the Roman ‘Hercules’) comes 
nowhere near the heights of Christ’s greatest triumph: conquering the entire kingdom of 
Hell, even obliterating death itself for all future generations and also, from this point 
forth, making Hell synonymous with sin and not just a place, described in earlier 
mythology, where all the dead go. This, Hillman argues, has had a huge impact upon 
the development of archetypes within the post-Christian psyche. The notion of Christ’s 
katabasis (or nekyia) is further discussed by Northrop Frye in artistic terms, noting that 
the Hell into which Christ descends is ‘often portrayed, especially in fresco, as the body 
of a huge dragon or shark, which he enters by the mouth, like his prototype Jonah’,19 
thus linking the story of glorious katabasis from the New Testament to another tale of 
Judeo-Christian descent from the Old Testament.  
I propose that the fascination with the medical condition of coma into which the 
victim ‘descends’ and from which he returns ‘transfigured’ is a natural development of 
the fascination with ancient katabatic tales. As I will illustrate, in many works of fiction 
(and also in some works of non-fiction) the coma is equated with the death-state, often 
appropriating imagery and narrative threads from a range of katabatic tales from 
classical and late antiquity. Baldly, coma and the death-state become synonymous 
because of the mysteries that surround them and the lack of empirical evidence of what 
occurs ‘beyond’ these liminal states. We find, then, authors employing katabatic tropes 
and archetypes in order to try to explicate a medical phenomenon that has only been 
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explored within the modern era. After all, it is within the last 30 years, with 
advancements in technology such as life support machines, CT, and MRI scans, that 
survival from coma (the return journey of this medical katabasis) has increased. Indeed, 
Robert P. Granacher points, in particular, to the identification of primary and secondary 
brain injury ‘in the three decades from the 1970s to the 1990s’20 as being a key 
contributing factor towards the increase in survival rates of the victims of coma and 
brain injury. If authors are using motifs of the katabatic narrative to explore the state of 
coma, it follows that not only is coma being viewed as a death-state, but it is also being 
considered as an ultimate, infinitely modern incarnation of the underworld. Coma is 
seen as a psychic ‘underworld’ into which the victim descends, his body steadily 
degrading in the overworld, as if it has, to all intents and purposes, ‘died’. Outside of 
the victim, the inhabitants of the overworld are hoping for a ‘miracle’ and for the 
victim’s psyche (or ‘soul’, as Hillman would posit) to rise again, triggering a 
resurrection in the medical sense. 
This fascination with descent/return is nothing new, of course, as testified to by the 
number of katabatic tales available to us, several of which I will be referring to 
throughout this chapter. What is most noticeable, however, is wherever there is a 
katabatic tale that has been largely unexplored or incomplete in some way, there are 
retrospective writings that attempt to bridge these narrative gaps. In the case of Christ’s 
descent, the Descensus Christi ad Inferos, an account appears, strikingly, in the 
apocryphal Gospel of Nicodemus written around the fifth or the sixth century. It is 
useful to examine this text of the apocrypha in order to trace the historical development 
of the figure of Lazarus and his ‘story’, focusing especially upon how his katabatic 
trauma is represented. In doing this, parallels between the traumatic experience of 
Lazarus and the experiences of katabatic heroes of coma literature soon become clear.  
As J.K. Elliott notes in the introduction to his translation of the Gospel of 
Nicodemus, ‘The motive for the original composition was to satisfy the curiosity of 
those who found the canonical biblical writings inadequate’,21 a need mimicked by 
Kazantzakis’s old villager who is desperate to know more of Lazarus’s journey to the 
underworld, and also mirrored perhaps by authors of coma fiction who use the katabatic 
motif to explore and narrate the elusive medical experience of coma. In this version of 
the Descensus in the Gospel of Nicodemus, a conversation between Hades and Satan is 
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imagined, with Hades, the Lord of the Dead, expressing his abject fear at the prospect 
of Christ descending into his kingdom. He professes that, ‘When I heard then the 
command of his word I trembled with fear and dread’,22 referring to the point at which 
he heard Jesus’s order to release Lazarus from the underworld. Lazarus, in fact, plays a 
prominent role within this text, representing the first member (as described in the 
Gospel of St. Matthew) of the ‘walking dead’ who arise from the grave at the point of 
Christ’s death on the cross. In short, Lazarus is depicted as the harbinger of Christ’s 
subsequent glorious transfiguration. This version of the harrowing of Hell and the 
defeat of Hades and Satan purportedly comes from the witness testimony of two such 
figures similarly raised from the dead on the day of the crucifixion, Karinus and 
Leucius. Their story alone presents the reader with a plethora of motifs of the ‘traumatic 
condition’ of resurrection. 
On hearing that Karinus and Leucius have arisen from the dead, several of the 
villagers, including Joseph of Arimathaea and Nicodemus himself, race to try and find 
them both and interrogate them about their katabatic  journey, in much the same way as 
the blind villager interrogates Lazarus in Kazantzakis’s novel: 
 
Hearing this oath, Karinus and Leucius trembled in body, and being 
troubled in heart, groaned. And together, looking to heaven, they made the 
sign of the cross with their fingers upon their tongues and immediately 
spoke together and said, ‘Give to each of us sheets of paper and let us write 
what we have seen and heard.’ So they gave the paper to them. And they sat 
down and each wrote as follows…23 
 
Like Lazarus, these two members of the ‘walking dead’ (for that is always what they 
will be known as and famed for) cannot express the experience of their katabasis and 
subsequent knowledge of Hell in spoken language, their state of ‘being troubled at 
heart’ conveying their traumatized state. When prompted on oath to speak of their 
ordeal, they can only ‘groan’, an utterance that appears, superficially, to be rather 
pathetic yet which conveys an anguished subversion of language itself and which fully 
emphasises the struggle to communicate the incommunicable: their experience of 
dwelling within the underworld and being wrenched out of it. They can only finally 
express their journey into Hell when given paper to write upon, the process of writing 
creating a certain distancing between experience and expression. Both Leucius and 
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Karinus feel impelled to narrate their experience, just as those around them feel 
impelled to hear their story narrated and their ‘hellish’ trauma translated into language. 
The act of writing that the two katabatic heroes undertake therefore becomes a 
microcosmic embodiment of the traumatic departure. In the temporal space between 
return from Hell and setting pen to paper (the ‘latency period’ of this particular 
katabasic journey), traumatic neurosis takes hold. Thus, in the act of writing about their 
trauma, the two resurrected men begin to repeat and ‘work through’ their trauma, the 
written word granting them a ‘voice’ through which they can attempt to express their 
trauma. For the victim, as Kalí Tal posits, ‘Trauma is enacted in a liminal state, outside 
of the bounds of “normal” human experience’, and therefore, ‘The horrific events that 
have reshaped the author’s construction of reality can only be described in literature, 
not recreated’.24 For the katabatic hero, trauma occurs in the ultimate liminal space of 
the underworld. Whilst Lazarus cannot communicate his ordeal, Leucius and Karinus 
‘describe’ the events of their trauma (as ‘reported’ in the Gospel itself) but still cannot 
fully ‘recreate’ the emotional and psychic disturbance of their katabasis.  
This desperate need (and difficulty) to communicate the incommunicable is apparent 
in the attempts to narrate the descent into coma in both fiction and (more rarely) non-
fiction. To illustrate the appropriation of the Lazarus story and the motifs of katabasis as 
a whole within coma texts, I would like to begin by looking at two poems. The first is 
the semi-autobiographical poem, ‘Lady Lazarus’ by Sylvia Plath. In this poem, the 
narrator shares her frustrations over being successively rescued from her death-state 
after each of her suicide attempts. Plath’s imagery is akin to that used by Kazantzakis, 
with references to, ‘The flesh | The grave cave ate’, the ‘eye pits’, the ‘sour breath’, and 
the ‘Worms […] like sticky pearls’.25 As in The Last Temptation, the imagery describes 
the corruption of the body and the effects of descent, rather than a glorious 
transfiguration, emphasizing the intrusive presence of the grave-worms that continue to 
attach themselves to the narrator. However, unlike the physical worms that crawl over 
Kazantzakis’s Lazarus, Plath’s worms are metaphorical imaginings of the narrator who 
sees herself as the risen ‘living dead’, a contemporary interpretation of the resurrected 
Lazarus. The poet amplifies the use of this biblical archetype further by transferring the 
spiritual power of God to the interfering medical profession, depicting a scientifically 
                                                     
24
 Kalí Tal, Worlds of Hurt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.15 / p. 121 
25
 Sylvia Plath, ‘Lady Lazarus’ in Ariel: The Restored Edition (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), pp. 
14-15. 
92 
 
 
explicable resurrection that also initiates a form of transfiguration: ‘Out of the ash | I 
rise with my red hair |  And I eat men like air’.26  
The Lazarus story is used as a metaphor for the narrator’s return from the death-state, 
a resurrection that leads to this ominous threat and mythical phoenix-like transfiguration 
which promises to enact violence and revenge upon the oppressive paternalistic society 
that refuses the narrator the right to die and fully inhabit the underworld. 
The second poem, a predecessor to Plath’s (and perhaps an influence upon it through 
the poet’s friendship with Plath and Ted Hughes) has more of an explicit connection to 
the coma condition. In ‘Lazarus and the Sea’, Peter Redgrove uses the image of Lazarus 
to allude to his own coma experiences that were particularly traumatic. Redgrove, 
whilst subjected to ‘an organised programme of bullying and humiliation’27 during his 
National Service basic training, suffered a breakdown after which he was hospitalized 
and diagnosed with incipient schizophrenia. After being transferred to a civilian 
hospital, he then underwent Deep Insulin Coma Therapy (DICT), a brutal cycle of 
treatment during which comas were induced in patients over the duration of five or six 
days a week, each coma lasting up to fifteen minutes. Within deep coma, patients would 
enter a state in which they lost their muscle tension and corneal and pupillary reflexes 
before having their system flooded with glucose to bring them out of, ‘The life-
threatening hypoglycaemic state’.28 As Neil Roberts points out, about one per cent of 
patients died from the treatment and more suffered permanent brain damage. However, 
it was normal practice to continue the treatment until fifty to sixty comas had been 
induced. 
‘Lazarus and the Sea’ paints a traumatic picture of DICT in which Redgrove sees the 
coma as a death-state, an organic shadow-world where his body is welcomed and 
exalted by nature. This vision is complicated, though, by the opening of the fourth 
stanza where Redgrove writes, ‘I could say nothing of where I had been’, yet goes on to 
assert that he, ‘[…] knew the soil in my limbs and the rain-water | In my mouth…’.29 
The poet acknowledges that his descent into coma triggers a void in consciousness, a 
‘nothingness’ in experience, yet at the same time he tries to navigate through this void 
by using the language and imagery available to him which is initially grounded in 
tangible concepts of burial and decay. The further the poem develops, the more complex 
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Redgrove’s imagery becomes, creating a network of mythological and archetypal 
references that the poet knits together in an attempt to narrate and perhaps ‘rationalise’ 
this rupture in consciousness brought on by the induced coma. Moving on from this 
somewhat conventional imagery of decay within the earth, Redgrove writes that, ‘[…] 
The knotted roots | would have entered my nostrils’, and that, ‘Many gods like me 
would be laid in the ground | Dissolve and be formed again in this pure night’.30 This 
suggests that the coma becomes a gateway through which one can reach a pagan ritual 
of death and re-birth, the narrator’s body sublimated by nature in preparation for a re-
forming of self or transfiguration, even a ‘reincarnation’ or ‘deification’. In this death-
state, Redgrove becomes a god consumed by the earth ready to be born again. However, 
the use of the past conditional ‘would have’ reinforces this notion that he has no 
recollection of where he has travelled to (as testified to, earlier, by the opening line of 
the stanza), yet he asserts that he has a certain ‘knowledge’ of his journey into the earth, 
a katabasis at the end of which he has been transfigured in some way making him ‘god-
like’. In the same way that he uses archetypal imagery of bodily decay in the earth, 
Redgrove now uses archetypal imagery of pagan rebirth and reincarnation, and it is the 
speculative past conditional that suggests that he is merely filling in the gaps of his 
coma experience with potential mythological concepts and stories. In other words, he 
creates an imagined narrative of katabasis and transfiguration in order to navigate 
through the trauma, not only of the cruel medical treatment, but of the void in 
consciousness that this has left him with. This is a particularly shattering form of 
katabatic ‘knowledge’ as it forces Redgrove to confront the fact that there may be no 
life after death; that the void in consciousness triggered by the death-state of coma is 
simply a forerunner to the eternal void of consciousness that might follow death. 
Redgrove explores this further when he writes: ‘But where was the boatman and his 
gliding punt? | The judgement and the flames?’ and describes being ‘uprooted’. He then 
questions what brought him back from coma: ‘And what judgement tore me to life?’.31 
The violence of the language, the imagery of being ‘torn’ from the coma and ‘uprooted’ 
(literally wrenched from his re-assimilation into nature) reflects the pernicious process 
of the treatment (the so-called ‘judgement’ being controlled by the medical staff 
administering the DICT) but also connects with Kazantzakis’s reinterpretation of the 
original Lazarus story. The narrator shares Lazarus’s anguish and reticence about being 
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brought back from the dead, not least because of the painful interruption of his journey 
into the underworld that has cruelly halted his corporeal and spiritual metamorphosis. 
However, it soon becomes clear that even this is a construction born out of his narrative 
powers in order not to face the true horror of his katabasis: that at the heart of his inner 
underworld lies nothing. In this way, the poems of both Redgrove and Plath convey 
Kazantzakis’s notion of the interruption that occurs post-resurrection: the schism that is 
opened up by aborting the death process, resulting in the victim coming back into 
consciousness but as a being that is now neither dead, nor fully living. This notion can 
also be seen in Redgrove’s earlier imagery of feeling the ‘soil’ in his ‘limbs’. Like 
Kazantzakis’s creation, Redgrove’s Lazarus is still alive, and yet has brought back with 
him elements of the underworld (the soil into which he imagines he has been interred) 
in a similar way to how the Lazarus of The Last Temptation still smells of soil, still has 
the grave-worms clinging to him. 
Even his burial ‘shroud’ has ‘stuck to his body’ and cannot ‘be removed’,32 again a 
constant reminder of his status as a liminal being. However, similar to Plath and her 
reference to the ‘worms like sticky pearls’, Redgrove’s Lazarus merely imagines these 
sensations, using archetypal imagery from traditional and classical stories of katabasis 
and resurrection. In addition, he draws on imagery of earthly burial and depicts his own 
psychological and physical obsession with mud and dirt to help physicalize and 
therefore comprehend the return and resurrection from the death-state of coma. 
This second half of Redgrove’s poem is also striking because of its use of classical 
references, the ‘boatman and his gliding punt’ referring to the ferryman of Hades, 
Charon, in classical Greek mythology, and ‘the judgement and the flames’ conjuring a 
scene from the Judeo-Christian Old Testament. However, these archetypes of traditional 
tales of death and descent are most conspicuous by their absence as the narrator 
descends deeper into coma (and comes closer to death). Indeed, Redgrove, as narrator, 
steadily becomes aware that there is nothing to greet him at the end of his journey of 
descent into his coma, as he discussed in a 1984 interview with Cliff Ashcroft: ‘I 
remember my last thought before nothing was, where’s my soul? The universe has 
gone, there is nothing. Did I expect to see Charon with his punt ferrying me across the 
river? The thing that knew there was nothing was taken away’.33 Reading this account 
                                                     
32
 Kazantzakis, The Last Temptation, p. 382. 
33
 Peter Redgrove, ‘Lazarus and the Visionary Truth’ in The Colour of Radio, ed. Neil Roberts 
(Devoran: Stride, 2006), 142-162 (p. 154). 
 
95 
 
 
of Redgrove’s coma descent, one is reminded of Garland’s fictional account of Carl’s 
journey into the deepest level of his coma, where he is little more than ‘a voice in a 
void’. In Redgrove’s case, the trauma of the descent and return is not constituted as such 
by the visions of a ‘hellish’ underworld, unlike in classical mythology where it is the 
experience of living within an underworld that embodies, as Falconer explains, ‘The 
absolutely horrific experience from which no one emerges unchanged’.34 Rather, 
Redgrove’s trauma is formed by the fact that there is no encounter with such archetypal 
images of Hell. Indeed, his frequent descents into coma only lead to an encounter with 
nothing, a void in consciousness and a constant awareness of this void which, in turn, is 
eventually taken away.  
To summarise, Kazantzakis’s Lazarus experiences a physical degradation of the 
body; the manifestations of Lazarus in the poems of Plath and Redgrove experience an 
imagined, psychological corruption of the body, with both narrators seeing their descent 
into the death-state as a process of fragmentation of the physical self into its constituent 
parts. In Plath’s case, she imagines these parts being used as Christian ‘relics’ (‘A bit of 
blood’, ‘a piece of my hair or my clothes’35) over which her ‘peanut-crunching crowd’ 
can squabble in an effort to be physically touched by the ‘miracle’ of her resurrection 
and return from the underworld. In Redgrove’s poem, there is a disjunction between the 
title and the appropriation of the name of Lazarus with the revelation the narrator 
reaches at the nadir of his descent: that ‘the universe has gone, there is nothing’, once 
more illustrating Falconer’s notion that the descent journey defies language, is 
incommunicable. At the end of Redgrove’s poem, a question is posed that explores this 
notion further: how can a void, a nothingness at the end of consciousness, ever be 
expressed within language? An absolute nothing will obviously be unspeakable, and yet 
Redgrove persists in trying to speak of it by using the imagery of mythology and of 
descent narratives which, as in the case of Leucius and Karinus, reveals an impulse to 
narrate. The void, therefore, the ‘absolute nothing’ is transformed into a tangible 
‘something’ (an imagined katabatic and transfiguratory experience) and so through this, 
Redgrove attempts to ‘work through’, rationalise and come to terms with the real ‘Hell’ 
at the heart of his coma therapy. 
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In the same interview with Cliff Ashcroft, Redgrove also referred to his comas as 
‘practice deaths’.36 ‘Deaths’ is a countable noun, but one which can only be used in 
relation to populations, never to individuals. While a population may encounter many 
‘deaths’ at many different times, it does not necessarily follow that the population itself 
will die. In fact, ‘deaths’ in a population does not mean the end. They occur as part of a 
continuing cycle of death and birth that allows the population to sustain itself in its 
environment. This idea of the cyclical nature of life is underlined by the appearance in 
the phrase of the word ‘practice’, which suggests repetition. By linking this plural in 
relation to the death of the individual with ‘practice’, Redgrove undermines the finality 
of death itself, so much so that ‘death’ is no longer an appropriate definition of his state 
of being: only resurrection will suffice. Interestingly, Plath achieves a similar effect 
with her opening phrase, ‘I have done it again’, alongside her reference to the feline 
myth of having ‘nine times to die’. Redgrove’s ‘practice deaths’ helps to reveal his 
narrativized perception of the coma: that it constitutes a gateway to the underworld, the 
departure point for a descent into Hell after which resurrection and transfiguration 
await. For Redgrove, the post-coma ‘dreams’ which ensued from these ‘deaths’ and 
which influenced much of his early poetry in themselves caused a transfiguration, a 
radical change in identity:  prior to his treatment, he was a keen, ‘orthodox’ scientist; 
post-treatment, he would become absorbed by dream-states, ritual, reverie, and 
shamanistic experience. In this way, perhaps, despite their traumatic impact, the induced 
comas came close to generating a transfiguration in the Christian sense, representing a 
spiritual metamorphosis and enlightenment of the self that occurs after a descent into an 
ultimate embodiment of Hell: the void that takes over from consciousness. 
Both of these deeply autobiographical poems clearly represent descent into and 
return from the death-state (Plath) and coma-state (Redgrove), using the archetype of 
Lazarus in order to communicate the authors’ traumatic experience. After their return 
from the underworld and after the traumatic departure is completed, both authors 
attempt to find the language through which their trauma can be expressed and almost 
inevitably they return to one of the ultimate symbols of descent and resurrection: 
Lazarus. In her warning against the potential totalizing effect of trauma fiction, Tal 
suggests that, for the real victims, ‘Traumatic events are written and rewritten until they 
become codified and narrative form gradually replaces content as the focus of 
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attention’.37 This strips away agency from the real survivor of trauma and therefore 
‘mediates’ the trauma and dilutes its gravity and impact, foregrounding a self-indulgent 
narrative form that ‘fetishizes’ trauma, to return to LaCapra. However, for both 
Redgrove and Plath (two real-life survivors of trauma and of Lifton’s ‘death encounter’) 
codification, imagery and narrative form that draws upon mythical and biblical 
archetypes allows the traumatic experience to be narrated, and the ‘katabatic’ journey 
towards death to be voiced. 
 
 
3.4: A Weird Conduit: Hell, Coma and the Post-traumatic Messiah 
 
These concepts of coma katabasis and trauma are developed and explored within the 
popular text, Stephen King’s The Dead Zone. This is a particularly interesting example 
of coma fiction as King weaves together scientific concepts and medical research with 
archetypal tales of descent from the Judeo-Christian canon to create the story of a victim 
who is transfigured, through his coma descent, into a messianic hero with the potential 
to save mankind. Again, what is most interesting is how King uses a similar archetypal 
repertoire of elements to that used in the texts previously discussed, and I will examine 
this whilst discussing theories of narratology, in particular the influence of mythology 
and traditional katabatic narratives upon contemporary literature, culture and 
conceptions of personhood. 
The novel follows the central character, John (or Johnny) Smith, a name that 
suggests an ‘everyman’ figure in a Christian morality play. As a child, he is victim to a 
brain injury whilst ice-skating, granting him psychic powers in which he has fleeting 
visions of the future, though at this stage he has not fully grasped or comprehended the 
significance of this ability. These powers are heightened when Johnny is involved in a 
road traffic accident and he awakens from a 4-year coma (again representing his 
‘hellish’ descent) to a world that has changed dramatically, not least because of the 
Watergate scandal which unfolded whilst Johnny was in his coma. Now, Johnny, 
through a kinetic, almost biblical ‘laying on of hands’, is able to read a person’s past 
experiences and, most significantly, predict future experiences that are yet to occur. 
Johnny’s mother, a born-again, fundamentalist Christian, sees her son’s power as a 
gift from God, insisting that he does his ‘duty’ when the time comes therefore 
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highlighting Johnny’s role as a contemporary messiah. King employs a range of 
Christian symbolism with the coma itself described as a, ‘Limbo, a weird conduit 
between the land of the living and the land of the dead’.38 Later, the Christian references 
become more explicit: ‘He could almost see them. All the whispering voices of 
purgatory’.39  
The reader therefore joins Johnny on his return from his katabasis, caught within a 
limbo between the underworld of deep coma (into which four years of his life have been 
submerged and lost) and the distant overworld. King uses metaphorical language to 
describe Johnny’s physical and medical condition that is reminiscent of the patterns of 
language used to describe Lazarus in the previous texts I have discussed. Johnny’s 
former lover at one point internalizes her musings upon the derivation and implication 
of the word ‘coma’, concluding that, ‘She didn’t like that word coma. It had a sinister, 
stealthy sound. Wasn’t it Latin for ‘sleep of death’?’.40 Once more, the 
interchangeability of sleep and death (the twins Hypnos and Thanatos) is conjured and 
when Johnny is referred to as, ‘The living corpse in the [room]’,41 the image of 
Kazantzakis’s Lazarus is evoked. 
King is not concerned, however, with the nature of Johnny’s descent itself and the 
topography of the underworld, unlike in Redgrove’s portrayal of the interrupted, 
shamanistic process of death and renewal within the underworld of coma. Instead, like 
Plath and Kazantzakis, King is more focused upon the consequences of Johnny’s 
traumatic return from his katabatic journey. This being said, Johnny’s return to the 
overworld is described in terms of rebirth that does correspond somewhat with 
Redgrove’s imagined experiences, as Johnny leaves the ‘corridors’ that represent his 
coma-limbo in preparation for his resurrection: 
 
It began to seem that he was not in a hallway at all anymore, but in a room – 
almost in a room, separated from it by the thinnest of membranes, a sort of 
placental sac, like a baby waiting to be born […] It came to him that this 
might be some sort of afterlife, and these bright shapes the shapes of 
angels.
42
  
 
The common metaphor of rebirth and regeneration is clear as Johnny leaves the clinical 
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‘womb’ of the steel hallway to come blinking, once more, into the light, fighting to 
break through the amniotic sac of his coma. Interestingly, both Jesus and Lazarus’s 
emergence from a dark cave can also represent a re-emergence from the earth itself, a 
rebirth from the earth-mother. In analysing this image of the ‘cave’ as the portal to the 
underworld, it is useful to look at Northrop Frye’s work on the influence of mythology, 
when he notes that, ‘The wonderful cave drawings of the paleolithic period may have 
been connected with an earth-mother cult in which the cave was identified with her 
womb’.43 In this way, death and rebirth are two sides of the same coin of the katabatic 
journey and one that is explicitly described in the above passage. In Johnny’s case, there 
is an almost seamless transition from this biological rebirth of the flesh to a celestial 
rebirth of the soul with the description of the near-death experience (a manifestation of 
anabasis or Heavenly ascension) as he confuses the hospital staff gathering around his 
bed for ‘angels’. Johnny, at least temporarily, tramps that road trodden by Dante’s 
literary alter-ego throughout the Divine Comedy. However, Johnny is not yet ready to 
enter the Paradiso as he returns to his earthly existence where, post-coma, a form of 
Christ-like transfiguration has occurred, granting Johnny visionary powers that can 
change people’s lives and that can, in the end, save mankind itself as his insights 
become steadily more disturbing and increasingly more significant. In fact, almost the 
first thing he realises after his resurrection is that, ‘He had changed… He had gone into 
the darkness with everything, and now it felt to him that he was coming out of it with 
nothing at all – except for some strangeness. The dream was ending’.44 This 
transfiguratory change plays a hugely significant role in the novel and it is Johnny’s 
ability to predict the future that constitutes the quest-objective of the katabatic journey 
despite the fact that, in Johnny’s case, he is a reluctant recipient of such a power. Frye, 
when discussing the journey of descent and return, touches upon this idea of the quest-
objective of katabasis when he writes that: ‘At the top of the winding stair one normally 
attains direct knowledge or vision, but the reward of descent is usually oracular or 
esoteric knowledge, concealed or forbidden to most people, often the knowledge of the 
future’.45 This seems to embody perfectly the result of Johnny’s descent with the 
exception, of course, that his quest is an accidental consequence of a traumatic event. 
He is that most modern of descent-protagonists – the reluctant hero – rather than the 
hubristically all-conquering hero of antiquity, like Heracles and Theseus before him.  
                                                     
43
 Northrop Frye, The Great Code (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), p. 191. 
44
 King, The Dead Zone, p. 139. 
45
 Frye, Fable of Identity, p. 62. 
100 
 
 
The description, above, of Johnny’s transfiguration, his ‘strangeness’, also helps to 
elucidate the nature of his katabasis and his experience in Hell: he has ‘gone into the 
darkness’ and returned. But it also helps to draw more links between the journey of 
katabasis and the post-traumatic condition. As Tal posits, ‘Trauma is a transformative 
experience, and those who are transformed can never entirely return to a state of 
previous innocence’.46 Again, this reflects earlier manifestations of the katabatic hero 
and the process of transfiguration that these experience, not least Lazarus’s new status 
as the ‘living dead’. Johnny, like Lazarus, changes and within this change lies the 
destiny of his future existence within the world. King, therefore, is more concerned with 
representing Johnny’s transfiguration that is triggered by his journey into an abstract 
concept of the underworld (as imagined by contemporary Christianity) rather than the 
geographical model of Hell depicted in descent narratives of antiquity, alongside such 
works as Dante’s Inferno. This abstract underworld sees Hell as an absence of God and, 
furthermore, an absence of everything – a darkness and emptiness of existence that 
resonates with Redgrove’s first-hand experiences of coma and an experience often cited 
by the many survivors of coma I have worked with. It is also a conceptual embodiment 
of Hell that conflicts with the mythological grand-narratives present within other 
fictional representations of coma that I critique throughout this investigation and one 
that is emphasized by King’s image of the empty, windowless and ‘dark’ metal corridor 
of the coma unconscious.
47
 
Johnny, having his powers of reading the future awakened at the peak of his re-
ascent to the overworld, brings these powers with him, transfiguring him completely. 
King, in creating a modern messiah, develops a hierarchy of the miraculous acts that 
Johnny now performs in the overworld, commencing with the resurrection from the 
coma in the first place. Granted the powers of second-sight, Johnny initially ‘reads’ the 
minutiae of people’s lives, from family relationships to the whereabouts of long-lost 
relatives. He then progresses to visions that become preventative measures for domestic 
accidents, able to intervene, for instance, in what could have been a highly destructive 
house fire. As the narrative develops, the miracle visions he conjures become 
increasingly significant: aiding local police to identify and capture a vicious sex 
criminal; rescuing his employer’s son from a freak accident at a local restaurant; and, 
ultimately, saving the world from a corrupt politician who will lead the country into all-
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out nuclear war. This hierarchy of miracles reflects the hierarchy of those performed by 
Christ across the Gospels, for example turning water into wine, walking on water, 
healing the blind, raising Lazarus from the dead, and finally saving the whole of 
mankind through his own death and resurrection. In The Dead Zone, however, there is 
no final resurrection for Johnny, only his initial transfigurative rising from the coma. 
This being said, after Johnny has the vision of the nuclear winter that future presidential 
candidate Greg Stillson will help to cause, the prophet decides to act, to abide by his 
mother’s final words: ‘Do your duty’. Unlike the actions of Christ, however, Johnny’s 
only solution seems to lie in an act of violence directed towards Stillson. Rather than 
allowing the violence to be enacted upon him in a modern version of the Passion, 
Johnny decides to assassinate Stillson at a political rally. 
The vision he has of Stillson is important to consider when looking at Johnny as a 
manifestation of Christ. It is unlike his others in that it is obscured by blue and yellow 
stripes which, Johnny reasons at the time, represent the image of ‘the Laughing Tiger’, a 
child’s game described to him by his employer’s Vietnamese gardener, Ngo Phat. In the 
game, a child dresses as a tiger, ‘And the other children tries to catch him as he runs and 
dances’ [sic]. Phat talks of how, ‘The child in the skin laughs, but he is also growling 
and biting, because that is the game’, completing his metaphor by saying that in 
Vietnam, ‘Before the Communists, many of the village leaders played the Laughing 
Tiger’.48 He concludes that Greg Stillson also plays this game with the image of the 
Laughing Tiger reflecting the metaphor of the ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’ in the Gospel 
of St. Matthew (ironically Christ’s warning against ‘false prophets’).49 The Laughing 
Tiger, though, is an inversion of the Christian idiom in that the tiger is overtly 
threatening, is clearly a tiger, yet its laughter and pleasantries have the ability to trick 
everyone into believing that it is something other than a tiger: something to be trusted. 
The dual-coloured stripes in Johnny’s vision, though, prove not to be a reference to 
the child’s game. His assassination attempt is unsuccessful, Johnny’s bullets straying far 
and wide as he is shot to death by Stillson’s bodyguards. However, in the fracas, 
Stillson seizes a small child and holds him in front of him as a human shield, the photos 
of which are leaked to the press, thus shattering his political career. This becomes 
significant in that the small boy in question wears a blue and yellow striped jumpsuit, a 
key revelation in understanding the function of Johnny’s katabasis. All of Johnny’s 
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visions up until now predict the consequences of a future event or act. By paying heed 
to these warnings, those involved prevent these consequences from happening, shaping 
an alternative future and a different reality. The Stillson vision is different in that it 
already suggests and assimilates the alternative future, intensifying the notion that 
Johnny was always going to die in a moment of messianic self-sacrifice in order to save 
mankind. His katabasis has granted him omniscience that will result in the salvation of 
the world, through his inevitable, unavoidable death. In this, his incarnation as a Christ 
figure, his katabasis and resurrection from the death state (the coma) and subsequent 
transfiguration (the prophetic visions) becomes clear to see, his final self-sacrifice only 
serving to highlight the archetypal Christian metaphor that runs throughout the text. 
Alongside the overt comparisons to Christ, Johnny is frequently described as the 
kind of embodiment of Lazarus present in The Last Temptation. As previously 
mentioned, whilst in his coma, he is referred to as a ‘living corpse’,50 and even prior to 
his accident, because of his physical height and tendency towards slouching, described 
as ‘Frankenstein’ by the children at the school in which he used to teach. This too is a 
germane comparison, the monster of Mary Shelley’s classic novel being a reanimated 
corpse, as is the Lazarus of Kazantzakis’s novel. Throughout The Dead Zone, Johnny 
descends into little more than a walking corpse, his physical self gradually 
disintegrating and breaking apart through the physical strain of the coma and the 
psychological stress of the visions (a degradation and fragmentation of both the 
corporeal and psychological self also touched upon within the two poems of Redgrove 
and Plath). Indeed, his physical transfiguration post-coma can be seen as a reference to 
Frankenstein’s monster, his body laced with scars left over from the gruelling 
operations he underwent in order to try and remedy the physical effects of muscle 
atrophy and ligament degeneration caused by the inert coma-state he was trapped within 
for four years. Johnny, therefore, becomes a walking corpse, much like Lazarus, 
alongside Leucius and Karinus from the apocrypha. Similarities between Johnny and 
Christ are also emphasized. After all, as Christ carried the cross to Golgotha, what else 
was he but a living corpse, moving towards his ultimate purpose on earth which meant 
that he was, essentially, already dead? Despite the fact that Christ, on several occasions 
prior to his crucifixion, expresses doubt over his self-sacrifice (most notably in his 
pleading with God in the Garden of Gethsemene) it is inevitable that he will accept his 
fate and fulfil scripture that proclaims that God will sacrifice his own son so that 
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mankind will be saved. For Christ, as for Johnny, the future has already been written. In 
this sense, despite Johnny’s constant doubts and attempts to walk away from his 
responsibility granted to him by his katabatic knowledge, the Stillson vision, obscured 
by the two-tone stripes, becomes his own prophetic ‘scripture’ and a symbol of his 
inevitable messianic self-sacrifice in order to save mankind.  
It follows that Johnny’s feeling that he has ‘changed’ on re-emerging from coma 
takes on another dimension: he experiences both a psychological and physical 
transfiguration that only exacerbates his katabatic trauma. Christ, too, underwent an 
inexplicable physical change post-resurrection, one that was enough to make his 
disciple, Thomas, question whether he truly was Christ risen from the dead, or merely 
an impostor.
51
 In a similar fashion to the incarnations of Lazarus seen in previous texts, 
Johnny descends into Hell and returns with physical scars and psychological knowledge 
and experience of the underworld which is indelibly imprinted upon his psyche. Indeed, 
the title of the novel, itself, is a metaphorical nod to the underworld, the ultimate ‘dead 
zone’. Later in the novel, Johnny’s physician, Weizak, attempts to describe his patient’s 
unusual condition at a press conference, declaring that: “…A part of John Smith’s brain 
has been damaged beyond repair […] He calls this his “dead zone”’. 52Going on to refer 
to this as ‘a small but total aphasia’,53 it appears that ‘all of these wiped-out memories 
seem to be part of a “set” – that of street, road, and highway designations’. 54 Weizak 
then discusses how another part of Johnny’s brain has been ‘awakened’, in an attempt to 
explain his patient’s sudden acquisition of ‘second-sight’. As is expected, Weizak 
strives to justify a supernatural phenomenon by using language that he knows and uses 
best – the language of science (in this case Johnny’s ‘aphasia’) in an attempt to explain 
the unexplainable: Johnny’s supernatural powers. He therefore endeavours to rationalise 
the concept of this ‘dead zone’ within the field of medicine but the fact that Johnny’s 
‘dead zone’ has been created alongside his unexplainable powers of second sight means 
that it will always defy logic. Indeed, his second sight and his dead zone are symbiotic, 
both arising from the underworld of Johnny’s coma which is, itself, incommunicable. 
However, in a pursuit that mirrors Redgrove’s own biographical mission, Weizak still 
tries to communicate both the void of coma and the second-sight phenomenon through 
the language that he knows best, attempting to attribute a tangible concept to Johnny’s 
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katabatic trauma of coma. 
Because of the nature of this katabasis, ‘the dead zone’ is imbued with metaphorical, 
spiritual significance. Johnny has descended into the dead zone and it seems that, like 
Lazarus, Christ and descent heroes before them, he has brought some of that dead zone 
back with him, a ‘knowledge’ which will forever shape future experience. It is 
significant that Johnny’s prophetic knowledge has been exchanged for his knowledge of 
topographical and spatial awareness in the overworld, a consequence of his newly 
acquired status as the ‘living dead’ who cannot take up his place on earth any more than 
he can in the underworld. Like Lazarus, he stands astride both worlds and cannot quite 
find the language, beyond the designation ‘dead zone’, to explain his position in the 
world, a position made all the more precarious by his geographical aphasia. 
The use of Judeo-Christian katabasis, therefore, can clearly be traced through these 
rather diverse examples of coma texts. In The Dead Zone, King also makes reference to 
Johnny’s descent by comparing him to that most renowned katabatic traveller, Jonah, 
when Johnny (a lexical variation of Jonah) muses that he, ‘Had been swallowed by a 
big fish. Its name was not leviathan but coma. He had spent four-and-a-half years in that 
particular fish’s black belly and that was enough’.55 In this Old Testament story, a 
wrathful incarnation of God sends a huge fish to swallow Jonah as a punishment for not 
preaching the Word. Jonah is only released when he prays to God, promising Him that 
from now on, he will fulfil the role that God has given him. This triggers a spiritual 
transfiguration through a katabatic journey, his restoration after three days inside the 
great fish apparently prefiguring the resurrection of Christ, again after spending three 
days in the ‘belly’ of the underworld. Johnny also directly reflects his Old Testament 
biblical counterpart by initially refusing to ‘listen’ to the visions that have been granted 
him: by not preaching the ‘Word’ embedded within his visions. Apart from this direct 
reference to the story of Jonah, King also references Leviathan, the sea monster and 
counterpart to the land monster Behemoth, both of which appear in the Book of Job. 
This image of the sea monster and the descent into its belly is another embodiment of a 
katabatic journey, as elucidated, once more, by Northrop Frye: 
 
Later, as mythologies, especially the Biblical one, broke away from earth- 
mother symbolism, the subterranean world became associated with the 
bowels of a sinister monster. This monster belongs to a lower world, and 
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may be thought of as under the earth.
56
 
 
This further explains the imagery of Christ entering the underworld through the mouth 
of a monstrous creature of the underworld in fresco paintings. In fact, according to Frye, 
in St. Matthew’s Gospel, Christ ‘accepted the Jonah story as a type of his own 
Passion’,57 saying to the Pharisees that: ‘For as Jonas [sic] was three days and three 
nights in the whale’s belly; so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the 
heart of the earth’.58 For King, it is the medical condition of coma that becomes the 
monster of the underworld in contemporary thought, Johnny spending four years inside 
its hellish ‘belly’. By constantly reflecting upon and assimilating these archetypal 
descent heroes and tales of katabasis, Johnny attempts to, like Redgrove, use the 
language of mythology to communicate the incommunicable and to make sense of his 
trauma, and King, as author, calls upon these archetypes of antiquity to try and navigate 
through the incommunicable mystery of the void in consciousness that the coma most 
often embodies. 
Within the next chapter, I will continue to explore the descent myths of antiquity, 
explicating further how authors of coma fiction use these in an attempt to communicate 
the trauma of coma, an experience that, for the victim, often constitutes not a complex 
quest narrative of katabasis, but (similar to Redgrove’s experiences) a total void in 
consciousness. 
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4: There Is the Trouble, There Is the Toil. Coma, Katabasis and the 
Greco-Roman Tradition 
 
Religions, philosophies, arts, the social forms of primitive and historic man, prime discoveries in science 
and technology, the very dreams that blister sleep, boil up from the basic, magic ring of myth. 
                                                                           - Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces 
 
 
4.1: Introduction 
 
The archetypal katabatic images in Judeo-Christian tradition, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, are symptomatic of a universal and historical fascination with descent 
narratives in antiquity, perhaps even influencing the development of the story of 
Christ’s own ‘harrowing’ of Hell. In Greco-Roman mythology, katabatic ‘quest’ 
narratives are rife, depicting flawed heroes such as Theseus, Heracles and, of course, 
Orpheus, who descend into Hades, driven by their own personal goal, only to emerge 
inexorably changed and transfigured. Once more, as I will illustrate, similarities can be 
seen between these katabatic heroes of antiquity and the protagonists of coma 
narratives. 
In this chapter, I will move onto the Greco-Roman tradition of katabatic mythology, 
using this as a framework to explore, in particular, Iain Banks’s novel of coma descent, 
The Bridge, alongside Liz Jensen’s The Ninth Life of Louis Drax. I will argue that the 
Jungian notion of a collective unconscious in which shared psychological archetypes 
inform our understanding of the world has its equivalent in narrative theory, not least in 
Northrop Frye’s extensive work on the influence of fable and mythology upon all works 
of literature, alongside Paul Ricoeur’s ideas of sedimentation. In the final part of the 
chapter, I will attempt to explicate why this relationship between coma and katabasis 
has developed, and why the stories and imagery of antiquity continue to be an obsession 
of authors of coma literature, proposing my own interpretation and application of the 
Jungian collective unconscious and its operation in society. 
But before I look more closely at manifestations of the katabatic hero of antiquity in 
coma literature, I will firstly, for illustrative purposes, examine another descent in Greek 
mythology and one that has caused some controversy amongst scholars: the katabasis 
outlined in Book Eleven in Homer’s Odyssey. In doing this, I will be highlighting 
recurrent motifs of the Greco-Roman descent myth which, I will argue, are consistently 
woven into tales of coma katabasis. 
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4.2: Beneath the Fog and the Darkness: The Underworld of the Mind 
 
In Book Eleven, or the nekyia, the witch Circe allows Odysseus to leave her island so 
that he may commune with the dead in order to fathom what his next course of action 
should be. As instructed, in the land of the Kimmerians, Odysseus performs a ritual 
which summons the underworld, allowing him to seek advice from its inhabitants, not 
least from the blind seer Teiresias. The advice and visions of the future that Odysseus 
receive (prophetic knowledge akin to Johnny Smith’s visions of the future) allow him to 
shape his future decisions, despite the fact that he still makes errors of judgement, often 
ignoring these visions altogether. Whilst some scholars, notably D.L. Page, see this not 
as a full nekyia (katabatic journey) but a nekyomanteia (a ‘calling up’ of the dead)1, 
Raymond J. Clark asserts that it ‘is distinguishable from regular necromantic evocations 
of the dead in the land of the living’,2 suggesting that what starts out as a necromantic 
consultation gradually becomes a full katabasis. This being said, when Odysseus first 
sees Hades, it does seem, through his use of passive verbs, as though it is a conjuration 
that simply appears before him: 
 
Now came the soul of Teiresias the Theban, holding 
A staff of gold, and he knew who I was and spoke to me.
3
  
 
However, as Clark points out, over time it appears as though Odysseus has actually 
descended, that a physical journey into the underworld and a dislocation from the 
overworld has taken place, as seen when Odysseus is addressed by Anticleia, his dead 
mother: ‘My child, how did you come here beneath the fog and the darkness | and still 
alive?’.4 To this, Odysseus replies, ‘Mother, a duty brought me here to the house of 
Hades’ [my emphasis].5 Both statements clearly imply that Odysseus has physically 
travelled to the underworld and this is emphasized later as Odysseus (when narrating 
this tale to his wife, Penelope) says that he, ‘Descended into the House of Hades’. Circe, 
too, says of Odysseus, ‘Unhappy men, who went alive to the house of Hades, | so dying 
twice, when all the rest of mankind die only | once…’.6 As Clark posits, Circe’s remark 
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suggests that Odysseus, as a result of his experience, ‘will be unlike other men’ which 
‘further distinguishes the catabatic journey from a necromantic consultation’.7  
Odysseus’s ‘full’ nekyia is a particularly instructive example of katabasis when 
discussing the representation of descent narratives in coma fiction. By performing the 
ritual taught to him by Circe, Odysseus summons the spirits of Hades to appear before 
him, but then there is an unusual linguistic turn: he and the spirits begin to speak as 
though Odysseus has physically descended into Hades. It seems as though in the act of 
summoning Hades to him, Odysseus has also been drawn into it. Modifying Clark’s 
proposition that Odysseus performs a full katabatic nekyia, I suggest that although 
Odysseus may not physically descend into the geographical heart of the underworld, he 
experiences a psychic katabasis that feels no less real, just as the protagonists of the 
coma fiction I will be discussing descend into the underworld of their unconscious 
without a physical journey taking place. 
Odysseus’s nekyia embodies a genuine quest for knowledge which he hopes to gain 
from the underworld. Rather than Heracles or Theseus, for example, he is not looking to 
sack Hades, or defy the God of the underworld himself. This form of a katabatic quest 
for enlightenment is again a running motif throughout coma fiction. As Clark posits, 
Odysseus will no longer be like ‘other men’ (like Lazarus and Christ in Judeo-Christian 
scripture) and this concept is consistently utilized within the narratives of coma fiction 
that I will explore. Odysseus’s quest starts out as a psychological encounter that soon 
transports him on a physical journey into Hades. In the examples of coma fiction I will 
be discussing, a similar transition takes place, albeit somewhat inverted. The physical 
departure (caused by an act of violence) triggers the coma which, in turn, triggers a 
psychological journey through the underworld. Like Odysseus, the coma victim is 
depicted paradoxically as being stationary in space, yet simultaneously experiencing a 
physical journey through the psychic experience. 
It is important to note that whereas exterior coma texts, like The Dead Zone, concern 
themselves with the consequences of the return from the underworld, and the impact of 
this in the overworld, interior coma narratives are more concerned with the descent 
itself, and the journey through the underworld on the quest to acquire knowledge. 
Welsh’s Marabou Stork Nightmares, discussed earlier, is a paradigm of this katabatic 
model. Roy’s descent and journey through his various layers of consciousness 
eventually leads him to the monster (there are always monsters in Hades) at the heart of 
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his psychological underworld, the marabou stork. The knowledge he acquires is the 
revelation that the monster represents his hidden self. Once acquired, his return from the 
underworld is initiated and he is ‘reborn’. Like Odysseus, he can no longer be like 
‘other men’. I have also previously discussed how out of Carl’s psyche emerge 
‘Virgilian’ guides8 that help him navigate through his own coma-Hell in Garland’s The 
Coma.  Odysseus’s katabasis is initiated by a ritual which requires him to dig a trench in 
the ground and make sacrifices and offerings within this rivulet, thus paying tribute to 
the infernal regions below. This concept of the gateway to Hades opening up within the 
earth also reflects Lazarus and Christ’s re-emergence from their respective caves, their 
rebirth from the womb of the earth mother and also the place into which they are laid. 
The cave within the earth is the departure point from which they commence their 
katabases: their journeys into Hell. 
This katabasis that takes the hero beneath ‘the darkness’ on a journey of 
enlightenment also connects with another classical Greek text: Plato’s ‘allegory of the 
cave’ in Book VII of the Republic. This extended metaphor outlines the consequences 
of a ‘soul’s earthly imprisonment’,9 discussing how we are all, ‘Men living in a sort of 
cavernous chamber underground, with an entrance open to the light and a long passage 
all down the cave’.10 This restrictive ‘cave’ represents the human mind and the potential 
it has to stagnate, oppressing the individual within its chambers of unenlightened 
darkness. However, the cave image also represents the possibility the mind offers the 
individual to escape into the light and shed his ‘unquestioning acceptance of material 
values’.11 If the mind is a cave, albeit a complex and multi-faceted cave (after all, Plato 
does not specify exactly how far-reaching this metaphorical ‘long passage’ is), then this 
image can be extrapolated to suggest that the narrative of interior coma descent 
constitutes a katabasis of the psyche. Within Plato’s parable, the physical katabasis is 
transformed into the psychical, and we are once more reminded of the ‘cave’ being the 
starting point for a descent to the underworld. The depictions of journeys into the 
supposed underworld of the coma unconscious, therefore, constitute a psychical 
katabasis with the mind becoming the ‘cave’ of departure. 
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This Platonic concept of the mind as cave is exploited in another example of coma 
fiction, Liz Jensen’s The Ninth Life of Louis Drax, the title immediately suggesting 
themes of death and rebirth and reminiscent of Plath’s reference to having ‘nine times to 
die’ in ‘Lady Lazarus’. The novel is centred on a young boy, the eponymous hero, 
Louis, who lies in a coma following an ‘accident’. The split-narrative follows Louis’s 
interior coma narrative, in which he tries to come to terms with his coma-underworld, 
and the exterior coma narrative of his physician, Dr. Dannachet. The Doctor struggles 
both to trigger a return from coma for his patient, and also to complete his mission to 
learn of the true cause of Louis’s accident: a suicide attempt after witnessing his mother, 
Natalie Drax (a victim of the syndrome Munchausen’s-by-proxy) murder his father by 
pushing him over a cliff edge. It is the same cliff edge over which the traumatized Louis 
willingly steps in plain vision of his mother. The guardian of Louis’s psychic Hades is 
the sinister shadow-figure, Gustave, whose face is concealed by bloodied bandages, his 
speech frequently interrupted by blood-frothed coughing. Over time, this shadowy 
‘Other’ is revealed to represent Louis’s murdered father, Pierre, and it is through this 
revelation, alongside Gustave’s ‘Virgilian’ guidance through Louis’s katabasis of coma, 
that the image of the mind as cave is developed. Gustave, when explaining to Louis how 
he came to reside in this ‘hellish’ place, says that: ‘I can’t remember [how I got here]. 
Not completely […] I just remember being in a dark place. A cave’.12 The fact that 
Gustave, to all intents and purposes, is residing within Louis’s mind (the underworld of 
his coma) exacerbates the image of the mind as cave, its darkness representing the void 
in consciousness (akin to Johnny Smith’s ‘dead zone’) into which biographical and 
experiential memory-details sink and disappear.  
This cave image is emphasized when, later in the novel, Gustave decides to guide 
Louis deeper into the ‘cave’, a journey that significantly involves Louis ‘climbing down 
into the danger’13 in a trajectory that once more evokes a katabatic descent. At the end 
of this journey lies the object of Gustave’s mission and ultimately (because of the fact 
that Gustave is a projection of Louis’s psyche) the object of Louis’s mission: to seek the 
truth hidden within the deepest layers of his unconscious. This physical landscape of the 
deepest level of the coma-underworld is described by Louis as ‘white stone like bone, 
like inside a creepy skull’.14 Louis, unknowingly at the time, uses a pertinent simile, 
bestowing upon his unconscious the physical designation of the skull / cave in which his 
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mind literally resides. On the walls of this cave, scrawled in blood, are the names 
‘Catherine’ and ‘Louis’, the former name being that of Pierre Drax’s first wife, the 
woman with whom he had planned to adopt Louis from Natalie, before eventually being 
manipulated into leaving Catherine to be with Natalie herself. Despite being cloaked as 
a descent into the mind of his father, into his father’s ‘cave’, this katabatic descent is 
revealed to be a journey into Louis’s own mind where he faces up to all of the family 
secrets that he has repressed in the exterior world of coma. He finally confronts the truth 
of his mother’s syndrome and the repeated, life-threatening dangers to which she has 
subjected him in order to court attention. 
The image of the cave is made more complex, later, when Dannachet learns that 
Pierre Drax’s body has been discovered in a sea-cave cut into the cliff-side over which 
he was pushed. Like Christ and Lazarus, Pierre was, ‘Stuck in that cave for three 
days’.15 In this way, it seems as though Louis’s katabasis of coma, with his father as 
Virgilian guide, also acts as a prophetic dream that reveals the location of his father’s 
corpse. It is a katabatic enlightenment that is similar to Johnny’s ‘gift’ of second-sight 
in The Dead Zone. Through the knowledge both characters acquire at the heart of their 
coma underworld, they are granted a certain vision of the future and, in Louis’s case, he 
is also granted knowledge of the present: an insight into his father’s final resting place. 
Louis’s katabasis also chimes with Odysseus’s journey into Hades. Both are quests for 
knowledge that can help to alter their present predicament but which can also 
potentially alter and influence future actions. Interestingly, though both katabatic 
journeys are successful in that prophetic knowledge is acquired, neither hero acts upon 
this knowledge. Odysseus seemingly ‘re-enacts’ the obstacles of the future that have 
been predicted for him, and Louis likewise fails to act upon his newly acquired 
knowledge, choosing to remain within his coma and hide from his future life that waits 
for him in the overworld. The image of mind as cave is also explored in the exterior 
world of coma. Louis appears to ‘awake’ miraculously from his coma during a romantic 
clinch between Dannachet and his manipulative mother, the good doctor rushing to the 
boy’s bedside only to comment that: ‘As I looked into the dark pools of his enlarged 
pupils, it felt as if I were looking at holes to darkness, no more’.16 This description, 
alone, is one that evokes the abyss of the mind of the coma victim, the eyes being the 
cave mouths through which the exterior witness can see the void of consciousness: the 
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incommunicable void of the underworld of the mind.  
This common motif of the katabatic cave can be more closely examined by drawing 
on the theories developed by the psychoanalyst Carl Jung, in particular his work on 
mythical archetypes and his concept of the collective unconscious. Jung’s theoretical 
concepts of the role archetypes and mythology have in the construction of identity are 
particularly instructive when analysing patterns of archetypal tropes throughout biblical 
and mythological narratives and will allow me to explicate further the passage of these 
tropes into representations of coma. The conceptual cave of the mind, then, and its 
potential to act as a departure point for a psychic katabasis would represent one of the 
‘eternally inherited’17 archetypes that humans, according to Jung, have stored within 
their psyche. As the father and originator of what would become archetypal psychology, 
Jung posits that all humans share certain images within a ‘collective unconscious’, 
archetypal concepts such as ‘mother’, ‘God’, ‘hero’, and ‘the wise old man’, but rather 
being fully formed, they are instead empty vessels, ‘primordial images’ into which the 
subject pours his own individual associations of ‘conscious understanding’.18 As Hall 
and Nordby explain, the archetype is ‘a [photographic] negative that has to be 
developed by experience’.19 For example, the Jungian archetype of ‘the shadow’ 
represents the unconscious, often constituting the subject’s darker side which is not 
generally acknowledged or with which the subject does not identify. Re-examining 
Marabou Stork Nightmares from a Jungian perspective, this ‘shadow’ is represented by 
the stork itself which, in turn, represents the dark side of Roy’s unconscious. For Roy, 
this archetype is ‘filled out’ with the ‘conscious experience’ of his criminal and violent 
deeds that he has committed throughout his life in the overworld that lies outside of the 
underworld of coma. 
Jung’s concept of a shared, inherited collective unconscious is one of his more 
radical and controversial theories, most notably because his justifications as to how one 
acquires this are at best vague, attempting to attribute the cause to biological factors. He 
calls this unconscious a, ‘Psychological instance of the biological “pattern of 
behaviour,” which gives all living organisms their specific qualities’,20 yet fails to 
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provide any real evidence of the kind which a solid biological theory would require. 
However, the archetypes that Jung discusses constantly occur within literature and I 
argue that it is the need for humans to narrate and share stories that has led to the 
development of such a collective unconscious or bank of recognizable archetypes. As 
discussed earlier, it seems as though, amongst other functions, such archetypes are 
drawn upon in order to narrate and navigate through difficult, often traumatic, 
experiences. They provide a reservoir of language and imagery which allows the 
communication of the incommunicable through a process of codification of the trauma. 
This creates a necessary distancing between the victim/narrator and the narrative itself, 
a dynamic that is clearly represented in Welsh’s novel. Northrop Frye, in analysing the 
role of archetypes in narrative development, postulates that, ‘Stories are told about gods, 
and form a mythology. The gods take on certain characteristics […] The same types of 
characters get into legends and folk tales, and, as literature develops, into fiction’.21 
Frye’s narrative ‘food chain’ can, I suggest, be used to explicate the Jungian collective 
unconscious further, thus drawing a parallel between theories of psychoanalysis and of 
narrative. It is through this gradual evolution of narrative and constant exposure to 
archetypal stories and imagery that has allowed these to become assimilated into the 
unconscious of the subject. This process therefore provides us with a bank of imagery 
and narrative tools that can be accessed when all other attempts at communication 
struggle or fail entirely. 
For Jung, archetypes manifest themselves in ‘archetypal imagery’, the specific 
‘personalized’ form that the generalized archetype of the collective unconscious takes 
within the psyche of the subject. For example, as discussed, in Marabou Stork 
Nightmares, the ‘shadow’ for Roy becomes the ‘stork’. For Louis in Jensen’s novel, the 
‘wise old man’ becomes Gustave/Pierre who attempts to aid and guide Louis out of the 
underworld of coma. Such archetypal imagery, Jung proposes, become most apparent 
within cultural, religious and mythical texts, but also arise most prominently from 
dreams and fantasies. For this reason, it is important to examine how the many 
manifestations of the underworld within interior coma narratives often possess dream-
like, or rather, ‘nightmarish’ qualities: the false realities and distorted half-memories of 
Garland’s novel; the stork nightmares of Welsh’s. In such texts, there are the consistent 
reminders of the symbiotic relationship between death and sleep. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, in Greek mythology, Thanatos, the god of death, and his twin brother 
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Hypnos, the god of sleep, resided within the kingdom of Hades, the god of the 
underworld. Moreover, Morpheus, the god of dreams, was Hypnos’s son and also dwelt 
within Hades. Given this historical and mythical tradition, it comes as no surprise that 
throughout our culture, the concepts of sleep and death are commutable. In Christian 
thought, this symbiosis of sleep and death is particularly present in St. Paul’s letters. In 
1 Corinthians, he writes, ‘Behold, I shew you a mystery; We shall not all sleep, but we 
shall all be changed | In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the 
trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be 
changed’.22 This is an especially germane passage as Paul explains what will happen to 
both the dead and the living prior to the Second Coming of Christ. This process of an 
ethereal, non-specific ‘change’ is highlighted, drawing a parallel between sleep and with 
language similar to that used by King when describing Johnny’s post-katabatic 
transfiguration. Indeed, when describing his protagonist’s return from the ‘darkness’ of 
coma, King writes, ‘The dream was ending’,23 once more equating the death-state of 
coma to the dream-state of sleep. These interchangeable archetypes of sleep and death 
are employed by authors across a range of coma literature with the coma itself 
represented as a form of sleep/death-state, the ‘dreams’ of which constituting infernal 
visions of the underworld of the mind. This appropriation of the sleep/death archetype 
therefore demonstrates the Jungian collective unconscious in operation and we can 
elaborate upon this symbiosis of states of consciousness by examining the work of the 
post-Jungian theorist, James Hillman, whose theories in general are invaluable when 
explicating the archetypal image of the underworld in psychology. 
Hillman was instrumental in developing Jungian thought into what is now known as 
archetypal psychology, an approach that proposes the practice of discussing and 
analysing the influence of the varied polytheistic mythologies upon the consciousness 
of the individual and his psychological life. These core principles of archetypal 
psychology are useful for the analysis of how archetypal imagery is assimilated by 
authors when writing about the descent and resurrection from coma. In his seminal 
work, The Dream and the Underworld, Hillman advances Jungian theory by proposing 
that dream, in fact, represents a kind of death, a descent into the underworld or a 
katabasis of the mind that one experiences every time one sleeps. He writes that, 
‘Where do contents of consciousness go when they fade from attention? Into the 
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unconscious, says psychology. The underworld has gone into the unconscious: even 
become the unconscious’.24 This underworld of the unconscious is descended into when 
one dreams and the dreams themselves conjure ‘hellish’ images of people and places: 
shades or eidola. These immaterial spirits represent real people from the overworld but, 
like Jung’s ‘primordial image’ of the archetype, they are somehow empty, devoid of the 
thymos (the body) yet craving attention of the flesh (hence the blood sacrifice that 
Odysseus performs). These eidola are described by the ghost of Achilles, in the 
Odyssey, as, ‘The senseless | dead men…[the] mere imitations of perished mortals’.25 
Desperate to hold onto what once made them human, they nevertheless fail to 
understand why they need to do this, anchoring into Achille’s use of the adjective 
‘senseless’ as they have become detached from the corporeality of their human form 
and motivations that existed within the overworld. In short, these eidola refer to ‘an 
archetypal person in human shape’.26 The image of Gustave in Louis Drax is one such 
‘senseless’ eidolon, a shade in Louis’s coma-underworld that is unable to remember the 
exact details of his life in the overworld, even possessing a different name, yet 
inextricably drawn to the fragmented memories of that world, desperate to re-unify 
them. Thus, for Louis, Gustave/Pierre only represents his father and is merely an 
archetype with the purpose of guiding Louis out of coma, in a similar way to how 
Catherine in The Coma is not really Carl’s lover, but an archetypal ‘Virgilian guide’ in 
the guise of Carl’s lover from the overworld. Topographical eidola also appear 
frequently within interior coma narratives, the false realities of the narrator’s shadow-
world in Alex Garland’s The Coma, for example. In another work of coma fiction, 
Nicholas Royle’s Regicide, the interiority of the protagonist’s coma (a katabatic hero, 
also named ‘Carl) is depicted as an oppressive cityscape, the author implying that a map 
that Carl finds is actually a drawing of his coma-damaged brain, the gyri and sulci 
representing the Orwellian streets of the city.
27
 In these novels, the coma-protagonist, 
like Drax, must travel downwards and deeper into the nadir of their coma-underworld in 
order to gain katabatic knowledge and return to the overworld. In The Coma, this lowest 
point is referred to as a ‘void’; in Regicide and The Dead Zone as ‘the Dark’ and ‘the 
darkness’ respectively; in Louis Drax, the ‘danger’, all reminiscent of the tenebrosity of 
the archetypal Hadean underworld and Plato’s metaphor of the cave. 
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When Odysseus performs his katabatic nekyia he similarly encounters such eidola, at 
one point reaching out to touch his dead mother Anticleia, who simply disappears in 
armfuls of vapour. Indeed, Odysseus says of this encounter, ‘Three times | I started 
toward her, and my heart was urgent to hold her, | and three times she fluttered out of 
my hands like a shadow | or a dream’28 [emphasis added]. There is yet another overt 
connection made here between death and dream which exemplifies the dream-as-death 
archetype upon which Hillman builds an entire theory of dreaming as katabasis. The 
very fact that often after we awake from sleep, the memories of a dream eventually fade 
away, sink back into the unconscious, reflects this notion of a return from the 
underworld, with the ‘shades’ we encountered no longer within the grasp of the 
consciousness of the waking world. In Greco-Roman mythology and culture, Hades, as 
a god, had no temples and no fixed image and was frequently described as ‘invisible’, 
much like a dream. He is therefore an embodiment of a mysterious and terrifying void, a 
presence that can only be described through its negative value. As Hillman posits, 
‘Hades is not an absence, but a hidden presence – even an invisible fullness’.29 This is a 
statement which embodies much of our dream-experience: we know we have dreamt, 
are indeed replete with that knowledge, yet the specifics of the dream itself often remain 
elusive. In this way, I argue that this process of post-katabatic ‘forgetting’ is indicative 
of the plight of the coma survivor who has an awareness of his descent into coma (the 
‘katabatic knowledge’ of his transfiguratory ‘change’) but cannot remember the details 
of the descent itself (the hidden-presence at the end of the psychic descent). 
Jung, among other theorists and scholars (including Northrop Frye), points towards 
the development of depth psychology as being a key influence upon how humankind 
has navigated towards an understanding of the inner workings of the mind and the 
unconscious. Freud, in particular, mapped out a topographical model of the mind that, 
like Dante’s vision of the cosmos, consists of various levels to which one can travel. 
The very nature of depth psychology is to attempt to delve into the darkest depths of the 
psyche in order to confront the particular eidolon at the heart of the disturbance: to bring 
that shadow into the light and to normalize it in rational, concrete terms, thus stripping it 
of its mystery – its ‘hellish’ qualities. Such psychological archetypes now occupy coma 
literature, as seen, for example, in Louis Drax. Like the depth psychologist and the 
katabatic hero of antiquity, the eponymous hero also journeys into the deepest realms of 
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his coma-underworld in order to excavate and retrieve what Rosalind Williams refers to, 
in her analysis of underworld topographies, the ‘absolute truth’30 about his mother. It is 
only this psychological manifestation of a geological practice that will allow him to 
return to the overworld. He performs, in short, the Freudian ‘dream-work’ of his coma 
descent and through this, is able to face the Jungian archetype of the ‘shadow’: the truth 
of his mother’s syndrome and her systematic abuse. This notion of psychological 
‘excavation’ often emerges in common parlance, as we are asked to dig deep or to 
dredge our minds, or even to ‘get “down to bedrock”’,31 itself an archetype that 
metaphorically concretizes the vertical topography of the psyche. As Hillman 
concludes, ‘[Freud] has returned to psycho-therapy the realm of inner space. Here Freud 
begins to write interior geography and to make a voyage in the imaginal. Through the 
dream, he rediscovers the underworld’.32 Freud, himself, refers to dream as the via 
regia, the royal road to the unconscious. Perhaps, as Hillman suggests, he also 
discovered the katabatic path from the cave mouth of the mind to the underworld of 
dream, a psychological and archetypal model of hellish descent that has allowed authors 
to depict the interiority of coma: the ‘sleep of death’. 
 
 
4.3: The Lower World: Coma and the Katabatic Excavation of the Underworld 
 
One text, in particular, that takes this archetype of dream-as-katabasis and superimposes 
it over the coma condition is Iain Banks’s novel The Bridge. Similarly to Welsh, Banks 
creates a multi-layered topography of the interiority of coma, though unlike Roy in 
Marabou Stork Nightmares, the unnamed narrator of The Bridge has no real control 
over the transitions between layers of consciousness. Each layer also possesses its own 
distinct narrator, so whilst the layers may certainly evoke those created in Welsh’s novel 
(the autobiographical narrative, the slips into a primal brogue of the Scottish persona, 
the fantasy/quest mythologem, the descent into the underworld), there is always a 
disjunction between narrators, causing a disruption in narrative form and flow. This 
implies that the Master-narrator (the victim trapped in coma) is for the majority of the 
novel unaware of the presence of his fractured alter-egos who constantly irrupt within 
his unconscious, jostling for narratorial supremacy. Also, whereas Welsh certainly 
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alludes to katabatic motifs, Banks openly exploits mythological archetypes, painting a 
vivid landscape of the katabatic dream-journey of coma. 
The complex narrative structure of the novel is scaffolded by clearly delineated, 
individually titled sections, themselves containing undertones of the katabatic quest-
narrative. The novel is split into three main sections (plus a fourth, shorter postscript, 
the ‘Coda’ section). These sections, ‘Coma’, ‘Triassic’, and ‘Eocene’, are then each 
split by another sub-section, ‘Metaphormosis’, ‘Metamorpheus’, and ‘Metamorphosis’ 
respectively, which are then split into further sections or chapters, one to four or, in the 
case of the final ‘Metamorphosis’ section, split into four named parts: ‘Oligocene’, 
‘Miocene’, ‘Pliocene’, and ‘Quaternary’.33 There are several conceits at play within this 
intricate matrix. The first thing to note is that this core three-part structure embodies the 
structure of the archetypal katabatic quest, the three stages that Joseph Campbell, 
writing extensively on the narrative form of mythological tales, would call the 
‘departure’, the ‘initiation’, and the ‘return’.34 In this dream-like katabasis of coma, it is 
the coma itself, as is the case with Louis Drax, which proves to be the departure point, 
the descent from the cave-mouth of the mind into the underworld of the unconscious – 
the nightmarish world of ‘the bridge’. The use of geological epochs is also revealing 
when analysing the representation of descent. As the novel progresses, each section is 
chronologically moving forward in terms of epoch, ending with the most recent period 
at the time of writing the novel: the ‘Quaternary’. Each period represents significant 
‘geological’ and evolutionary change, suggesting that throughout his katabasis, Banks’s 
narrator is in a constant state of developmental flux. This leads to a form of katabatic 
transfiguration as he gradually re-unifies his fractured pre-coma identity, an identity that 
will nevertheless remain forever changed through the process of ‘destruction and rebirth 
of the self through an encounter with the absolute Other’.35  
Each of the epochs is also marked by significant extinction events leading to radical 
shifts in evolution, for example, during the ‘Eocene’ period, there was a major 
extinction event known as the Grande Coupure or ‘the Great Break’. This refers to the 
disruption in evolutionary continuity and is marked by the dawn of the first modern 
mammals. This epoch is used to commence the third section of the novel, and the 
narrator’s third stage of his journey (his ‘return’), implying that he is in a constant state 
of flux as he battles to find his way back to the overworld. This return ‘leg’ of his 
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infernal journey is integral in any katabatic quest, as Falconer explains when she writes 
that, ‘There has to be a return in katabatic narrative, but it need not be the hero who 
returns’.36 In this statement, Falconer argues against Clark who posits that there can be 
no katabasis without a return to the overworld of the hero himself. However, in the case 
of Louis Drax, as I touched upon earlier, there is no return by the end of the novel. 
Moreover, Louis ‘chooses’ to stay within his coma rather than return to the overworld, a 
narrative twist that is evocative of Campbell’s discussion of ‘the refusal of return’ 
depicted in several quest-narratives, whereby the hero fails to complete the ‘full round’ 
of his quest.
 37
 However, in support of Falconer, this ‘refusal’ does not mean that Louis 
fails to perform a true katabasis. Because of the knowledge that Louis acquires at the 
heart of his descent, Louis realises that the overworld has become more of a Hell-state 
than that of his coma. In fact, as the forest fires that grip France rage on, threatening the 
hospital in which Louis is housed, the entire topography of the overworld is transformed 
into an infernal vision. At the point at which Natalie Drax throws herself into the 
conflagration, a final act of defiance and self-victimization, Dannachet describes her as, 
‘Hurtling into hell’:38 the irruption of Hell on earth. In this sense, and through this 
inversion of the physical overworld and the psychic underworld, Louis does ‘return’ 
from his Hell-state, complete with katabatic knowledge, without ever actually returning 
from coma. He simply opts not to make the final physical (and medical) leg of the 
journey out of his disorder of consciousness. In the case of The Bridge, technically it is 
not the hero, or in this case, multiple heroes who return: these are just individual, 
isolated facets of the unnamed narrator’s psyche, as I will discuss later, who are 
constantly metamorphosing and evolving through the journey of descent. In the end, 
when the narrator escapes from coma, it is not these heroes who ascend but an 
altogether different, re-assimilated hero, the elusive name of whom is still only hinted at 
by Banks. 
This use of ‘Eocene’ with its connotations of disruption and change is also reflected 
within the build-up of disruption between the various narrative threads, as the individual 
narrators (the ‘heroes’) battle for narrative supremacy. The use of increasingly modern 
epochs as the novel progresses highlights the concept of evolutionary change, death and 
rebirth, and emphasises how the extinction of the old makes way for the new. The 
geological references also connect with the concept of the descent to Hades through the 
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earth as the narrator’s psychological descent is described in terms of the physical world. 
At the point at which we meet him, the narrator is moving through the layers of the 
earth to get to the underworld. The novel begins in coma, the departure point for the 
underworld, and so as the narrator descends, he reaches the deepest part of the earth – 
the ‘Triassic’ section of the novel, from which he must attempt to return. The closer he 
gets to the overworld, the more recent the epoch. This structure creates another 
topographically vertical model of the mind and of consciousness, the layers of which 
the narrator must ‘excavate’ in order to escape the underworld and return to the 
overworld. 
The theme of evolution and transfiguration is further emphasized through the 
structural designations, ‘Metaphormosis/Metamorpheus/Metamorphosis’. These 
somewhat meta-textual delineations help to shed a light upon Banks’s use of 
mythological and traditional archetypes to represent the katabasis of coma. 
‘Metaphormosis’ implies that the entire novel is an allegory with the idea of coma 
utilized as an extended metaphor for ‘hellish’ descent during which the mind is 
constantly appropriating and assimilating mythological motifs in order to cope with the 
trauma of the underworld of the unconscious. This is a process that exemplifies the 
workings of Jung’s ‘collective unconscious’, alongside Frye’s notion of the absorption 
of religion and myth into fiction. In an attempt to explain the phenomenological world 
and the trauma that caused the coma, metaphorical and archetypal ‘coma dreams’ are 
generated within the unconscious of the protagonist, forming an entire narrative of 
katabasis which provides the victim with a tangible coping strategy and also with the 
potential via regia out of the Hell of the unconscious. With the designation 
‘Metamorpheus’, Banks draws a parallel between the coma-state and the sleep/dream-
state, using the Greek god of dreams who, as mentioned, dwells within the underworld. 
In the third instance, ‘Metamorphosis’, Banks returns to the root word upon which his 
other titles are based. Metamorphosis again emphasizes the notion of change and 
transfiguration, the coma itself being compared to a pupal stage within which, through 
the dream-like katabasis, the victim is constantly evolving and gaining the knowledge at 
the heart of his psychological Hades before returning to the overworld, forever changed. 
It is significant that the very field of psychology is named after Psyche, the ancient 
Greek goddess of the soul and is also a word that, in one of its archaic forms, refers to a 
‘butterfly’, a creature that experiences a metamorphosis, emerging from a ‘katabatic’ 
pupal stage. In The Bridge, the coma psyche of the Master-narrator, like its 
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etymological and entomological counterpart, is forever evolving and metamorphosing 
with geographical and physical forms playing a key role throughout the novel in 
contributing to this change. It is within one such form, the sinister, oppressive structure 
of ‘the bridge’ that the central narrator, John Orr (a pun on a geological ‘ore’, again 
representing the physical world) resides. 
In this dream-world of coma, the bridge is an imposing, constantly-evolving 
structure that stretches over a seemingly endless expanse of water. The landmasses 
between which it stretches cannot be seen in either direction, evoking a sense of limbo. 
Orr, the main hero trapped within the coma-underworld, has no recollection of how he 
has ended up in this place; he only knows that he was ‘fished…out of the sea’.39 This 
immediately reinvents classical katabatic mythologies where the descent-hero has to 
cross vast expanses of water to reach the edge of the world where the land of the dead 
meets the land of the living. The Mesopotamian Gilgamesh mythology and Odysseus’s 
own nekyia are two examples of this archetypal narrative. Throughout mythology, the 
sea itself is often represented as a departure point for a katabatic journey as Frye 
explains: ‘The lower world [is] reached by descent through a cave or under water’,40 
reflecting Louis Drax’s katabasis, similarly initiated by his plunge into the sea. 
The socio-political environment of the bridge itself is highly oppressive, with 
bureaucratic divisions of social class laid in vertical relation to one another. The further 
down the bridge you are forced to live, the lower your social class (and the more 
insignificant you will be), reflecting David Pike’s observation that one of the chief 
tendencies of certain narratives of descent, such as Aristophanes’ Frogs and Lucian’s 
Voyage to the Underworld, was to create and satirise ‘a transparently social or political 
allegory of contemporary life on earth’.41 Each of Banks’s spatial divisions also reflects 
the delineations within Dante’s topographical imagining of Hell, which itself adopts 
ancient archetypes of ‘hellish’ society and includes satirical undertones akin to those to 
which Pike alludes. It is therefore instructive to note that at one point, when Orr has 
been unfairly and abruptly stripped of his relatively high status as a psychiatric patient, 
he is condemned to dwell in the nether regions of the bridge, living alongside the 
faceless masses. At this lowest point the environment is described as ‘cold and dark’ 
with ‘grey waters’ that ‘crash white outside’.42 Mapping Orr’s descent through the 
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layers of the bridge against classical concepts of the underworld, this lowest point of the 
bridge becomes comparable with the lowest zone of Hades, Tartarus, which, as Hillman 
explicates, was, ‘In the imagination of late antiquity […] a region of dense cold air 
without light’.43 Traditionally it is in this ‘pneumatic region’44 where the shades who 
have made some form of terrible transgression (usually against the Gods) are subjected 
to horrendous, repetitious punishments, for example Sisyphus who is forced to roll a 
huge rock up a hill, only to have it roll all the way to the bottom before he manages to 
get it to the summit. Tartarus is frequently described as ‘an almost bottomless pit of 
anguish and despair’,45 and this is emulated by Orr’s own descent into the lower depths 
of the bridge where he suffers anguished punishment, stripped of all his trappings of 
status and position and removing what little identity he has. He is condemned to become 
one of the faceless eidola of the lower reaches. 
Aside from the references to Tartarus, there are numerous allusions to Christian 
imagery of Hell that appear within the world of the bridge, infernal visions that arise out 
of its geological and mechanized fabric. It is revealed that the Master-narrator once 
studied geology, before training and working as an engineer. Several times, this 
narrator’s ‘dream-brother’ (his archetypal eidolon in the form of Orr) encounters violent 
accidents within the bridge, happenings that conjure images of mechanical suffering and 
Hell-fire. At one point, Orr inspects a sketch of the bridge that his Virgilian guide, 
Abberlaine Arrol, has drawn for him. It depicts trains that are ‘grotesque, gnarled 
things, like giant maggots’ and ‘girders and tubes’ that ‘become branches and boughs, 
disappearing into smoke rising from the jungle floor; a giant, infernal forest’.46 Orr’s 
appraisal of this gift from Abberlaine takes the form of the exclamation, ‘Imaginative’, 
a rather stoic comment that is loaded with irony as it is his imagination (his katabatic 
coma ‘dreams’) that causes this place to be created. This visual interpretation of the 
bridge makes open reference to it being an ‘infernal’ place, a sinister, smoking forest 
that invokes Dante’s departure point for the Inferno. This artistic impression of the 
underworld of the bridge, combining topographical details of both Hades and Hell, 
clearly contains monsters (that tradition for classical interpretations of Hades) but these 
monsters are grafted to the physical environment, onto the ironwork of the bridge so 
that the metal, itself, becomes organic and the creatures are integrated into the physical 
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engineering of the place. Thus, the girders become branches; the trains are maggots; the 
engine a ‘fiery lizard’. They are no longer topographical, passive features of the dream-
Hell, but threatening, evolving, organic abominations that attempt to seize hold of the 
tortured shade who runs, screaming, from its depths. 
The manifestation of the bridge, like the characters Orr encounters there, is in fact an 
eidolon (to use again Hillman’s taxonomy) taken from the Master-narrator’s past life 
and assimilated into the dream-Hell of coma. As the novel progresses, it is revealed that 
the bridge represents the Forth Rail Bridge that stretches into Edinburgh, a feat of 
engineering that is a constant source of macabre fascination for the Master-narrator. It is 
an element of the overworld, rendered into something altogether more foreboding in its 
dream-shadow equivalent. In this world of the bridge, Orr continues to encounter 
infernal visions that include train crashes and platform explosions, resulting in violence 
and terror enacted upon the inhabitants: the shades of the underworld, punished with 
fire and ‘brimstone’. These, too, are dreamlike eidola representing aspects of the 
Master-narrator’s psyche and experiential memory which are only fully understood 
when their connections to the overworld are made with the narrator realizing that they 
represent the car crash he was involved in which propelled him into his katabatic coma. 
The crash, it is revealed, was caused by him driving whilst drunk, absent-mindedly 
marvelling at that masterpiece of engineering down-river, the Forth Rail Bridge, leading 
him to take his eyes off the road and consequently follow the path of descent into his 
coma underworld. In a similar way to Roy in Marabou Stork Nightmares, these eidola 
are conjurations from the narrator’s unconscious, shades that dwell within the dream-
Hell of the psyche and which represent memories from the overworld that Orr must 
interpret in order to return to that world. 
Initially, the eidolon that Orr is seeking is embodied by what he refers to as the 
‘Third City Records and Historical Materials Library’, a building that appears to be 
‘lost’ within the kaleidoscopically shifting and metamorphosing structure of the bridge. 
Orr refers to his search as a ‘quest’ and at one point enters one of the huge mechanical 
lifts of the bridge, instructing the operator to take him to floor 52. This promises to be 
the location of the Third City Library but on arrival, the doors open to reveal not a 
library but a ‘scene of terrible disaster’.47 Imagery of mechanical destruction and 
collapse alongside descriptions of a scorching, all-engulfing inferno pervade the novel 
once more, yet another vision of Hell that is created within Orr’s katabatic quest and 
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another one that hinders his progress. On encountering this scene, Orr decides to retreat 
back to his ‘normal’ ordered existence within the bridge. The imagery of the mechanical 
chaos again represents the trauma of the Master-narrator’s car accident whilst also 
conveying his fascination with engineering, a preoccupation that has been repressed into 
his coma unconscious. But it is also significant that this particular eidolon is in the place 
where the library should be. The library becomes an ultimate embodiment of knowledge 
(in this case knowledge of the self) that the Master-narrator seeks through the 
unconscious quest of his katabatic alter-ego John Orr. The library holds the key to 
identity and consequently the key to ‘awakening’ from the coma: the knowledge of the 
car accident and of the events leading up to his descent into the unconscious. However, 
he is not yet ready to face up to this traumatic knowledge, just as Roy, throughout 
Marabou Stork Nightmares, is frequently not prepared to face up to the true identity of 
the monster at the heart of his descent (the marabou stork). Similarly, Louis Drax 
refuses to accept who Gustave actually represents within his coma underworld. In a 
process that reflects Freud’s theory of ‘remembering, repeating and working through’48 
(discussed in chapter two), all three characters persistently re-live the same dream-like 
visions before they are finally ready to come to terms with what these visions or eidola 
really portend. 
In The Bridge, the Master-narrator has to keep ‘digging deeper’ into his unconscious, 
descending further on his katabatic quest to retrieve the knowledge that will allow him 
to understand fully the eidola that appear all around him, just as Louis, led by Gustave, 
has to descend deeper into the skull-cave. One such eidolon created by Banks, in a 
conceit that was later appropriated by the BBC drama Life On Mars,
49
 
  
is the haunting 
vision of a man wired up to a life-support machine that keeps appearing on Orr’s 
television set, alongside the intermittent ‘bleeps’ on his phone-line that he deems to be 
an intermittent fault but which clearly represent the noise of the life support machinery 
in the overworld. The fact that Orr fails to make the connection between these images 
and the Master-narrator’s situation only serves to illustrate how far he is embedded 
within his coma underworld. This image becomes an ultimate eidolon, representing his 
corporeal presence in the overworld but ‘recast’ as a bodiless shade in the underworld. 
The closer Orr comes to katabatic knowledge as he descends deeper into his coma, the 
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more the Master-narrator begins to understand what these eidola denote. 
Another example of a ‘hellish’ eidolon that is particularly significant in causing the 
Master-narrator’s final departure from the underworld, is the heroine of the bridge (and 
Orr’s Virgilian guide), Abberlaine Arrol. Clearly, as the various narrative threads switch 
between one another, she comes to represent the Master-narrator’s lover of the 
overworld, Andrea, the rather aloof object of his desire who cannot commit to a 
monogamous relationship and to whom the narrator is driving, drunkenly, at the time of 
his accident. Throughout Orr’s quest, there are subtle suggestions of this connection 
between the underworld and the overworld, most notably in the handkerchief that 
Abberlaine gives to Orr. The circumstances surrounding this simple transaction are 
important to consider. The couple are involved in a rickshaw accident on the bridge 
(another eidolon that references the Master-narrator’s road-traffic accident). Orr hands 
Abberlaine his handkerchief so that she can stem the blood running from her nose. 
Later, Abberlaine hands back the handkerchief to Orr – it has been washed and now 
bears the monogram of his initial – ‘O’. Following this episode, when he is stripped of 
everything and condemned to the cold, isolated ‘Tartarus’ of his coma consciousness, 
the handkerchief is one of two items that he is allowed to keep, the other being the 
picture Abberlaine drew for him. It is the monogram on the handkerchief that saves it 
from being impounded, due to the fact that the monogram does not fit the description of 
the inventory that the foreman of the search-and-seizure officiously wields. As Orr 
descends further into the world of the bridge, the Master-narrator’s autobiographical 
narrative begins to develop and gradually reveal more information about his life leading 
up to the accident. In one recollection, he describes a cherished scene of lovemaking 
between him and his partner, Andrea. Andrea is menstruating, and uses a white scarf to 
stem the blood-flow. Later, the narrator finds the scarf in his car, ‘The blood stain, dried 
in a rough circle’.50 He says that this stain ‘wouldn’t shift’, no matter how many times 
he washes it. However, when he hands it over to Andrea, she washes it clean with ease 
and hands it back to him, ‘Monogrammed with his initials’.51  
These episodes serve to emphasise the notion of ‘hellish’ eidola of the coma 
unconscious that represent memories of the overworld. The ‘O’-shaped stain in the 
overworld ‘wouldn’t shift’ – in the underworld of the coma, no matter how many times 
Orr washes the handkerchief, it is always bloodied by various twists of fate. This 
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emphasises the concept of the eidolon that insistently transmits and communicates 
memories of the overworld (the handkerchief has to be bloodied and can be nothing 
else), thereby presenting Orr (and therefore the Master-narrator) with a metaphor that 
has to be unlocked and interpreted in order to escape from the underworld of coma. 
These dream eidola are merely images within the underworld of the coma, and as 
Hillman suggests, they ‘are not substantial’, but are instead ‘ideational forms and 
shapes, the ideas that form and shape life, but are so buried in it that we may only “see” 
them when pulled out in abstractions’.52 The link between traditional visions of the 
underworld and the dream-underworld of the coma can be seen in this notion of 
abstraction. The eidola are drawn out and extricated through the process of descent, 
allowing the katabatic hero to try and make sense of them in order to return to the 
surface of the overworld with the transfiguratory knowledge recovered from the heart of 
his ‘hellish’ unconscious. 
In Orr’s coma katabasis, these eidola constantly appear around him in various forms 
and it is only when these accumulate and conflate that knowledge is reached. At this 
point, the autobiographical narrative develops and the links are made between this 
memorial story and the ‘hellish’ visions of Orr’s descent. This relationship between the 
overworld and the coma underworld can also be seen when Orr and Abberlaine first 
make love. The frequent references to the ‘hissing gas fire’ are reminiscent of 
descriptions used within the autobiographical narration when detailing a holiday that 
was taken together by the Master-narrator and Andrea, a holiday that largely consisted 
of love-making. The sound of the fire becomes an immediate aural eidolon, thereby 
knitting the scenes and experiences together. However, despite the initial thrill of the 
passion and connection between Orr and Abberlaine in the dreamworld of the bridge, 
something is not quite right: 
 
Its climax chills me though; something makes it worse than joyless, makes it 
frightening, terrifying […] a memory. Ancient and fresh, livid and rotten at 
once; the hope and fear of release and capture of animal and machine and 
meshing structures; a start and an end.
53
  
 
Banks’s use of ideational opposites underscores the image of the ‘hellish’ eidolon. 
The act of lovemaking is at once ‘ancient’ and ‘fresh’, existing both within the 
immediate experience of the sexual shadow-act, but also within a much older memory 
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of the overworld that remains buried within the unconscious and which manifests itself 
in this sexual act of the underworld. The lovemaking is also ‘livid’ and ‘rotten’ – both 
containing blood (for something to be livid, for something to bruise, it has to have 
blood) and devoid of blood, like the archetypal ‘hellish’ shade; and it is both the ‘start’ 
and the ‘end’. This last oxymoronic coupling is perhaps most interesting. On one level, 
it could represent the start of his sexual relationship with Abberlaine whilst inherently 
representing the end of his relationship with Andrea, but it also perfectly embodies the 
result of any katabasis. It represents the ending of one life as the hero knows it, and the 
beginning of another caused through the acquisition of ‘hellish’ knowledge which 
means that the descent hero can never be the same again, transfigured for perpetuity and 
no longer like ‘other men’ (to once more return to Clark). These eidola of Abberlaine 
and the sexual act are both devoid of thymos within the coma-underworld, yet replete 
with distant memories of the waking-overworld. The very descriptions of the sexual act 
being ‘chilling’ and having a feeling that is ‘less than joylessness’ suggests that Orr is 
carnally engaged with a being that is not fully alive, but not fully dead. She is a woman 
who exists within the underworld of his mind, yet who actually exists, just out of reach, 
in the overworld. The ‘little death’ of his orgasm becomes a reminder that, to all intents 
and purposes, he is sleeping with a psychic embodiment of the ‘living dead’. Through 
this scene that Banks carefully crafts, the image of another Greco-Roman katabatic hero 
is conjured: Orpheus. In the story of this tragic hero, Orpheus manages to charm Hades 
and Persephone into releasing his dead wife, Eurydice, from the underworld on the 
condition that as he leads her into the overworld, he must never look behind him. Of 
course, he cannot resist this fatal temptation and inevitably turns around at the very 
point of leaving Hades (in an action that is mirrored by the story of Lot and his wife in 
the Old Testament). What is significant within the Orpheus myth is that it is the 
discomfort he feels by being in the presence of his wife’s eidolon that causes him to 
turn around in the first place, hearing no footsteps or voice, thus emphasizing the idea of 
the eidolon being an empty vessel, devoid of thymos and little more than a shadow of 
the past. 
Orr ultimately describes this sexual act by saying that he has, ‘Just fucked the 
bridge’.54 He has penetrated the heart of his coma-Hell and has been granted more 
knowledge, albeit knowledge that he has not yet fully grasped. Despite this initial lack 
of insight, from this point onwards he descends further into the underworld, finally able 
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to leave the mechanical topography of the bridge and move into the world beyond. In 
short, it is this particular intersection of the eidolon of the underworld and the memories 
of the overworld that proves to be a springboard towards the final quest for katabatic 
knowledge. Once he has finally taken this jump and moved beyond the world of the 
bridge, Orr suddenly finds himself in a war between two bureaucratic armies, attacking 
each other from speeding trains that hurtle away from the bridge until they reach land 
whereupon they burrow downwards into the very centre of the earth. Through this 
narrative development, the geological divisions of the novel are stressed once more, 
reflecting the idea of physical descent and the Master-narrator’s increasing desire to dig 
deeper towards the heart of his coma-Hell and seize hold of the katabatic knowledge 
which will trigger his transfiguration and process of ‘rising’. The deeper Orr travels into 
the earth, the more extreme his visions of Hell become, but also the more traditional 
they become in a Catholic sense of contrapasso, where the ‘form of retribution [is] 
exactly suited to the nature of each sin’.55 Earlier, in one particular moment of clarity, 
Orr considers why he is trapped within this Hell-state, saying, ‘I do not know why I am 
here. Because I did something wrong’.56 The seamlessness between this call-and-
response utterance, between the doubt and the certainty, echoes the notions of Hell 
being a place of punishment where the individual is so accustomed to their torture that 
they almost become senseless. They passively accept their fate, in the full knowledge 
that they have committed a wrongdoing and deserve their punishment in some way, but 
forgetting the specifics of their transgression. Later in Banks’s novel, captured soldiers 
are thrown into ‘pools of boiling mud’.57 They are then dragged out again, with more 
mud shovelled onto them so that they become ‘gnarled statues’, symbols of the 
punishment that awaits other rebels or transgressors in this psychical underworld. 
Betrayal constitutes the ultimate sin in this world where faceless factions go to war over 
an unknown cause (an eidolon that represents the Master-narrator’s own disgust at the 
senselessness of the Falklands War of the overworld). Similarly, within the ninth circle 
of Dante’s Hell (a place that, like The Bridge, also punishes traitors), the transgressors 
are punished by being turned into gnarled and distorted statues, trapped in time. 
However, unlike the traditional Christian image of Hell-fire, Dante envisions his 
innermost circle of Hell as being a place of utmost cold, Satan himself held in a frozen 
lake of blood. Once more, the symbiosis of Hell and Hades and the mythological 
                                                     
55
 Falconer, Hell in Contemporary Literature, p. 25. 
56
 Banks, The Bridge, p. 186. 
57
 Ibid., p. 311. 
129 
 
 
traditions of both can be seen, Dante’s ninth circle echoing the cold, pneumatic region 
of Tartarus, rather than the traditional Christian image of Hell. Banks, too, adopts this 
‘magpie’ approach, developing his own vision of the underworld based upon archetypal 
imagery of both the Christian Hell and of the Greco-Roman Hades. 
At the furthest extremity of his descent, Orr finds himself at the edge of another body 
of water, again the archetypal symbol, in the mythology of antiquity, of the division 
between the land of the living and of the dead. Here, he once more encounters an old 
man who whips the corpses of men that wash up on shore. The first time they met was 
in a dream Orr had whilst he lived within the bridge. Back then, Orr could extract no 
dialogue from the stranger; now, the old man lets slip a telling utterance in reply to 
Orr’s pressing question: ‘What happened here? What happened to all these people?’ to 
which he responds: ‘They didn’t listen to their dreams’. Orr does not say anything. 
Instead, he sets off again ‘for the distant line of light which fills the horizon like a streak 
of white gold’.58 This interchange is apposite to the entire representation of the coma 
descent. The words of the old man imply to Orr that the reason why he is still being 
punished, being psychologically scourged within this Hell of the unconscious, is 
because he, too, is not listening to his dreams. It is an unconscious signpost towards the 
fact that he is flagrantly refusing to decode the ‘hellish’ visions, the eidola that are 
appearing all around him within his coma. Again, this endorses Hillman’s theory of 
dream, embodying the archetypal descent into the underworld and it is these words that 
prove to be the final catalyst for the Master-narrator’s return and ‘awakening’ from the 
coma underworld. No sooner are they spoken than Orr suddenly turns and heads 
towards the light, finally beginning to understand what the eidola in his coma ‘dreams’ 
represent. The ‘white gold’ light takes on both physical and metaphorical connotations, 
constituting the bright, clinical light of the hospital room penetrating his eyelids and 
forming a horizontal slant of light, but also representing the spiritual incandescence of 
transfiguration that enlightens the soul and allows for resurrection and passage back into 
the land of the living. 
As discussed, the novel can be examined through the lens of Hillman’s theory of 
dream as underworld, but it can also be analysed using earlier theories of dream-states 
as posited by Freud and Jung and upon which Hillman developed his own praxis of 
dream analysis. Furthermore, the whole novel is preoccupied with the notion of 
psychoanalytical ‘dream-work’. Whilst living in the bridge, Orr has frequent sessions 
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with his psychotherapist, Dr. Joyce, a specialist in dream-analysis who advocates this 
approach in order to unlock Orr’s lost memories, including the core aspects of his lost 
identity: his name, past life and how he came to live within the bridge. At the start of 
the novel, Orr seems reluctant to engage in this dream-work, supposedly inventing more 
‘interesting’ dreams that compensate for his ‘real’ dreams that he deems to be, ‘Too 
banal to be worth analysing’.59 This practice of ‘inventing’ dreams is significant as 
everything that occurs within the ‘hellish’ world of the bridge is an invention of the 
Master-narrator’s unconscious: in the darkest reaches of coma, all is dream. Dr. Joyce 
therefore is an eidolon, representing yet another Virgilian guide who can lead the way 
out of coma, similar to the role of the nurse in The Coma who helps Carl to confront the 
truth of his own inner Hell: that he is still trapped within his coma dreams. Akin to both 
Garland’s novel and Welsh’s, in The Bridge dream-archetypes persist in trying to reveal 
to the Master-narrator the truth of his predicament and to unify the fractured narrative 
threads of his coma underworld. Here, we may once more return to Hillman and his 
analysis of how dream-‘persons’ may operate within the inner Hell of the dream-state: 
‘The dream image of a human person cannot be taken in terms of his actuality, since the 
image in a dream belongs to the underworld’.60 As discussed, the eidola in the novels of 
Garland, Welsh and Banks are not the ‘actual’ individuals of the waking world, the 
Catherine of the underworld not really representing the ‘real’ Catherine of the 
overworld in The Coma any more than Joyce represents any particular doctor that the 
Master-narrator has encountered in his overworld. Instead, what ties together the eidola 
in all three novels is that they each represent the same archetype: the Virgilian guide (or 
in Jungian terms the ‘wise old man/woman’) whose job it is to ensure safe passage of 
the katabatic hero out of the dream-Hell of coma. 
Despite their differences, both Jung and Freud, in their praxis, were concerned with 
extricating particular dream images (Hillman’s eidola), deconstructing and 
demystifying them until all of their connections to the ‘dayworld’ were made clear. 
Whereas Freud was dedicated to analysing how the dream-image manifested the 
repressed wishes of the ‘id’ (often sexual), Jung focused more upon how dreams were 
attempts to ‘individuate’ the archetypes of the psyche, that is, the varied and conflicting 
incarnations of the self that co-exist within the individual. The Jungian archetype of the 
‘shadow’, in a similar way to Freud’s id, holds the key to impulsive, often destructive 
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and self-destructive desire. Through this process of individuation, dreams attempt to 
bring into equilibrium the various aspects of the psyche in order to ‘unify them into a 
harmonious, balanced whole’.61 Jung concludes that by doing this, dreams may well 
constitute projections of past experience, or even embodiments of repressed desires, as 
Freud postulates, but they also have the potential to pave the way for, ‘Realizing the 
aims of the developing personality’.62 Thus, rather than looking at how an individual 
dream represents a particular complex of the unconscious (a goal in Freudian analysis), 
Jung would instead analyse sequences of dreams (‘dream series’) with the aim of 
discovering which archetypes of the collective unconscious were under-developed, 
leading to solutions as to how to enhance the psychic life and bring it into equilibrium. 
This idea that dreams can actually suggest to us, not only how we are currently living 
our life, but also how we may live our life in the future (should we listen to the dream 
image and individuate the parts of our psyche that are under-developed) led to Jung’s 
rather controversial concept that dreams can often have a prophetic quality at their 
centre. To highlight this notion, Jung proposes that: 
 
Dreams prepare, announce, or warn about certain situations, often long 
before they actually happen. This is not necessarily a miracle or pre-
cognition. Most crises or dangerous situations have a long incubation, only 
the conscious mind is not aware of it.
63
  
 
This so-called illusion of precognition is created by the unconscious. During the process 
of dream, the unconscious generates suggestions of the consequences of continuing to 
ignore the individuation process of the psyche, so for example if one continuously had 
dreams of daring, life-threatening behaviour, it might suggest that the ‘shadow’ is 
overly dominant, creating a certain sense of inevitability that some danger may well 
befall the dreamer in the overworld. This was the case for one of Jung’s patients who 
repeatedly had visions of his own death. These visions eventually came to fruition due 
to the fact that he was a thrill-seeker and often climbed mountains without harnesses, a 
risk that was repeatedly reflected within his dream-states, thus creating the illusion of 
dream-‘prophecy’. This Jungian approach to dream-work, I suggest, is once more 
evocative of the katabatic quest: the descent into a shadowy underworld in order to 
reach self-enlightenment and knowledge of the future. Moreover, it is an approach that 
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is conveyed in several of the works of coma fiction discussed, with the katabatic heroes 
Carl, Roy, Louis and John Orr descending into the underworld of coma in order to 
individuate the fragmented parts of their psyche and reach the katabatic enlightenment 
that will allow them to return from their coma, ‘reborn’ and ‘transfigured’. One is also 
reminded of Johnny’s prophetic waking dreams in The Dead Zone, a gift of knowledge 
brought back from his coma underworld that seems to embody Jungian thought in its 
fullest ‘prophetic’ sense, alongside Louis’s own vision of his dead father trapped within 
a cave. 
Throughout The Bridge, Banks is preoccupied with developing katabatic dream 
eidola archetypes, ‘enigma codes’ that the Master-narrator, alongside the reader, must 
‘crack’ in order to unravel the mystery at the heart of the novel – at the heart of the 
coma-Hell. Banks bestows upon the Master-narrator (and the reader) the role of Jungian 
psychoanalyst, setting them both the task to draw out the dream-images of the 
underworld and make the connections between these and their equivalent manifestations 
in the overworld. Banks’s position as a post-Freudian/Jungian writer is further 
exemplified by one of the other narrative threads that he creates: the folkloric narration 
of an illiterate, Scottish barbarian. Written in a thick brogue, this fantasy-narration 
persistently intrudes upon both Orr’s journey of katabasis and the Master-narrator’s 
biographical revelations. The Barbarian’s story draws on archetypes of descent 
mythology and overtly so. In one sequence, in a hybridization of fairytale and myth, he 
is set the task of travelling into the ‘Underwurld’ [sic] in order to rescue the ‘Sleepin 
Byooty’, following the model of the archetypal katabatic quest in the vein of Orpheus 
or, more pertinently, Heracles. Like that man-god, instead of passively interacting with 
the shades of Hades, the Barbarian battles against them. Within this sequence, Banks 
openly draws a parallel between the coma descent and the katabasis of antiquity, the 
Barbarian encountering such mythological figures as the ferryman of the river Styx, 
Charon (here pronounced ‘Karen’) and Sisyphus, the doomed transgressor (discussed 
earlier), who keeps rolling, ‘This huge fuckin chuckie right tae the tap aw the hill’.64 
Truly Herculean in his aggression, the Barbarian disrupts this repetitious punishment, 
helping Sisyphus with the boulder by leaving it at the top of the hill, a dream action 
which implies that the Master-narrator, too, has the power to put a stop to the repetitious 
nightmares that grip him and sustain his coma-Hell. In other words, these archetypal 
‘dream series’ of the underworld allude to the possibility that, like the greatest man-
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gods Heracles and even Christ, the Master-narrator has the power to conquer the 
underworld (to harrow the Hell of his unconscious) and rise again, reborn and 
transfigured as a messianic man-god akin to Johnny Smith. 
At the end of this quest into the underworld, the Barbarian finally locates the goal of 
his katabasis, the ‘Sleepin Byooty’, a designation that immediately resonates with the 
Wijdicks’ identification of the Sleeping Beauty trope in filmic representations of coma. 
However, this particular fairy-tale ‘princess’ turns out to be no such thing, as we see in 
the following extract focalized through the Barbarian: 
 
…a man lyin in bed, all white-faced an asleep. There’s these big things 
like metal chests on theyre sides all clustered around him an wee bit things 
like strings attached tae him. Fuk aw else.
65
  
 
The eidolon of Orr’s narrative (the bed-ridden coma patient) also makes an appearance 
at the heart of the Barbarian’s own story and in both cases, he embodies the knowledge 
at the heart of all katabatic quests. However, it is only one element of the entire 
catalogue of knowledge represented, as discussed, by the ‘Library’ and the Master-
narrator must collect all pieces of the jigsaw if he wishes to return to the overworld. In 
short, looked at in isolation, this image of the coma-victim means nothing; it is only 
when put into sequence (in a Jungian ‘dream series’) that it begins to make sense and 
cohere into a fully-formed katabatic knowledge within the hero’s psyche. These are 
therefore archetypal and primordial images of the Master-narrator’s ‘self’ that is locked 
inside coma and which needs to be ‘individuated’ if a return to the overworld is to be 
achieved. The Barbarian represents either the Freudian ‘id’ or the Jungian ‘shadow’, 
encapsulating deeply primal, violent and sexual urges that have the potential to result in 
self-destruction. Depending upon the theorist, the specifics of how such a psychic 
archetype is operating within the dream-Hell of coma would vary dramatically. For this 
reason, I wish to elucidate this discussion of dream as underworld by analysing two 
specific sequences, approaching them from both theoretical positions. 
At one stage of the novel, Orr awakens from a particularly vivid dream in which the 
Barbarian rapes the dismembered yet still living corpses of what appear to be vestal 
virgins. Filled with self-disgust, Orr internalizes the fact that, ‘It was worse than that 
[…] I was there, that was me’.66 For both Freud and Jung, the dream of the Barbarian 
would represent an aspect of the psyche that needs to be confronted, supported by Orr’s 
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exclamation, ‘That was me.’ In fact, in this ‘hellish’ dream-world of coma, every image 
is part of the Master-narrator’s overall psyche, the understanding of which is essential 
for his departure from Hell. However, a Freudian reading would focus on the violence 
of the sexual act, proposing that this represents a repressed wish from the overworld. 
This wish of the Master-narrator would be that he had been more forceful with Andrea 
in making her take more responsibility for their relationship, thereby forcing her to 
commit, whole-heartedly, to his sexual virility: to his libido. A Jungian approach would 
not be preoccupied with the Barbarian’s brutal act per se but would rather look to how 
the Barbarian, as ‘shadow’, is constantly fighting its way into consciousness and 
oppressing other psychical archetypes that are less aggressive and less threatening. The 
Barbarian’s narrative, therefore, becomes a warning to the psyche, an indication that the 
other archetypes of the Master-narrator’s unconscious must fully individuate themselves 
in order to reunify his fragmented psyche, thus reforming an equilibrium of selfhood 
and triggering an awakening. Moreover, if the ‘shadow’ was always dominant within 
the Master-narrator’s unconscious, it can perhaps explain the cause of the accident in 
the first place. It is revealed that he is particularly jealous of Andrea’s relationship with 
her lover in France, who has MS. Towards the end of the novel, in the increasingly 
revealing biographical narration, it is said of the Master-narrator that, ‘He had dreams 
about the dying man in the other city, and sometimes thought he could see him, lying in 
a hospital bed, surrounded by machines’.67 This is reminiscent of Orr’s visions of 
himself immersed in coma, and so on a Jungian level, the car accident can be seen as an 
inevitability, a product of an increasing move towards self-destruction in order to pull 
Andrea’s focus away from her lover and to force her into caring for the Master-narrator. 
This, in turn, creates an inner Jungian ‘complex’ that prevents him from commencing 
the return leg of his katabasis as whilst he is in his coma, he can still hold onto Andrea 
and the thought that she might be caring for him instead of his love-rival in France. 
However, despite these subtle variations in psychoanalytical praxis, both Freud and 
Jung would insist upon the importance of interpreting the archetypal dream images. For 
the katabatic hero of Banks’s novel, it is this interpretation that is the key to unlock his 
‘resurrection’ from coma. 
This eventual resurrection from the Hell-state is triggered by the Master-narrator, in 
his various guises as John Orr, or the Barbarian, or any of the eidola that inhabit the 
underworld of his unconscious. In fact, returning to the old man on the beach and the 
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final knowledge he provides (‘They didn’t listen to their dreams’) one may think once 
more of Jung’s archetype of the ‘wise old man’. After all, it is this shade that initiates 
Orr’s final journey out of coma which I would now like to look at more closely. 
I have discussed, earlier, how in order for the Master-narrator to arise from coma (to 
move upwards out of the underworld of his unconscious) he must, in the guise of John 
Orr, descend and dig deeper into this unconscious. This, therefore, becomes a 
paradoxical and oxymoronic course: an ‘inversion’ in which the Master-narrator can 
only move up and out of coma by going deeper into its hellish ‘landscape’. This 
psychical manifestation of a topographical ‘inversion’ that occurs at the deepest point of 
the descent journey is reminiscent of the Dantean model of escape from hell during 
which there is, in Falconer’s words, a ‘turning upside down at a zero point and a return 
to the surface of some kind’.68 In the Inferno, Dante travels down through Hell until he 
re-emerges on the other side of the earth; he and Virgil climb down Satan’s body, 
reaching the deepest point of Hell at which point the inversion occurs: ‘I raised my 
eyes, believing I should see | the half of Lucifer that I had left; | instead I saw him with 
his legs turned up’.69 He has descended into the earth via one hemisphere and ended his 
katabatic journey emerging into the other hemisphere, staring at the stars and leaving 
Satan behind forever. In The Bridge, a similar inversion occurs, an inversion that is 
again accentuated by the geological denominations of the chapters. As Orr further 
traverses the world of the bridge, the deeper he journeys into its geological landscape, 
burrowing into the volcanic layers of the earth and so therefore delving deeper into his 
unconscious. In moving towards the ‘core’ of this world, he comes closer to the surface 
of the waking overworld, a paradox represented by the increasingly modern geological 
epochs used as section-titles for the novel. As Falconer suggests, ‘Katabatic inversion 
thus inverts the hero’s sense of entrapment into one of liberation or insight’.70 Such 
depictions of ‘hellish’ inversions are rife within the literature of mythological descent. 
Hillman, for example, discusses how in the Egyptian underworld imagination, ‘The 
dead walked upside down so that stuff of their bowels came out through their mouths’.71 
In another one of Orr’s many visions of Hell, he imagines that, ‘The bridge is part of a 
circle’, Banks again drawing on Dante’s topographical model of the nine circles of Hell. 
However, interestingly, Banks also employs archetypes from classical mythology, not 
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least this ‘hellish’ inversion of faecal matter. At one point, Orr dreams of being trapped 
in a different manifestation of the bridge, staring at macabre sexual orgies on the shore 
opposite, where the women, in an image reminiscent of the sirens in the Odyssey, call to 
him to join in their sexual depravity. He cannot cross the water, however, because of the 
‘carnivorous fish’ which inhabit the water, embodying the monstrous guardians of the 
underworld inherent in mythology (the Greco-Roman hellhound of the underworld, 
Cerberos, being one such example, and one that appears in the Barbarian’s own 
descent). Orr details his frustrated revenge upon these ‘Hell-bags’: ‘I waited until I 
needed a crap, then threw the turd at them. Those obscene brats used it in one of their 
filthy sex games’.72 In a scene that harks back to Hillman’s discussion of Egyptian 
inversion within the underworld, faecal matter, a symbol of discarded, ‘dead’ matter, 
becomes a symbol of sexual desire and virility. Such a depiction of an archetypal 
inversion creates an overall vision of the underworld, a mirror world that seems to 
represent the overworld in the form of eidola, yet which subverts and inverts all of the 
meanings and associations of that world.  
Within the ‘inverted’ world of both Hell and the coma, time, too, becomes subverted, 
just as time becomes suspended and distorted within the world of dream. In archetypal 
manifestations of the underworld, there occurs at once the impossible re-running and 
collapsing of time (the repetitious punishments of Sisyphus and Ixion, for example, that 
never reach a conclusion) and yet the descent hero must move through time and space 
in order to fulfil their katabasis and return to the overworld. The Inferno is a paradigm 
of this portrayal of the dichotomy of Hell-time whereby Dante perceives eidola trapped 
in time, and yet his own journey is framed by a time-scale, descending at 6am and re-
emerging at 6pm. Set against this oxymoronic inversion of time is again the other 
inversion of place: the return to the overworld by climbing further into the underworld. 
It is this sudden inversion that occurs in such works as the Inferno that can also be seen 
in coma literature, not least in Louis Drax in which, as discussed earlier, Louis, by 
travelling deeper into the Hades of his coma, comes closer to inhabiting a place of 
overworldly respite, whereas the overworld itself transforms into a manifestation of an 
archetypal, burning Hell. 
In another example of Greco-Roman descent literature, the Aeneid, Virgil writes: 
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The way downward is easy from Avernus.  
Black Dis’s door stands open night and day.  
But to retrace your steps to heaven’s air, 
There is the trouble, there is the toil. 
73
 
 
However, this depiction of the difficulty of the katabatic return is contentious, as 
explicated by Falconer in her discussion of Eduard Norden’s work on the ‘hellish’ 
inversion of return when she writes that, ‘[The difficulty of return] is only true in a 
limited sense; it is easy to go to Hades by dying, but difficult to cross over when alive; 
and the return journey in most cases occurs swiftly and with little hindrance’.74 The key 
word in the extract from Virgil is ‘retrace’. It implies that a return involves travelling 
back over the ‘hellish’ lands already covered, yet this does not occur in the Inferno. 
Dante travels through Hell to come out on the other side, a return he describes in less 
than seven lines. Odysseus, too, at the end of his own katabasis, seems to find the return 
easy, simply turning away from the teeming, tortured souls of Hades and returning to 
his ship. A process of toilsome ‘retracing’ is avoided. Even Theseus’s return from the 
labyrinth at Minos (in an ‘earthly’ version of the descent myth) is easy; he does, in fact, 
retrace his steps, yet his passage is made effortless through the gift of Ariadne’s thread. 
Contrary to Virgil’s statement, katabatic return seems to be not so difficult and this 
model is likewise exploited in coma fiction. In Marabou Stork Nightmares, no sooner 
has Roy faced up to his inner demons than a return is triggered; in The Coma, a similar 
transition occurs, the return triggered by confronting the simple contents of a briefcase, 
and in The Bridge, the return seems to be entirely in the Master-narrator’s hands. Like 
Carl, at the deepest point of the Hades of coma, all the hero of Banks’s novel has to do 
is to make the cognitive decision to return, and a return will be granted. As the Master-
narrator says, ‘The choice is not between dream and reality; it is between two different 
dreams’.75 In the end, return from the underworld is all about choice, an active decision 
that is in itself an inversion of Orr’s passive helplessness within the Hell-dreams of 
coma. Again, in Louis Drax, return from Hades is a matter of choice, as summarized by 
Louis in the novel’s final lines: ‘I know that one day, if I want to, I can do it. I can take 
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one step forward. And then another’.76  
Far from being an arduous task, then, the katabatic return appears to be rather simple, 
and this simplicity is similarly represented in the works of coma fiction discussed. 
However, I suggest that the real Virgilian ‘toil’ is metaphorically embodied in the post-
katabatic ‘transfiguration’. For the katabatic hero, despite gaining some form of 
enlightenment from the underworld, something of their old self has been lost, changing 
them inexorably. For Lazarus, despite the second life that has been granted him, I argue 
that he will always be considered as the man who arose from the dead; for Orpheus, he 
will always know that the cause of losing his wife for the second time was his own 
doubt in the promises made to him by Hades himself; and even Heracles, despite 
‘conquering’ the underworld, is left with the unsettling knowledge that after he dies, 
whilst his spiritual form will ascend Mount Olympus and join the gods, his physical 
form will be trapped in the underworld forever. And for many of the real-life survivors 
of coma, the ‘katabatic’ knowledge that they have emerged from the ‘underworld’ 
forever changed will become the Virgilian trouble and toil of their post-coma condition.  
 
 
4.4: The Limits of Mortality: Coma, Restitution and the Function of Boundaries 
 
It is clear, from the discussions within these two chapters, that much of coma fiction 
(both interior and exterior) is preoccupied with equating the medical condition, not only 
with dream and sleep, but with mythological and biblical narratives of ‘hellish’ descent, 
resurrection and transfiguration. Even within the biographical work of Redgrove and 
Plath, mythological archetypes are used to navigate through the experience of the 
‘death-state’. Throughout this chapter, I have examined how the development of depth 
psychology, in which the locus of the unconscious is placed at the deepest part of the 
self within a topographical model, serves to echo underworld mythologies. I have also 
discussed how Freud and Jung draw links between both classical and traditional descent 
narratives and the model of the mind, and how Hillman develops these ideas to generate 
an entire theory based upon the conceit that dream is the underworld. Rosalind 
Williams, in her work on the archetype of actual and imaginary subterranean worlds, 
observes that, ‘Since the nineteenth century […] excavation has served as a dominant 
metaphor for truth-seeking […] In this respect scientific inquiry retains an aura of the 
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mythological, since the heroic quest for scientific truth has the pattern of a descent into 
the underworld’.77 In short, the archetypes of mythology and, in particular, of descent, 
are so far embedded into consciousness that humankind almost takes them for granted. 
As Paul Ricoeur observes in his appraisal of Frye’s ideas about the longevity of 
mythological narratives, ‘If an archetype designates a stable conventional order, this 
order can be established in terms of its correspondence to the order of nature and its 
recurrences – day and night, the seasons, the years, life and death’.78 This seems to 
explain why these archetypes are still in existence: that no matter how distant they now 
are from their original mythological source material, they have over the centuries helped 
to form, ‘An already existing order of words [that] is not pure chaos’,79 therefore 
allowing humankind to attempt to make sense of the world. At this point, it is perhaps 
useful to examine Ricoeur’s development of narrative theory in a little more detail, as 
the ideas he proposes, I suggest, draws attention to the link between the Jungian concept 
of the archetype and narratological discussions of the role of mythological archetypes in 
the creation of selfhood. Indeed, Ricoeur, in development of Aristotelian theories of 
emplotment and narrative, asserts that, ‘Fiction contributes to making life, in the 
biological sense of the word, a human life’.80 This statement almost directly echoes 
Frye’s observation that, ‘Literature […] has a lot to do with identifying the human 
world with the natural world around it, or finding analogies between them’.81 Literature, 
therefore, is not just a record of human experience with which the reader has a passive 
relationship. Instead, it actively informs one’s knowledge of the world and helps to 
develop one’s understanding of the self. Thus, as Ricoeur proposes: 
 
Fiction, in particular narrative fiction, is an irreducible dimension of self- 
understanding. If it is true that fiction is only completed in life and that life 
can be understood only through the stories that we tell about it, then an 
examined life, in the sense of the word as we have borrowed it from 
Socrates, is a life recounted.
82
  
 
In support of this statement, Ricoeur points towards the interplay between the analyst 
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and the analysand in psychotherapeutic sessions, with the latter encouraged to draw out 
‘story-fragments’ into ‘a narrative which would be at once more bearable and more 
intelligible’.83 In Jungian practice, of course, this unification of story-fragments would 
be encouraged by tracing them through archetypal imagery and narratives, mythologies, 
fables – that which forms the collective unconscious. Here, Ricoeur’s concept of 
‘fragments’ is mirrored by Jung’s concept of the ‘fragmented’ self that needs to be fully 
‘individuated’. It is also a term that, I suggest, Jung would find more acceptable than 
Freud’s designation ‘archaic remnants’ that he used to describe the ‘dream-images’ that 
Jung consistently argued were ‘analogous to primitive ideas, myths, and rites’.84 Jung 
heavily criticized Freud’s use of ‘remnants’, arguing that this contributed to a 
‘prevailing depreciation of the unconscious as a mere appendix of consciousness […], a 
dustbin which collects all the refuse of the conscious mind’.85 Ricoeur’s ‘fragments’, 
rather than Freud’s ‘remnants’, is suggestive of something that can be potentially re-
formed into a cohesive form once more, a concept central to the Jungian approach to 
‘dream-work’ in which the symbolic and archetypal ‘language’ of dreams is ‘translated’ 
from its cultural form into one that speaks of the ‘truth’ at the heart of the unconscious. 
Similarly, central to Ricoeur’s work on the importance of narration in the formation of 
selfhood is the idea of ‘sedimentation’ and ‘innovation’, concepts that, I suggest, 
correlate with Jungian concepts of the ‘archetype’ and ‘translation’. The ‘sediment’ 
refers to the universal historical archetypes, the ‘models that constitute, after the fact, 
the typology of emplotment which allows us to order the history of literary genres’.86 
‘Innovation’ constitutes the assimilation and redevelopment of such archetypal tropes 
(the sediment), allowing the possibility for ‘a later experimentation in the narrative 
domain’,87 in other words, individual creativity and reinterpretation of the ‘sediment’ 
into new, personal narratives. In this sense, we can once more return to Frye’s theories 
of narrative, not least his notion that in literature: 
 
Everything is new, and yet recognizably the same kind of thing as the 
old, just as a new baby is a genuinely new individual, although it’s also an 
example of something very common, which is human beings, and also it’s 
linearly descended from the first human beings there ever were [sic].
88
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Here, Frye uses the image of biological ‘inheritance’ to describe how literature 
constantly assimilates and reinvents what has gone before, conveying Ricoeur’s 
concepts of ‘sedimentation’ and ‘innovation’. However, whilst Frye uses biology and 
genetics as a metaphor for how literature has developed, in Jungian terms, such a 
‘literature’ has been biologically ‘inherited’ through the collective unconscious. I 
suggest, therefore, that the ‘sediment’ can be seen to be the conceptual, literary 
equivalent of the Jungian collective unconscious. As both Ricoeur and Frye suggest, 
there is a constant reinvention and innovation of literature and literary archetypes (the 
‘sediment’) and this, I suggest, has its equivalent in the Jungian collective unconscious 
that also perpetually evolves. In other words, literature holds the ‘sediment’ of all 
historical human experience, emotions and attempts to understand the world. In this 
way, this allows the individual both to assimilate and innovate the sediment in literature, 
perhaps allowing him to continue to try to make sense of the world and thereby continue 
to develop ‘new-but-different’ literature. This process helps to further elucidate 
Ricoeur’s assertion that: ‘Fiction contributes to making life’. In this way, Jung’s 
collective unconscious is not necessarily unlocked by literature, or by tracing the links 
between literary or mythological archetypes and the mind. I suggest that the collective 
unconscious is literature. In his discussion of the katabatic journey (one particular 
aspect of the ‘sediment’), David Pike observes that, ‘It requires the descent through hell 
to teach the protagonist allegorical interpretation’.89 Perhaps writers of coma fiction are 
consistently using and innovating sedimentary archetypes from the mythologies of 
descent to try and come to terms with the fear and chaos that the coma itself represents: 
that they are creating allegories to help to rationalise coma. 
But the question remains: why this particular medical condition? 
The range of coma texts examined over the course of these last two chapters and the 
parallels of literary and mythological archetypes employed certainly seems to suggest 
that authors have elected to speak for the victims of coma and to create allegories of 
katabasis continually. In doing so, coma fiction, in particular, fills in the gaps of 
experience with archetypal narratives and imagery in an attempt to navigate through an 
incomprehensible concept (a total void in consciousness) by equating it with a vastly 
more comprehensible concept (a semi-conscious state – sleep and dream and the 
‘hellish’ descents this state can initiate). As discussed in the light of Redgrove’s work, 
an absolute nothing cannot be communicated, so it has to be narrated through the 
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medium of a near-tangible something. In this sense, authors, like the creators of 
mythologies and religious stories before them, attempt to express the unspeakable by 
grounding it in archetypal images – the ‘order of words’ to which Ricoeur refers. 
During a seminar talk given in London to the Guild of Pastoral Psychology, Jung 
observed that, ‘Now, we have no symbolic life, and we are all badly in need of the 
symbolic life. Only the symbolic life can express the need of the soul’.90 Here, the 
Greek word psyche is again evoked. Once meaning ‘soul’, it now implies ‘mind’, and so 
Jung’s comment can be linked to Ricoeur’s insistence upon the self’s ‘genuine demand 
for narrative’.91 This Jungian ‘need of the soul’ (or Ricoeur’s ‘narrative demand’) 
becomes a fundamental need for the human mind to comprehend the incomprehensible 
and to strive continually to find ways to communicate the incommunicable. By 
concentrating on the dwindling of Christianity and religious faith in the West, perhaps 
Jung failed to see that the symbolic life also resides within literature. It is literature that 
both reveals authors’ concerns and obsessions with unanswered questions, but which 
also exposes their need to try and answer those questions in an attempt to alleviate the 
inner fears of the unknown – to maintain, as Ricoeur states, the ‘stable conventional 
order’. As Frye suggests, ‘When a system of myths loses all connexion with belief, it 
becomes purely literary’.92 I argue that this does not necessarily mean that it loses all of 
its power and influence upon the individual and upon society. Instead, it provides one 
with the tools with which one can narrate, ‘work through’ and comprehend the world in 
which one lives and all of its obstacles. The narration of illness and trauma is one such 
example of the symbolic life, with the writers of coma fiction confronting and 
challenging the potential void of death by appropriating archetypes of descent, 
resurrection and, ultimately, immortality. The coma victim is perhaps, himself, an 
eidolon, a reminder that one can be alive, yet appear dead, devoid of all psychic 
associations that had hitherto been seen to constitute identity: a ‘hellish shade’ of the 
victim’s former self. For the majority of those who are lucky enough to return from this 
‘death-state’, the lack of memory of the coma-state (and often of their previous identity) 
becomes representative of the absolute, all-consuming nothing that may come with 
death, and that is prior to birth. The coma victim becomes an image of there being no 
life after death, of the total void in consciousness, and regardless of one’s religious 
stance, this represents an ultimate, archetypal fear, made all the more dreadful by the 
                                                     
90
 Jung, Collected Works, p 274. 
91
 Ricoeur, ‘Life in Quest of Narrative’, p. 29. 
92
 Frye, Fables of Identity, p. 32. 
143 
 
 
fact that it is a state of consciousness that can never be communicated; can never be 
narrativized. It is, by definition, unspeakable and therefore a trauma that is unassailable: 
the abstract concept of a void. 
In his work on the dead, and his explorations of the places where the dead co-habit 
the world of the living, Robert Pogue Harrison explores the human need to delineate 
and ‘contain’ space. His discussions are particularly pertinent to this notion of the need 
to ‘contain’ the abstract coma experience through archetypal depictions of spaces of the 
underworld. Claiming that ‘places are located in nature, yet they always have human 
foundations’, Harrison goes on to assert that places ‘do not occur naturally but are 
created by human beings through some mark or sign of human presence’.93 Harrison 
therefore suggests that out of the abstract notion of ‘space’ humans craft more tangible 
embodiments of ‘place’ by creating concrete, bounded ‘landmarks’. It is this process 
that allows nature to ‘become bounded’, thus granting man the power of ‘human 
containment’.94  
This creation of place as a form of human containment of an abstract concept is at 
the heart of traditional tales of katabasis. The construction of subterranean topographies 
is an attempt to concretise and rationalise the abstract concept of death and the afterlife. 
By attributing physical, traversable landscapes to the underworld and, moreover, by 
allowing their heroes to return from these places, authors of katabatic narratives are able 
to ‘contain’ death by describing it in terms of tangible, imaginable and topographical 
imagery. Similarly, as discussed earlier, the pursuit of depth psychology was to 
‘contain’ the somewhat abstract concept of the mind within a more ‘bounded’, 
perceptible model: a physical and geographical landscape. I therefore argue that many 
writers of coma fiction, in their creation of such interior, psychological landscapes of 
the underworld are attempting metaphorically to harrow the hell of a liminal space. In 
other words, by ‘binding’ the unconscious state of coma within topographically 
concretized and archetypal depictions of a physical underworld, these writers are 
attempting to contain and comprehend coma.  
This process of containment is common within the works of fiction I have discussed, 
with authors creating places out of the abstract space of the unconscious (just as Plato 
concretized the space of the mind into the place of the cave). In Liz Jensen’s novel, the 
interior space of Louis’s unconscious becomes concretized and ‘bounded’ in the form of 
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his own cave which, in turn, increasingly maps the subterranean topography of Hades. 
At the deepest point of descent, and shortly before reaching the point of katabatic 
enlightenment, the cave is described as ‘a freezing mouth breathing out’.95 Here again, a 
comparison with the deepest part of Hades – Tartarus – can be made through the 
reference to cold air, expelled from the ‘mouth’ of the cave. Banks’s novel borrows 
topographical motifs from traditional representations of both Hades and Hell to 
represent a vertically-structured ‘hellish’ society, the layers of which the coma victim 
must travel through in order to return to the ‘waking’ overworld. At one point, when Orr 
is cast down to the lowest reaches of the bridge (this particular novel’s version of 
Tartarus), he wakes from a nightmare and believes he is ‘encased in ice’.96 This not 
only stresses the references to Tartarus, through the depiction of a ‘cold’ landscape, but 
also chimes with Dante’s own nadir of Hell in the Inferno, itself influenced by various 
strands of Greco-Roman thought as dramatized in the katabatic works of Homer and 
Virgil. Banks even openly alludes to katabatic descent in the narration of the Barbarian 
alter-ego, who has to travel through the Hadean topography of the ‘Underwurld’ [sic], 
and is at one point told to, ‘Beware Lethe, the waters of oblivion’.97 The ‘containment’ 
of the space of the mind in a physical place is once more emphasized, this particular 
reference to Lethe, the river of forgetfulness within Hades, acting as a warning to the 
Master-Narrator to battle against the potential oblivion of coma. Ultimately, the 
underworld topography attributed to the interior state of coma allows authors and 
readers alike to rationalise the terrifying prospect of a violently-induced, prolonged state 
of unconsciousness. Through literature, through the exploration of the ‘sediment’ and 
the process of ‘innovation’, authors are striving to ‘navigate’ through the void of 
unconsciousness. In this way, and to return once more to Ricoeur, we are constantly 
‘applying to ourselves the plots that we have received from our culture… [in an] 
…attempt to obtain a narrative understanding of ourselves’98 and this innovation of 
the sediment is clearly visible in the works of coma fiction discussed. 
Arthur Frank, in his work on illness and patient narratives, writes that, ‘Any sickness 
is an intimation of mortality, and telling sickness as a restitution story forestalls that 
intimation’.99 Much of coma fiction (and certain examples of non-fiction) embody this 
principle and in particular, by adopting the ultimate archetype of the restitution story, 
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the katabatic journey and return from the underworld, such literary works articulate an 
understanding of mortality. Significantly, in all of the works of fiction discussed, the 
protagonist returns from his coma underworld (or at least, gains the knowledge of how 
to return). In this way, by allowing their protagonists to travel through and return from a 
physical underworld, both writers of coma literature and of katabatic tales of antiquity 
are, in turn, allowing humankind to ‘translate’ and ‘work through’ incidents of trauma 
and the Liftonian ‘death encounter’. These attempts to overcome this confrontation with 
mortality (which, Frank argues, ‘cannot be part of the story’ of restitution100) ultimately 
leads to a sense of hope and the promise of survival. Indeed, as Frank further argues, 
‘Turning illness into story is a kind of meta-control’,101 an attempt to overcome the 
confrontation with the fragility of life that is acquired, often, through experiencing 
serious illness. However, we must remember that Frank primarily refers to the writer of 
illness who has experienced the illness first-hand, proposing that, ‘People who are 
written on from the outside have lost their voices’.102 In this way, whilst the writer of 
coma fiction, in the drive to generate hope, fulfils the fundamental need to overcome the 
potential void that occurs after death, he also ‘overwrites’ the majority of first-hand 
experience of the coma-victim, thus stripping him of voice and agency and contributing 
to the misleading representation of coma itself, the dangers of which I will address in 
my final chapter. 
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5: Everything Must Leave Some Kind of Mark. Selfhood and the Post-
coma Condition 
 
When everything is taken away, nothing is left. 
 
This is false. 
 
The equation of everything and nothing, the subtraction of the remainder, is totally false. 
 
It is not that there is no remainder. But this remainder never has an autonomous reality, nor its own 
place: it is what partition, circumscription, exclusion designate… what else? It is through the subtraction 
of the remainder that reality is founded and gathers strength… 
                                                              -Jean Baudrillard, ‘The Remainder’, Simulacra and Simulation. 
 
 
5.1: Introduction 
 
Over the course of this investigation I have primarily explored the representation of the 
interiority of coma: the largely fictional approximations of the individual’s subjective 
experience of the coma itself, and the psychic impact upon selfhood that occurs within 
this liminal state. I have argued that for the most part, such representations depict the 
conditions of coma and head trauma as being akin to conventional states of 
psychological trauma, ultimately implying that the effects of coma and brain injury are 
‘curable’. One example of the post-coma subject that I have examined is Johnny Smith 
in Stephen King’s The Dead Zone and his manifestation of a ‘resurrected’ and 
messianic ‘zombie’. Despite the fact that King does not address the possibility of 
cognitive, post-lesional impairment in his depiction of Johnny’s post-coma plight, I 
discussed how there was some attention to accuracy in the overall portrayal of the 
physiological impact of coma, muscle atrophy being one such example. Interestingly, 
despite this lack of focus upon post-coma traumatic brain injury (TBI), Johnny’s 
second-sight becomes imbued with metaphorical undertones of brain injury, each vision 
he has having the impact of a secondary ‘accident’ or injury that progressively takes its 
toll on his entire physical and psychological wellbeing. 
In response to the Wijdicks’ damning appraisal of the portrayal of coma in 
contemporary motion pictures, and referring to their focus on Almodóvar’s Talk To 
Her, Joseph J. Fins concurs that whilst the director’s portrayal of Alicia’s recovery from 
coma is ‘mere fantasy’, his ‘depiction of a young ballerina’s recovery from the 
vegetative state is metaphorically powerful’.1 It can be seen, therefore, that King’s 
portrayal of Johnny Smith’s post-coma recovery is similarly ‘metaphorically powerful’, 
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a figurative distillation of the struggles of living with TBI manifested within a horror-
fantasy narrative. Alternatively, this could simply be a further example of the lack of 
representation of brain injury in coma narratives, a misgiving that is held by the 
Wijdicks brothers and communicated in their counter-response to Fins. Fins’s 
speculation that, ‘The cinematic distortion may have been used deliberately to show 
another perspective or to inspire’, the Wijdicks concede, is interesting and an alternative 
‘take on the screenwriter’s frame of mind’. However, they conclude that, ‘Coma is just 
another device to tell stories in movies such as thrillers or comedies’.2 As discussed in 
chapter one, Eelco and Cohen Wijdicks could also have added ‘romance’ to this list of 
genres. 
Within this chapter, I will continue to explore this debate around realistic versus 
metaphorical portrayals of coma and brain injury by turning to another example of an 
‘exterior’ coma text: Tom McCarthy’s 2005 novel, Remainder, with its representation 
of the fractured post-coma identity. Examining how the novel represents the post-
traumatic, post- coma self (one manifestation of the ‘new wounded’ that Catherine 
Malabou refers to in her most recent work on the survivors of coma and brain injury
3
), I 
will address how it highlights postmodern and neurological debates surrounding the 
concepts of selfhood and authenticity. I will also draw links between this particular 
fiction and real-life cases of the ‘split-subject’ in coma survival, apparent in the story of 
Mark Hogancamp portrayed in the documentary film Marwencol. Taking Jacques 
Derrida’s concept of the trace and Jean Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra and the 
hyperreal, I will look at how these theories are addressed in the novel and through 
McCarthy’s representation of a post-coma protagonist, whilst also looking at the extent 
to which these theories can be assimilated into current conceptions of post-lesional 
brain plasticity and the ‘neuronal personality’.4  
In response to Baudrillard’s often nihilistic position, I argue that far from being an 
insidious condition of a culturally vacuous postmodern world, the process of simulation 
and the creation of simulacra are inherent strategies of the human brain in its ability to 
process information, adapt to its world and, ultimately, to survive beyond even the most 
traumatic physical or psychological injury. 
 
                                                     
2
 Eelco F.M. Wijdicks and Coen A. Wijdicks, Neurology, Volume 68 (1), January 2007, p. 80. 
3
 Catherine Malabou, The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain Damage (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2012). 
4
 Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do With Our Brain?, trans. Sebastian Rand (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), p.58. 
148 
 
 
5.2: Like Something That’s Come Out of Something: Authenticity – Elasticity –
Plasticity 
 
Remainder portrays an unnamed narrator’s recovery from coma and his difficulties of 
coping with a traumatic brain injury that was caused by ‘something falling from the 
sky’.5 The accident, itself, has left ‘a blank: a white slate, a black hole’,6 a physical and 
psychological consequence of the accident that is exacerbated by the fact that the 
Enactor, to use Zadie Smith’s designation to refer to Remainder’s protagonist,7 is forced 
into a position whereby he is not allowed to talk about the accident. This is a 
constrictive condition of the £8.5 million pay-out he receives from the shadowy 
organization that is indirectly responsible for his plight, and a caveat that seems strictly 
academic as, by the Enactor’s own admission, he ‘never had any memory of it in the 
first place’.8  
Crucially, since the accident, the Enactor no longer feels ‘authentic’ (a crisis of 
identity reflected in McCarthy’s refusal to name him): his ‘movements are all fake. 
Second-hand’.9 Indeed, he comes to the gradual realization that he had ‘always been 
inauthentic’10 and, moreover, that everyone that inhabits the world around him are 
plagued with the same affliction, seeing them as ‘self-conscious’ and ‘false’ characters 
that put in ‘amateur performances’.11  Immediately, the novel introduces debates 
surrounding the constitution and construction of identity, subjectivity and authenticity, 
and the impact that coma and brain injury has upon selfhood. For this reason, it is useful 
to look first at some of the theories of authenticity and the development of the subject 
that are most pertinent to this novel, most notably the Freudian designation of the ‘split-
subject’.  
Freud’s denomination of the id, ego and super-ego called into question exactly which 
one of these multiple, competing ‘selves’ residing within the subject was the truly 
‘authentic’ self. As Charles Guignon posits in his extensive work on selfhood and 
authenticity, the discovery of the ‘heart of darkness’ that the id represents called into 
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question the ‘placid assurance that human beings are fundamentally good at heart, their 
natures having been distorted only by socialization’.12 Freud, therefore, saw the id as the 
truly authentic self, its dark desires only tempered by the ego and super-ego, concluding 
in Civilization and Its Discontents that ‘human beings are not gentle creatures in need of 
love’.13 This primordial aggression is summed up, by Freud, in the Latin phrase: ‘Homo 
homini lupus’14 – man is a wolf to man – and because of this propensity to enact 
violence, humans have developed the super-ego, an ‘internalized sense of a moral 
authority that promises punishment for infractions of a moral code’.15 This 
identification of a tripartite model of selfhood meant that if the id (the ‘real’ self) was 
controlled by the super-ego (a product of socialization and moral control) as well as the 
ego (an ‘appendage that is added on to the id in the course of its development’16) then in 
psychoanalytical terms, authenticity of selfhood was constantly being compromised. As 
Guignon observes, ‘Seen from this angle, to be authentic is to openly express all the 
rage, raw sexuality and cruelty within you’.17  
I have discussed, extensively, how this concept of the ‘split-subject’ has been used in 
many works of interior coma fiction, with the protagonist often having to relocate his 
so-called ‘authentic’ self in order to emerge from coma, Roy in Marabou Stork 
Nightmares, for example, forced to accept his ‘true’ barbaric and id-like nature that he 
consistently tries to repress. But even before Freud came to prominence, the American 
psychologist William James proposed that a ‘normal’ individual may contain many 
selves, all operating on multiple levels and achieving different purposes according to the 
needs of the individual at any given moment. The subject, according to James, is 
constantly ‘adopting different masks appropriate to different contexts’:18 father, 
husband, work colleague, friend, lover. If the individual is no longer an autonomous, 
cohesive and unitary ‘soul’, but an ‘unfolding, centerless play of persons’,19 it follows 
that there is also a ‘decentring’ of what it means to be authentic. Despite the fact that the 
individual constantly adopts different masks of subjectivity for different purposes, it 
does not necessarily mean that each one is inauthentic or that any particular one of them 
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is the true ‘authentic’ self that is concealed by the other masks. 
Interestingly, this postmodern ‘play’ of selves and of authenticity refutes the Platonic 
notion that the actor, in engaging with the identification and appropriation of different 
characters (or masks) jeopardises the authenticity of his soul. This is a concept that 
Jean- Jacques Rousseau further developed through his own theories of authenticity and 
of his conception of the one ‘true’ self of a ‘naturally occurring’ individual ‘that is 
preyed upon and entrapped by society’.20 In his seminal work, Sincerity and 
Authenticity, Lionel Trilling explicates Rousseau’s position with regard to the 
performance of the actor: ‘[B]y engaging in impersonation at all the actor diminishes his 
own existence as a person’.21 This rather arcane concept, however, seems to resonate 
with the Enactor’s distaste for the inauthentic ‘actors’ he sees all around him in 
Remainder. However, it is precisely this fluidity of subjectivity and authenticity, the 
movement between different ‘masks of identity’, that perhaps chimes most with 
modern, neurobiological models of selfhood and which is represented in many works of 
coma literature, not least McCarthy’s novel. Moreover, real-life cases of post-coma 
brain trauma, whereby the identity of the victim is changed inexorably, expose the huge 
problems inherent in Rousseau’s entire concept of authenticity and his promotion of 
individualism. 
Thomas Docherty, in his discussion of Gilles Deleuze’s theory of selfhood and 
authenticity, points towards the importance of the concept of ‘becoming’ which, I 
suggest, connects with current neurobiological concepts of a self that is constantly 
evolving according to changes in its environment. Docherty writes that, ‘For Deleuze, 
[…] one is never in a state of being (a being that would allow me to give an account of 
‘my identity’) but only becoming (in which ‘I’ never quite coincide with myself’).22 
This, of course, means that selfhood (and therefore the possibility of achieving 
authenticity) is always elusive, in a state of flux, thus reflecting the ‘decentred subject’ 
of postmodernity. But it also reflects the neurobiological model of the pre-conscious 
‘proto-self’23 proposed by the influential neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. This proto-
self, Damasio writes, is ‘a coherent collection of neural patterns which map, moment by 
moment, the state of the physical structure of the organism in its many dimensions’24 
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[original italics]. This unconscious process of mapping such neural patterns, or 
‘signals’, occurs, according to Damasio’s tests, across multiple regions in the brain and 
points towards a constant state of development ‘in the process of regulating the state of 
the organism’.25 This biological pre-conscious functioning, therefore, is a ‘ceaselessly 
maintained first-order collection of neural patterns’26 that sets in motion an entire chain 
of ‘becoming’ and flux within the ongoing construction of selfhood and identity. The 
proto-self  is born out of the non-conscious neural signalling of the organism, which 
then allows the development of the ‘core self’ and ‘core consciousness’, which, in turn, 
gives rise to the possibility of an ‘autobiographical self’ which permits ‘extended 
consciousness’. At the end of this chain of ‘becoming’, then, ‘conscience’ is finally 
reached.
27
 The subtlest unconscious shift or change in the proto-self, therefore, has huge 
ramifications for the chain of becoming, affecting the organism’s development of 
selfhood and, consequently, its sense of authenticity. As Catherine Malabou summates, 
‘From one end of the chain to another, Damasio explains, one must assume that the 
brain somehow recounts its own becoming, that it elaborates it in the form of an 
“account”’.28 Again, Malabou refers to this process of ‘becoming’ with the brain taking 
an account of itself within this perpetual state of flux. By implication, then, one must 
recognise this on-going development of selfhood in order to feel a sense of authenticity. 
This sense of becoming and authenticity, of course, is thrown into extreme crisis, as 
in the Enactor’s case, when the brain suffers a severe injury: when a huge rupture in the 
conception of one’s selfhood occurs, and it is this crisis of authenticity that McCarthy 
invokes within his novel. Described by many critics as an ‘anti-Realist’ novelist (Smith, 
in fact, suggesting that the novel itself is a violent ‘rejection’ of ‘lyrical realism’29), 
McCarthy explores a crisis of identity and authenticity par excellence: the decentring of 
an already decentred subject – the postmodern man. Ultimately, for McCarthy, 
‘becoming’ seems to depend upon one’s understanding of who one once was and so he 
examines the struggle to regain authenticity when the anchor-points of a previous 
identity are shattered by coma and traumatic brain injury. 
The Enactor’s emergence from coma acts as an immediate reminder of his struggle 
to feel ‘authentic’. His ‘no-space’ of coma gradually, like a developing Polaroid, 
becomes his ‘no-past’ of post-coma cognitive confusion, sitting in bed but failing to 
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remember anything about himself. At the very start of the novel, the Enactor admits that 
the memories of the accident that do come back might well be inventions of his 
‘traumatized mind’.30 He then metaphorically describes the eventual recovery of 
‘memories’ with the majority of his past returning ‘in instalments, like back episodes of 
some mundane soap opera’.31 This depicts a sense of detachment from his own 
memories as he stands as isolated witness to the gradual piecing together of a 
fragmented self. The episodes come back and slot into place, but the context within 
which they are being reassembled has shifted enormously. Because of the brain damage 
that he has sustained and because of the gaps in memory that still exist within his 
traumatized brain, alongside his detachment from the majority of memories that do 
return, what he ‘becomes’ post-coma is a ‘re-edited’ (or ‘re-booted’) self. McCarthy 
later extends this metaphor. Caught in a slapstick repetition of journeys between a 
phone-box and his London flat (due to the fact that he keeps forgetting items that he 
needs to remember in order to break this cycle), the Enactor reaches a heightened state 
of self-awareness. Caught in a pattern of stuttering movement, turning towards his flat a 
couple of steps, then turning back, he realises that two men are staring at him from 
across the street, seeing him ‘jerking back and forth like paused video images do on 
low-quality machines’.32 This makes the Enactor feel ‘self-conscious, embarrassed’, and 
despite the fact that his injured brain makes the decision to go back to the flat and 
retrieve what he needs to move forward, he begins to procrastinate further, but this time 
deliberately, introducing some ‘play’ into the scene. He pretends to ‘weigh up several 
options and then come to an informed decision’, using physical language to inhabit this 
‘role’ fully by using his right finger to indicate his thought processes. By his own 
admission, this becomes a ‘performance’ that allows his movements to ‘come across as 
more authentic’.33 He therefore becomes an actor in his own ‘video images’, seeing his 
authenticity as something that is based upon how he is perceived by others, not by how 
he feels himself. The importance he places upon authenticity, in this scene, seems based 
upon his desire for others to see him as being ‘authentic’ and ‘real’ and so this leads to a 
double-bind: ‘performing’ authenticity so that others can see him as being authentic but 
this very process of performance exacerbates his feeling of being inauthentic. Later, he 
refers to his recovered memories as ‘the wrong holiday photos back from the 
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chemist’s’,34 demonstrating an absolute lack of empathy for this alterity of ‘another 
history’: a re-shot, re-photographed self that is detached from his new ‘performative’ 
self. 
His self-conscious performance, above, is not just simply a consequence of his 
embarrassment within that particular moment of realizing he is being watched, but is a 
larger result of his brain injury. A short moment after this incident, he describes his 
process of walking along a road as ‘like a blind man’s fingers reading Braille’, 
concentrating on each separate movement and motion. As he concludes, ‘That’s the way 
I’ve had to do things since the accident: understand them first, then do them’.35 This 
reduction of instinct and rupture in mind/body unity continues to haunt the Enactor and 
exacerbate his crisis of authenticity. Throughout the novel, McCarthy renders this 
rupture in selfhood using the metaphor of technology, as seen when the Enactor, 
making an over-enthusiastic grab for his landline telephone whilst being told of his 
‘pay-out’, yanks it out of the wall socket: 
 
[T]he connection had been cut. I stood there […] holding the dead receiver 
in my hand and looking down at what the wall had spilt. It looked kind of 
disgusting, like something come out of something.
36
  
 
This minor mishap serves as a metaphor of the Enactor’s plight: the connection has 
been cut between his pre-coma and post-coma selves. His post-TBI apathy and 
emotional neutrality (common in many cases of brain trauma
37
) certainly reflect this, 
earlier, when he reveals that he did not feel like ‘doing anything’.38 In many ways, he is 
the ‘dead receiver’, taking in external signals and impulses, but neither knowing what to 
do with them or, most importantly, not really caring what he does with them: a 
functional failure of his non-conscious neural signalling, to return to Damasio. Even the 
‘settlement’ fails to arouse him; indeed he is more concerned with the irksome half-a-
million (the point-five decimal ‘remainder’) that corrupts the perfection of the circuitous 
whole integer of the ‘eight’. In the same way that he is disgusted by the mess that his 
broken phone leaves, he is similarly disgusted by the person he is ‘becoming’. The 
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Enactor is the ‘something’ that has come out of ‘something’, the repetition of this 
abstract pronoun not only a subtle allusion to his post-TBI aphasia but also to the 
incomprehension of both who he once was and who he is now and is to come. 
In her overview of brain injury recovery and the brain’s resistance to injury, 
Catherine Malabou refers to brain ‘plasticity’ as ‘a form’s ability to be deformed 
without dissolving and thereby to persist throughout its various mutations’.39 It is 
precisely this ‘strange sculptural power’ of lesional plasticity, Malabou argues, ‘that 
produces form through the annihilation of form’.40 This dichotomy of creation through 
destruction is sharply observed by McCarthy, and consistently explicates the crisis of 
authenticity. The Enactor’s re-formed self has been born out of his ‘remoulded’ brain; 
whilst it is still made out of the same material, it has now taken, to extend the metaphor, 
a new ‘shape’. The very notion of plasticity suggests that the brain is malleable, 
resistant, yet by its very definition it can never fully return to its original form because 
of the permanent damage that has been caused. This being said, in the Enactor’s case, 
most of his memories alongside his ‘biographical self’ have returned but to a newly 
formed ‘brain’ or ‘shell’ (like old videotape wound around the spools of a new plastic 
casing). In this regard, lesional plasticity creates two senses of self shaped from the 
same material yet conflicting through their difference in form. Indeed, from a 
neuropsychological perspective, Gronwall, Wrightson and Waddell observe that, ‘The 
majority of the improvement which is seen after a head injury is due to reorganization 
of the brain which is undamaged […]. Functional areas take over from the areas which 
are no longer functional’.41  
The plasticity of the brain is therefore remoulded and creation is born out of 
destruction: something comes out of something. It is this neurobiological model of 
plasticity that motivates Malabou to warn against the proliferating confusion between 
psychopathology and psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis proposes the possibility of the 
‘return to a previous state’;42 psychopathology refutes this possibility because of the 
permanence of brain plasticity. In other words, juxtaposed against neurobiological 
plasticity, there is psychoanalytical ‘elasticity’ in its championing of a therapeutic 
regression to a former state of being and a ‘healing’ of the ‘wound’ of trauma. 
This notion of post-coma/TBI plasticity is examined in close detail by McCarthy in 
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one particular sequence of the novel that describes the Enactor’s physical rehabilitation. 
In a passage that echoes Gronwall, Wrightson and Waddell’s discussion of the 
reorganization of functional/non-functional areas of the brain, the Enactor speaks of his 
physiotherapist who had to ‘route the circuit that transmits commands to limbs and 
muscles through another patch of brain – an unused, fallow patch’.43 McCarthy, then, 
paints a picture of ‘becoming’ a future self that is both physically and mentally 
frustrating, that is forced to compartmentalise every subtle manoeuvre involved in an 
individual movement, for example, the ‘seventy-five manoeuvres involved in taking a 
single step forward’,44 each of which the Enactor has to learn in order to ‘re-route’ his 
damaged brain. It is this painstaking process that seems to be inherent in the growing 
fissure between mind/body existence that questions the Enactor’s authenticity, as he has 
to think, over-think and learn ‘all seventy-five’ manoeuvres, thus suffocating instinct 
and spontaneity inherent within the simplest of physical actions. The Enactor observes 
that this process of ‘learning’ how to walk is itself inauthentic: ‘In the normal run of 
things you never learn to walk like you learn swimming, French or tennis […] you 
stumble into it, literally’.45 It is this inauthenticity of having to ‘learn’ to walk post-
coma that leads him to the devastating conclusion that, ‘My movements are all fake. 
Second-hand’.46 This arises from the awareness that he is no longer the person he used 
to be and that this person he is ‘becoming’ is being partly constructed through the 
artifice of motor-function rehabilitation. 
All of this being said, the whole question of authenticity becomes even more 
complex when the Enactor begins to see the authentic in the inherently fake – when he 
takes a trip to the cinema with his pre-coma ‘friend’, Greg. Watching a screening of 
Scorsese’s Mean Streets, the Enactor is struck by just ‘how perfect De Niro’ is,47 
seemingly executing each action perfectly. He is, as far as the Enactor is concerned, 
‘perfect, seamless’, an observation at which Greg scoffs. The Enactor then replies: 
‘“He’s natural when he does things. Not artificial, like me. He’s flaccid. I’m plastic”’ 
[emphasis added]. Here, echoing his physiotherapist’s words, the Enactor pointedly 
refers to his crisis of authenticity. 
It is ironic that the Enactor sees authenticity and spontaneity in cinematic 
performance and, in particular, in an actor who is famous for his meticulous adherence 
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to ‘the method’, that painstaking process of making a performance seem real and 
‘authentic’. In fact, the Enactor, commenting on how actors perform physical 
movements, suggests that, unlike him, ‘They’re just doing their thing, real, not thinking 
anything’.48 In this observation, the crisis of his post-coma authenticity and very 
selfhood is exemplified, implying a complete collapse of his ability to distinguish 
between fiction and reality and amplifying his need for performance. But McCarthy’s 
role as postmodern novelist is also at work here, this section in particular drawing on 
Jean Baudrillard’s concepts of the ‘more real than real’49 and cinema becoming ‘more 
cinema than cinema’ that appear in his work, The Evil Demon of Images. Chiefly, 
Baudrillard refers to certain exponents of the American new-wave of the 1970s, and the 
obsessive preoccupations to capture the ‘real’: Roman Polanski’s Chinatown, Sydney 
Lumet’s All The President’s Men and, in one particular sequence of analysis, Peter 
Bogdanovich’s The Last Picture Show that are all ‘a little too good, better adjusted, 
better than the others’. In being charmed by the ‘more real than real’ of Mean Streets 
and De Niro’s performance (themselves arising out of the realist movement of the New-
Wave), the Enactor is duped by cinema’s ‘ever-increasing perfection, absolute reality’.50 
It is this illusion of the real that heightens the Enactor’s sense of inauthenticity all the 
more, despite the fact that DeNiro’s ‘authenticity’ is clearly rehearsed. Ultimately, for 
the Enactor, if authenticity can only be achieved by inhabiting a ‘fluid’ and spontaneous 
self, then it will prove to be perpetually elusive due to the fact that he is haunted by the 
‘trace’ of his pre-coma self. Anything he does now in his pursuit of becoming a new self 
will be forever superimposed over the self he had become prior to coma. In short, the 
‘remainder’ of a previous selfhood prevents the ‘reformed’ self to ‘feel real’ or 
authentic. 
 
 
5.3: You’ve Got a Scar Right There: Self – Coma – Trace 
 
The turning point for the Enactor comes when, at Greg’s behest, he makes an 
appearance at ‘David Simpson’s party’. Meeting the Enactor at the door of his flat, the 
party’s host exclaims, ‘“Oh! Hello! […] I heard you were… you know, better”’.51 As he 
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utters this somewhat ‘normalizing’ greeting, the Enactor observes that, ‘His eyes were 
scanning my forehead above my eyes; Greg must have told him about the plastic 
surgery on the scar’.52 Earlier, when the Enactor meets his friend, Catherine, at the 
airport, the first thing she says is, ‘“You don’t look like – oh yes, you’ve got a scar right 
there”’,53 before running two fingers down the length of the scar. 
The plastic surgery represents the attempt, on behalf of medical staff, to conceal the 
rem(a)inder of the accident, yet the ‘trace’ of it both remains and reminds. This trace 
signifies both who the Enactor once was and who he is not now, and the virtual 
obscurity of the injury highlights this crisis: he ‘looks okay’ but the trace of the scar is a 
constant echo of the absence of his pre-coma self. To appropriate the knotty language of 
Derridean deconstructive analysis, the scar represents the ‘absent-presence’ of the trace 
of the accident and of the Enactor’s pre-coma self. It is useful, therefore, to explore in 
more detail Jacques Derrida’s concept of the trace (this absent-presence) and how 
McCarthy appropriates this for the novel in his exploration of neurological trauma. 
In his development of the concept of ‘the trace’, Derrida examines how ‘elements’ 
(linguistic sounds, signifiers, memories) are neither simply present, nor simply absent, 
thus emphasizing the undecidability of language and of metaphysics as a whole. The 
trace is a constant ‘sliding’ between absence and presence, an acceptance that elements 
can be both/and, rather than either/or that challenges the metaphysical presumptions of 
‘being’ and the repletion of presence. On a linguistic level, take, for example, the word 
‘dog’. The /d/ sound may be exchanged for /c/ or /h/. The sounds in themselves may be 
lacking in ‘full’ meaning, but the difference between them affects the concept (element) 
to which they refer. Derrida would see this as ‘presence in action’. When the word ‘dog’ 
is uttered, listeners will not hear /c/ or /h/; the sound that is present is /d/, as these 
multiple consonant sounds cannot be uttered simultaneously. The other sounds are 
therefore absent. However, Derrida does not side with such a simple binarism, as first 
proposed by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. These absent sounds, in 
Derrida’s view, are not simply absent. To identify and understand the concept to which 
/d/og refers, it must be understood that /d/og is not /c/og; is not /h/og. Therefore, for 
/d/og to be meaningful, it has to be dependent upon the other sounds from which it 
differs. In this regard, Derrida argues, /d/og carries with it the ‘trace’ of the other 
consonant sounds, sounds which are not simply absent or simply present, but absent-
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present. 
On a metaphysical level, the image of the zombie can be used to explore this notion 
of the absent-presence of the trace. For Derrida, the cinematic portrayal of the zombie 
was the ultimate image of undecidability and the ultimate play between absence and 
presence. The zombie occupies the uncertain space between the living and the dead and 
may be ‘either’ alive ‘or’ dead, depending upon one’s interpretative preference. 
However, it is ‘neither’ alive ‘nor’ dead since neither of these existential states fully 
describes the state of the zombie. Therefore the zombie, like Schrödinger’s eminent cat, 
can be seen to be both alive and dead. Cutting across and playing between these 
categories of existence, then, the zombie is a paradigm of undecidability. It seems 
hardly surprising, then, that the image of the zombie, the ‘living dead’, extends into 
coma literature. Within the coma, the victim is neither dead nor fully alive, representing 
the absent-presence of the trace of who he once was. I have already examined how, in 
The Dead Zone, Johnny is manifested as a zombie-figure, a member of the ‘living dead’ 
who has ‘arisen’ from the death-state of coma. Malabou’s definition of post-lesional 
plasticity can likewise be seen in light of Derrida’s philosophical notion of 
undecidability: a phenomenon that is both destructive and creative. 
Returning to Remainder, the Enactor is either/or who he was and who he is 
becoming, but he is also neither/nor these selfhoods. He is haunted by the trace which 
means that he can neither be who he was, nor fully become who he should strive to 
become. This also means that he is both of these things, a condition of his brain injury 
that constantly arises through everyone’s insistence that he ‘looks the same’. To all 
outward appearances, he even seems to act the same. He has the same physical 
appearance, the same memories and the same functional behaviours… or rather, he has 
the same physical appearance (barring the scar); the same memories (barring those that 
have not returned, most notably, that of the accident); and the same behaviours (barring 
his lack of auto-affection). He is the same-but- different; the absent-presence of his 
former pre-coma self that constantly haunts his on-going process of ‘becoming’ and his 
natural, neuronal state of ‘flux’. 
Damasio, writing on the survivors of brain injury, makes a particularly pertinent 
observation in regard to this ‘same-but-different’ concept: ‘The distinction of the 
patients with damage to the retromedial sector of the frontal lobe is that their problems 
seem confined to their strange social behaviour. For all intents and purposes, they look 
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the same’.54 This misconception is illustrated by McCarthy through both Catherine and 
David Simpson’s very real need to look for the difference in the Enactor, and their sense 
of disappointment at not finding the difference, leading to an assumption that there has 
been no change in him: that the accident has left no trace or ‘remainder’. Malabou 
similarly examines the persistence of the trace in brain injury survivors, asking: 
 
How can one deny, even in cases of very serious damage, that something 
like a psychic structure or profile remains intact? How can one deny that a 
style of being endures despite the alterations and disturbances that it 
undergoes? Even if a subject no longer recognises us, don’t we always 
recognise him within his very metamorphosis?
55
  
 
From this standpoint, the absent-presence of the brain injury survivor may manifest 
itself in the perceptions and the remembrances of who he once was, archived within the 
minds of his loved ones. Because of their need for him to ‘return’ to himself, and their 
insistence (maybe to avoid instigating an overly traumatic recovery) on his not being 
‘changed’ in any way, the survivor both ‘lives on’ as his ‘old’ self, whilst attempting to 
become his new. It is interesting to note Malabou’s use of the word ‘being’ in this 
passage – the reference to the fact that the ‘style of being’ seems to rely upon the 
memories of the pre-coma, pre-TBI self. This ‘being’ seems to be an obstacle for future 
and on-going ‘becoming’, therefore creating a crisis of selfhood. Looking across case-
studies of brain injury survivors who seem to demonstrate traces of their pre-injury 
selves, Malabou insists that ‘something remains […] that resists the ordeal of trauma’. 
She then goes on to ask, ‘And doesn’t this prove that, regardless of the apparent 
metamorphosis, the victim of brain damage or trauma has not entirely become someone 
else?’.56 To Malabou, this ‘trace’ is a presence of who this person once was. However, 
the presence of this trace can be questioned from a Derridean perspective that would see 
this trace not as a full presence, but rather as ‘the simulation of a presence that 
dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself’.57 In other words, the trace of the former 
‘self’ is only a ‘simulation’ of that self (not, as Malabou sees, an actual ‘remainder’ of 
the self) as the ‘original’ self has been lost through brain injury. All attempts to 
reassimilate such a trace will only lead to further dislocation and fracturing of the 
subject – a reminder that one can no longer be who one once was. From this position, 
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the Enactor’s same-but-different post-coma existence is merely a simulation of who he 
once was, based upon the absent-presence of his pre-coma self. 
The shadow of the trace, therefore, affects the Enactor acutely. He is unable to 
develop and inhabit a new future self as what he ‘becomes’ is unavoidably 
superimposed over who he once was, dislocating him from himself and shattering his 
sense of authenticity. As he proposes, on multiple occasions, ‘Everything must leave 
some kind of mark’.58 Like Freud’s reference to the ‘mystic writing pad’,59 a child’s toy 
that was rather like the modern Etch-A- Sketch (and an analogy that Derrida, himself, 
refers to), despite the fact that one element is seemingly wiped off the plastic cover 
sheet of the pad to make way for a new inscription, there will always remain the 
indelible print in the wax layer of the toy below the sheet. In short, there will always be 
the trace of the Enactor’s pre-coma self, lying beneath his future ‘inscriptions’ of post-
coma selfhood. Thus, to cite Edward E. Sampson’s insightful and precise observation in 
his navigation between theories of selfhood and Derridean deconstruction, ‘The trace, 
which is absent from consciousness, forms the basis of consciousness itself’.60 Indeed, 
if the concept of ‘becoming’ is developed further, then the human subject can be 
interpreted as developing along a constant chain of differences that reflects Derrida’s 
postulation that, ‘There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces’.61 For the 
Enactor, though, coma and brain injury has ruptured and accelerated the natural order of 
‘becoming’ (the chain of the trace) and so he realises that he must annihilate this 
remainder by reassimilating it into the perceived ‘whole’ of a pre-coma self if he wishes 
to ‘feel real’ and authentic once more. 
It is at David Simpson’s party when he is offered the lifeline, he thinks, that will 
allow him to do precisely this: when he confronts the last time he did feel ‘whole’ and 
‘real’. Wandering restlessly through the flat, he realises he is following a circuit that 
‘[has] the pattern of an eight’.62 This is another carefully crafted allusion, by McCarthy, 
both to patterns/circuits and the ‘remainder’. Since the accident, the Enactor sees 
patterns and circuits in everything. These provide comfort for him as they represent 
unbroken systems and feedback loops that are authentic ‘totalities’ that temporarily 
distract him from confronting his own fractured selfhood. This craving for circuits and 
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patterns also seems to be a ‘trace’ of his ‘no-space’ of coma, or, more precisely, of his 
‘lightening’63 of coma in a description that employs the same language as that used by 
Ruthann Knechel Johansen, discussed in chapter one. During this period, the Enactor, in 
a semi-conscious state of cognitive confusion, finds himself in imagined spaces, ‘large 
sports stadiums’ and ‘athletics venues’.64 He sees himself sprinting around the asphalt 
circuits, with a commentary running over the top of his imagined exertion. He knows he 
has to recite this commentary to the ‘rhythm of [the] beeps’ of his ‘plastic lung’ that 
keeps him alive in the world outside of coma in order to survive. This surreal image of a 
circuit of survival is the only ‘memory’ that the Enactor takes with him into the post-
coma world of recovery, and it is another trace over which he must re-build his selfhood 
and authenticity. The Enactor’s obsession with closed circuits also reflects his traumatic 
compulsion to repeat and his inability to come to terms with the traumatic event that 
was erased even as it happened. McCarthy, in a 2008 interview, himself draws attention 
to his representation of the erasure of the traumatic event, and the gap that ‘demands to 
be substituted or supplemented’,65 leading to a ‘kind of stuttering, repeating, looping 
logic’.66 Yet the Enactor’s figure-of-8 movement through David Simpson’s flat is not 
just a re- enactment of this coma trace of sports stadiums. It is an evocation of the eight 
million he has received for the ‘settlement’, the rem(a)inder of the accident, which he 
claims he cannot remember, but of which he cannot speak even if he wanted to. The 
settlement is actually eight point-five million, the point-five being the decimal 
remainder for which the Enactor holds disgust: ‘Why had they added the half? It 
seemed so messy, this half: a leftover fragment, a shard of detritus’.67 Like the trace of 
his former self, this mathematical remainder is messy and complicated, standing in the 
way of a perfect ‘whole’. 
However, despite the Enactor’s security in his figure-of-8 movement at the party, it is 
within another ‘remainder’ that he finds something like true security, this particular 
remainder, as he observes, being a precursor to ‘the event that, the accident aside, was 
the most significant of my whole life’.68 Whilst embarking on another circuit around the 
flat, the Enactor happens upon an ‘extra room’ off one of the corridors, a room that 
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‘seemed to have just popped up beside it like the half had in my settlement: off-set, an 
extra’69 – a remainder. This room is a bathroom, and inside it the Enactor has ‘a sudden 
sense of déjà-vu’.70 He sees a crack in the wall beside the mirror and bathtub, images 
that he remembers seeing before, but it is the specificity of the crack that seems to be 
most vivid, most ‘crystal-clear, as clear as in a vision’.71 It is this crack that evokes the 
trace memory of a previous time and a previous life, and this then begins to evoke other 
traces, an entire signifying chain: his room in a flat; a building opposite with red roofs, 
black cats lounging on them; the smell of liver cooking in the flat below, the ‘spit and 
sizzle’ loud in his ears; a pianist rehearsing; an old woman taking rubbish out of her flat, 
saying something to him as he passes her, him saying something back; iron banisters; a 
patterned, tiled hallway; marble floors. He ‘re-remembers’ every little detail or more 
precisely (and by his own admission) he mis-remembers these details as he later admits: 
‘I don’t think this was a straight memory. It was more complex. Maybe it was various 
things all rolled together: memories, imaginings, films’.72 Regardless of this possibility 
of him faking this memory, he realises that in this other place (this ‘trace-space’) all of 
his ‘movements had been fluent and unforced. Not awkward, acquired, second-hand 
but… seamless, perfect. They’d been real’. He further asserts, ‘I’d been real – been 
without first understanding how to try to be’.73  
McCarthy, then, paints another complex relationship that the Enactor has with the 
trace. At once, he is disgusted and repelled by it (at one point recoiling at a smear of oil 
on his shirt sleeve, or the mess that his yanked-out phone socket leaves behind), whilst 
also being morbidly drawn to such ‘kinks’ in the circuit. It is within the ‘remainder’ of 
David Simpson’s flat that the Enactor thinks that he has found his salvation. He decides 
to use his settlement money to recreate, rebuild and ‘re-enact’ this chain of traces of his 
pre-coma ‘memory’ in order to re-inhabit these trace-memories and consequently, he 
hopes, to feel real again. His new modus operandi becomes his need to ‘recreate’ the 
trace into a fully-operational, 1:1 scale wunderkammer, despite the fact that the oddities 
of memory-traces that will be recreated may well constitute the ultimate paradigm of an 
absence: false memories. McCarthy’s image of the crack is particularly germane to the 
Enactor’s re-ownership of the trace: it is, itself, an absent-presence, a trace of what used 
to be there with the plaster falling away and the paint around the aperture chipping and 
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flaking. The crack is only understandable through its difference from the whole and the 
crack becomes a counterpoint to the Enactor’s scar. Despite the attempt to conceal this 
scar, the trace always remains; instead of covering the trace of the crack, the Enactor 
will now embark upon a journey to recover it, using it as the kernel (a kernel constituted 
by an empty space) around which an entire, simulated, ‘hyperreal’ building (together 
with its inhabitants) will be recreated, in an attempt to reassimilate himself into the 
whole, and thus, to feel real again. 
 
 
5.4: They Looked Like Mine but Weren’t Mine: Trauma – Simulation – 
Assimilation 
 
Jean Baudrillard’s seminal essay ‘The Precession of Simulacra’ opens with a reference 
to Jorge Luis Borges’s short story, ‘On Exactitude in Science’, that ‘finest allegory of 
simulation’,74 according to the theorist. In it, Baudrillard explains, the cartographers of 
the Empire create a map that is so meticulously detailed that it ‘ends up covering the 
territory’.75 Now, Baudrillard argues, ‘the territory no longer precedes the map, nor 
survives it’, with ‘the real’ disappearing in a precession of simulations, thus 
‘substituting signs of the real for the real itself’.76  
According to Baudrillard, signs have become fractured, with an almost viral 
production of ‘floating signifiers’ infecting the world; signifiers that have broken away 
from their corresponding signifieds, thus no longer corresponding to any objective 
‘reality’. He observes, in this ‘precession of simulacra’, that signs have to progress 
through four stages before they evolve into simulacra: the first being ‘the reflection of a 
basic reality’ (the sign represents reality); the second being a distortion of reality (‘it 
marks and perverts a basic reality’); the third phase conceals the fact that there is a total 
‘absence of a basic reality’; and the fourth stage in which the sign has no relation to any 
corresponding reality: it has become ‘its own pure simulacrum’.77 Within this system, 
reality quickly disappears and becomes a simulation or, more accurately, becomes a 
simulation of a simulation: a copy of a copy. In short, there is what Baudrillard refers to 
as a breakdown of the reference principle of images: the basic reality that the sign 
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represents and then distorts is already a simulation in itself, thus it has become 
impossible to ‘recognise’ reality as it now no longer exists. As Madan Sarup explicates, 
for Baudrillard, society now functions within a postmodern world ‘in which all we have 
are simulations, there being no ‘real’ external to them, no ‘original’ that is being 
copied’.78  
I now turn to television and, in particular, the influx of so-called ‘reality-TV’ 
programmes over the last two decades. As I will demonstrate, society’s obsession with 
the ‘representations’ of reality within such programmes exemplifies Baudrillard’s 
notion that the image has ceased to embody an objective, pre-existing reality. Reality-
TV purports to constitute a window onto an objective reality but increasingly becomes 
detached from it. At a purely technical level, such programmes are edited and re-edited 
in order to present reality or rather, the reality that producers wish to communicate (the 
more real than real) in order to define story arcs and ‘characters’ more sharply with the 
sole purpose to entertain. Baudrillard refers to the absurd ‘phantasm’ within such 
shows: of ‘filming […] as if TV wasn’t there’, leading to a situation of spectatorship 
during which it seems ‘as if we weren’t there’79 within this transaction of viewing. This 
illusion of invisibility leads to one believing that what one is seeing is real, naïvely 
lulled into the assumption that the ‘players’ in such programmes are also unaware of the 
presence of television: that their behaviours are real and that they are ‘really’ showing 
the audience their true selves, unaffected by the intrusion of all of the trappings of the 
medium. This ‘loss of the real’ has accelerated, with reality-TV subjects becoming 
‘celebrities’ (and sometimes becoming reality-TV subjects once again, in the case of Big 
Brother’s Jade Goody). Another case in point is that of Chantelle Houghton, a non- 
celebrity sent into Celebrity Big Brother 4 in 2006, posing as a celebrity who then went 
on to win the competition and ‘become’ a celebrity. Houghton, therefore, becomes the 
‘own pure simulacrum’ of the fourth order of simulation, her first appearance as a 
celebrity having no reference to an objective external reality (a breakdown of the 
reference principle). This simulacrum, in turn, ‘precedes’ the ‘reality’ of her ‘becoming’ 
a celebrity thereafter. This is a clear example of the ‘Ouroborus’ of reality-TV: the 
media eating its own tail. Indeed, Tony Thwaites, in his discussion of Baudrillard’s 
‘four stages’ of simulation, refers to the fourth stage as ‘an involution that swallows its 
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own tail’,80 a comment that immediately evokes the image of the Ouroboros. Currently 
there is the manic production of programmes within the oxymoronic genre of ‘scripted-
reality’, with shows such as The Only Way Is Essex and Made In Chelsea. The very 
name of the genre indicates a palpable loss of the real and the production of simulacra. 
It seems no coincidence that in recent series of Celebrity Big Brother, large proportions 
of the ‘contestants’ consist of ‘characters’ from scripted- reality TV shows, again 
demonstrating the loss of the real and crisis in authenticity. 
 
 
The Ouroboros, an ancient symbol depicting a dragon or serpent eating its own tail, often symbolizing 
something re-creating itself, cyclicality or self-reflexivity. 
 
Such a system of production, re-production and simulation (and therefore a loss of 
the real) is clear to see in Remainder, with the Enactor embarking upon a mission to re-
create the building (and its inhabitants) ‘awoken’ in his unconscious. But of course, as 
discussed previously in relation to the ‘trace’, by the Enactor’s own admission his 
recreation is not necessarily based upon an objective reality, a ‘straight memory’. 
Instead, it is based upon a bricolage of fragmented images and senses that may have 
come from many different sources, even ‘imaginings, films’81 that have been re-edited. 
In this regard, then, the Enactor’s simulation has no reference principle: it is the copy 
without an original, not a ‘mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its 
concept’.82 However, for the Enactor, it is of no concern to him that his simulacrum 
(and simulacra within his building) represents reality, thereby inadvertently privileging 
‘a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal’.83 All that matters to him is his memory of 
being in this place and feeling real – itself a simulacrum of who he once was and once 
felt. As soon as the Enactor leaves David Simpson’s party, he embarks upon a frenzied 
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attempt to capture what was ‘recovered’ from his ‘memory’: 
 
I decided to safeguard [these memories] by sketching them out. I gathered 
all the unused paper I could find around my flat and started drawing 
diagrams, plans, layouts of rooms and floors and corridors. I blutacked each 
one to my living-room wall as I finished it; sometimes I’d run three or four 
or five into a big block, a continuous overview. When I’d run out of blank 
paper, I used the reverse side of letters, bills and legal documents – whatever 
came to hand.
84
  
 
This description of frenetic sketching and commitment to paper of memories, whilst not 
reaching the extremity of Borges’s cartographers’ map-simulation, evokes the same 
obsession. In fact, one could argue that this obsession is eventually fully realized in the 
actual construction of the Enactor’s building. The Enactor’s sketches that run over onto 
multiple sheets of paper resonate with the image of the expanding map: the cartographic 
exercise out of control. In his critique of modern society, Baudrillard points towards the 
‘hysteria of production and reproduction of the real’ in order for society to restore ‘the 
real which escapes it’.85 In trying to simulate a non-existent real, the Enactor becomes 
caught up within such a postmodern hysteria, a frenzy of production and re-production 
in order to recapture the elusive lost real. However, this ‘frenzy’ of reproduction is made 
even more complex by the fact that the lost real he is trying to reproduce is a previous 
conception of his selfhood. 
Employing Nazrul Vyas, or Naz (a ‘facilitator’) to act on his behalf, the Enactor is 
able to realise his simulations. However, no matter how many staff Naz and the Enactor 
hire to find the perfect location for the simulation of his building (and entire pre-coma 
memory) or how much money is invested in location scouts, it seems that only the 
Enactor is capable of finding the perfect spot, gradually coming to the realization that ‘it 
wouldn’t be my building unless I found it myself’.86 But even the Enactor struggles 
initially. On seeing buildings that ‘came closest’ to those in his post-coma ‘memory’, he 
says that, ‘They looked like mine but weren’t mine’.87 This statement is immediately 
indicative of a breakdown of post-coma ‘reality’ as it becomes unclear whether he is 
looking for a ‘simulation’ of his building, or the building itself, a building which may 
have no real referent in the first place. In the end, though, he does find ‘his building’, 
the ‘reality’ of which is confirmed by the fact that it is close to a sports track, one very 
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similar to that created in his coma: ‘The tracks I’d seen in my coma had been like this 
one […] I stood against the green fence, looking in and thinking about the 
commentaries I’d had to give during my coma’.88 And immediately, in this moment of 
reverie, he turns around and sees ‘his’ building. The realness of this simulation, then, 
seems to be a direct correlative to the Enactor’s re-emersion into the unreality of his 
coma flashback. 
This paradox of the real and the simulation appears throughout the novel with the 
Enactor constantly caught on the cusp of feeling real and feeling as though he is a 
simulation. McCarthy represents this paradox through his protagonist’s continuing faith 
in the principle that reality and ‘realness’ lies within rehearsal, a notion also embodied 
by McCarthy’s reference to De Niro’s performance in Mean Streets. However, during 
discussions with Naz over the people the Enactor needs to populate his building (the old 
‘liver’ lady; the pianist; a motorbike mechanic), he balks at the use of ‘performer’ to 
describe these people: ‘“Performers isn’t the right word… Staff. Participants. Re-
enactors”’.89 This notion of ‘re-enactment’ again invokes the notion of simulation, and 
the simulation of simulations ‘which transforms the real into the hyperreal’.90 This 
concept of hyperreality (in which all that is left of the world is a ‘reality’ that is made up 
of simulations and simulations of simulations) is sharply realized by the Enactor’s 
simulations of the gaps and voids in his consciousness and in the pre-coma memory. 
Like Redgrove describing an intangible ‘nothing’ in terms of a tangible ‘something’ (the 
descent into coma in terms of a descent into the underworld in his poem ‘Lazarus and 
the Sea’, discussed earlier), the Enactor tries to embody the ‘non-spaces’ of his 
consciousness. When trying to ‘re-remember’ the entire building in which he last felt 
real, he had left blank spaces in his diagrams. In translating these absences into 
physical, architectural spaces, the Enactor creates what he calls ‘neutral space’ with 
‘doorways papered and cemented over, strips of wall left bare’,91 although these 
forgotten parts ‘should be blank in reality’, according to the Enactor. The principle of 
this architectural approximation of the void also extends to some of the re-enactors 
within the building whose faces the Enactor cannot remember. These people (including 
the concierge of the building) wear blank hockey masks and the Enactor makes a point 
of justifying this decision: ‘Her face had never come back to me – or to be precise, it 
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had come to me, but only as a blank – so I’d decided she should wear a mask to blank it 
out’.92 Here, again, is a total loss of the real, with a simulation of voids in consciousness 
that become more real than the objects and places and people to which they refer. It is 
significant, then, that both Naz and the Enactor, in order to achieve this, turn to staff 
who are in the business of reproduction of ‘the real’ through simulation: Frank, a film 
set designer, and his assistant, Annie, a props buyer. Again, McCarthy explores the 
Enactor’s dichotomy of the pursuit of authenticity through the channels of artifice: the 
mechanisms and devices of the film industry. 
The Enactor’s hunger to recapture the lost real does not just stop at simulating 
absences; he also assimilates and simulates memories that were never of his ‘reality’, as 
seen in his simulation of the building’s courtyard: ‘Swings were being installed that day. 
I hadn’t seen swings in my original vision of the courtyard – but they’d grown there 
later, as I thought about it further’.93 Earlier, in a conversation with his pre-coma friend 
Catherine, the Enactor asks her, ‘“What’s the most intense, clear memory you have?”’. 
She describes a play-area near to where she lived in Chicago, with swings ‘on concrete, 
with a lawn around them’. As she describes this scene, her eyes are ‘sparkling’ and full 
of wonder, her voice trails off and the Enactor says, ‘She didn’t need to go on. I could 
see her seeing the swings’.94 This point at which Catherine loses herself in her memory 
becomes sexually arousing for the Enactor; he feels her becoming totally consumed and 
at one with her memory, something, post-coma, that he has not yet been able to achieve. 
Thus his assimilation, recreation and simulation of Catherine’s swings indicate once 
again the loss of the real. The fact that he doesn’t acknowledge the source of his new 
‘memory’ demonstrates that the image has become detached from its referent, and so by 
becoming part of the Enactor’s so-called real memory, it no longer refers to the real: it 
is merely the simulation of somebody else’s evocation of a childhood memory that 
made her ‘relive’ it at the moment of remembrance. Or to complicate this act of 
simulation further, it becomes the simulation of the Enactor’s pleasure at seeing 
Catherine’s pleasure evoked through her own recollection of a childhood memory: a 
copy of a copy of a copy. The Enactor’s simulation of Catherine’s ‘reality’ then 
influences his own ‘reality’: the re-memory of when he last felt real that ‘preceded’ the 
moment when he heard about Catherine’s memory and then assimilated and simulated 
that memory within his own memory. As Baudrillard would argue, this process of 
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assimilation (here represented by the co-opting of Catherine’s memory into the 
Enactor’s own memory) is not necessarily ‘unreal, but a simulacrum, never again 
exchanging for what is real, but exchanging in itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without 
reference or circumference’.95 In this, we again see the image of the Ouroboros, and it is 
therefore significant that the Enactor is fascinated with the ‘8’ of his £8m settlement, 
and with performing ‘figure of 8’ circuits. It is also the reason he is disgusted with the .5 
‘remainder’ of the settlement. The figure of 8 is not only seen to be a perfect unbroken 
loop (a seamless form that the Enactor wishes to adopt with regard to his identity) but 
also, laid horizontally, it represents infinity and is also identified, in modern mysticism, 
with a variation of the Ouroboros: 
 
However, the constant haunting of the ‘remainder’ of his pre-coma self (again 
represented metaphorically by the ‘ugly’ half-a-million pounds of his settlement) 
suggests that the Enactor’s quest to feel real again is doomed from the very outset, and 
this fate becomes immediately apparent in the first re-enactment within his building. 
The first suggestion of a problem comes when the building is initially put into ‘on 
mode’ (to use the Enactor’s description) and the cooking of liver downstairs begins. But 
the Enactor cannot get over the fact that there is something wrong with this, despite the 
fact that Annie (his ‘props’ facilitator) has promised him that the pans used to fry the 
liver have been ‘broken in’. However, to the Enactor, the liver still smells ‘a bit like 
cordite’,96 despite the fact that he does not really know what cordite is. It the trace of a 
signifier that has become detached from its specific signified (the smell of a discharged 
gun) but re-attached, in the Enactor’s mind, to the sensation of an unspecific unpleasant 
smell. 
Next, in his attempt to eliminate the post-coma sensation of all of his movements 
feeling like they are ‘duplicates, unnatural, acquired’,97 he tries to re-enact the 
movement of brushing past his waist-high kitchen units in order to watch the black cats 
lounging on the red-roofs of the building opposite (a building he has also bought and 
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had redeveloped according to his re-memory). However, this seemingly simple motion 
proves to be far from that, his shirt catching and snagging ‘for half a second too long’ 
on the counter-top. Needless to say, this ‘wasn’t right’ – wasn’t how he remembered 
it,
98
 and even after multiple attempts, the movement is not as deft as he wants it to be 
(or re-remembers it to be). As he concludes, ‘It was difficult, this whole manoeuvre: I 
would need to practise’.99 McCarthy once more explores an idea of realness achieved 
through practised spontaneity or rehearsed authenticity, the Enactor falling into the trap 
(set by post-coma rehabilitation) that he is trying to avoid. After all, in order to be able 
to perform this rehearsed re-enactment, he has to learn how to move again, post-coma, 
through practice and rehearsal. Here, then, McCarthy suggests that the Enactor’s quest 
for authenticity is a futile one, his recreation of the trace of a previous life, his 
simulation of a lost real, permanently dooming him to a retrogressive obsession with 
‘being’ rather than the progressive system of ‘becoming’ a future self. 
His failure and dissatisfaction with simulation and repetition is clear when the 
Enactor moves from his apartment during the first re-enactment and explores the rest of 
the building, leading to his encounter with one of the re-enactors: the old ‘liver’ lady 
who, as he passes, is tasked with placing a bag of rubbish outside her flat. The Enactor 
re-remembers the fact that she says something to him, although he cannot remember 
what. It is then decided that she should make something up on the spot, and this is 
precisely what she does do: ‘“Harder and harder to lift up”’, to which he immediately 
replies, ‘“Yes. Every time”’.100 The words just ‘come’ to him and it is at this point when 
he feels a tingling and lightness in his body, granting his physical self the ability to 
‘glide fluently and effortlessly through the atmosphere around it’.101 It is the same 
feeling that he describes in the moments just before the accident, as though all of his 
simulations (unbeknownst to him) are actually to try and re-create the moment before 
the disaster: the last time he felt real, inhabiting his lost, pre-coma self. However, in the 
stairwell of his building, this sensation soon fades and he quickly has the desire to 
recapture this ‘new’ moment, once more halting the process of ‘becoming’ by 
simulating that already absent-presence of dialogue that occurred within the lost 
moment of the immediate past. The second re-enactment instils the same sensation; the 
third fails, the old lady re-enactor inadvertently introducing a different parabola through 
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which she lifts the bag of rubbish and the bag itself leaving behind a ‘sticky-looking 
patch on the floor’.102 This is a motif of detritus (of a remainder) that runs throughout 
the Enactor’s life: oil on his sleeve or a coffee stain on his trousers that become 
symbolic of the trace of the lost memory of the Enactor’s ‘accident’ which I will 
explicate later in this discussion. But McCarthy also uses the motif of the stain to 
illustrate the ‘stain’ of the Enactor’s lost self, the self against which all attempts to 
create and ‘become’ a new self will be judged and found to be wanting. 
McCarthy, in the writing of this first ‘re-enactment’, presents a puzzling dichotomy 
once more: the Enactor wishes to recapture his lost ‘real’ through rehearsed production, 
re-production and simulation, yet he seems to get the greatest pleasure and sensation 
when the genuinely spontaneous occurs – the impromptu dialogue born out of the 
moment of simulated interaction between him and the liver lady. In other words, he 
feels most real and authentic in a moment of spontaneity, and yet he ignores this in 
order to re-enact this new moment, thus undermining its authenticity and, as a 
consequence, all of his ‘realness’. As Daniel Lea cogently posits in his analysis of the 
anxieties of authenticity in Remainder, ‘Such re-enactments are attempts to access the 
authentic through the profoundly inauthentic process of endless recreation, robbing the 
moment of its spontaneity through forensic aestheticization and examination’.103  
Later, the simulacrum of the building is threatened further when, walking down the 
stairs as he listens to his re-enactor pianist practising Rachmaninov, the Enactor meets 
the pianist.  It transpires that what the Enactor is listening to is a recording, a 
‘loopback’,104 that the pianist has created, complete with rehearsed and practised 
‘mistakes’: another copy of a copy of a copy. This exposure of the artifice of the 
simulacrum affects the Enactor profoundly, forcing him to slip into a state of ‘rage and 
dizziness’,105 violently disagreeing with the pianist that his copy is ‘the same thing’. His 
quest to feel real again is once more threatened, just as De Niro’s ‘real’ performance in 
Mean Streets would be threatened should Scorsese’s camera come into shot. 
As a result of these growing disillusionments, the Enactor’s creation of simulacra 
grows beyond the building and become increasingly eccentric, bizarre and dangerous, 
with McCarthy suggesting that the more manic the Enactor becomes in his pursuit of the 
real, the more detached from reality he becomes. In one episode, he and Naz hire re-
                                                     
102
 McCarthy, Remainder, p. 147. 
103
 Daniel Lea, ‘The Anxieties of Authenticity in Post-2000 British Fiction’ in Modern Fiction Studies, 
58 (3) (Chicago: The Johns Hopkins Press, 2012), 459-476, (p. 467). 
104
 McCarthy, Remainder, p. 147. 
105
 Ibid., p. 147. 
172 
 
 
enactors to re-enact an incident at a car mechanic’s garage during which it appears that 
the screen-wash poured into the Enactor’s car engine has been ‘transubstantiated’ into 
pure nothingness. However, on starting the engine, the blue fluid pours through the 
dashboard, gushing all over him (and staining his trousers, another image of detritus and 
the remainder) thus ‘turning the scene of a triumphant launch into the scene of a 
disaster, a catastrophe’.106 Interestingly, in his re-enactment of this scene (which even 
has someone ‘playing’ his role: a re-enactor of an Enactor, in a mise-en-abyme of 
simulation), he does not have his staff perform what actually happened, but what he 
thought and wanted to happen – for the washer fluid to ‘disappear upwards. Become 
sky’.107 Here, McCarthy not only represents the ‘fourth order’ of simulation (the image 
bearing ‘no relation to any reality whatever’) but also creates a metaphor that speaks of 
the Enactor’s over-arching goal post-coma: to re-integrate and transubstantiate himself 
into the loop of the ‘real’ and to obliterate the remainder by re-assimilating the trace of 
a former self. In this sense, I would argue that perhaps McCarthy represents the Enactor 
as a perfect example of a simulacrum: a copy without the original. This once more 
seems indicative of Malabou’s discussion of destructive plasticity during which ‘the 
permanent dislocation of one identity forms another identity – an identity that is neither 
the sublation nor the compensatory replica of the old form’.108 Whilst most of the 
Enactor’s memories have returned, the form of his brain has remoulded itself so they 
have returned, in essence, to a different ‘shell’ that, whilst made from the same material 
of its original, cannot ever return to the shape of its original form: the ‘mould’ is broken 
and the ‘copy’ is left with no original. 
It is this pursuit of the impossible that leads to the growing dissatisfaction with all of 
his simulations, even his re-enactment of a gangland shooting in which he replaces the 
murdered man with himself. In this scenario, he slows down the re-enactments of the 
shooting to greater and greater degrees, in a desperate attempt to become at one with the 
event itself. This is a technique that he begins to employ throughout his building 
resulting in his instructions to his extremely confused concierge to ‘do nothing even 
slower’.109 But despite the ‘performance’ of meticulous slow-motion re-enactments, he 
can never fully incorporate or assimilate the trace and can never be at one with the lost 
real. Thus, the Enactor’s mania of simulation threatens to become over-saturated and 
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implode, a consequence of which Baudrillard is all too aware. As Douglas Kellner 
explicates in his critical appraisal of Baudrillard’s theoretical positions, the proliferation 
of simulation presents a ‘“cool” catastrophe for the exhausted subject, whose 
fascination with the play of objects turns to apathy, stupefaction, and an entropic 
inertia’.110 In line with this argument, as his simulations increasingly begin to spiral out 
of control, the Enactor sinks into entropic fugue states, ‘waking comas’111 that, like his 
actual coma, begin to blur the boundaries between the ‘real’ and authentic and the ‘fake’ 
and inauthentic. Within these states (brought on by excessive and obsessive ‘slo-mo’ re-
enactments) he cannot ‘move for stretches of time, or register any stimuli’.112 His doctor 
concludes that he is ‘manifesting […] the autonomous symptoms of trauma’ through his 
‘addiction’ to opioids: the ‘endogenous opioids’ that are released every time he re-
enacts a particular traumatic event.
113
 The Enactor, then, has become addicted to the 
‘panic-stricken production of the real and the referential’114 leading to periods of 
catatonic inertia: the implosion of simulacra. In this, McCarthy again draws parallels 
with post-coma, post-traumatic repetition compulsion in order to confront the ‘lost 
event’ of the catastrophe, the Enactor trapped in the mania of simulation in order to 
achieve this confrontation. This mania comes to a head in the Enactor’s final act of 
simulation, and one that constitutes McCarthy’s most obvious reference to Baudrillard’s 
ideas: a re-enactment of a bank robbery. 
One of Baudrillard’s most notable claims in ‘The Precession of Simulacra’ is that if 
you were to stage a ‘fake’ hold-up within a bank, there would be nothing to separate this 
from the real as the signs of this simulated robbery would inevitably be the exact same 
signs of a real theft: ‘The web of artificial signs will be inextricably mixed up with real 
elements’. Baudrillard gives examples of a ‘real’ police officer shooting on sight, or a 
bank customer who will ‘really’ die of a heart attack. Thus, by staging a fake bank 
robbery, ‘You will unwittingly find yourself immediately in the real’.115 The simulation 
will therefore be inadvertently ‘devoured’ by the ‘real’ and all of the simulated signs of 
the robbery reduced ‘to some reality’. Such a simulated robbery, Baudrillard 
controversially suggests, would be more dangerous than a ‘real’ robbery, as the latter 
simply transgresses the law and thereby endorses the justice system whereas the 
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simulated robbery exposes the law of simulation itself and reveals the artifice of the 
hyperreal. What is more, Baudrillard suggests, there are only really ‘simulation hold-
ups’, inscribed with the ‘decoding and orchestration rituals of the media, anticipated in 
their mode of presentation and possible consequences’.116 Taking the image of the 
Ouroboros once more, the production, reproduction and simulation of reality has a 
profound affect and influence upon reality itself. As Mark Poster advances in his 
analysis of reality-TV, for Baudrillard, ‘The simulacrum is also real but of a different 
order from everyday life […] the hyperreal’.117 However, as discussed, once the 
simulacrum of a robbery is performed within a real bank, then the simulation fails as its 
signs are inextricably bound up with the signs of the real. For the Enactor, therefore, the 
re-enactment of a bank robbery seems the perfect way to feel real once more, the rules 
and patterns and signs inherent in a hijack presenting the perfect opportunity for his 
skewed vision of ‘rehearsed authenticity’ and for him to re-invoke ‘realness’. Hiring an 
ex-bank-robber-turned-author, Edward Samuels, the Enactor is charmed by his 
observation that all bank robberies have a ‘preset pattern’118 that allows for a ‘chain 
being set in motion’,119 a comment that has echoes of Derrida’s signifying chains. This 
idea of simulated patterns also links to Baudrillard’s theories and promises a return to 
authenticity and feeling of ‘fluency’ and realness that the Enactor desires. When asked 
by his consultant-thief if he wishes to re-enact a particular bank robbery, the Enactor 
says: ‘“No, not a particular one. A mix of several ones, real and imaginary. Ones that 
could happen, ones that have, and ones that might at some time in the future”’.120 At 
once, this evokes Baudrillard’s concept of the hyperreal whilst also communicating the 
Enactor’s post-coma plight. This ‘indefinite reproduction’121 of the bank robbery 
certainly seems to demonstrate what Baudrillard famously describes in The Orders of 
Simulacra: ‘The real is not only what can be reproduced, but that which is always 
already reproduced. The hyperreal’ [original emphasis].122 The Enactor’s description of 
the robbery he wishes to simulate can be also connected to his description, earlier, of the 
memory he has of the building upon which his first simulation is based: 
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I don’t think this was a straight memory. It was more complex. Maybe it 
was various things all rolled together: memories, imaginings, films.
123
  
 
Here, the author suggests that post-coma, the Enactor has been existing within the 
hyperreal, with all of his attempts to feel real again being merely simulations of the lost 
real and of his lost self. In other words, the robbery-simulation, alongside his building-
simulation, have no reference principle as they already refer to an original that is itself a 
hybrid simulation of films, imaginings, other people’s memories and other robberies. In 
other words, the Enactor is trapped in this mise-en-abyme of the simulacra, of trying to 
reproduce events and selves: [selves] that could happen, [selves] that have and [selves] 
that might at some time in the future. He has therefore become ‘the real without origin 
of reality’.124  
This crisis of identity and authenticity becomes clear when the Enactor, under the 
guidance of Naz and Samuels, hires re-enactors to simulate the robbery with the Enactor 
‘directing’ each move, once more borrowing from the conventions of the film industry 
to rehearse realness and authenticity. At one point, Robber Five trips on a kink in the 
carpet, much to everyone’s amusement. But the Enactor responds with, ‘Do that each 
time’,125 a moment that is reminiscent of his improvised dialogue with the old ‘liver’ 
lady in his building. He even gets Frank to slip a piece of wood under the carpet, so that 
the kink does not smooth over. Again, the Enactor, in his perception of an absence of 
‘fluency’ in his own movement post-coma, finds great pleasure in the genuinely 
spontaneous and authentic ‘real’ events that occur, the original spontaneity of action 
that is then consumed by his obsession with the simulacra. This ‘hypersimulation’126 
leads to his most dangerous simulacrum yet, as he restages the simulation within an 
actual bank, but without informing the staff (or even his re-enactors). Accordingly, the 
Enactor, to return to Baudrillard’s analogy of the simulated bank robbery, finds himself 
‘unwittingly’ and ‘immediately in the real, one of whose functions is precisely to 
devour every attempt at simulation, to reduce everything to some reality’.127 This, 
therefore, seems to be the perfect solution for the Enactor, to feel real again at last, and 
for his fractured, plastically-altered selfhood to become unitary once more within ‘the 
real’. It would allow him to ‘insert’ himself ‘back into the world’ and return his 
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‘motions’ and ‘gestures’ to ‘ground zero and hour zero, to the point at which the re-
enactment’ would finally merge ‘with the event’.128 In other words, he would finally be 
able to obliterate the remainder of his former self, allowing him to move out of this 
‘demarcated zone’129 of selfhood. The simulation of the bank robbery, therefore, will 
allow him to inhabit, finally, the real and ‘penetrate and live inside the core, be 
seamless, perfect, real’.130  
Things do not quite go according to plan, yet despite the fact that this simulated 
robbery (this ‘echo of an echo of an echo’131) is, in the Enactor’s words, a ‘fuck-up’, it 
is also simultaneously ‘a very happy day’.132 Initially, things seem to be going well 
(‘fluently’), the Enactor gaining pleasure from the fact that the re-enactors are looking 
for ‘some kind of boundary’ between the simulation and the real, but of course, as 
Baudrillard explains, no such boundary exists in a simulated hold-up. The Enactor’s 
pleasure comes from the fact that ‘there was no edge, that the re-enactment zone was 
non-existent, or that it was infinite, which amounted in this case to the same thing’,133 
once more evoking the image of the Ouroboros. By implication, McCarthy suggests that 
the Enactor has finally become a part of the whole, has inserted himself back into the 
system and circuit of realness and authenticity, eliminating, through assimilation, his 
former self. McCarthy, once more, calls upon Baudrillard’s theory of the simulacra 
when the Enactor refers to the markings on the surface of the road outside of the bank, 
as the getaway car pulls up: ‘[They were] perfect reproductions of the ones outside my 
warehouse’.134 The Enactor views his simulacrum of the bank as being ‘more real than 
real’ (the hyperreal) with the ‘real’ road markings constituting ‘copies’ of his 
simulacrum, again placing under threat the very principle of reality. As the Enactor 
observes, when discussing the impact of the ‘scripted’ lines that are now spoken by the 
re-enactors: ‘Now, though, they were more than accurate: they were true’.135 The ‘real’ 
therefore begins to ‘devour’ the simulations. 
As the robbery commences, the Enactor begins to feel his (re)immersion into the 
real: ‘I was right inside the pattern, merging, part of it as it changed and, duplicating 
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itself yet again, here, now, transformed itself and started to become real’.136 In this 
frenzied moment of realization, he is finally becoming at one with the world, wiping out 
the trace of his former self alongside the memories of the ‘false’ and ‘second-hand’ 
processes of post-coma rehabilitation that caused him to feel inauthentic. However, it is 
another ‘trace’ that comes back to haunt the robbery, making it at once a fuck- up and a 
very happy day: the kink in the carpet. As Robber Re-enactor Five feels for the kink (the 
‘ghost-kink’, an ‘absent-presence’ that haunts the ‘real’ of the bank), he applies the 
same force, the trip transformed into a full-blooded pratfall that causes him to collide 
into Re-enactor Two who, in turn, discharges his shotgun into Re-Enactor Four’s chest, 
accidentally killing him. The Enactor, however, rather than being dismayed at such a 
‘disaster’, revels in the confusion and gradual realization of the other re-enactors, finally 
allowing him to experience and sustain the sensation of feeling ‘real’ and ‘weightless’ at 
the moment when one of the Re-Enactors exclaims: ‘“It’s real!”’.137 Indeed, the Enactor 
is caught within a trance-like, transfiguratory and hallucinogenic reverie, glorying in the 
spontaneous act of violence, in this confrontation with the real: with death. As he and 
his fellow Re-Enactors flee from the scene of the crime, he is serene in the face of their 
panic and horror at the fact that this ‘had been real and not a re-enactment’. To this, he 
responds: 
 
But it was a re-enactment. That’s the beauty of it. It became real while it was 
going on. Thanks to the ghost kink, mainly – the kink the other kink left 
when we took it away’.138  
 
Here, again, McCarthy alludes to both the real devouring the signs of the robbery 
simulacrum and to the absent-presence of the trace that can never be fully re-created but 
which, when transposed to this particular context of the ‘real’ bank, creates a different 
scenario altogether. The absolute recreation of the trace, therefore, is impossible and 
like the ghost-kink, the Enactor cannot recover and re-assimilate the trace of his old 
self, or the trace of his previous life, and so all of his simulations lead to the bank 
robbery where he finally does feel real again, but only, to return to Baudrillard, 
‘unwittingly’ through the absent-presence of the ghost kink that haunts the simulacrum 
and becomes ‘real’. Ironically, in his pursuit to annihilate the remainder in order to feel 
real again, the Enactor actually feels real because of the remainder (the ghost-kink). 
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The concept of death and the real is also at play in McCarthy’s denouement of the 
novel. In his discussion of Baudrillard’s position on death and simulation, Ryan Bishop 
posits that, ‘Death resists modelling, the simulation […] Death is the event without 
compare and which must be elided at all costs’.139 For the Enactor, all sense of feeling 
authentic and real had been damaged by his accident and subsequent coma: his 
unwitting ‘death encounter’. It is this encounter, I suggest, that constitutes a ‘failed’ 
simulation of death. Thus, McCarthy implies that his protagonist has been trapped by an 
‘incomplete’ simulacrum – the simulacrum that, Baudrillard argues, resists modelling. 
Thus, from this point onwards, the Enactor cannot feel real because of the rift that this 
failed simulation has driven between his pre-coma and post-coma selves. It is 
significant, therefore, that the Enactor appears to feel real once more when he is witness 
to a ‘complete’, non-simulated death that occurs within a simulacrum of his own 
creation and that becomes real within the context of the real setting of the bank. 
McCarthy makes subtle allusions to this realignment and re-assimilation of his pre- 
and post-coma selves (to the Enactor’s ‘merging’ with the real) by implying that his pre-
coma memory is coming back to him. Most significantly, as he takes his seat on his 
getaway jet, the Enactor muses upon the other jet on which his re-enactors and staff of 
‘simulators’ have been booked and which he and Naz have arranged to be blown up (in 
order to obliterate the ‘remainder’ of his simulations constituted by all of those who 
have been involved in helping to create these simulations). The Enactor wonders if 
‘their plane [has] already exploded’, and says: ‘I wondered if it would be over sea or 
land. If it was land, perhaps a bit of debris might even fall on someone and leave me an 
heir’.140 I suggest that at this point, the trace of the Enactor’s accident (that he has 
always explained has been lost) is finally reawakened and brought back into 
consciousness. By the subtlest of suggestions, the death encounter in the bank has 
brought him back to the moment when he last felt real, just before a rogue fragment 
(perhaps a ‘remainder’ that had broken away from a damaged aeroplane) fell from the 
sky. 
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5.5: The Figures of the Characters Were Moveable: The Self – The Trauma –The 
Model 
 
Whilst McCarthy clearly adopts various strands of deconstructive and postmodern 
theory, I would argue that he takes a rather playful approach in order to explore their 
manifestation in a real-world setting: the trauma that arises from coma and brain injury. 
This literary agenda seems clear, immediately, in his acknowledgements at the end of 
the novel, thanking two individuals in particular for ‘generously sharing their 
experiences of (post-) trauma’ with him.141 This interest is also supported in several 
interviews McCarthy has given, the author citing various cases of brain trauma and their 
aftermath as profound influences upon the novel. In an interview given for The White 
Review, McCarthy discusses the case of the cricket commentator Henry Blofeld, a 
promising young practitioner of the sport whose prospects were cut short when, as a 
teenager, he was knocked off his bike by a double-decker bus, causing him to slip into 
coma. After emerging from coma, he discovered that his hand-eye co-ordination had 
been lost. Now, Blofeld, instead of playing the game, comments on it, ‘Watching his 
own past-future that never happened’.142 In another interview, he refers to the two 
individuals he thanks in the acknowledgements of the novel,  whilst also referring to 
cases of ‘traumatized [Vietnam] veterans’ who, likewise, suffered with his protagonist’s 
syndrome – of the constant feeling of ‘nothing being real’.143 He goes on to discuss 
cases of such post-trauma victims who ‘would also reconstruct events’, for example one 
veteran who became a bank-robber, his crimes often recreating the layout of the 
battlefield on which he’d lost all of his friends. As McCarthy points out, he 
‘reconstructed and replayed the battle that he could not actually remember’.144 This 
obsession with recreation in an attempt to recapture and confront a lost event (or 
identity) of the past is clearly shared by the fictional Enactor of McCarthy’s novel. 
It soon becomes apparent that McCarthy is not just interested in the theoretical 
paradigm of simulation. He is instead fascinated with how the preoccupation with 
simulation manifests itself within the psyche of the post-coma survivor. It is this 
obsession with simulation in order to feel real that Pieter Vermeulen might call 
McCarthy’s ‘signature logic’: the fact that, throughout the novel, ‘a residue is generated 
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through the friction generated by an attempt to cancel one reality by the imposition of 
another’ through a process of hypersimulation.145 At its most extreme, this ‘residue’ is 
the Enactor’s former self over which he tries to superimpose another self. As part of his 
physical rehabilitation, for example, he has to imagine lifting an invisible, imaginary 
carrot to his mouth. However, when it comes to lifting a real carrot (the imposition of 
one reality over another in an attempt to cancel it out), the whole process fails, the real 
carrot being ‘more active’ than the imaginary one.146 Once the ‘surplus signals’ have 
been factored in (the sensory signals of touch, for example, that map the multi-
dimensional surfaces of the carrot) and the process of ‘visualization’ repeated, the 
Enactor picks up the real carrot again until the movement is complete. Another 
residual/remainder of this is that he ‘hates carrots now’.147 But the ramifications of this 
carrot exercise run deeper. Not only is the real carrot an imposition over a visualized 
carrot, but the entire exercise is an imposition over how the Enactor once performed this 
movement, without even thinking about it: fluently and ‘real-ly’. Thus McCarthy’s 
‘signature logic’ of post-coma, post- trauma simulation creates a perpetual chain of 
residue. As Lea explicates, the Enactor’s ‘attempts to reconstruct unreliable memories 
and re-enact the coalescence of the sublime moment of individuation all fail in the face 
of the materiality of matter’.148 In short, this propensity for production and reproduction 
of simulacra is not merely a frenzied cultural phenomenon made all the more possible 
by contemporary mass-media. Instead, as McCarthy implies, there is something about 
trauma and about the human condition as a whole that leads to a naturally occurring 
(and re-occurring) obsession with simulation. This is not quite as simple as the Freudian 
compulsion to repeat and to re-enact trauma, inherent in the traditional psychoanalytical 
model.  
As discussed earlier, according to Malabou, psychological and physical paradigms of 
trauma are distinct from each other, the latter not allowing for a return to a previous 
state due to the ‘shredded psyche’149 of the brain injury survivor, rather than the 
‘wounded’ one of the trauma survivor. Significantly, in Remainder, despite the fact that 
the Enactor seems to finally feel real again in the aftermath of the robbery, in the final 
coda to the novel, the reader learns that he has not really changed after all. As his plane 
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is recalled back to the terminal, he forces the pilot at shotgun to continue on their flight-
path, the plane banking to-and-fro in a figure-of-8 pattern thus granting the Enactor a 
new pleasure as part of a new systematic ‘loop’: an illusion of ‘infinity’ (the Ouroboros) 
that will eventually be broken one way or another. McCarthy implies, therefore, that his 
protagonist’s psyche will remain shredded, that for him there is no regressive return to a 
previous state and, moreover, it seems that it is within this shredded psyche, within the 
form that is born out of the destructive nature of brain plasticity, the compulsion to 
simulate is generated. 
To move from literature and neurobiological perspectives of brain trauma to theories 
more rooted in psychology, I suggest that this need for simulation is entrenched within 
the human psyche. In their discussion of the reconstitution of selfhood post-brain injury 
and coma, Biderman et al cite Erik Erikson’s concept of the formation of ‘ego-identity’, 
one stage of which is ‘identity as imitation’.150 As they discuss, this first crucial stage is 
the child’s inherent mechanism to imitate others and to ‘simulate’ the habits and 
mannerisms of parents and peers. As it reaches adolescence, the child gradually fuses 
these imitations together and consolidates them into a unitary sense of self or ‘ego-
identity’. Over time, these imitations/simulations become more subtle, from dress codes 
to music tastes to political affiliations. Turning once more to neurobiology and its 
explication of how we ‘see’ and process the world around us, this capacity and desire 
for simulation can be seen to be even more deep-rooted. The things that one sees are 
mapped in neural patterns that are created according to an object’s design. As Antonio 
Damasio concisely posits, ‘The images we experience are brain constructions prompted 
by an object, rather than mirror reflections of the object. There is no picture of the 
object being transferred optically from the retina to the visual cortex’.151 In this sense, 
one could argue that everything is simulated. This process of simulation, however, can 
enter into crisis when the ego-identity’s sense of continuity becomes ruptured in some 
way, either through physical or psychological trauma, leading to what R.D. Laing called 
‘ontological insecurity’.152 Within this state, the individual ‘may feel more insubstantial 
than substantial, and unable to assume that the stuff he is made of is genuine, good, 
valuable’.153 Developing this psychoanalytical model further, Laing goes on to suggest 
that, ‘If the individual cannot take the realness, aliveness, autonomy, and identity of 
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himself and others for granted, then he has to become absorbed in contriving ways of 
trying to be real, of keeping himself or others alive, of preserving his identity’.154 Whilst 
Laing is primarily discussing cases in which there are ruptures in psychological identity, 
the language that he uses can be adopted to further elucidate the Enactor’s pursuit of 
‘realness’ in Remainder. From Laing’s psychoanalytical perspective, the Enactor’s 
increasingly manic ‘contrivances’ promise the possibility of reinstating a continuity of 
selfhood and ‘substantial’ identity post-coma. These contrivances take the form of 
simulations, futile attempts to get back to and ‘preserve’ the ego-identity that existed 
prior to the accident and the subsequent brain injury. Indeed, as Biderman et al discuss 
in their appraisal of various theories of the rebuilding of ego-identity post-brain injury: 
 
One of the tasks of rehabilitation should be to assist the brain-injured 
individual to rebuild his or her sense of identity based on exploring the 
individual’s new possibilities and capacities, rather than focusing on 
attempts to restore the pre-injury ego-identity of those individuals.
155
  
 
Again, to look at this notion through Thomas Docherty’s discussion of Deleuze, this is 
an approach that favours ‘becoming’ (a new individual) rather than ‘being’ (an older 
individual or lost-original). Certainly, McCarthy clearly depicts the Enactor falling into 
the trap of the latter approach, of ‘ontological insecurity’, and therefore caught in a 
perpetual simulation of the lost real.  
This also connects with Steph Grant’s short story ‘Blue Polystyrene Shoes’ (as 
discussed earlier), in which he describes no longer being able to understand the works 
of Mill, yet perseveres because ‘he looks the part’, 156 which in turn links to William 
James’s notion of the individual adopting different ‘masks’. Grant’s state of ‘being’ a 
simulation of someone he used to be only leads to frustration and confusion, however, 
as the reader sees in Grant’s follow-up to ‘Blue Polystyrene Shoes’, ‘Unremembered 
Memoirs’. In this story, set a number of months after his emergence from coma, Grant 
writes about his ‘disturbing behaviours’.157 After one particular unremembered, violent 
incident, Grant’s wife observes: ‘“There’s still something wrong with you”’,158 both 
acknowledging the change in her husband but simultaneously implying that at some 
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point in an unknown future this ‘wrong’ will right itself, allowing Grant to become his 
‘old’ self again, or at least a simulation of this old self. In fact, Grant’s second story 
narrates multiple instances during which he tries to recapture his lost self by simulating 
the habits and behaviours of that pre-coma self. Moreover, it seems that friends and 
loved ones are, likewise, keen for Grant to perform such simulations: to get back to 
‘normal’ or, to use McCarthy’s language, to go ‘through the zero’.159 However, all of 
these attempts to simulate the lost self ultimately end in failure, just as the Enactor’s 
simulations end in failure. For Grant, even going to the local pub with his friends Bass 
and Neil ends in disaster, their trademark larking about ending in an ‘eruption of violent 
behaviour’.160 The invitation of an old school friend to visit the house ends in Grant 
chasing him and his family to his car, yelling ‘scabs’ and ‘blacklegs’:161 in an attempt to 
simulate a friendship of his lost self, all that is remembered (all that ‘remains’) is the 
fact that his friend broke the picket line during the miners’ strike of the 1980s. This 
trace is the only remainder in Grant’s memory, meaning that the simulation of a healed 
friendship, post-strike, is impossible. There is also an attempt to take Grant to hear one 
of his heroes, Arthur Scargill, speak at Ollerton Miners Welfare Club: 
 
Steph can remember having a front seat to hear Arthur speak. He can 
remember seeing Arthur and hearing him speak – but he also remembers 
that it was as if Arthur was speaking a completely alien language not one 
word of which he had been unable to understand. Not a solitary single 
word…162 
 
It seems that just as in ‘Blue Polystyrene Shoes’, Grant is attempting to simulate his 
former self (is again playing a part) but the simulation fails due to his brain injury and 
post-coma cognitive confusion that have created a schism between who he is post-coma 
and who he was prior to his accident. Across this schism is the ‘trace’ of a former self 
(the absent- presence of a lost original) and it is the almost mournful simulation of this 
self in an attempt to re-invoke the real and to reintegrate the remainder that leads to a 
crisis of identity and authenticity. This autobiographical crisis, above, can also be linked 
to McCarthy’s introduction to his Enactor’s predicament who, post-coma, does not ‘feel 
like doing anything’ and, indeed, ‘wasn’t doing anything’, passing his days ‘in the most 
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routine of activities’ but mostly just sitting in his flat ‘doing nothing’.163 This depiction 
of a distinct lack of post-coma, post-TBI auto-affection (an apathetic condition caused 
by a destruction of ‘the emotion-triggering region’ of the brain164) conveys the 
Enactor’s clear attempts to simulate all of the habits and drives that he should be 
fulfilling (‘getting up and washing’, ‘walking to the shops’, ‘reading the papers’165) 
should he wish to return to his old self again and feel authentic. These ‘trace’ habits are 
clearly set against the knowledge that something has changed, that in order to recover 
from coma and from the accident, his brain had to be ‘rerouted’.166 However, the 
superimposition of this rerouted self cannot obliterate the remainder of his ‘original’ 
self and so any attempt to simulate this self will fail: everything must leave some kind of 
mark, a mark that seems impossible to erase. 
In the case of both Grant and the Enactor, their attempts to simulate the lost real of 
the pre-coma self constitute, as discussed, an attempt to ‘be’ rather than to ‘become’, 
thus contravening the natural functioning of neural-processing and one of the principles 
of human development according to current neurobiological theories of brain plasticity 
alongside Deleuze’s model of ‘becoming’: that to be human is to be ‘necessarily always 
in flux’.167 Furthermore, Docherty surmises, for Deleuze, ‘‘Being’ would equate with 
death and is negative; ‘becoming’ is equivalent to living and is affirmative, ‘joyful’’.168 
In the Enactor’s case, the reader sees his simulacra as an attempt to recover a self that 
no longer exists. In this regard, his slo-mo re-enactments are always vain attempts to re-
integrate himself into the whole by reaching a state of total inertia – or even reaching a 
state of inert matter, in a McCarthian evocation of the Freudian death-drive. It is, in fact, 
a pursuit that is in stark opposition of much of the neurological praxis for post-brain 
injury survivors, as reviewed by Bideman et al, that promotes a focus on the future self, 
not the lost self of the pre-injured past. 
The intersection between cultural, neurobiological and psychological theories of 
simulation can be seen most prominently in Jeff Malmberg’s compelling documentary 
Marwencol
169
 which explores, in close detail, the simulation compulsion of the post-
coma, brain injury survivor. It tells the story of Mark Hogancamp who, after undergoing 
a brutal attack at the hands of five youths outside his local bar, went into a nine day 
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coma, after which he had to undergo a rehabilitation programme similar to that of 
McCarthy’s Enactor. This programme, Hogancamp’s friend makes clear, involves him 
‘literally [having] to learn everything over’. Hogancamp, himself, states that, ‘When the 
teenagers kicked my head to pieces […] they wiped everything’. Significantly, in 
figurative language that chimes with McCarthy’s depiction of the return of the Enactor’s 
memory, Hogancamp explains that, ‘My memories that I do get, they come back in 
stills, single shots but no context’. This intersects with McCarthy’s imagery of the 
Enactor’s memory coming back as soap-opera episodes, within a context that has 
changed inexorably. Hogancamp’s image of snap-shots, likewise, can be connected to 
McCarthy’s reference to the Enactor’s memories being like a wrong set of holiday snaps 
being brought back from the developer. 
What is most pertinent to this analysis of post-TBI trauma and simulacra is that 
losing his ability to sketch and draw, Hogancamp finds respite from the frustrations of 
rehabilitation in another artistic hobby – the creation of scaled models. These intricate 
simulacra, created out of meticulously-realized buildings, action figures and Barbie 
dolls, have given birth to an entire fantasy world, set within the fictional Belgian town 
of ‘Marwencol’ during the Second World War. Within this model-town, he has created 
his own alter-ego, but more than this: he has alter-egos for all of his friends and family, 
all interacting, all involved in the action of the complex narratives that he invents and 
plays out within the town. What he creates, therefore, are not just tableaux of simulated 
scenes but a series of ‘re-enactments’ in which he fully immerses himself, to the point 
whereby when he discusses ‘his life’, there is frequently a blurring between his ‘real’ 
life and the simulated life in his town. Indeed, when the reader first meets him, he is 
holding ‘his’ doll and proclaims: ‘This is me, after the attack of course. Always 
smoking […] I used to carry one revolver. Then General Patton gave me his other 
revolver, so now I have two’. Initially, the viewer, in this introduction to Hogancamp 
himself, thinks he is talking about his life in the ‘real’ world (with his reference to the 
attack) but it soon transpires that he is talking about his simulacrum. This confusion is 
heightened when it is revealed that Hogancamp’s simulacrum is not just based upon his 
fantasies, but that he incorporates and translates his own experiences into these 
simulations, the most notable of which being the trauma of his attack. In this sense, 
when Hogancamp refers to ‘him’ after the attack, he is talking about both his ‘real’ self 
and his ‘simulated’ self: blurring the line between the real and the simulacrum. This 
obfuscation of boundaries is similarly illustrated in fictional terms by the Enactor’s 
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insistence that the ‘real’ road markings outside the bank are perfect copies of the 
markings of his bank-simulacrum. This blurring and ultimate loss of the real is voiced 
when Hogancamp, demonstrating a tiny toy gun belonging to one of his model re-
enactors, says, ‘Everything’s real. The slide on the 45. The hammer. The clip even 
comes out. So that adds to my veracity of getting into it, of getting into the story’. 
Again, Hogancamp’s ardour for the simulation of the real has its fictional counterpart in 
McCarthy’s Enactor, with his absolute attention to detail essential in order to recapture 
and recreate the lost real, for example, of his building. 
The loss of the real and the creation of the hyperreal is rendered no more powerfully 
than in one particular anecdote, regarding Hogancamp’s neighbour. Despite his 
neighbour already being married, Hogancamp reveals to her that she is about to get 
married to him within his town Marwencol. She clearly balks at this news, saying, 
‘There comes a time when you just have to stop’. This reaction causes Hogancamp to 
recreate her rejection of the marriage within the simulacrum. The rejection of the 
marriage (a ‘real-world’ rejection of a proposed ‘simulation’ of marriage that has no 
reference to a ‘real’ marriage between them) then leads to a second, simulated rejection 
of marriage within the simulacrum of Marwencol. But it is even more intriguing and 
complex than this. His neighbour in the real world reacts to the prospect of a simulated 
marriage as if it were her real marriage to him in the real world. Thus, to return to 
Baudrillard, the ‘simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as itself a 
simulacrum’.170 The simulation of marriage in Marwencol is therefore not simply false 
but is of the order of the more real than real: it influences the reality that precedes it.  
 
 
‘Anna and I Get Married’ by Mark E. Hogancamp. 
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Here we see Baudrillard’s theoretical paradigm manifesting itself in real-world 
terms, made possible through severe physical trauma – coma and brain injury. Again, it 
appears that there is something within the human brain that is inherently drawn to 
simulation. After all, as discussed in relation to Biderman and Erikson’s work on the 
formation of selfhood, an essential stage of creating ‘ego-identity’ for the child is 
imitation and simulation. As humans we are constantly drawn into acts of simulation 
and we are likewise fascinated by that which is simulated: dolls and doll houses; model 
vehicles; railways and villages; building blocks; actors and comedy impersonators. 
Indeed, the proliferation of social networking sites has given rise to another frenzy of 
simulation, the simulacra of our ‘online selves’ interacting within the hyperreal of 
hyperspace.
171
These all generate pleasure and the more exact the simulation is (the more 
‘real’) the more pleasure that is created. This ‘more real than real’ is seen in 
Hogancamp’s photographic work in which he commits the actions and narratives of his 
re-enactments to celluloid and is highlighted further by the proclamation of the 
magazine editor who commissions his work: ‘I was astonished by the realism’. He later 
comments that there is ‘no irony’ of ‘photographing dolls’ in the work; instead, 
Hogancamp is ‘in the work […] the work is him […] A very authentic feeling’ [my 
emphasis]. Like McCarthy’s Enactor, authenticity seems to be recognized and sought in 
re-enactments, rehearsals and simulations in an attempt to re-capture and re-assimilate 
the trace of the pre-coma self: the lost real that was lost at the moment of the attack 
(Hogancamp) or the accident (the Enactor). 
Interestingly, just as the Enactor finds comfort in patterns and circuits so, too, does 
Hogancamp find comfort in routine and in particular in ‘patterns’. It is revealed that his 
reintegration into the work environment involves working at his local bar for a few 
hours one day a week where he makes meatballs. The camera shot focuses on the 
repetitious, ‘fluent’ and precise movement of his fingers and hands (movements that, 
like the Enactor, he has had to ‘relearn’) as he instinctively moulds the meat into orbs, 
laying each one next to each other: near-perfect simulations of each other. In a similar 
system of repetition, Hogancamp constantly re-enacts the trauma that he experienced 
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outside of his local bar within his simulacrum: gradually, his attack is confronted again 
and again through the re-enactments and simulacra that take the form of violent attacks 
by ‘SS Guards’ (re)enacted upon his alter-ego. In one attack, he scars one side of his 
alter-ego’s face, the side that corresponds to his ‘real’ scarring: the ‘remainder’ of the 
attack. In another, even more evocative simulation, five SS Guards kick his alter-ego to 
a pulp (the visceral nature of the violence made clear in the bloodied doll-simulacrum 
he creates), at which point Hogancamp closes his eyes, almost re-living his moment of 
trauma as his five ‘real’ attackers struck, and utters, ‘And then it all comes back to me’. 
Even his photographic and artistic praxis seems to reveal the desire to produce and 
reproduce. When asked by another photographer how he captures perspective and light 
so perfectly so that the models no longer look like models (a slippage into the domain of 
the hyperreal), he admits that it is trial and error and that his light meter does not work. 
He says that if the photographs come back from the commercial developers as over- or 
under- exposed, he just re-enacts, re-shoots and re-sends them until they come back 
correct. 
Ultimately for Hogancamp, in the face of the withdrawal of post-coma therapy due to 
financial restrictions (just at the moment when he was starting to show signs of 
improvement) this obsession with simulacra and re-enactments becomes his ‘therapy’, 
in the same way that McCarthy’s Enactor sees his re-enactments as a therapeutic way to 
feel authentic again. However, in both cases, there is always a remainder over which the 
simulations are superimposed, leaving a certain level of dissatisfaction. In Hogancamp’s 
case, for example, his town is replete with women, who all adore him, yet his real life is 
devoid of female contact, a condition that has been born out of the trace of the attack. At 
one point, he talks of remembering his wedding within the simulacrum, but of failing to 
remember his ‘real’ wedding. Whilst he remembers having a wife and referring to her as 
his wife, his lack of auto-affection and fractured memory and selfhood has shattered and 
re-ordered the context, a phenomenon also portrayed in McCarthy’s novel. 
All of the people in the documentary view Hogancamp’s use of simulacra as a 
clearly therapeutic praxis: his lawyer comments on how the violence his alter-ego 
enacts upon his simulated attackers in Marwencol is a positive way to deal with the 
trauma; his magazine editor sees the simulacra as a way to ‘regain something that is 
lost’; and Mark, himself, sees the model as a ‘safe’ place, proposing that, ‘I created my 
own therapy’. Now, while his obsession with simulation certainly does not prove as 
disastrous as the obsession of McCarthy’s Enactor, I would query the assertion that 
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Marwencol is a wholly successful mode of therapy. I would suggest that Hogancamp 
does not, in fact, ‘regain something that is lost’ because, ultimately, what is lost is his 
pre-coma self. Instead, he superimposes what he now is over that lost real and absent-
presence, a result which is never fully satisfactory. I also propose that Marwencol is not 
necessarily ‘safe’: in the end, the violence of his attack constantly pervades and haunts 
the model and is persistently beyond the realms of comprehension and assimilation. As 
Hogancamp himself says, ‘I believe that they attacked me because I was a cross-
dresser’. His tone is replete with doubt and uncertainty, despite the fact that he has 
access to the interview tapes of his attackers confessing to this being their motivation to 
commit violence. In short, I suggest that the rem(a)inder will always be there for 
Hogancamp and haunt his reformation of selfhood, resulting in a simulacrum that is 
self-perpetuating. This is exemplified when, in the coda of the film, Mark’s alter-ego 
likewise begins to create simulacra, even smaller, more intricate scaled models, in order 
to re-enact and simulate the traumatic attacks at the hands of the SS: a copy of a copy of 
a copy. 
Interestingly, this mise-en-abyme pattern of simulation is portrayed by McCarthy in 
Remainder, his Enactor not just compelled to create re-enactments in his life-size 
models (the building, the gangland shooting), but also in scaled-down versions, most 
notably his model of the building-simulacrum. The scale model that is produced is 
‘brilliant […] about three feet high and four wide [with] walls and floors [made] from 
see-through plastic’172 so that the Enactor can see all of the ‘little figures’ and details: 
the ‘concierge with her stubby arms and white mask’; the ‘miniscule mop and Hoover 
for her cupboard’; ‘the stretches of neutral space […] made white’; ‘light switches and 
doorknobs, the repeating pattern on the floor’.173 To add to the growing sense of the 
Enactor as an omnipotent, manipulative supreme-being overseeing this miniaturized 
simulacrum, ‘Sections of wall and roof came off too, so you could reach inside’. 
Crucially, ‘The figures of the characters were moveable’, the Enactor picking them up 
and making them do his bidding – playing the role of a Greek god in an old 
Harryhausen movie. As the Enactor moves the figures around this model, Naz radios 
down to the re-enactors in the building, instructing them to replicate, reproduce and 
simulate the miniaturized movements that the Enactor has performed in the model. In a 
reversal of Hogancamp’s post-coma world, actions are created in the model then played 
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out in the ‘real’ (albeit already-re-enacted) world. At one point, the Enactor places the 
model of the pianist on the windowsill at the exact same moment when, a few floors 
below, the ‘real’ pianist re-enactor leans out of his window. The Enactor says of this 
moment, ‘I could look down on the model’s head poking out at the same time as I 
looked at the real one. The distance made them both look the same size’.174 From this 
distance, then, the blurring between the model and reality (just as in Hogancamp’s 
world) becomes heightened, the ‘reality’, in this case, itself being a re-enacted fiction: a 
1:1 scale model of a (non)memory. In the end, for the Enactor, this model ‘is enough’175 
– he does not need to leave his flat, knowing that the action he enacts in the model will 
be re-enacted in the building. 
For the Enactor (and, I propose, for Hogancamp) the simulacra are ultimately ways 
to recover control that was lost in their respective disasters of their physical traumas, 
and the trace-echoes of trauma in their new post-coma lives. However, for both, I 
suggest that the simulations fail because control is always ceded to a feeling of 
dissatisfaction with the model, leading to endless productions and reproductions. For 
both, the simulacra, in an attempt to re-assimilate the remainder and to feel whole again, 
may always be haunted by the irruptions of violence and the trace of trauma. 
This being said, for Hogancamp, there is a possibility of escape from the fate that 
McCarthy bestows upon his protagonist. Against the cycle of simulation and stuttering 
condition of ‘being’ is the hope of moving forward and ‘becoming’. This comes in the 
form of his new narratives of self that he is gradually developing. In this process of 
affirmative self-storying, Hogancamp refers to his ‘second life’, an image that has 
undertones of the miraculous and which resonates with imagery of resurrection 
discussed earlier. At one point, he holds up a photo of his pre-coma self and proclaims, 
‘I never want to see this guy again’. Hogancamp almost re-codes the trauma of his 
attack with a positive nucleus. Despite the trauma and violence of the attack, his 
‘second life’ is one free of alcohol, thus constituting a full, irreversible recovery from 
the addiction that plagued his ‘first life’, pre-coma. As his friend and boss at the local 
bar says, ‘After he got out of hospital it was like somebody turned a switch. He had no 
interest in alcohol at all’. This is in line with many clinical studies of the reconstructing 
of self-narratives in brain injury survivors, with patients often revising, according to 
Masahiro Nochi, ‘their self-narratives by changing the appearance of their past and 
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future’.176 Indeed, Hogancamp’s positive ‘spin’ on his post-traumatic self could be 
equated to what Nochi would call the ‘grown self’. This manifestation of the 
reconstruction of post-brain injury identity leads to patients suggesting that TBI had at 
least one positive outcome for their lives. Significantly, Nochi cites an example of one 
participant in his research study who stated that, ‘“When I had my accident, it was kind 
of a balancing because it stopped my drug use and alcohol use for a while’”.177 Despite 
the fact that Nochi goes on to point out that in actuality, his substance abuse was not 
halted ‘immediately after the accident’, he does concede that, ‘He certainly considered 
the accident a fundamental step toward abstinence, however’.178  
For Hogancamp, the traumatic nature of his repetitious simulations of the lost real 
may potentially give way to more positive and affirmative self-narratives of ‘becoming’ 
that will allow him to move beyond the trace of his lost self and continue to ‘become’ a 
new self of the future. For McCarthy’s Enactor, however, no such respite exists, stuck, 
as he is, in the simulacrum of a past that may not even be his own, that resist being 
recoded into the narrative of the ‘grown self’. 
 
 
5.6: Get More Cats: Real – Unreal – Realism 
 
In examining the human propensity for simulation, Umberto Eco’s work on the cultural 
phenomenon of simulacra and the hyperreal is particularly instructive. In his pseudo- 
travelogue, ‘Travels in Hyperreality’, he suggests that, ‘The pleasure of imitation, as the 
ancients knew, is one of the most innate in the human spirit’, suggesting that when one 
takes pleasure in a perfect imitation, one ‘also enjoy[s] the conviction that imitation has 
reached its apex and afterwards reality will always be inferior to it’.179 Eco is therefore 
more critical of simulacra than Baudrillard, suggesting that the ‘Absolute Fake’180 is 
more preferable than the lost original. Rather than seeing the real as being merely 
supplanted by the simulacrum, Eco proposes that the division between the real and the 
simulation is no longer recognizable. For McCarthy’s Enactor and to some degree for 
Hogancamp, the hyperreal is preferred to the lost real but because of the haunting trace 
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of their pre-coma selves, full pleasure in the imitation can never quite be achieved. For 
the Enactor, in particular, his simulations are not simply to create something that is 
more real than real, but to try and re-make the lost real once more: to become real and 
authentic again through the precession of simulacra. 
Eco’s allusion to the innate pleasure of imitation, I would suggest, connects with the 
theories of the formation of ego-identity that I discussed earlier with humans, from an 
early age, imitating the mores of the world around them. This need to simulate also 
seems to be embedded within how the human brain works, as suggested by Damasio’s 
discussion of how the objects one sees are not mirror images, but neuronally-
constructed representations or simulations. As examined within this investigation, when 
trauma strikes, the compulsion to repeat, reproduce and simulate seems to arise. In the 
two coma texts I have analysed here, the physical trauma of brain injury, leading to the 
‘feeling of not feeling’ real any more against the trace of a former self, awakens a 
further compulsion to simulate. The fact that both the Enactor and Hogancamp create 
dioramas in their process of simulation emphasises their need for some kind of reality, 
as Eco hypothesizes when he writes that ‘the diorama aims to establish itself as a 
substitute for reality, as something even more real’.181 This seems crucial for the 
Enactor and Hogancamp, in the face of the disappearance of their ‘real’ and authentic 
pre-coma selves. 
This notion of post-coma/TBI simulation, I would suggest, is a particular 
preoccupation with several authors of coma fiction in their attempts to emulate the crisis 
of authenticity and simulation that occurs in many neurological cases of brain trauma 
patients. A further example is Richard Powers’s 2006 post-coma novel, The Echo 
Maker. It follows the travails of Mark Schluter who, after being involved in a major 
road-traffic accident, emerges from coma with severe brain damage and a long-lasting 
neurological condition: Capgras Syndrome. This disorder is concisely described by V.S. 
Ramachandran in his work on rare neurological conditions – the ‘phantoms in the 
brain’. With Capgras Syndrome, he writes, ‘The patient, who is often mentally quite 
lucid, comes to regard close acquaintances – usually his parents, children, spouse or 
siblings – as impostors’.182 In the case of Powers’s protagonist, Mark, the impostor is 
his sister, Karin, much to her great frustration and despair. Whilst there is some debate 
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about whether Capgras Syndrome is a ‘syndrome’ at all,183 one cannot deny the fact that 
a crisis of simulation within the post-coma self manifests itself once more. As John M. 
Doran posits in his overview of various perspectives on Capgras, ‘Through the ages, 
there has come a wealth of evidence that humanity has been preoccupied with the 
double as an ideational theme’,184 a statement that evokes Eco’s concept of the ‘innate’ 
tendency within the human condition to simulate. 
In The Echo Maker, the crisis of simulation is two-fold. On the one hand, for some 
reason unknown to all around him, Mark’s brain can only see Karin as a simulation: 
‘Kopy Karin’, an ‘actress who looked very much like his sister’.185 On the other hand, 
for Karin, Mark, too, is a kind of simulation. He is someone who looks like her brother, 
but is not quite him; a loved one who seems ‘almost healed’.186 As Ramachandran notes 
when referring to a particular case of Capgras that he worked on, the patient seems ‘to 
all outward appearances’ to be back to normal.187 However, as is so common in coma 
fiction, there is a clear reference to the trauma of Mark coming ‘back from the dead’.188 
Like McCarthy, Powers focuses on his protagonist’s post-coma rehabilitation with Mark 
having to re-learn everything. Powers pays particular attention to the reacquisition of 
language and the painstaking agony of learning to talk again but, eventually, to all 
intents and purposes, Mark seems to be, ‘One hundred per cent […] Back together’.189 
Nevertheless, from both Mark’s subjective perspective (and Karin’s external objective 
perspective) this is not the case. Both of them know that something is not right, a feeling 
that is generated and exacerbated by the fact that this ‘new’ Mark and his ‘second life’ 
(to quote Hogancamp) is not quite the same as the ‘old’ Mark, leading to the trauma that 
stems from superimposing the new self over the trace of the old. 
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I suggest this portrayal of Capgras Syndrome therefore also illustrates both a crisis of 
simulation and also the haunting and complex nature of the Derridean trace. For Mark, 
Karin is only a trace of her former self and this trace consistently causes post-coma 
trauma and unsettlement. Conversely, for Karin, Mark, too, is a trace of his former self. 
Mark is ‘almost healed’ and becomes more and ‘more like his old self’,190 and yet this 
delusion he holds onto that she is not his real sister is a constant reminder that he is not-
quite-Mark: he is the same-but-different, exhibiting only a trace of his former self. As 
Mark tries to continue the life he led prior to coma, ‘Kopy Karin’ prevents a full return 
to ‘normality’. Not only does her presence remind him of the fact that something is not 
quite right (she looks like his sister but is not her), it also reminds him that Karin is 
absent and has not even visited him in hospital which would be anathema to his ‘real’ 
sister, thus exacerbating his sense of post-coma trauma, alienation and unsettlement. 
Karin is perhaps the perfect example of the Derridean trace. She is an absent-presence 
for Mark and is ‘both’ his sister (physically) and is ‘not’ her (emotionally). It is the 
haunting paradox that Kopy Karin represents that causes Mark to enter a crisis of post-
coma simulation in order to explain and narrate through this rupture in selfhood that he 
is experiencing and that he is reminded of every time he sees Karin. In fact, Powers’s 
neuroscientist Gerald Weber (a character loosely based upon the neurologist and 
narrator of strange neurological case studies, Oliver Sacks) highlights the medical 
profession’s fascination with the syndrome whilst invoking Derrida’s philosophical 
position when, musing upon Mark’s case-file, he comments: ‘It’s the kind of neither-
both case that could help arbitrate between two very different paradigms of mind’.191 
Karin both is and is not Mark’s sister illustrating the undecidability of post-coma trauma 
embodied, in this case, by a rare syndrome. Capgras causes Mark to formulate 
simulations and complex narratives to, in turn, explain and justify these simulations in 
order to try and resolve this undecidability: to attempt to justify to himself exactly why 
Karin is not his sister despite being an exact copy of her.
192
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Ramachandran, in line with other studies, has looked at how Capgras more than 
likely arises from damage to the limbic system, which is concerned with the generation 
and processing of emotions. Ultimately, for Ramachandran, the syndrome is caused by 
a disconnection between the part of the brain that is responsible for facial recognition, 
and that part that is responsible for emotions, a position supported by John M. Doran: 
‘The Capgras patient “recognizes” the significant other in every sensory way an 
organically intact person would, except that the Capgras patient does not recognize him 
emotionally!’.193 This theoretical position not only helps to elucidate the brain’s 
potential to enter a crisis of simulation but also the fragility of the mechanisms that keep 
this crisis at bay. It is precisely this crisis of post-coma simulation and the 
undecidability that arises from it that are explored within the other texts I have 
examined within this chapter. For McCarthy’s fictional Enactor, and in the real-life 
cases of Mark Hogancamp and Steph Grant, the undecidability arises from the feeling 
that they are and are not the same person that they were prior to coma, and it is through 
simulation that they attempt to work through this, with varying degrees of success. 
When discussing his protagonist’s position as a hero in the novel (as ‘an agent of 
justice’194), McCarthy comments, ‘I think what horrifies him is forgetting’, concluding 
that, despite his growing acts of violence, he truly is a hero ‘because he refuses to 
forget’.195 However, I would argue that it is his feverish pursuit of the Derridean trace 
through hypersimulation in an attempt not to forget his pre-coma self that is his 
undoing. As Roger Luckhurst posits in his discussion of the crisis of memory in 
modernity, ‘Memory can tyrannically bind you and impose a determining identity you 
might wish to resist; active forgetting can be a liberation from the dead weight of 
memorial history’.196 In the case of McCarthy’s Enactor, it is the trace of a memory of a 
previous selfhood that becomes the dead weight around his neck, forcing him into a 
cycle of remembering through simulation, even if the simulations are based upon 
‘traces’ of memory that may be distortions in the first place. In other words, the 
Enactor, in a bid to regain authenticity, finds comfort in the simulation of authenticity as 
embodied by the underlying principle of the international chain of Ripley’s Believe It Or 
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Not museums as described by Eco: ‘Everything looks real, and therefore it is real; in 
any case the fact that it seems real is real, and the thing is real even if […] it never 
existed’.197  
In his discussion of the representation of trauma in Remainder, Pieter Vermeulen 
argues that , ‘The novel is an attempt to debunk the customary pieties of trauma fiction’ 
by remaining ‘conspicuously indifferent to the weighty ethical issues that normally 
mark our engagement with the extreme violence and the psychological suffering that 
characterize trauma’.198 Using an affectless protagonist, with anti-realist plot, lack of 
psychological depth and ‘readerly empathy and sentiment’199 are a few of McCarthy’s 
techniques Vermeulen picks out in order to demonstrate that, whilst employing the 
characteristic tropes of repetition and re-enactment, Remainder is not a ‘typical’ trauma 
novel. Furthermore, going on to discuss how McCarthy’s anti-empathic approach leads 
to a refreshing lack of psychological realism, Vermeulen argues that, ‘Trauma, far from 
registering as a psychological event, is merely mobilized as a structural plot element’.200 
I would argue that in what Vermeulen sees as constituting McCarthy’s absolute lack of 
psychological realism lies the foundation of realism itself. It is exactly McCarthy’s first-
hand research that connects theories of simulation and the trace with medical theories of 
the human capacity for simulation, manifested post-coma, that constitutes a nucleus of 
realism within the novel and which refutes Vermeulen’s notion that McCarthy ‘merely’ 
uses trauma as a narrative device. What Vermeulen (alongside other critics) might see 
as a lack of psychological realism (and a general criticism that is often directed at the 
novel) actually conveys, as discussed, the lack of auto-affection so often present in the 
survivors of coma and brain trauma. At one point, the Enactor is told that all of the 
black cats have fallen off the red roofs of the building opposite as they lack the ability to 
cling onto the incline. When asked what he wants to do about the rate of loss of the cats, 
he simply replies, ‘“Get more”’,201 a comment that again emphasises McCarthy’s 
sharply-observed representation of damaged auto-affection, alongside coma and brain 
injury survival as a whole, not least the detailed depictions of physical rehabilitation. 
It is overly simplistic, therefore, to suggest that Remainder is an anti-realist novel. 
Certainly, it may lack the psychological and emotive depth of traditional trauma novels 
but this is indicative of the specific type of trauma that McCarthy portrays. It is this 
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trauma, the trauma of coma and brain injury, both psychological and, most importantly, 
physical, that allows the novelist to explore complex literary and cultural theories by 
looking at how these manifest in real-world situations and crises. In this way, I would 
argue, McCarthy has created an ethical depiction of coma within fiction. It is one that 
experiments with theory and a range of imaginative narrative devices yet takes, at its 
very core, a ‘responsible’ authorial position through its commitment to representing and 
revealing to the reader the true plight of the post-coma, post-TBI survivor. In my final 
chapter, I will continue to explore this notion of an ethics of authorship in relation to 
coma literature.  
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6: It Was Kind of Like the Whole World Went Into Coma. Coma as 
Metaphor 
 
Of course, one cannot think without metaphors. But that does not mean there aren’t some metaphors 
we might well abstain from or try to retire. As, of course, all thinking is interpretation. 
But that does not mean it isn’t sometimes correct to be ‘against’ interpretation.  
                                                                                                 -Susan Sontag, AIDS and Its Metaphors. 
 
 
6.1: Introduction 
 
During an interview given in 2011 for the BBC documentary Faulks on Fiction,
1
 the 
author Martin Amis, whilst discussing whether he would ever consider writing a 
children’s book, said, ‘People ask me if I ever thought of writing a children’s book. I 
say, ‘If I had a serious brain injury I might well write a children’s book’ […] I would 
never write about someone that forced me to write at a lower register than what I 
write’.2 What is perhaps most startling about Amis’s insult against brain injury 
survivors is that the majority of the backlash came from those who were offended by a 
perceived slur against children’s fiction and its authors. Indeed, the sub-heading to an 
article in The Guardian reporting on this incident illustrates this rather misdirected 
outrage: ‘Children’s authors have expressed anger over ‘insult’ to their work on BBC 
programme’.3 This same article also cites the children’s author Lucy Coats who sees 
Amis’s faux-pas as ‘an implicit insult to those of us who do write children’s books’, yet 
she fails to mention how this is an explicit insult against those living with brain injury. 
Furthermore, the majority of blog-comments from the public that accompany the article 
either seem to concur with Amis’s view on children’s fiction and his use of the brain 
injury metaphor, or object to it on similar grounds to Coats, despite the fact that the 
article does also cite Jane Stemp’s objection to the metaphor (an author with cerebral 
palsy who felt that Amis ‘couldn’t have insulted [her] harder’). 
This is one example of what I will refer to as the ‘brain injury metaphor’, a negative 
and pejorative technique that seems to be increasingly employed within socio-political 
and cultural arenas. Juxtaposed with this is the ‘coma metaphor’ which, as discussed 
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throughout this investigation, proliferates the misleading notion that coma is a form of 
sleep-state from which the patient can emerge quickly in ‘light switch’ moments of 
‘awakening’ with most of his cognitive and mental faculties immediately intact. The 
brain injury metaphor, I suggest, is a consequence of the coma metaphor due to the fact 
that it is rarely depicted accurately, or explored as a condition of post-coma recovery. 
Baldly, I argue that there are very few accurate and ethical representations of coma and, 
as a consequence, of brain injury which leads to a proliferation of misinformation and 
medical ‘mythologies’ that have, in turn, caused the conditions of coma and brain injury 
to pass into the realm of metaphorical and figurative language and imagery. As can be 
seen in the Amis case, this largely negative use of the coma and brain injury metaphors 
can have a stigmatizing impact upon the survivors of the conditions. 
In this final chapter, I will examine the use of coma and brain injury as metaphor 
within the cultural and socio-political spheres, and discuss the often misinformed or 
insensitive and discriminative connotations at their core. Drawing on Susan Sontag’s 
critical works on illness as metaphor, I will argue that coma and brain injury have, like 
the illnesses of tuberculosis and cancer in Sontag’s discussions, become embedded 
deeply as metaphors in culture, though in starkly contrasting ways. Coma has come to 
symbolise socio-political stasis or inertia, or the mystical possibility of creative rebirth 
whereas brain injury is frequently used as a derogatory slur against those who are seen 
to be lacking in some capacity. Returning to Ricoeur’s theory of sedimentation and 
examining medical cases of coma (and other disorders of consciousness), I will explore 
how literary and media representations feed into one another (continuing to propagate 
mythologies surrounding these conditions) and examine the potential real-world impact 
this can have upon the survivors of coma and their loved ones. Lastly, I will further 
explicate why we have developed this perceived need for these mythologies of ‘miracle’ 
recoveries and the ‘economies of hope’ that they provide, ultimately proposing two 
ethical models of authorship for the writer of coma fiction. 
 
 
6.2: A Triumph Over Illness: Coma as Metaphor - Brain Injury and Its 
Metaphors 
 
Martin Amis’s use of the brain injury metaphor certainly isn’t an isolated example, its 
use as a cultural slur apparent later in 2011 when, during an edition of BBC2’s The 
Review Show, the writer and critic A.L. Kennedy suggested that the writer of the 
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Channel 4 fantasy-drama Camelot must have had a ‘brain injury’ as an explanation for 
why it was so badly written.
4 
Most recently, during the World Cup qualifying match 
between Portugal and the USA, football commentator Mark Lawrenson, by way of 
explaining the erratic ability of the Portuguese player Nani, said: ‘A great description of 
Nani – promising career ruined by a niggling brain injury’.5 Whilst Lawrenson’s use of 
the metaphor has the same register and effect as Amis and Kennedy’s usage (referring 
to brain injury as a means of describing a perceived creative ‘flaw’), I suggest that it has 
more significant and worrying implications. The fact that Lawrenson refers to a 
‘niggling’ brain injury grossly undermines the gravity of this neurological disability on 
several levels. It at once describes brain injury as persistent yet simultaneously reduces 
its severity to a ‘nagging’ or even ‘petty’ complaint, something that, whilst persistent, 
may be intermittent, thus trivializing the condition and glossing over its permanence. 
Moreover, this brain injury metaphor, Lawrenson maintains, is a ‘great’ description. 
The use of the equally misleading coma metaphor is no less prevalent, not least in the 
socio-political arena. On accepting the Democratic Party’s nomination for Vice 
President in 1988, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, recalling the Reagan administration, declared 
that, ‘America has just passed through… an eight-year coma’.6 Over a century prior to 
Bentsen’s speech, in another era of contentious political debate, the suffragist Sarah 
Emily Davies, during a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the National 
Association for the Promotion of Social Sciences in 1868, proposed that, ‘We have 
persuaded ourselves that Englishmen of the present day are such a nervously excitable 
race, that the only chance for their descendants is to keep the mothers in a state of 
coma’.7 These examples illustrate how long the coma metaphor has been employed in 
political rhetoric and in both, it is used to criticise paternalistic and oppressive 
governance. In the first example, it is used to condemn the political oppression of an 
entire country; in the second, the oppression of one particular gender within a country is 
condemned. In both, the word ‘coma’ becomes synonymous with a state of sleep or 
stupor, as in so many of the texts I have examined throughout this investigation. In 
Bentsen’s quote, the notion of coma as being a state that can be ‘passed through’ 
suggests a lack of permanence, emphasizing the fact that, whilst having a stupefying 
effect, it can be left behind and overcome, again negating the long-term traumatic effect 
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of medical coma. In the quote by Davies, the notion of ‘control’ of coma is implied, 
with those in power having the ability to place women in coma and control this at will.
8
 
Certainly, within contemporary medicine, the coma can be used as a clinical tool, for 
example, the induced coma that can be employed to reduce brain swelling or to stem the 
growth of cancer cells. However, this sense of clinical control is limited, physicians 
having the power to initiate coma but not always having the capability or ‘control’ to 
initiate an immediate return, as discussed earlier in the high-profile case of the racing-
driver Michael Schumacher, whose induced coma had been prolonged for over six 
months, despite the fact that the sedation administered to sustain his coma had started to 
be withdrawn in January 2014.
9
 There are other examples whereby patients have not 
been able to be brought out of induced comas by the reduction of sedation. In the case 
of teenager Vicki Alex, medical professionals ‘were unable to guarantee that she would 
regain consciousness’10 after inducing a coma to help her body fight an infection 
brought on by acute myeloid leukaemia. 
The coma metaphor is similarly present within the literary arena, and beyond the 
broader ‘allegories’ of coma (the katabatic journey, for example, or coma as an 
embodiment of psychoanalytical abreaction) discussed throughout this thesis. In his 
poem ‘And Others, Vaguer Presences’, John Ashbery, in typically minimalist and 
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cryptic style, muses upon the dislocation of the self within a brutalist architectural 
landscape: 
 
… To extend one’s life 
All day on the dirty stone of some plaza,  
Unaware among the pretty lunging of the wind,  
Light and shade, is like coming out of 
A coma that is a white, interesting country…11 
 
Ashbery’s reference to coma, here, is evocative of the so-called ‘white tunnel’ 
phenomenon of the near-death experience and therefore the portrayal of ‘coming out’ of 
coma is ambiguous. The reader wonders whether he is leaving through the exit into life 
beyond coma, or through the exit into death. Regardless of this, Ashbery’s coma 
metaphor has similar implications to the two examples of the coma metaphor in political 
rhetoric in that it suggests a certain simplicity and ‘ease’ of slippage between extreme 
states of consciousness. Indeed, in all of these references a certain sense of tranquillity 
is conveyed, either in describing the emergence from coma, the subject still within 
coma, or the control and maintenance of the coma. The coma metaphor, then, 
consistently overlooks and undermines the complexities of medical coma and continues 
to propagate the mythology that the patient moves fluidly and peacefully from either 
coma to death or coma to consciousness. In Aldous Huxley’s 1944 novel Time Must 
Have a Stop, the character Bruno Rontini sardonically suggests that the key to life is to, 
‘Ignore death up to the last moment; then, when it cannot be ignored any longer, have 
yourself squirted full of morphia and shuffle off in a coma’.12 It seems that this overly- 
simplistic notion of either shuffling into or out of coma is still prevalent in both 
representations of the condition and in the use of the coma metaphor and furthermore, I 
suggest that by consistently propagating the image of coma as a form of sleep or even 
tranquil death-state, the aetiologies of brain injury are obfuscated and frequently 
ignored. Furthermore, I propose that the aetiologies of coma and other chronic disorders 
of consciousness (CDCs) are similarly glossed over, resulting in the escalation of 
medical ‘mythologies’ that confuse and conflate the CDCs of coma, the persistent 
vegetative state, the minimally conscious state and stupor. 
Susan Sontag’s work on illness as metaphor is germane to this discussion, and I will 
draw a parallel between her analysis of the two disease metaphors of tuberculosis and 
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cancer with the metaphors of coma and brain injury. In her seminal work Illness as 
Metaphor, Sontag traces the use of the metaphors of tuberculosis and cancer through the 
history of literary and socio-political language. She examines how, traditionally, TB 
was often romanticized, with the dying victim ‘pictured as made more beautiful and 
more soulful’, whereas the victim of cancer was often ‘portrayed as robbed of all 
capacities of self-transcendence, humiliated by fear and agony’.13 She exemplifies this 
theory by looking at how the metaphors are manifested: the ‘spiritualizing of 
consciousness’ of TB juxtaposed with the ‘obliterating of consciousness’ of cancer.14 
The literary and medico-social language of these two diseases contribute to a sense of 
metaphorical polarity: TB described in terms of a certain ‘vigour’ or vitality15 that it 
instils in the patient; cancer in terms of invasions of the ‘Other’, of ‘alien’ or ‘mutant’ 
cells stronger than normal cells’,16 sinister and potentially stigmatizing imagery that is 
immediately evocative of the science fiction genre. However, despite this ‘privileging’ 
of one disease over the other, the gravity of both is undermined because of the 
metaphorical implications. There is a similar paradigm in the cases of the coma and 
brain injury metaphor and their uses in contemporary society and literature. As 
discussed, coma is frequently described as an ethereal, transient dreamscape and a place 
where transcendent enlightenment and revelatory knowledge of the self and society can 
be found. Brain injury, on the other hand, is often ignored altogether and so it seems 
that, as a metaphor, it has accumulated the register of an insult, becoming synonymous 
with stupidity, or with a sense of existential lack. 
Sontag also writes of the ‘predilection for psychological explanations of disease’ and 
that such an understanding ‘undermines the ‘reality’ of a disease’.17 This dynamic 
similarly arises out of the production of the coma metaphor, depicting coma as a purely 
psychic disturbance, thus causing it to become detached from reality. As discussed 
extensively throughout this investigation, recovery from coma is most often depicted as 
being quick and immediate, with the survivor’s cognition being apparently intact. The 
coma metaphor, therefore, has become a literary device that grants the author extensive 
creative freedom for fulfilling whatever literary agenda he has set for himself whilst 
perpetuating mythologies surrounding the condition of coma and disregarding the 
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‘reality’ of brain injury. 
From a literary perspective, the critic and poet John Hollander discusses how these 
misleading metaphors of consciousness are created. He examines how even the process 
of writing about altered states of consciousness becomes ‘immensely complicated by 
the impulses to use language to represent them’.18 He notes that ‘the rhetoric of such 
representations will liken a direct experience of such a state, or an imagined one, to that 
of another such condition’.19 As discussed, the authors of coma fiction consistently 
appropriate other altered states of consciousness to describe the state of coma in order to 
try and narrate the intangible ‘nothingness’ of the coma consciousness. This ‘likening’ 
of one state of consciousness to this unconscious state within the literary arena can be 
examined further through Sontag’s notion that such psychologizing and figuring of 
illness leads to ‘the promise of a triumph over illness’,20 therefore creating a feeling of 
hope. Certainly, in many of the works discussed in this thesis, by psychologizing the 
state of coma with ‘unacknowledged interpretive construction’,21 to return to 
Hollander’s discussions, the coma is depicted as a condition that can be conquered and 
brain injury a condition that can be ‘cured’ (if not denied altogether). 
This privileging of coma over brain injury, and the consequences this has for the 
utility of each metaphor, is exacerbated further by the constant misrepresentations 
within popular culture. Danny Boyle’s 2013 film Trance22 depicts how someone with 
amnesia arising from a traumatic brain injury (caused by the stereotypical ‘blow to the 
head’) undergoes hypnotherapy to recover his memories. This again illustrates the 
confusion of physical and psychological brain trauma (of brain plasticity and elasticity), 
the archetype of the amnesic hero offering infinitesimal potentials for dramatic conflict. 
Consequently, Boyle’s film, through its characterization and narrative development, 
once more serves to propagate medical mythologies, implying the possibility of a ‘cure’ 
for brain injury. 
The role of the coma metaphor in the development of narrative devices is likewise 
seen in another of Boyle’s films, 28 Days Later.23 In the opening minutes of the film, 
the central protagonist, Jim (Cillian Murphy) emerges from a month-long coma, both 
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with cognition fully and immediately intact, but also with unimpaired motor functions. 
In almost a mirror-image of this initiating dramatic event, in the first book of Robert 
Kirkman and Tony Moore’s zombie-apocalypse comic-book series The Walking Dead, 
the central protagonist Rick Grimes likewise emerges from a month-long coma with 
cognition intact. In this text, though, slightly more attention is paid to the degradation of 
muscle strength and motor functioning, as evident in the frames below: 
 
24
 
 
This being said, there seems to be the smallest of temporal lapses (between the 
penultimate and final frame in the above sequence, denoted by the same division of 
white-space used between each frame of action) before Rick is up on his feet again, 
rummaging through drawers for his belongings. 
In both 28 Days Later and The Walking Dead: Days Gone Bye, the coma is used 
purely as a narrative device which allows the writers to collapse time and quickly move 
beyond the narrative timeframe during which the rage virus spreads (28 Days Later) and 
the dead start to reanimate (The Walking Dead). In fact, the second text is most effective 
in the use of the coma device, depicting Rick being shot within the first six frames of 
the comic, and then having him emerge from coma in the seventh frame. In Boyle’s 
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film, there is a version of a ‘pre-credit’ sequence during which the audience sees the 
moment of break-out of the virus, an expository device that is absent in The Walking 
Dead comic and first season of the TV adaptation.
25
 In this use of the coma metaphor in 
The Walking Dead, Rick is also metaphorically represented as ‘awakening’ from ‘death’ 
only to encounter those who have similarly ‘awoken’, only in a much more literal sense, 
and this immediacy of injury/coma ‘awakening’ allows the audience to be also awoken 
in the midst of this apocalyptic scenario. However, what is most noticeable is the 
depiction of an immediate recovery from a month- long coma in both texts, the ‘light 
switch’ moment of the return from the unconsciousness of coma. 
Sontag’s hypothesis that ‘part of the denial of death in this culture is a vast expansion 
of the category of illness’26 is pertinent to this discussion. Through the coma metaphor, 
and literary licence that is taken by authors, the ‘category’ of coma is ‘expanded’ into 
other categories of consciousness and states of being (sleep and dream, for example) 
from which the patient ‘awakes’, seemingly with no long-term effects. This intersection 
of categories of consciousness may best be illustrated by the diagram below: 
 
 
Sontag’s ‘denial of death’ resonates with Arthur Frank’s work on patient and illness 
narratives as discussed in chapter four, most notably his assertion that the metaphorical 
restitution narrative of recovery from sickness allows one to ‘deny’ and therefore 
‘conquer’ death. In this way, I suggest that the use of the coma metaphor contributes to 
what Zygmunt Bauman refers to as ‘deconstructed mortality’,27 a concept that Arthur 
Frank explores in analysing the various narrative archetypes employed in stories of 
illness. Examining, from a sociological and philosophical perspective, death and dying 
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and how modern societies deal with these ‘taboo’ subjects, Bauman argues that such a 
process of deconstruction ‘does not abolish death’ per se, but instead allows death to be 
‘stripped of significance’ in the light of medico-social rhetoric and promises of hope of 
survival. As Frank explicates in his discussion of Bauman, modernity ‘exorcises the fear 
of mortality by breaking down threats, among which illness is paradigmatic, into 
smaller and smaller units’.28 This, on the surface, appears to contradict Sontag’s notion 
of the ‘expansion’ of illness, but I propose that these two theories can exist alongside 
each other. As coma is ‘expanded’ into other ‘categories’ through the use of metaphor, 
coma itself starts to become demystified and broken down into smaller, more 
manageable associations and meanings. For example, coma is ‘expanded’ into the 
category of the archetypal restitution narrative which, as Frank posits in further 
developing Bauman’s concept of deconstructing mortality, is the ‘culturally preferred 
narrative’ whether it is told by ‘television commercials, sociology, or medicine’.29 This 
narrative type is preferred precisely because it offers hope of conquering death and in 
the case of coma, it allows the incomprehensible notion of a void in consciousness to be 
broken down into the ‘smaller units’ of either a ‘restitution’ or ‘quest’ narrative. In 
short, it translates the unintelligible experience of coma into the various comprehensible 
stages of a journey into the unconscious that the protagonist must complete in order to 
reach an almost inevitable point of return, allowing audiences to defeat superficially the 
fears over their mortality. 
For a neurological disability like brain injury that lacks the aura of mystery and 
ethereality of coma, it has inevitably acquired darker and more pejorative connotations. 
Writing about the punitive notions of disease inherent in the cancer metaphor, Sontag 
explicates this development of the negative medical metaphor. She discusses how 
traditionally in debates about cancer, the illness itself is seen as the enemy, but that 
conversely, ‘It is also the cancer patient who is made culpable’. Moreover, the onus of 
responsibility both for becoming ill and for getting well falls upon the cancer patient, 
thus the illness is imbued with a moralistic meaning.
30
 This ‘blame culture’ arising from 
the illness metaphor is embodied in the current trend of brain injury metaphor, 
attributing the condition to the person who is being insulted, before using the condition 
as an excuse to blame that person for an inexcusable shortcoming, thus creating both 
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victim and culprit. 
Sontag lucidly describes the process an illness has to go through in making its 
transition into metaphor. The first stage, she explains, invokes the identification with the 
disease of negative associations, ‘subjects of deepest dread’. It is at this point that the 
disease has become a metaphor, but in order for it to be sustainable, it has to enter the 
secondary ‘adjectival’ stage, during which the disease and all of its horrific associations 
are imposed upon other targets. As Sontag concludes, ‘Something is said to be disease-
like, meaning that it is disgusting or ugly’.31 I argue that brain injury has passed into this 
adjectival stage of metaphor, loaded with such ugly connotations and associations, as 
seen in the three examples of the imposition of the brain injury metaphor cited earlier, 
each one implying that to be brain injured is to lack creative skills and artistic 
discernment. Whilst the coma metaphor seems to have evaded this overtly negative 
adjectival stage, maintaining its status as a ‘poetic’ illness (akin to TB a century ago), it 
has nevertheless completed its metaphorical conversion, its effects and implications 
being, I argue, no less damaging to the public perception and conception of the 
condition. In her famous polemic ‘Against Interpretation’, Sontag proposes that, ‘To 
interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the world in order to set up a shadow world of 
“meanings”. It is to turn the world into this world’.32 To interpret something causes that 
thing to pass into the realm of metaphor, to load it with alternative meanings and 
connotations, thus resulting in the original thing no longer being synonymous with its 
original meaning: it becomes an imprint within the ‘shadow world’ that Sontag refers to. 
The interpretation of coma and brain injury, therefore, has similarly caused the medical 
conditions to enter the process of metaphorical conversion, creating interpretive 
imprints (shadows) of these and loading them with connotations which are consequently 
handed down to and circulated amongst the public audience or readership, instigating 
and perpetuating the medical mythologies surrounding the conditions. 
I will examine this ‘shadow world of meanings’ in more detail at the end of this 
investigation where I will discuss the potential real-world impact (and damage) this may 
have, but before I do that, I would first like to examine, in closer detail, two contrasting 
uses of coma as both narrative device and metaphor in two notable works of fiction 
from the twentieth century: Robin Cook’s medical conspiracy thriller Coma and 
Douglas Coupland’s postmodern, apocalyptic satire Girlfriend in a Coma. 
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6.3: You See, They’re Not Really Alive… Coma, Metaphor and the Neomort 
 
Robin Cook’s 1977 novel, Coma, follows the investigations of a medical student, Susan 
Wheeler, as she tries to uncover the mysteries surrounding a number of patients who 
have inexplicably fallen into coma following otherwise routine operations within 
Boston Memorial Hospital. Throughout the novel, Cook employs the level of medical 
detail that one would expect from a writer who, himself, is a trained medical doctor, but 
this leads to an unusual fictional hybrid: a mainstream, high-concept bestseller that also 
depicts the minutiae of medical procedure. The novel, therefore, provides a fascinating 
and largely accurate insight into ‘deep’ coma as a medical condition, against which 
previous fictional representations and their uses of the coma metaphor can be critiqued. 
Central to the novel is the deconstruction of the image of the coma patient as 
‘sleeping beauty’ (to refer back to the Wijdicks’s study), and consequently, of the notion 
of coma-as-sleep. This is evidenced in the descriptions of Nancy Greenly, the young 
coma victim who instigates Susan’s investigations. Focalizing the confrontation with 
the comatose patient through Susan, Cook depicts the steady, almost immediate 
degradation and corruption of Nancy’s body and, moreover, of her humanity. Susan, 
along with her fellow students, notices that there is ‘no sign of life save for the 
rhythmical hiss of the breathing machine’.33 Here, the organic body has become 
mechanized and this dehumanizing of the patient is not just a physical process. Nancy is 
also dehumanized through the attitudes shared by the experienced physicians as they 
cease to recognise her humanity. Dr. Bellows views Nancy purely in terms of medical 
process, needing to keep ‘the ions at the right level’, ‘the urine output up’, ‘the bacteria 
at bay’, the absence of the personal pronoun ‘her’ in Cook’s writing indicative of 
Bellows’s determination to obliterate ‘the human element’ for which he simply doesn’t 
‘have time for’.34 Later, another physician, Stark, sees the ‘comatose patient’ as being, 
ultimately, enormously ‘rewarding’ due largely to the fact that ‘the teaching aspect 
alone is priceless’.35 This process of depersonalizing and dehumanizing the comatose 
patient is best summed up by Susan who, reflecting upon this dilemma of the body and 
of personhood, concludes that, ‘Nancy Greenly had become a technical challenge, a 
game to be played’.36  
In his physical description of Nancy, Cook initially seems to be falling into the 
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common trap of the ‘sleeping beauty’ metaphor, describing Nancy’s face as ‘marble 
white’ in direct correlation with the beautifying of Louis Drax in Liz Jensen’s novel. As 
Cook proceeds to depict the beauty of Nancy’s ‘sable brown’ hair, this process of 
glorification of the body of the comatose patient seems to be heightening, reflecting the 
‘elegance’ of Lauren’s post-accident corporeality in Levy’s If Only It Were True. 
However, almost as soon as this beautified image of the sleeping beauty is created, 
Cook begins to depict the degradation of the body of the comatose patient. He describes 
her ‘dried and cracked’ lips, her ‘mouth held open with a plastic mouthpiece’ and the 
‘brownish material’ that has ‘crusted and hardened on her front teeth’.37 Cook then goes 
on to employ beautifying, figurative language, as Susan holds one of Nancy’s hands ‘as 
if reaching for a delicate piece of porcelain’.38 Notably, though, this is focalized through 
Susan herself, conveying her increasingly horrified attitude at the dehumanizing of the 
coma patient, something to which she is already succumbing in viewing Nancy as a 
piece of ‘porcelain’: inanimate and breakable. It is an attitude that is stressed, a short 
time later, when Bellows declares, in relation to Nancy’s prognosis, ‘If her squash is 
gone, I mean wiped out, then we might as well get the kidneys for someone else’.39 This 
lack of emotional investment in and objectification of the comatose patient (comparing 
the brain to a vegetable: ‘squash’) provides a stark contrast to Susan’s humane and 
somewhat naïve attitude, whilst at the same time serving as a narrative hook for the 
novel, foreshadowing the events to come and the object of Susan’s investigations. 
Gradually, she begins to uncover a hospital conspiracy whereby patients are deliberately 
forced into irreversible coma on the operating table, following which they are housed in 
the sinister Jefferson Institute where their lives are sustained until the last moment when 
their bodies are ‘harvested’ for organ donations. 
Cook’s novel explores debates surrounding medical ethics and black market organ 
donation, focusing on the comatose patient as a paradigm of what has been termed the 
neomort: the ‘new dead’. The term was coined by the psychiatrist and bioethicist 
Willard Gaylin in 1974 in his controversial article for Harper’s, ‘Harvesting the Dead’. 
In this think-piece, Gaylin addresses the issue of the increasing number of brain-dead 
comatose patients whose lives are being sustained in hospitals and care-facilities 
consuming valuable space. He proposes that such neomorts can be housed in vast 
‘bioemporia’ or ‘farms of cadavers’ where they can be ‘harvested’ for organ 
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transplantation, drug studies, and medical teaching and education.
40
 Cook’s novel, 
therefore, seems to come directly out of such a vision of future medical praxis, although 
despite including an ‘Author’s Note’ at the end of the novel that contains his own 
reflections on the inspiration for Coma, there is actually no reference to Gaylin’s article. 
Nevertheless, Cook’s Jefferson Institute is the archetypal embodiment of a Gaylinian 
bioemporium, with swathes of comatose patients suspended in mid-air by cables within 
vast hangars or ‘barns’ (to extend Gaylin’s metaphor of farming), their vitals constantly 
monitored and adjusted, as required, by cyber-technology. Even before Susan realises 
that these neomorts have been deliberately forced into coma, she finds it difficult, 
ethically, to accept this situation, struggling to see the comatose patient as anything 
other than ‘a sleeping human being’ and not simply ‘a brainless shell’.41 In this, 
perhaps, Susan voices the opinions and misconceptions of the wider, lay population: 
that coma is little more than a deep sleep. As her initial investigations lead to a tour of 
the institute, she gets the ‘impression of grotesque, horizontal, sleeping marionettes’,42 
hanging above her. Cook again uses dehumanizing imagery to convey Susan’s dilemma 
over exactly what state of consciousness and existence the comatose patient occupies, at 
one point his protagonist saying, ‘“It’s like some science fiction setting. A machine 
taking care of a host of mindless people. It’s almost as if these patients aren’t 
people”’.43 However, Michelle, the Head of Operations and ‘tour-guide’ of the Institute, 
is under no illusion as to where on the spectrum of consciousness and, moreover, of 
humanity these neomorts lie, responding to Susan’s outburst with the impassive 
observation that, ‘“They aren’t people […] They were people; now they’re brain stem 
preparations”’, before extolling the virtues the bioemporium has in a ‘cost-effectiveness 
crisis’.44 This reference to the economic ‘value’ of the comatose patient reflects 
Gaylin’s own discussion of the ‘cost-benefit analysis’ of the bioemporium,45 a financial 
dimension of the neomort that is further exemplified in Michael Crichton’s 1978 film 
adaptation of the novel, with a scene in the Jefferson Institute in which a virtual auction-
room is established, with individuals bidding on the sale of organs.
46
 
In the most recent American TV mini-series adaptation, Michelle’s unwavering 
perception of the neomort is complicated further through her equivalent character Mrs 
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Emerson (Ellen Burstyn), who, when prompted by Susan, describes the comatose 
patients thus: ‘“You see, they’re not really alive. But they’re not dead either”’.47 In fact, 
exploring the preoccupations and concerns of the current climate, this adaptation sees 
the neomort as the perfect subject for the advancement of the Human Genome 
Programme. By triggering coma in those patients pre-disposed to certain medical 
conditions (Alzheimer’s Disease being of particular concern to this adaptation), the key 
players at Peach Tree Memorial Hospital, alongside the Jefferson Institute, can use the 
neomorts for experimentation and research in the pursuit of finding a cure for such 
genetic disorders. The bodies are also, as is revealed in one particularly graphic 
sequence, harvested for organs and even, it is suggested, used as receptacles for 
surrogate babies, whilst providing valuable ‘stem cells from umbilical cords’. As 
Susan’s nemesis, erstwhile mentor and brains behind the Jefferson Institute, Professor 
Hillside declares: ‘“The herd must be culled and we must perfect mankind”’, once more 
conveying Gaylin’s use of agricultural metaphor in relation to his cadaver farms. This 
most recent adaptation develops the concept of cyber-phobia (at which Cook hinted in 
the original source material), with a vast computer-driven bioemporium transporting 
bodies to ‘visiting chambers’ where the neomorts, meticulously arranged and groomed, 
are deposited into beds, ready for their families to visit. Here, unlike Cook’s novel, the 
comatose patient is represented as the archetypal sleeping beauty figure, although this 
creative choice is justified by the fact that the neomort’s aesthetic appearance must be 
maintained to prevent any undue distress for visiting relatives. However, the exact 
nature of the mechanisms that are in place to save the patients from muscle atrophy and 
other bodily wastage is rather brushed over by the vague expository umbrella term 
‘breakthrough technology’. 
Coma, and its various adaptations, raises some important questions surrounding the 
identity of the comatose patient. Cook’s novel, in particular, tries to address some of the 
misrepresentations and mythologies surrounding this chronic disorder of consciousness, 
deconstructing the sleeping beauty metaphor, for example, or presenting the long-term 
physical effects. It also explores, ethically and philosophically, how the comatose 
patient can be viewed: neither fully alive, nor not quite dead which, by implication, 
means that they occupy both of these polar existential states. Similarly, it examines the 
prognosis of long-term coma, and raises difficult ethical questions, building on Gaylin’s 
work, with regard to how the neomort might be utilized. 
                                                     
47
 Coma, dir. Mikael Salomon (Original broadcast: A&E, 2012; UK premiere: Channel 5, 2013). 
213 
 
 
However, I suggest that its representation of coma is hampered exactly because of 
these ‘big questions’ it addresses – that over the course of the novel, the image of the 
coma and of the comatose patient fades into the background due to the privileging of 
central thematic and ethical concerns of the novel that arise from its high-concept twist: 
the sale of black market organs harvested from the coma patients. After reading the 
‘Author’s Note’ at the end of the novel, the reader is left under no illusion that it was 
Cook’s encounters with articles concerning such a scandal that inspired him to write the 
novel, rather than an obligation to explore the dilemma of the comatose patient. The 
coma of the novel, therefore, becomes a device through which other hierarchically-
privileged themes can be explored, and not merely that of black market organs, but also 
cyber and techno-phobia, patient depersonalisation, sexual politics in the workplace 
(Susan’s authority as a physician persistently undermined by her gender), and medical 
ethics. In the era of post-Watergate conspiracy dramas, Cook’s novel (and film 
adaptation) seems to have perfectly transplanted (no pun intended) the culture of fear 
and paranoia into the medical thriller, using coma as the perfect springboard for wider 
narrative and thematic development. 
A more problematic example of the use of coma as a narrative device, and one which 
will help to exemplify the complexities and controversies of the use of the coma 
metaphor, is Douglas Coupland’s 1998 novel, Girlfriend in a Coma. This work of coma 
fiction is centred upon the fate of Karen McNeil who, after consuming a dangerous 
concoction of alcohol and a small amount of her mother’s downers one night at a party, 
subsequently collapses into coma. Much of the narrative thereafter traces the lives of 
Karen’s friends and loved ones, most notably her boyfriend, Richard, who, struggling to 
cope with the ‘loss’ of his lover in coma, descends into alcoholism and, along with her 
other friends, begins to inhabit a somewhat vapid existence. 
In his descriptions of Karen, Coupland, similar to Cook or Richard Powers in his 
novel The Echo Maker, focuses upon the degradation of the body. Coupland describes 
Karen’s ‘ever-shrinking hands reduced to talons’,48 her eyes like those of ‘a photo of an 
aquarium fish’ (not even a real fish), her stomach bulging ‘like a goiter on a crone’s 
neck’.49 The ethical dilemma over the existential state of the neomort is also addressed 
with Karen’s mother immediately asking, ‘“Is she alive? Is she dead?”’.50 And later, 
over ten years after Karen entered coma, Richard muses, ‘And what of Karen? Neither 
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alive nor dead after all these years, ever dimming from the world’s mind – rasping, 
blinded, and pretzeled in a wheelchair’,51 a description that also highlights Karen’s 
gradual physical wastage, her muscle atrophy causing her limbs to desiccate and curl in 
on themselves. 
The novel reinterprets the ‘sleeping beauty’ metaphor present in previous examples 
of coma fiction, representing Richard’s unending love for Karen, regardless of her 
physical decline: she does not need to be physically beautiful for Richard to have 
feelings for her still. However, despite addressing the ethical and philosophical 
considerations surrounding the state of existence the comatose patient inhabits, 
Coupland’s novel presents deeply problematic issues, most notable of which is the fact 
that Karen is not in a coma. This is implied very early on in the novel when her 
physician explains to her parents that, ‘Karen will have sleep and wake cycles and may 
even dream’.52 However, in coma, there is no sleep-wake cycle, with patients lacking 
‘both wakefulness and awareness’53 and a ‘complete failure of the arousal system with 
no spontaneous eye opening’.54 Later in the novel, Richard describes Karen thus: ‘She 
moves her head, her eyes flicker, and for three seconds she sees the sky and the 
clouds’.55 Far from being in a coma, then, Karen is actually within a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS), a disorder of consciousness ‘characterized by the complete 
absence of behavioural evidence for self or environmental awareness’, yet with the 
‘preserved capacity for spontaneous or stimulus-induced arousal, evidenced by sleep-
wake cycles’.56 In fact, Coupland is quite overt about the chronic disorder of 
consciousness into which his heroine slips, with the character Dr. Menger announcing to 
her friends, ‘“It doesn’t give me any pleasure to tell you, kids, but your friend, Karen, is 
in what’s known as a persistent vegetative state”’.57 Coupland, in a literary move that 
seems to lift information directly from the medical literature on PVS, develops this 
announcement with Menger asserting that Karen ‘is completely unaware of either 
herself or her environment’, despite having ‘sleep cycles and awake cycles’, lacking any 
‘high brain function’.58 At the heart of this novel lies a puzzling dilemma whereby 
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Coupland knowingly conflates coma with the persistent vegetative state. ‘Girlfriend In 
A Persistent Vegetative State’, perhaps, did not have the same appeal for the author as a 
title for the novel, or at least, did not offer the opportunity to incorporate a trademark 
reference to popular culture. What occurs in the novel, therefore, is the passage of coma 
into the realm of metaphor, encouraging the reader to interpret coma as the persistent 
vegetative state: to conflate these two markedly different chronic disorders of 
consciousness. Furthermore, throughout the novel and beyond this confusion, Coupland 
exploits the coma metaphor to fulfil his wider literary agenda, moving progressively 
away from what might be termed the ‘ethically responsible’ representation of the reality 
of CDCs present in the earlier stages of the novel.  
Coupland’s primary use of the coma metaphor lies within his characterization of 
Karen herself, and the narrative function she performs. Prior to becoming comatose, she 
warns Richard of a dream she had, a ‘dark…Future’ where ‘everybody looks so old’,59 
‘meaningless’ and ‘electronic’.60 Insisting this is not just a dream but a prophetic vision, 
she speaks of Richard’s (and her friends’) future selves, all seeming normal but with 
‘eyes… without souls’.61 She also predicts her own departure, and even her return from 
‘wherever it is’ she has gone.62  
As predicted, Karen emerges from her persistent vegetative state to find that the 
world has changed, dominated by new technologies, greed and social dysfunction – the 
dystopia of postmodernity. Richard, her once-teenage lover, is an alcoholic; her friends, 
Pam and Hamilton, are successful yet vacuous, hooked on heroin, which they treat as a 
recreational drug of the middle classes; and Linus remains unchanged from high school 
but stagnating, unable to translate the intellectual promise he exhibited as a teenager 
into a career that is worthy of his talents. Coupland, therefore, uses the coma metaphor 
as a springboard for critiquing (post)modern society and existence, a contemporary 
satire in the vein of Washington Irving’s The Tale of Rip Van Winkle which itself, 
nearly two-hundred years before Girlfriend in a Coma, used the ‘deep sleep’ motif to 
satirise the hardships of the American Revolution through which Rip had the good 
fortune to sleep.
63
 In Coupland’s novel, Karen, in a reluctant post-‘coma’ interview with 
a cable news channel that is desperate to report on her ‘miracle’ recovery, is asked by a 
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reporter: ‘“How does it feel to be a modern Rip Van Winkle?”’.64 It is  a motif that is 
similarly utilized in Wolfgang Becher’s tragi-comedy Good Bye, Lenin!65 in which a 
German woman, Christiane, suffers a near-fatal heart attack and falls into coma during 
an anti-government demonstration in East Berlin prior to German reunification. When 
she emerges from coma, the Berlin Wall has already fallen and the world has changed, 
though her son, fearing a confrontation with such political upheaval might bring on 
another heart attack, sets about maintaining the illusion that reunification has never 
occurred. A similar conceit is used in Ma Jian’s Beijing Coma. Jian’s neomort, Dai Wei, 
is trapped in coma after being shot in the head during the Tiananmen Square protests of 
1989, and escapes into his memories as his loved ones (in the ‘overworld’ outside 
coma) tell him stories of the political and cultural changes occurring in China.
66
  
Interestingly, this version of the coma metaphor (the deep sleep akin to that of Rip 
Van Winkle) used to satirise socio-political upheaval has emerged in the reportage of a 
real-life modern ‘Rip Van Winkle’, Jan Grzebski, who emerged, in 2006, from a 19-
year coma to find that Poland was no longer under the rule of the Soviet Union or a 
communist president, that the Berlin Wall had fallen, and that the world had become a 
slave to unrecognizable technologies and consumer culture, dominated by mobile 
phones and ipods.
67
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In Coupland’s novel, Karen, as a Rip Van Winkle figure, provides the perfect device 
to explore the changed world on the brink of the millennium. Coupland further deploys 
the coma metaphor in the creation of Karen as a living, breathing time capsule, her body 
‘retain[ing] memories long after [her] mind’68 has forgotten them: an organic, corporeal 
databank. And Coupland draws attention to this image, writing, ‘Karen is a time capsule 
– a creature from another era reborn’.69 It is these reborn memories, this yearning, 
nostalgic invocation of the 1970s that makes Karen the perfect subject through which 
her friends (and the reader) can view the world with a fresh pair of eyes: the eyes of the 
resurrected neomort. 
In describing Karen’s ‘miracle’ emergence from PVS, Coupland works against the 
realistic representations of her condition itself. Like many of the works of fiction 
discussed earlier, Karen emerges from her seventeen year coma with cognition 
immediately and fully intact, language and speech fluent and unimpaired. Whilst 
Coupland still depicts Karen’s long-term muscle atrophy and physical wastage, there is 
still a perpetuation of coma mythology with the coma metaphor becoming intensified 
when Karen’s post-coma prophetic predictions of an apocalypse turn out to be not just 
satirical representations of postmodern society, but of a literal, global apocalypse. The 
world’s population (with the exception of Karen and her friends) succumbs to a sleeping 
sickness pandemic which causes the victim to drift into a somnolent state, shortly after 
which they die. This cataclysmic event is described, significantly, as the ‘whole world 
                                                                                                                                                      
employed by Coupland in his novel. Certainly, Plum and Posner seem wholly aware of the 
confusions that occur through the interchangeability of different CDCs when they write: 
‘Terminologic differences  surround descriptions of these chronic states of wakeful responsiveness, 
variously called vegetative states, akinetic mutism, coma vigil, or the apallic syndrome’ (Plum and 
Posner, The Diagnosis of Stupor and Coma, p. 7). Thus, what the editor-in-chief of Grzebski’s local 
newspaper denotes as being a ‘coma’ was, more than likely, a PVS state, a confusion that, I contend, 
is propagated by many works of coma fiction, Coupland’s novel not excluded. Grzebski’s recovery, 
therefore, was not a ‘miracle’ or an immediate ‘awakening’ from coma and effortless transition back 
to pre-coma personhood, but a painful and protracted transition between traumatic CDCs: from 
coma to the persistent vegetative state to the minimally conscious state to consciousness, and 
extensive rehabilitation thereafter. As an interesting coda to this case, in the BBC’s initial reporting 
of Grzebski, their news website contains a paragraph (a supposedly factual ‘pull-out’ defining coma) 
that is particularly informative for this discussion: ‘Although those in coma do not respond to stimuli 
in a meaningful way,   contrary to popular belief they do not always lie quiet and still – in some 
cases they can move, open their eyes and even talk’ (‘Pole Wakes Up from 19-year Coma’, BBC 
News). Certainly, the comatose patient may respond to pain stimuli, for example, the testing of 
motor functions being one criterion for determining the depth of coma and an eventuality that is 
rendered in Cook’s novel Coma, as Susan pinches Nancy’s thigh. Susan ‘[recoils] in horror’ as 
Nancy’s body stiffens in a ‘painful contraction’, her jaw performing a ‘side-to-side chewing motion’ 
(Cook, Coma, p. 110). However, it is explained that Nancy has had ‘a seizure of some kind’, which 
is in stark contrast to what the BBC report purports, a description that conveys the aetiology of the 
persistent vegetative state rather than coma. 
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[going] into coma’,70 Coupland simultaneously using the coma-as-sleep and coma-as-
death versions of the wider coma metaphor with similar undertones of the socio-
political metaphor employed by Senator Lloyd Bentsen discussed earlier. 
Despite this apocalypse, Karen’s friends still fail to change their selfish and 
materialistic lives, and it is within the final denouement of the novel that Coupland’s 
use of the coma metaphor is amplified. The novel takes a fantastical direction, with 
Karen, together with the ghost of a former high-school friend, Jared (through whom this 
last section of the novel is focalized) proclaiming to her friends that it is within their 
power to restore the world to its former pre-apocalyptic state. All they have to do is to 
alter their shallow existence and promise to do everything in their power to change the 
ways of the world by forever challenging the iniquities and vagaries of modern society: 
by ‘boiling the carcass of the old order’.71 There is, of course, one big catch. In order for 
this to happen, the ultimate sacrifice has to be made: Karen has to return to her 
comatose state. In this way, Coupland’s coma metaphor reaches completion, with Karen 
granted the messianic status of the post-coma hero, like Johnny Smith before her. 
Ultimately, what starts out as being an insightful, accurate and realistic portrayal of a 
young woman who is suddenly and dramatically consumed by a chronic disorder of 
consciousness, alongside an examination of the trauma felt by her loved ones, quickly 
collapses into a perpetuation of the coma metaphor. This is not to say that the novel 
does not raise some important and ethical issues, most notably its examination of the 
use of the terms ‘vegetative’ and ‘vegetable’ in descriptions of the PVS patient, terms 
that are, I suggest, somewhat pejorative and insensitive. Coined by Jennet and Plum in 
1972 (though only accepted by the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research in 1983), the 
designation ‘vegetative’ was used to focus on ‘the contrast between the severe mental 
loss and the subject’s preserved autonomic or vegetative functions’.72 Citing the Oxford 
English Dictionary to justify their choice of terminology, they posited that ‘“to vegetate 
is to live a merely physical life devoid of intellectual activity or social intercourse”’ 
with the adjective ‘vegetative’ referring to ‘“an organic body capable of growth and 
development but devoid of sensation and thought”’.73 They postulate that this is the 
                                                     
70
 Coupland, Girlfriend in a Coma, p. 229. 
71
 Ibid., p. 271. 
72
 Fred Plum and Jerome B. Posner, The Diagnosis of Stupor and Coma (Philadelphia: F.A.Davis 
Company, 1980), p. 6. 
73
 Nicola Latronico, Ottavia Manenti et al, ‘Quality Reporting on the Vegetative State in Italian 
Newspapers. The Case of Eluana Englaro’, PLoS ONE, 6 (4), e18706 (2011), 1-8 (pp. 3-4). 
219 
 
 
perfect linguistic framework as both physicians and laymen can immediately understand 
the connotations and it has greater dignity ‘than many of the terms sometimes applied 
vulgarly to the hopelessly brain damaged’.74 However, Coupland implicitly questions 
this summation, focalizing the debate through Richard and Karen’s ‘miracle’ daughter, 
born whilst Karen was still in her ‘coma’. Coupland writes of Megan being bullied at 
school by ‘vicious little oiks [who] told Megan… that her mother was a “vegetable”’.75 
Megan’s torment becomes acute, with such insults as ‘lettuce’, ‘corn’, ‘green beans’ and 
‘carrot’ constantly directed at her mother.76 Here, Coupland queries the use of 
commonly accepted medical metaphor and its impact upon those victims who are 
affected, directly or indirectly, by whichever condition it figuratively describes. 
Coupland therefore carefully unpacks the traumatic emotive undertones that such 
metaphors potentially have upon children, for example, exploring the impact of the 
pejorative ‘vegetable’ upon a little girl of six years-old. However, what might be 
deemed to be an ethical examination of metaphor is somewhat nullified by the author’s 
own liberal use of the coma metaphor, not least in the title of the novel which 
immediately ‘markets’ it as a genuine depiction of coma, thus again contributing to the 
perpetuation of the coma mythology in the public sphere. 
 
 
6.4: …But They’re Not Dead Either: Metaphor and Hope 
 
To briefly summarise, I propose that the proliferation of the coma metaphor has had a 
profound effect upon the public perception and understanding of this chronic disorder of 
consciousness. Fictional representations, I suggest, seems partly responsible for this, 
frequently denying the gravity of coma by equating it to a deep sleep or temporary state 
of stasis or inertia, after which the patient returns to the ‘normality’ of the overworld 
with little permanent damage. Furthermore, the conflation of coma with other chronic 
disorders of consciousness only serves to exacerbate this confused collective 
(mis)understanding of coma and other CDCs, further propagating misleading 
mythologies. Coma also constitutes a useful narrative device, a springboard from which 
authors can explore other thematic concerns and whilst the representation of coma, 
itself, may be accurately depicted in certain texts (Robin Cook’s Coma, for example) it 
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is often compromised by the privileging of more sensationalized and spectacular 
narrative strands or themes. We can again return to the Alex Garland interview in The 
Guardian in which he revealed his motivation for writing The Coma: to write about 
‘dreams’ in a ‘less naff’ way. But we can also turn to the Canadian novelist Robert 
Wiersema and an article he wrote in 2007 in which he discussed his own coma novel, 
Before I Wake, a fantasy text that exploits the motif of the coma patient as a 
‘miraculous’ being (in this case a three year-old girl who, still in coma, has the power to 
cure the illnesses of those who come in contact with her).
77
 In his article ‘Wake Up, 
Wake Up, You Sleepyhead’, Wiersema, writing of the inevitable comparison of Jan 
Grzebski’s recovery to the Rip Van Winkle archetype, asserts that, ‘Characters in comas 
don’t lend themselves well to dramatic conflict […] a comatose character perhaps isn’t 
the best vehicle for narrative tension. Awakening from a coma, however, is another 
matter entirely’.78 Again, Wiersema seems to confirm the fact that the coma provides 
the writer of fiction with the perfect narrative device that will allow him creative 
freedom, whilst also implicitly explaining why authors of interior coma texts 
appropriate other states of consciousness in order to narrate the experience of coma and 
thereby generate ‘dramatic conflict’. Not only are mythologies of coma propagated 
within the public arena, then, but also the mythologies surrounding brain injury are 
circulated, thus contributing to the notion that brain injury is ‘curable’ (a temporary 
psychological condition, for example, that can be abreacted), ultimately, I suggest, 
stigmatizing the brain injury survivor in society. 
To conclude this investigation, I will explicate this idea of stigmatization of the brain 
injury survivor that arises from a lack of representation of post-TBI/ABI injury and 
post-coma rehabilitation: stigmatization through normalization. I will examine the role 
of the media and news coverage, as well as, most surprisingly, the literature and 
publicity of popular science. Alongside this, I will argue that by romanticizing coma, 
and the post-coma condition, such misrepresentations across the spectrum contribute to 
the creation of what Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good has termed a ‘political economy of 
hope’,79 which has a profound effect upon the genuine victims of CDCs, their loved 
ones and even upon clinical decisions. But before I move onto this, I will return to 
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Girlfriend in a Coma and examine a statement made by Coupland concerning the novel 
which proves to be a useful introduction to the ethical debate surrounding the 
misrepresentation of coma and the prevalence of the coma metaphor. 
In an article for the Toronto Globe and Mail from 1998, Coupland, discussing his 
inspiration for the novel, told interviewer Stephen Smith that, ‘“Comas really are more 
modern than plastics or TV. I like the notion that comas can allow a person to radically 
reinvent themselves upon awakening. I think we all want to do that – radically reinvent 
ourselves – I think it’s our deepest need”’.80 This comment is deeply problematic on 
several levels. Regardless of the language of sleep that Coupland employs (‘awakening’ 
from coma), what is most contentious is that he continues to refer to Karen’s CDC as a 
‘coma’, despite overtly acknowledging it to be a persistent vegetative state within the 
pages of the novel. The tone and subtext of the comment is likewise controversial, 
implying that the coma is a fantastic ‘opportunity’ for the redevelopment of a new self, 
as though the medical condition offers a choice for the coma survivor. Just as Welsh 
and Garland represent a sense of control within coma, Coupland speaks of a sense of 
control outside of coma – a freedom that is presented to the reborn and resurrected 
neomort. In these words, the potential for brain trauma and long-term neurological 
conditions is brushed over once more, again reflecting Robert Wiersema’s implication 
that the dramatic device of coma has to be manipulated and exploited in some way if an 
engaging, commercial fiction is to be created. But what is most problematic about 
Coupland’s comment comes to light when considering the real inspiration for the novel: 
the high-profile case of Karen Quinlan. 
In 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan, after accidentally ingesting a combination of alcohol 
and sedatives, suffered a heart attack which caused massive brain damage, leaving her 
in a ‘permanent’ vegetative state (the adjective ‘permanent’ referring to her lack of 
positive prognosis for recovery, usually defined after the patient has been in a PVS for 
one year). In 1976, her father’s application to remove his daughter’s ventilator was 
granted by the New Jersey Supreme Court. However, once removed, Quinlan survived 
for another nine years in a vegetative state, therefore drawing to the attention of the 
public the fact that ‘VS patients breathe spontaneously’.81  
The parallels between this case and Coupland’s novel are immediately clear: both 
victim and fictional counterpart enter coma after ingesting a lethal cocktail of drink and 
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sedatives; both enter a persistent vegetative state, maintaining and sustaining 
autonomous aspiration; the full name of Coupland’s character is Karen Ann McNeil, the 
fictional equivalent of Karen Ann Quinlan. However, it is here that the similarities end, 
and it is this that emphasises the difficulty both of Coupland’s reflection upon the novel 
and of the novel itself. Clearly aware of the Quinlan case, Coupland still creates a 
hugely misleading representation of coma/CDCs and, moreover, he openly discusses the 
potential ‘coma’ has to offer for the reformation and reshaping of identity whilst fully 
aware that Quinlan had no choice over a reshaping of selfhood, and whilst still using the 
inaccurate designation ‘coma’. As Fins posits when analysing the ethical and policy 
implications of late recovery from the minimally conscious state, ‘The conflation of 
these brain states is understandable but never excusable’.82  
Such misrepresentations, I argue, have a palpable impact not only upon the public 
understanding of coma and other CDCs, generating widespread confusion and 
misinformation, but also upon the public’s recognition of and empathy with brain injury 
and, moreover, its survivors. If the public receive representations of coma that largely 
belie the possibility of brain injury, or even (in the case of a film like Trance) 
representations of brain injury that propagate the belief that the neurological condition is 
‘curable’, then the public are poorly equipped with the accurate knowledge that would 
allow them to recognise survivors of brain injury in the world at large. This, I suggest, 
results in stigmatization of the brain injury survivor. Frequently, those survivors I have 
worked with during the course of my research have spoken of experiences which speak 
of their stigmatization in a society where misinformation about brain injury is abound. 
Both Steph Grant and Caroline Waugh have discussed how, on numerous occasions, 
they have been mistaken for ‘drunks’ because of slurred speech or impaired motor 
functions. Caroline even spoke of one occasion when, phoning for an ambulance for her 
sick son, the emergency operator refused to help, again mistaking Caroline’s slurred 
speech (a consequence of her TBI) for alcohol-impairment. 
John McClure writes extensively on this topic, examining the role of causal 
attributions in the public misconceptions about brain injury. Because, largely speaking, 
‘brain injury is invisible’,83 the general public, when confronted with the behaviours of 
a brain injury survivor (uninhibited or aggressive behaviour, for example), will 
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‘misattribute’ these as being facets of the individual’s inherent personality or nature. In 
line with my discussions of the perception of brain injury being curable, McClure posits 
that, ‘Many of the public believe that… a person with even severe brain injury may 
completely recover apart from some problems with memory’,84 reflecting the 
preoccupation with memory and amnesia that is common within fictional 
representations of coma and brain trauma. Thus, McClure concludes, ‘With invisible 
conditions such as brain injury, people tend to discount the severity of the injury and 
suggest that the person will fully recover all their normal abilities’.85 This medical 
perspective, I suggest, reflects Sontag’s critique of contemporary culture and, in 
particular, her notion, discussed earlier, that when a disease becomes a metaphor, the 
victim of the disease becomes both a victim and a culprit. In the case of the brain injury 
survivor, the public extend their sympathy, yet then lose this when the survivor does not 
fully recover: when the survivor is perceived to be ‘not trying hard enough’ to recover. 
This ‘invisibility’ that McClure speaks of is perpetuated by the wealth of misleading 
coma fictions that are in the public domain, highlighting the central findings of the 
Wijdicks’s study of the misrepresentations of coma in motion pictures, and the potential 
impact and influence that these had, they discovered, on medically-trained and lay 
populations alike. 
However, where McClure postulates that because of an absence of ‘a [physical] 
marker of injury’, the brain injury survivor ‘does not suffer automatic stigmatization’,86 
I contend that it is precisely this invisibility of injury that does lead to stigmatization: 
what I would call a stigmatization through normalization. McClure does concede that 
the ‘appearance of normality and wellbeing leads people who do not understand brain 
injury to overlook any disability’, suggesting that these ‘misconceptions can lead to 
accusations of malingering and may impede survivors’ re-integration into society and 
fuel discriminatory practices’.87 However, he does not necessarily see this as stigma as 
the brain injury, itself, isn’t being stigmatized unlike, perhaps, the physical, detectable 
‘signifiers’ of others who are physically disabled. However I would contest this 
postulation. In fact, to use McClure’s language register, I suggest that the brain injury 
survivor is stigmatized precisely for the misattribution of alternative stigmatizing 
‘labels’ circulating in society (‘drunk’ or ‘benefits cheat’, for example, or McClure’s 
                                                     
84
 McClure, ‘The Role of Causal Attributions, p. 86. 
85
 Ibid., p. 87. 
86
 Ibid., p. 88. 
87
 Ibid., p. 88. 
224 
 
 
own label, ‘malingerer’), as well as the broader medico-social misattributions of ‘mental 
illness’ or ‘learning disability’. 
In the work of coma and brain injury survivors I have published, much of the writing 
focuses upon the trauma, hardship and permanence of post-brain injury living. Laurence 
Cox, a TBI survivor of a motorcycle accident, writes of his ‘fear of seeing the world 
permanently broken into shards, with people wildly out of focus’,88 evoking the 
cognitive confusion that he still has many years after the accident and his emergence 
from coma, alongside the panic that is so often triggered, for him, in crowded social 
situations. Crucially, also, he overtly makes reference to the ‘permanence’ of his 
neurological disability which leads to fluctuations in energy, concentration and mood. 
In communicating these sporadic subjective experiences, Cox employs sparsely-
punctuated streams of consciousness, his need to be ‘energised exercised worked’89 
often hampered by an apathy and lack of auto-affection, symptoms of his brain injury 
and condition that often make him feel as though he is physically ‘ill’.90  
Similarly, in his story ‘Unremembered Memoirs’, Steph Grant, as discussed, 
recounts his post-coma ‘fugue-states’. In trying to communicate the cognitive rupture 
during which he violently assaults his two best friends, Grant exploits mise-en-page, 
physically jolting the reader and inviting them into the fearful jumble of snapshot 
memories that, like those of McCarthy’s Enactor in Remainder, gradually come back to 
him, fragmented and out of synch, and that are ‘in some sense… not real’ [original 
emphasis]:
91
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92
 
 
These behaviours that both Grant and Cox describe might be confusing and difficult 
to comprehend for a general public whose misconceptions of brain injury are constantly 
sustained by fictional misrepresentations of the condition. Grant’s sporadic violence 
would possibly demonise him as an individual in the eyes of the public because of the 
invisibility of his injury and the misinformation they are fed. Interestingly, in McClure’s 
research and social experimentations, when the public were presented with a set of such 
behaviours and given a photograph of the ‘perpetrator’ sporting a physical scar or 
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injury, the public were much more forgiving and understanding and more likely to put 
this behaviour down to some form of perceived brain injury. However, it is important to 
reiterate that the prevalence of the coma metaphor alongside the misleading conflation 
of CDCs (that have led to this crisis of misunderstanding of brain injury in society) have 
not arisen from fiction alone. As touched upon, there are frequently slippages of 
language and examples of misreporting in media coverage when attempting to describe 
coma and other CDCs, as I will now further illustrate. 
In 1984, an Arkansas teenager, Terry Wallis, went into a coma after a serious car 
crash. Nineteen years later, he emerged from coma (apparently with cognition and 
speech functions largely and quickly intact) to find himself a middle-aged man with a 
teenage daughter. In the Mail Online’s reportage, the ‘miracle recovery’ dimension is 
exploited, describing how the first word he uttered was ‘Mom’, exploiting the emotive 
weight of the story.
93
 The article refers to the ‘experts’ who point out that ‘cases like 
Wallis’s, where the patient is able to talk freely after a long period of unconsciousness, 
are extremely rare’. However, The Guardian Online presents an entirely different 
picture. Here it is revealed that ‘a few years’ before his dramatic ‘calling out for his 
mother’, Wallis had ‘begun responding to questions by blinking his eyes’.94 It becomes 
clear that far from this being a ‘miracle’, Terry Wallis has taken the slow, painful, 
frustrating and traumatic road to recovery, moving between coma to permanent 
vegetative state to persistent vegetative state to minimally conscious state and finally, to 
consciousness. Despite the more accurate (and less emotively-charged) reporting of The 
Guardian, however, the headline still reads: ‘Crash Victim Wakes Up After 20 Years In 
Coma’. This appears to be a ‘short-cut’ utilized to fulfil a news agenda that not only 
conflates and confuses the CDCs but also draws upon the coma-as-sleep metaphor. 
The case of Terry Wallis becomes even more complex when the finer details are 
examined more closely. Slipping into coma in 1984, eighteen years before the 
minimally conscious state (MCS) was recognized in 2002, the protestations of Wallis’s 
family that he could ‘[follow] a command or purposefully [track] an object in his visual 
field’ fell on deaf ears, the physicians putting these observations down to ‘wishful 
thinking rather than useful clinical evidence’.95 This exemplifies the confusions that 
                                                     
93
 Rosalind Ryan, ‘Coma Man Wakes After 19 Years’, Mail Online (2003). 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-187920/Coma-man-wakes-19-years.html> [accessed: 
19/07/14]. 
94
 Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Crash Victim Wakes Up After 20 Years’, The Guardian (9 July 2003) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/09/usa.suzannegoldenberg> [accessed: 19/07/14]. 
95
 Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘Crash Victim Wakes Up After 20 Years’. 
227 
 
 
occur with CDCs, even within the medical profession. As Derick Wade points out in his 
discussion of the ever-changing boundaries of what constitutes death in the light of the 
rise of the neomort and CDCs, ‘There is no absolute boundary, and as medical practice 
and capabilities advance, so once clear boundaries become increasingly ill-defined, 
especially so for death’.96 This ambiguity surrounding states of consciousness is 
similarly explored through ideas more rooted in philosophy, most notably in Giorgio 
Agamben’s notion of the multiple ‘thresholds’ between life and death. Reflecting upon 
the ethical and existential positioning of the comatose patient, Agamben posits, ‘The 
concept “death”, far from having become more exact, now oscillates from one pole to 
the other with the greatest indeterminacy’,97 an uncertainty that has stemmed, in line 
with Wade’s argument, from increasing discoveries of complex and barely-delineated 
levels and divisions of consciousness. It is also a sentiment that was addressed, a quarter 
of a century earlier, by Robin Cook in Coma, communicated at the point at which Susan 
begins her research into coma: ‘The more she read about coma, the less she felt she 
knew… it was not known what determined consciousness, other than saying that the 
individual was not unconscious… In fact, being fully conscious and being totally 
unconscious (coma) seemed to represent opposite ends of a continuous spectrum’ 
[emphasis added].
98
 Again, this conveys Wade’s medical stance on this subject and 
Agamben’s philosophical perspective, with Wade explicating that, ‘The vegetative state 
is simply one end of a spectrum of awareness, and there is no obvious cut-off between 
the vegetative state and the low-awareness state’.99  
The Wallis case is just one example of many that illustrates how the degree of media 
misreporting is rife. In Latronico’s study of the quality of reporting on the vegetative 
state of the Italian woman Eluana Englaro, it was found that ‘the majority of articles 
(88%) [of 967 articles] were dedicated to non-medical aspects of VS’ with the 
inadequacy of the reporting being ‘mostly the result of missing information’.100 This 
study also draws attention to the case of Theresa (Terri) Schiavo and the US media 
coverage of her VS, revealing that ‘only 1.4% of articles [of 1,141 studied] provided an 
explanation of VS, with a high number of incorrect or equivocal descriptions’.101 
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Latronico exemplifies the dangers of such misrepresentations and the effect these can 
have upon the public understanding of these conditions: 
 
[A] videotape showing that Ms Schiavo was able to open and move her eyes 
ignited the public skepticism [sic] over her diagnosis of VS because most 
viewers had no idea that VS patients can have periods of [sleep-wake] 
periods in which eyes are open and may move about.
102
  
 
Furthermore, in Eric Racine’s analysis of the media coverage of the Schiavo case to 
which Latronico also refers, it is observed that, ‘The most frequently used terms to 
describe Schiavo’s neurological condition and diagnosis were “persistent vegetative 
state”, “brain damage”, “vegetative state”, “severe brain damage”, and “coma”’.103 This 
once more evidences the conflation of terminology and CDCs, leading to escalating 
public misinformation and confusion. In this instance, this confusion had a profound 
impact, most notably, upon Schiavo’s ‘right to die’ decision due to the fact that the 
press, through misreporting of the persistent vegetative state, suggested that Schiavo’s 
instinctive behaviours represented deeper cognitive functioning, thus influencing a huge 
public and moral backlash against the Schiavo family’s case to withdraw Artificial 
Nutrition and Hydration (ANH) to allow their daughter to die. 
Gabrielle Samuel and Jenny Kitzinger’s extensive analysis of reporting 
consciousness in coma explores these case studies, whilst also examining the rush to 
report so-called ‘miracle recovery’104 stories, as in the case of Terry Wallis. These do 
occasionally occur, as Samuel and Kitzinger acknowledge, although they are 
enormously rare, but what they are primarily concerned with is how even the more 
routine recoveries (like that of Wallis) are reported in terms of the miraculous event, 
sometimes ‘presenting scientific inaccuracies and confusing use of terminology’.105 
This can be seen, for example, in the article cited earlier of the young girl, Vicki Allen, 
who failed to come out of her induced coma which was administered in order to stem 
leukaemia cell-production. The headline ‘SAVED… BY SUMS’ carries all of the 
emotive weight of a miracle recovery story, with an almost redemptive undertone, as the 
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article focuses on how she was brought out of coma by her father posing arithmetical 
puzzles to her, maths being her ‘favourite subject’.106 The privileged pull-out quote is a 
soundbite from her father: ‘It was magical’, thus reflecting the obsession the media has 
with miraculous recoveries from coma. This is further supported by Eelco Wijdicks and 
Marilou Wijdicks’s study into the coverage of ‘coma’ in the headlines of American 
newspapers from 2001 to 2005. They note that the most popular reporting on coma was 
constituted by so-called ‘miracle awakenings’ that were covered by multiple 
newspapers.
107
 They go on to discuss how, from the details of recovery described in the 
reports (all involving ‘emergence of speech after no communication for decades’, as in 
the Wallis case), ‘none of these patients appeared in a persistent vegetative state, and 
patients were far more likely to be in a minimally conscious state or other severely 
disabled neurological state’.108 Furthermore, ‘Persistent vegetative state was rarely a 
subject of interest’,109 again contributing to the wealth of misinformation in circulation. 
Press inaccuracies are clear to see, therefore, but what is interesting about Samuel 
and Kitzinger’s study is that it also examines the role of scientific reporting in creating 
confusion and misinformation surrounding CDCs. Focusing on the ‘breakthrough’ 
discovery that fMRI scanning supposedly revealed that patients in a persistent 
vegetative state responded positively to verbal stimuli (patients’ brains ‘lighting up’ 
when asked to, for example, imagine they were playing tennis
110
), Samuel and Kitzinger 
explore the level of ‘hope’ that both scientific and media reportage generates. They 
point towards how ‘two senior figures’ within the field of medicine ‘made public 
statements’ that suggested that the initial fMRI studies revealed the patient’s ‘rich’ or 
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‘complex’ inner mental life.111 These comments were naturally seized upon by the 
mainstream press. However, as Samuel and Kitzinger assert, ‘Reports rarely mentioned 
that only a minority of the patients had responded to the fMRI task and did not discuss 
the implications for ‘non-responders’ and their families’.112 Referring to the literature of 
the original study, this limited success is clear with only 5 subjects out of 54 tested 
being able to ‘wilfully modulate their brain activity’, and all 5 of them having a 
traumatic brain injury.
113
 However, as Samuel and Kitzinger reveal, much of the press 
reportage and the subsequent scientific papers ‘presented no caveats about the level of 
cognitive function such patients might possess’,114 citing the use of such hyperbole as 
‘Astonishing Breakthrough Medical Miracle’ (The Sun, 4 February, 2010) and the 
Sunday’s Times’ less hysterical yet nevertheless fantastical: ‘Telepathic Leap’ (7 
February, 2010).
115 
This latter example of media embellishment, in its science-fiction 
infused reference to ‘telepathy’, has its counterpart in fiction itself, most notably in 
Tarsem Singh’s coma film The Cell116 and, most recently, in Kristina Buožytė’s 
psycho-erotic coma film Vanishing Waves,
117
 both texts depicting the central 
protagonist being projected into the psyche of a victim of a particular chronic disorder 
of consciousness: the neomort as virtual-reality pod. In a reversal of this narrative 
model of the ‘external’ protagonist ‘inserting’ themselves into the telepathic mind of the 
coma patient, the 1978 film Patrick sees the murderous eponymous anti-hero, whilst in 
coma, telekinetically controlling the overworld to defend himself against those who 
wish to do him harm,
118
 once more representing the fictional ‘telepathic leap’ of the 
coma protagonist. 
In the conclusion to their study, Samuel and Kitzinger assert that such scientific and 
media misrepresentations and ‘hype’ contribute to what has been termed the ‘political 
economy of hope’. Coined by Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good in her examination of the 
discourse of hope in American oncology, the ‘political economy of hope’, Good posits, 
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sustains ‘specialist-research oncology’ through maintaining the belief that cancer is 
‘curable’. This allows ‘society’s cultural interpretation of “hope” to be perpetuated’ and 
as Good asserts, ‘The funding of cancer research both depends on and promotes’ the 
hope that cancer can be cured.
119
 This constant drive to sustain hope, a ‘dynamics of 
expectations’ to refer to Nik Brown’s exploration of this topic,120 inevitably leads to 
‘hype’: a magnification of the potential of new technologies and scientific developments 
designed both to sustain hope and to ensure medical funding will continue. Brown is 
fully aware of the dangers of such build-up of hope through hype, particularly through 
the over-reporting of new technologies (as in the fMRI study). He proposes that as 
‘once distant futures advance towards the present, comparisons are made between past 
promises and present realities’.121 Of course, there is nothing more damaging than a 
scientific breakthrough that is suddenly found to be a failure, yet conversely, in order 
for the breakthrough to be funded and advanced, the language of scientific reportage has 
to overly ‘hype’ the breakthrough in order to continue to interest the public and 
maintain funding and investment – in order to preserve ‘hope’. 
I propose that this political economy of hope is at work within literary and fictional 
representations of coma and the use of the coma metaphor. Returning to my discussion 
in chapter four, I suggest that the coma metaphor allows authors to confront fears over 
this chronic disorder of consciousness and what it can be seen to represent: the void in 
consciousness that may come with death. In this sense, then, the prevalence of the coma 
metaphor not only helps to sustain this political economy of hope, but also perhaps 
reveals the need for a personal and cultural economy of hope. As Zygmunt Bauman 
further discusses in his analysis of the deconstruction of mortality by modern societies, 
there is a constant ‘drive to mastery’ over death which, he argues, is a ‘mode of being 
shot through with hope’.122 Moreover, Bauman argues, ‘The very act of thinking death is 
already its denial’, proposing that ‘our thoughts of death, to be at all thinkable, must 
already be processed, artificed, tinkered with’.123 The proliferation of the coma 
metaphor and metaphorical representations of coma within literature and media 
reportage alike can be seen as a manifestation of the human desire to ‘process’ death, 
therefore contributing to a ‘mode of hope’ and to an overall ethical dilemma. We only 
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need to return to the examples of misleading and confusing reporting on Michael 
Schumacher’s condition, discussed at the beginning of this investigation, to see this 
mode in operation. All of the overly ‘hopeful’ reporting conveys the very real need not 
to conceive of this ‘giant’ of motor-sport as anything other than ‘heroic’ and flawless, 
thus consistently failing to address the possibility of long-term neurological damage. 
This ‘hope culture’ and the mythologizing of difficult and traumatic experiences can be 
further explicated by returning to Ricoeur and his concepts of sedimentation and 
‘narrative identity’. 
In his discussions concerning our ‘demand’ for narrative and story-telling, Ricoeur 
explores how the self begins to ‘know itself’ through the ‘cultural signs’ and ‘symbolic 
mediations’ which constitute ‘the narratives of everyday life’.124 Furthermore, he 
argues, ‘Human lives become more regularly intelligible when they are interpreted in 
the light of the stories that people tell about them’, going on to suggest that these ‘life 
stories’ are even more ‘intelligible’ when ‘narrative models’ or ‘plots’ from ‘history or 
fiction’ are applied to them.125 Ricoeur therefore suggests that humans consistently use 
and ‘innovate’ the sediment of historical and fictional narratives in order to try and 
understand and explicate their own lives, thereby meaning that we ‘never cease to 
reinterpret the narrative identity that constitutes us, in the light of the narratives 
proposed to us by our culture’.126 In considering Ricoeur’s theoretical position, I argue 
that society has developed the coma metaphor by innovating elements of the 
mythological and fictional sediment (including, for example, archetypal tales of 
katabasis and the interrelationship of sleep and death) in order to explain and demystify 
this otherwise incomprehensible disorder of consciousness – in other words to make it 
more ‘intelligible’, to use Ricoeur’s language, and therefore to contribute to an overall 
personal, cultural and political economy of hope that spans across all modes of writing 
and story-telling, from fiction to the media. As Ricoeur posits, ‘It is therefore by means 
of the imaginative variations of our own ego that we attempt to obtain a narrative 
understanding of ourselves’.127 In this way, then, we perhaps need these stories – and 
the hope that they promise us – in order to understand ourselves and the world we live 
in, even if this ‘understanding’ may be somewhat illusory. Indeed, writing of the 
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function of fiction in ‘shaping’ reality, Ricoeur proposes that, ‘[M]imesis is not simply 
reduplication but creative reconstruction by means of the mediation of fiction’.128 
However, I argue that this ‘creative reconstruction’ can be dangerous and that our 
‘imaginative variations’, rather than allowing us a ‘narrative understanding of 
ourselves’, can often lead to more confusion and crisis of identity, as seen in the 
development of the coma metaphor. Not only does this metaphor dilute the gravity of 
coma as medical condition, but it also masks the potential for permanent brain damage, 
once more contributing to a personal and political economy of hope. These ‘creative 
reconstructions’, then, intersect with the ‘hype’ and circulation of misinformation by the 
media and mainstream scientific reportage, the ‘sediment’ of coma and CDC 
mythologies therefore being constantly appropriated and innovated. Between fiction and 
the misinformation circulated by so-called ‘factual’ reporting, I argue, there is a very 
human cost to the economies of hope that are being generated and sustained. 
To illustrate this human cost, Nik Brown explains that whilst there are advantages of 
the circulation of overly positive sickness narratives and of medical reportage (for 
example, in the advancement of ‘research space, attractive investment and [justification 
of] morally challenging research’) there is also often a negative impact upon the patients 
and loved ones at the centre of such narratives. Stories such as the skewed, overly 
optimistic reportage of Wallis, Grzebski and Schiavo, alongside the fMRI studies, have 
‘enormous potency because they tell of the precarious futures of individuals who are 
desperate for treatment’.129 In these coma cases, the desperation for a ‘miracle recovery’ 
so common in fiction or media reportage is shared by the loved ones of the patient, 
leading to the ‘costs of inflated promise’, an overly-‘hyped’ assurance that is further 
communicated and perpetuated in the press. Samuel and Kitzinger, for example, 
examine the impact that such reporting of the fMRI studies had on the loved ones of 
PVS patients. What promised to be a ‘telepathic leap’ (again a description that is 
evocative of some of the sensationalized premises of coma fiction referred to earlier) 
had profoundly negative effects upon loved ones who found themselves suddenly 
caught in a double-bind. On the one hand, it built hope that they could now 
communicate to their loved ones (if they did not already have that hope and belief), but 
on the other hand, with this ‘proof’ that they could communicate, they now did not 
know how they could translate hope into a practical means that could help their loved 
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ones to recover. In fact, for some, knowing that their loved one did have autonomous 
awareness of his or her self and surroundings made the situation even more painful. 
Samuel and Kitzinger also describe, for example, how one particular family member of 
a patient in PVS was ‘bitterly disappointed’ when she  discovered that ‘it would be 
difficult to access fMRI because – contrary to the expectations raised in her by media 
reporting – the imaging was only available as part of scientific studies’.130 When 
looking closer at The Sun’s reporting of the study, the economy of hope is once more 
stressed, and overtly so, as Samuel and Kitzinger reveal, with the newspaper using a 
‘sleeping beauty’ image of a comatose patient along with the caption ‘Hope…brain 
study’.131  
This hope economy is certainly not straightforward in this field of chronic disorders 
of consciousness, and continues to be complicated by fictional misrepresentations which 
feed into the public’s confused conception of coma and other CDCs. I further suggest 
that it complicates the ethical positioning of the neomort’s status of existence, and it 
does this by, paradoxically, over-simplifying this status by a feverish use of the coma 
metaphor and innovation of the sediment: coma as a deep sleep, the interiority of which 
is akin to dream; coma as death-state, the interiority of which is akin to katabatic and 
topographical descent; coma as a hypno-analytical process of abreaction, during which 
there is a confrontation with the darkest desires and secrets of the unconscious; 
emergence from coma as resurrection and transfiguration. It is perhaps because coma is 
none of these things, yet appears as though it could be all of them, that has motivated 
the writers of coma fiction to perpetuate the coma metaphor. Indeed, the figure of the 
neomort can be seen to represent one of the most unintelligible conditions of human 
existence, viewed as neither fully alive, nor fully dead, to refer to Gaylin’s bioethical 
paradigm whilst simultaneously adopting the language of Derridean analysis. Most 
recently, the existential nature of the neomort has been complicated further, with a study 
by Gray et al discovering that the neomort is also seen, puzzlingly, to be ‘more dead 
than dead’. In this study, research participants were found to perceive persons in the 
persistent vegetative state as ‘having reduced mental capacity relative to the 
disembodied dead person’.132 This study seems to corroborate therefore Jennett’s 
assertion that many people regard the permanent vegetative state ‘as a fate worse than 
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death’,133 whilst emphasizing Wade’s claim that there could be ‘extensive arguments 
about whether continued existence in a low awareness state is worse than being 
dead’.134  
What these observations and findings further reveal is the confusion and fear that 
surrounds the figure of the neomort and the range of CDCs that he can potentially 
inhabit. But it is precisely this confusion and fear, I suggest, that has led to the rise and 
longevity of the coma metaphor which not only serves to dilute this confusion over 
coma and other CDCs, but also dilute the fear over brain injury by disregarding its 
permanence, or refuting its possibility. However, paradoxically, in the attempt to 
conquer this fear and confusion and to maintain an economy of hope through the use of 
the coma metaphor (Bauman’s ‘drive to mastery’ over death), authors have only given 
rise to more fear and confusion for those who have been truly affected by coma and 
brain injury and their loved ones. In short, the real-life experiences and encounters with 
these medical conditions do not embody those that are depicted across literature and the 
media, leading to the proliferation of misinformation, the rise of the pejorative brain 
injury metaphor and the stigmatization of the brain injury survivor and of the neomort. 
Susan Sontag, at the end of Illness As Metaphor, suggests that it is ‘likely that the 
language about cancer will evolve in the coming years’.135 The fact that, ten years later, 
her focus moved from the cancer metaphor to the proliferation of the AIDS metaphor 
testifies to her prediction coming true. However, in the constant proliferation of over-
simplified fictions of coma, it is difficult to see whether such a change in language will 
occur with this condition or, indeed, with the long-term neurological condition of brain 
injury. As Caspermeyer concludes in his study of stigmatizing language and medical 
inconsistencies in neurology coverage by American newspapers, ‘Public perceptions 
and attitudes are the foundation of the stigmatizing process’.136 I suggest that fictional 
representations form part of the bedrock (the ‘sediment’, to return once more to Ricoeur 
and in extension of his geological metaphor) of such perceptions and attitudes. This 
makes it all the more imperative to represent and circulate more accurate and ethically 
‘responsible’ representations of coma before public misunderstanding spirals out of 
control, leading to even greater impact upon the victims of CDCs, alongside their loved 
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ones. And so in closing this investigation, I would like to propose (in adapting Zadie 
Smith’s phrase) ‘two paths’ for the future coma novel: two potential models which 
might aid the creation of ethically responsible representations of illness (coma/brain 
injury) whilst simultaneously allowing for creative freedom and autonomy. 
 
 
6.5: Conclusion: Two Paths for the Novel – A Proposition. 
 
The first path can be seen in Tom McCarthy’s Remainder. A post-trauma, post-coma 
novel, this accurately presents the hardships of rehabilitation, and the long-term impact 
that brain injury has upon the unnamed narrator. Whilst not delving into what actually 
occurred within the coma (the void; the no-space), it does depict certain ‘islands’ of 
consciousness during the ‘lightening’ of coma, as written about, for example, by James 
Cracknell. These islands haunt the mind of McCarthy’s Enactor and may or may not be 
real, just as Steph Grant calls into the question the validity of memories that he 
confronts in his two autobiographical short stories. Throughout the novel, also, there are 
subtle allusions to the Enactor’s aphasia. Often struggling to find words or their 
meanings, the Enactor frequently tasks Naz’s ‘people’ to find them for him. Indeed his 
mantra ‘like something that’s come out of something’ repeatedly conveys his aphasic 
condition. McCarthy also depicts the Enactor’s violent emotional outbursts (typical of 
frontal lobe damage) and implies that he may have parosmia, an olfactory dysfunction 
which causes the brain to identify improperly an odour’s ‘natural’ smell (the ‘liver’, for 
example, smells ‘a bit like cordite’). There is the insistence of the Enactor’s friends that 
‘he looks the same’, and must therefore be the same (McCarthy tapping into the notion 
of brain injury largely being an ‘invisible’ injury); and then there are the detailed 
descriptions of physical rehabilitation which have struck a chord with brain injury 
survivors and their carers when I have shared these passages of the text at numerous 
brain injury conferences. Yet McCarthy’s novel never feels compromised by ethical 
responsibility, nor by the need to present ‘the facts’. Indeed, its increasingly surreal and 
frenzied plot development spirals out of control, and, one might say, out of reality, yet 
seems to be simultaneously born out of a very real situation: the struggle for identity of 
a traumatic brain injury survivor who is desperate to become again the person whom he 
used to be. 
The second path for the novel, I propose, can be seen in Richard Powers’s The Echo 
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Maker, discussed in chapter five. Like McCarthy, Powers is meticulous in his depiction 
of the traumas of post-coma rehabilitation (most notably the re-acquisition of language) 
but also, unlike McCarthy, attempts to describe the interiority of the coma itself. 
Writing about the degradation and dehumanization of Mark Schluter’s body from his 
sister’s perspective, Powers gradually deconstructs the ‘sleeping beauty’ metaphor that 
is common in coma fiction and which is also privileged in media reportage. Powers’s 
description of Capgras syndrome is likewise painstakingly researched and represents 
many of the discoveries reported within medical literature, but this does not mean that 
the author does not amplify the uniqueness of the condition itself as part of his fictional 
agenda. Describing Mark’s condition, Powers, through the narrative focalization of the 
psychiatrist Weber remarks that, ‘True Capgras resulting from closed-head trauma: the 
odds against it were unimaginable’.137 Weber goes on to maintain that the majority of 
Capgras cases arise in patients with psychosis. Yet when referring to the medical 
literature, it becomes clear that, ‘Although frequently seen in psychotic states, over a 
third of the documented cases of Capgras syndrome have occurred in conjunction with 
traumatic brain lesions, suggesting that the syndrome has an organic basis’.138 Powers, 
then, magnifies the mystery and intrigue of the condition for narrative impact, yet 
without undermining the gravity of the condition itself, or without compromising his 
accuracy of depicting it. However, it is in the initial representations of Mark’s coma 
unconscious where the greatest examples of artistic licence are seen, yet these, I argue, 
constitute the perfect paradigm for future representations of the interiority of coma. 
Throughout the first section of the novel, whilst Mark is still in coma, Powers 
frequently shifts from third-person focalization to first person, depicting Mark’s 
comatose consciousness. But unlike so many of the fantasy-narratives and the use of 
mythological metaphors and archetypes of sleep and dream, Powers’s depiction focuses 
on Mark’s struggle to regain his identity and, chiefly, his reacquisition of language, 
speech and mental lucidity: 
 
He has to work some, with time come back. Up and attic, there and bath 
again. Have him living in a boxcar now. Old train with others orphaned like 
him. He’s lived in worse. Not easy to say just where he is. So he says 
nothing. Some things say him. What’s on his mind hops off. Thoughts come 
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out, not thoughts he knew he had. No one always knows what he means. 
This can’t bother him. He doesn’t really, either.139  
 
In this extract, and subsequent sequences, Powers creates approximations of the coma 
consciousness as Mark moves through this towards other disorders of consciousness in 
order to achieve ‘full’ consciousness in the ‘overworld’. Powers describes a vague 
awareness of Mark’s physical entrapment that collapse into distant, fractured memories 
of the past. Intrusions of the comings-and-goings of the hospital around him similarly 
impinge on his consciousness (later referencing a ‘girl’ who ‘comes by’ whom ‘he’d 
like to do’) and are also assimilated into the fragmented non-sequiturs of his 
traumatized brain. The disjunctions between half-completed or broken phrases conveys 
Steph Grant’s rendering of his own post-coma cognitive confusion examined earlier, 
Powers’s technique beginning to depict a transition into the ‘lightening’ stage of coma. 
It is also a technique similarly employed by Alex Garland at the point whereby, as 
discussed, Carl reaches the nadir of his coma consciousness, the broken signifying 
chains of language eventually flooding his consciousness as his brain ‘reboots’. In 
Powers’s novel, Mark’s linguistic slips and trips metaphorically represent the impact of 
his brain injury upon his personhood, memory and language skills, although not in a 
sensationalist way. Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck, in their analysis of Powers’s ‘effort 
to imagine the basic level of Mark’s consciousness’,140 refer to ‘the narrator’s fabulating 
presence’ that constitutes ‘a shining illustration of poetic illusion’.141 At the moment at 
which he begins to gain full consciousness, he sees himself as a beached whale rotting 
on the beach with his ‘skin’ peeling off ‘in sheets of blubber’. Whilst this is clearly a 
metaphor of ‘rebirth’ or ‘metamorphosis’ through death (common motifs in coma 
fiction), it is not overly exploited or developed into a complex mythological ‘grand 
narrative’. Instead, he navigates through the void in consciousness of coma and examines 
this interiority by representing the traumatic symptoms of Mark’s brain injury, most 
notably his aphasia and memory gaps. These staccato and disjointed imaginings of the 
cognitive process during which Mark’s ‘parts come back to him, so slowly’142 
creatively embody the painstaking and traumatic return to consciousness and 
reacquisition of mental faculties. It is a process that is similarly depicted by McCarthy 
                                                     
139
 Powers, The Echo Maker, p. 49. 
140
 Luc Herman and Bart Vervaeck, ‘Capturing Capgras: The Echo Maker by Richard Powers’, Style, 
Vol.43 (3) (2009), 407-428, (p. 422). 
141
 Ibid., p. 427. 
142
 Powers, The Echo Maker, p. 42. 
239 
 
 
in writing of the gradual return and re-ordering of memories of his Enactor, or even 
perhaps by Redgrove, when writing of his induced comas, describing the sensation of 
the ‘pieces’ of his selfhood being ‘taken away like a stage-set being dismantled’,143 
pieces (‘parts’, to refer again to Powers’s novel) that were gradually reassembled post-
coma. 
Whilst Herman and Vervaeck contend that such representations of the interiority of 
coma ‘for some readers run counter to the rather elementary brain activity of which 
Mark gives proof elsewhere in the early depictions of consciousness’,144 I argue that it is 
such a representation that constitutes this second path for the coma novel, creating an 
approximation of the lightening of coma (akin to Hollyman’s ‘surfacing’ in Keeping 
Britain Tidy) as the survivor struggles with the impact of brain injury, whilst 
simultaneously conveying the chaos of cognitive impairment and confusion that will 
continue throughout post-coma rehabilitation. Despite the metaphorical and figurative 
nature of this particular work of fiction, it is precisely this lack of cohesion and 
disjointed imagery that combines to create an ethical representation of the coma 
consciousness, indicating, as Herman and Vervaeck lucidly posit, ‘the narrator’s 
guiding light in the relative darkness of Mark’s psyche’.145  
I will close by referring, once again, to the tragic case of the PVS patient Terri 
Schiavo. As reported upon extensively within medical literature, Schiavo’s ‘right to die’ 
case was hugely complicated by misrepresentation and misreporting of her condition, 
with ‘many print and media outlets [choosing] to sensationalize the dispute’146 between 
her family and the Florida legislature in her family’s desperation to withdraw Terri’s 
treatment. Eric Racine’s report on the media coverage of the case found extensive 
scientifically inaccurate, inconsistent or incorrect prognoses, erratic diagnostic 
terminology (as referred to earlier, with the conflation of different CDCs), and highly 
emotively and politically charged language designed to mislead audiences in their 
conception of Schiavo’s end-of-life care. Descriptions of the withdrawal of life support 
were abound, including references to ‘murder’ or ‘death by starvation’, and 
‘explanations of the basic concept of PVS and other CDCs were rare’.147 Crucially, it 
was found that, ‘Statements conveying false hopes for recovery were disseminated in a 
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general absence of adequate critical examination and background information about 
PVS and CDCs’ [my emphasis].148 This misinformation was reflected in the backlash 
against the family of Terri Schiavo, resulting in multiple repeals of the decision to 
withdraw treatment which only served to prolong and exacerbate the trauma felt by all 
parties closely involved. It is such cases, I suggest, that emphasise the negative impact 
of the economies of hope that are generated and sustained, in part, by fictional and 
media misrepresentations of coma and other CDCs. The Schiavo case, in which the 
decision to withdraw treatment was repeatedly granted and overturned, is a clear real-
world example of how confusions, obfuscations and fictions of complex medical 
conditions have a fundamental impact upon both the victims of CDCs and their loved 
ones. And whilst one can never prescribe what an author should or should not write, I 
concur with the conclusions made by the Racine study. That as long as 
misrepresentations of coma, CDCs and brain injury continue (and as long as the coma 
metaphor is replicated), then the more likely we are to encounter increasing ethical and 
diagnostic challenges to how society perceives the victims of such conditions, and their 
struggle for identity within a misinformed public arena. 
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